Retour de Laurent Gbagbo en Côte d’Ivoire : une nouvelle occasion de réconciliation
Retour de Laurent Gbagbo en Côte d’Ivoire : une nouvelle occasion de réconciliation
Report / Africa 2 minutes

Côte d’Ivoire: Peace as an Option

For the first time in nearly four years, Ivorian political actors seem tempted by peace. International intervention, the exhaustion of a population overwhelmed by its leaders’ bad faith, and a good start by Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny have primed the country for presidential elections, meant to be held before 31 October 2006.

Executive Summary

For the first time in nearly four years, Ivorian political actors seem tempted by peace. International intervention, the exhaustion of a population overwhelmed by its leaders’ bad faith, and a good start by Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny have primed the country for presidential elections, meant to be held before 31 October 2006. However, progress is far from irreversible. Simultaneous steps must be taken to restore the government’s presence throughout the divided country; launch a process to identify who is an Ivorian citizen and so entitled to vote; start disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants; and dismantle militias. International efforts, frequently hampered by squabbles between France and South Africa, need better coordination.

None of what the Ivorians must do will be easy or cheap, and the history of the crisis cautions against too much optimism. The protagonists are engaging in trench warfare to get the upper hand in the electoral process, and there is little indication that any of them are actually prepared to risk their power and protection in an election they might lose. There remain plenty of reasons and opportunities for spoilers to sabotage the painstakingly resuscitated peace process. President Laurent Gbagbo and his FPI party (Front Populaire Ivoirien), the Forces Nouvelles (FN) former rebels who control the north of the country, and hard liners in other groupings all retain their capacity to resort again to violence.

The last few months have shown how volatile the situation remains. The violent outbreak of 16-19 January 2006 targeted the UN peacekeeping operation (ONUCI) for the first time, along with all other symbols of an international community accused of trying to “recolonise” the country. In the west, even humanitarian organisations independent of the UN were not spared. Those who planned the violence and those around President Gbagbo who welcomed and supported it sought to destroy, at the start of his term, any possibility that Bannycould exercise effectively the powers the Security Council conferred on him in Resolution 1633 of 21 October 2005. Similar events hobbled former Prime Minister Seydou Diarra’s government from the beginning in 2003, but Banny has recovered by combining dialogue and determination.

The results so far are largely symbolic but nevertheless significant. The government organised school exams, which had been delayed for two years in the North. Political dialogue resumed with the 28 February summit, which brought the four key figures of the conflict together with the prime minister. The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) began its work. Guillaume Soro, the FN chief, returned to Abidjan and to his work as a government minister. Political parties are preparing for an election many still doubt can be held on schedule. The belligerent forces restarted military dialogue, although it was suspended shortly thereafter.

The next several months are crucial. If the government can achieve concrete results in the parallel processes of identifying who has citizenship and DDR, the momentum toward peace and reunification may become harder to stop. Maintaining a working relationship with Gbagbo, who is likely to try to delay elections in order to prolong his stay in office, is important, but Banny’s personal qualities will not be sufficient to guarantee a positive outcome. The International Working Group (IWG), which includes the key states, international organisations and international financial institutions, has a chance to be proactive in discouraging those who still want the process to fail. It needs to resolve its internal power struggles and weigh in with strong financial and political support for the government.

Dakar/Brussels, 17 May 2006

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