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Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?
Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts
It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts
Report 145 / Africa

Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Sudan’s generation-long North-South civil war in 2005 is at risk in Southern Kordofan state, where many of the same ingredients exist that produced the vicious Darfur conflict.

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Executive Summary

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Sudan’s generation-long North-South civil war in 2005 is at risk in Southern Kordofan state, where many of the same ingredients exist that produced the vicious Darfur conflict. Both parties to that agreement, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), who together form the Government of National Unity in Khartoum, have been guilty of mistakes and misjudgements there as they manoeuvre for partisan advantage in advance of national elections scheduled for 2009. Any strategy for addressing the problems must recognise that time is short. Concrete progress on integration and reform is essential to address the prospect of what could be a devastating new conflict. Rapid interventions are needed, well before the national elections.

Southern Kordofan is a new state, created by the CPA, in the critical border area between North and South, a zone of ethnic interaction between Arab (mainly Misseriya and Hawazma) and indigenous African (mainly Nuba) tribes. Inadequate implementation of the CPA’s special protocol relating to the region has led to insecurity and growing dissatisfaction. Tribal reconciliation based on negotiation of a common agenda, establishment of an efficient state government administration and adherence to the CPA’s principles of power and wealth sharing have to be fostered from Khartoum and pushed forward by the international guarantors. There has been some limited recent progress, but much more is urgently needed.

The state’s inhabitants were mobilised by the opposing sides during the North/South war and despite the CPA remain deeply scarred by that conflict, polarised and fragmented along political and tribal lines. They are armed and organised and feel increasingly abandoned by their former patrons, who have not fulfilled their promises to provide peace dividends. Return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), development projects and creation of an integrated state government administration have all stalled. Hundreds of people have died in disputes over land and grazing rights, with no comprehensive or sustainable local or national response. Efforts by the NCP and SPLM to co-opt Arab and African tribes, respectively, prior to elections by politicising development policies are aggravating tensions.

Tribal and communal reconciliation to foster peaceful coexistence is a daunting but essential task. More is at stake than the prevention of a local conflict. The fate of peacebuilding in this front-line state will say much about the viability of Sudan’s entire peace process and in particular whether the CPA genuinely offers an effective framework for resolving the Darfur conflict and satisfying all those in the country who do not belong to core SPLM and NCP constituencies.

Moreover, if peacebuilding fails in the transitional areas of the 1956 North-South border, where the majority of the two armies’ troops are still concentrated, it is highly unlikely the secession option the CPA gives the South can be implemented peacefully. Though more than half the six-year transition period has already been lost, there is still time to implement key steps to calm the situation prior to national elections, which may have to be postponed to 2010. In addition to producing an integrated state administration, the NCP and the SPLM need to accelerate the integration of combatants within the Joint Integrated Units provided for by the CPA and otherwise pursue disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs, including for the many militias. They must also immediately release the accumulated 2 per cent share of oil revenue for Southern Kordofan so major development projects can be carried out, based on an inclusive consultative process involving tribal authorities.

The Nuba are bitter at their SPLM allies, believing they did not negotiate a better deal for them in the CPA because they prioritised getting Abyei territory and its oil and an independence referendum commitment for the South. But the special protocol provides for a public consultation to be held after the elections to consider revision of the peace agreement’s terms for the new state and address unresolved issues (for example, land ownership and use). Financial aid is needed for the organisation of inter-tribal dialogue aimed at fostering reconciliation and producing a common agenda for that consultation. Discussions should be held in particular on creation of a formal state mechanism dedicated to resolving tribal disputes over land use and livestock migration (transhumance) routes, such as the Southern Sudan Peace Commission created for the Southern states, and on identifying principles for the commission that is supposed to address the deep land grievances accumulated by the Nuba, in particular since the early 1970s.

The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and other members of the international community have vital roles to play in the stabilisation of the new state. UNMIS should not just observe and register violent incidents, but also follow the example of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) established in the Nuba Mountains after the 2002 ceasefire agreement and become an active partner in local conflict prevention, in cooperation with the tribal authorities. If its local leadership is incapable of this, it should be replaced. Simultaneously, the CPA’s international guarantors and Sudan’s bilateral partners should press the national unity government to pay more attention to peacebuilding in the state. It is not yet too late to show the front-line populations that a new war is not the way to address their grievances.

Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 21 October 2008

Op-Ed / Africa

It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts

Originally published in Daily Monitor

President Museveni will naturally defend Uganda’s short-term interests, but he should also work towards longer-term stability by supporting President Salva Kiir’s pledge to bring peace through ARCSS implementation, negotiations and national dialogue.

Uganda has a crucial role and interest in supporting South Sudan’s efforts to forge a more inclusive transitional government

Reducing South Sudan’s internal strife would not just benefit the South Sudanese but is also critical for Ugandan interests, including the security of its citizens and border, reducing refugee flows and the protection of its economic investments and trade.

President Museveni and other Ugandan leaders should encourage their South Sudanese counterparts to prioritise political rather than military solutions to ongoing conflicts; support national dialogue to increase the transitional government’s inclusivity; and encourage better relations between Juba and Khartoum over key bilateral issues.

Uganda is a long-time supporter of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), rooted in its decades-long struggle against the Sudanese government prior to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

When South Sudan’s civil war broke out in December 2013, Uganda sought to prevent the government falling to what it saw as rebels. Fearing that these rebel forces would ally with long-term regional rival Sudan, Ugandan forces intervened, securing Juba before retaking Bor alongside the SPLA.

Hostilities have driven more than 400,000 South Sudanese refugees into Uganda since July 2016

Uganda thus became a party to the conflict – although it was perhaps the only one that largely abided by the laws of war. Uganda paid a diplomatic price for becoming party to the conflict. Uganda was not asked to participate as a mediator in the peace talks led by the Horn of Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad), even though Museveni was actively involved in Igad Heads of State summits that oversaw the mediation process.

Uganda negotiated a withdrawal of its troops in October 2015 as part of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) that ended the war. The two-year military deployment was costly – both financially and politically. Active diplomatic engagement now can both prevent the need for another deployment and at the same time secure Ugandan interests in South Sudan.

Fighting in Juba in July 2016 and an insurgency in South Sudan’s Equatoria region on the Ugandan border has once again brought the country’s conflicts to Kampala’s attention. Hostilities have driven more than 400,000 South Sudanese refugees into Uganda since July 2016. This is far more than arrived during the 2013-15 civil war, when fighting was more intense in northern regions and Ethiopia and Sudan bore most of the humanitarian burden.

Rebel groups in the Equatorias have engaged in deliberate provocations against Ugandan civilians and targeted commercial vehicles from Uganda. Yet, Uganda’s response has been more restrained than in December 2013. It deployed a military convoy to rescue civilians during the July 2016 fighting in Juba and subsequently agreed to joint South Sudanese and Ugandan police deployments patrols along key roads to protect vehicle transport. 

President Museveni will naturally defend Uganda’s short-term interests, but he should also work towards longer-term stability by supporting President Salva Kiir’s pledge to bring peace through ARCSS implementation, negotiations and national dialogue.

In particular, President Museveni should use his influence on his South Sudanese counterpart and his experience of regional and international relations to shape a more sophisticated approach from Juba to resolving conflicts and bringing political opposition into the transitional government. President Museveni’s counsel to Kiir has helped smooth the way for the deployment of a regional force approved by the region and operating under the United Nations. Uganda should continue to work with the region to ensure that the force helps set security conditions that enable dialogue and an inclusive government.

Uganda should further deepen its recent rapprochement with Khartoum

Uganda should further deepen its recent rapprochement with Khartoum. Improved relations – noticeable since 2014 when both sides sought to tackle antagonism resulting from their long involvement in South Sudan’s conflicts – have already reduced regional tensions and, in doing so, allowed for more effective cooperation over South Sudan. 

This is facilitated by bilateral visits by both heads of state and broader diplomatic engagement. Uganda has also committed to end its support for Sudanese rebels and should push for Juba to make good its commitment to Khartoum that it will do the same.

President Museveni’s recent attempts to get Sudanese rebels to participate in the African Union-backed peace process has also been a positive move towards finding a lasting solution to Sudan’s enduring conflicts.

While Kampala cannot solve the internal political problems of South Sudan, it can, in conjunction with other Igad members, continue to reduce the danger of an escalation in regional tensions.

As a major regional actor with considerable experience in mediation and a close relationship with the South Sudan government, Uganda can leverage these advantages to help the country overcome its political crisis through national dialogue and negotiations rather than perpetual conflict.

This will also serve as the most effective method of protecting Uganda’s own long-term security and economic interests in its neighbour.