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A Course Correction for the Sahel Stabilisation Strategy
A Course Correction for the Sahel Stabilisation Strategy
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
  2. Introduction
  3. The Stabilisation Strategy under Pressure
    1. Defining the Approach
    2. An Evolving Challenge
    3. Mounting Popular Anger
    4. COVID-19
  4. Limitations of the Current Approach
    1. Security and Development Nexus
    2. Governance: Reform Trails Capacity Building
    3. The Pau Summit and its Aftermath
  5. Looking for an Alternative
    1. Western Concerns
    2. A Prospective AU Force
  6. Righting the Sahel Stabilisation Strategy
    1. Dialogue and Reform
    2. Military Efforts in Support of a New Political Approach
  7. Conclusion
  8. Appendix A: Violent Events in the Sahel (2005-2020)
French President Emmanuel Macron next to Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou and Chad's President Idriss Deby during a news conference as part of the G5 Sahel summit on the situation in the Sahel region in Pau, France, on 13 January 2020. REUTERS / Guillaume Horcajuelo
Report 299 / Africa

A Course Correction for the Sahel Stabilisation Strategy

Since 2013, when it sent troops to Mali, France has led international efforts to root out Islamist militancy from the Sahel. Yet the jihadist threat has grown. Paris and its partners should reorient their military-centred approach toward helping improve governance in the region.

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