The peace agreement signed in Ouagadougou by Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro on 4 March 2007 is a major turning point in resolving Côte d’Ivoire’s armed conflict but is only a first step in the right direction. It is now essential that all Ivorians who want long-term peace work together to ensure the transitional government effectively delivers identity documents to all citizens, collects all weapons still held by militias, embarks on comprehensive security sector reform and provides a credible election process. The international community stopped Côte d’Ivoire from descending into chaos for four years and must maintain its military, political and financial commitment. The peace process should not be driven by the ambitions of the men who signed the Ouagadougou Agreement alone but also by the goal of building lasting peace in Côte d’Ivoire, which is essential for stability throughout West Africa.

Hope was revived when Ivorians saw Soro, leader of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), appointed prime minister alongside President Gbagbo, whom he had tried to overthrow on 19 September 2002. Security Council Resolution 1721 (1 November 2006) had extended the transition by one year after presidential elections had been twice postponed. It reinforced the powers of then-Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny but it was predictable that it would meet the same fate as earlier resolutions. Determined to retain power, Gbagbo immediately made clear he would not respect it. He had a different plan: direct dialogue with the FN under the auspices of Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré – the rebels’ main backer. With the help of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Gbagbo renewed ties with his Burkinabe counterpart and was willing to put everything on the table, including making Soro head of government, so long as his presidential powers were guaranteed up to the elections.

Gbagbo recognised that the political stalemate could threaten his interests and took advantage of the widespread apathy. This in turn increased pressure on Soro and the other FN leaders to reach a settlement that would preserve their influence in a unified Côte d’Ivoire. The agreement they signed is more a deal between two sides looking for an escape route that protects their own interests than a compromise which guarantees lasting peace. It does not break with the political practices that led to war in the first place. The old political opposition dating back to the Houphouët-Boigny era appears weakened by this deal but still has an essential part to play in putting an end to the political crisis.

The Gbagbo-Soro partnership must pass the tests of nationwide identification of citizens, voter registration and army restructuring. The Ouagadougou Agreement’s major challenge will be to control tensions resulting from the contradictory strategies of these two men and their more extreme supporters. The role of Compaoré, the new mediator, is crucial. Many logistical and financial difficulties inherent in election preparations must also be overcome. International partners must help but not become accomplices in a botched national identification process, security sector reform or elections. For the latter, the post of UN High Representative for Elections must be retained to ensure credibility. Even if correctly implemented, the Ouagadougou Agreement will not in itself end the political crisis that has divided Ivorian society. Civil society organisations must also assume their responsibilities and not allow the country’s future to be hijacked again by a handful of power-greedy individuals.

Dakar/Brussels, 27 June 2007