The latest phase of the negotiations in Machakos, Kenya closed on 18 November 2002 with the signing of an important new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on power sharing and an extension of the earlier MOU on cessation of hostilities and unimpeded aid access. Significant progress was made during this phase.  The Khartoum government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) are slowly, painstakingly elaborating the structures of governance and wealth sharing arrangements through intense haggling – for example, what proportion of seats southerners will have in the legislative bodies and the oil revenues that will go to a Southern Reconstruction Fund.

Though the final protocol on power and wealth sharing that the mediators sought was in the end not signed, there was more movement toward a comprehensive peace agreement than the MOU reflected. Both parties wanted to retain manoeuvring room for making tradeoffs at a later stage and so held to some maximalist positions. They will continue to do so during the adjournment while trying to persuade their constituencies that they are battling extremists on the other side of the table, and wait until the negotiating endgame to explore bottom line compromises.

Major credit for achievements to date goes to the structure and the personnel of the process. The partnership between IGAD and the observer countries is solid and working. The chief mediator, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, is indispensable – an excellent negotiator with good instincts about the parties’ intentions and requirements.

There are still serious obstacles, however. The next phase, scheduled to begin in early January 2003, must make substantial progress on the remaining issues or the process may collapse under the pressures of hard-line constituencies and domestic politics on both sides. The government still has difficulty envisioning a real partnership with southern Sudanese, while the SPLA is moving further toward independence-oriented positions.  Both postures make a final agreement harder to reach.

Given the history of SPLA and government opposition to a provisional ceasefire and unimpeded aid access respectively, the extension of those commitments to 31 March 2003 was remarkable. Most importantly, it came at a time when Khartoum normally would be preparing to launch its annual dry season offensive.  Although there are elements in the capital who are sorely tempted to use the government’s new military hardware to try again to dislodge the SPLA from the Western Upper Nile oilfields, leaders on both sides appear to be giving peace a chance.

Nevertheless, the moment is not indefinite. The peace process is nearing the decisive point, and when the parties return to the table next month, it will be time for historic decisions, compromises, and political courage.

Nairobi/Brussels, 18 December 2002