لبنان واستراتيجيات البقاء المضللة
لبنان واستراتيجيات البقاء المضللة
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  1. Executive Summary
Time to Resolve the Lebanon-Israel Maritime Border Dispute
Time to Resolve the Lebanon-Israel Maritime Border Dispute

لبنان واستراتيجيات البقاء المضللة

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الملخص التنفيذي

يحافظ لبنان على وجوده رغم كل العوامل التي تهدّده في بيئة مضطربة، وذلك بفضل جهازه المناعي الاستثنائي. غير أن هذه القدرة على البقاء تحوّلت إلى ذريعة لعطالة وتراخي طبقته السياسية، وهو ما يمكن أن يؤدي في النهاية إلى انهيار البلد. جارته سورية، والمرتبطة به كما يرتبط توأمان سياميان، غارقة في الدماء، وتدفع إليه موجات مستمرة من اللاجئين عبر الحدود. حزب الله، الحزب السياسي الشيعي اللبناني والحركة المسلّحة، انجرّ إلى صراع طائفي إقليمي شرس ومكلف ويائس. داخلياً، أخفقت الأطراف اللبنانية المختلفة التي تخشى انهيار التوازن السياسي الهش في انتخاب رئيس للبلاد أو تمكين رئيس الوزراء من الحكم، وفضّلت الشلل على أي خيار تعتقد أن من شأنه إحداث تغيير عميق في الوضع الراهن. يفرز الصراع في سورية جميع أنواع المشاكل، القديمة منها والجديدة والتي، على المدى البعيد، ستحمل جميع الاحتمالات لزعزعة الاستقرار. رغم أن هذا الوضع يتطلب التصدّي له على نحو عاجل، فإن من غير الواقعي توقُّع اتخاذ تدابير جريئة. غير أنه يمكن للسياسيين بل ويجب عليهم أن يتّخذوا خطوات ملموسة من شأنها مجتمعة أن تخفّف من حدة التوترات بانتظار السنوات التي قد تستغرقها تسوية الصراع في سورية.

يستمر لبنان في "أداء وظائفه" في احتواء أزمة تتوالى فصولها ببطء، و إجراءات أمنية ينتج عنها استقطاب متزايد وترتيبات غير رسمية بين الخصوم السياسيين يتوقَّع منها التعويض عن غياب رئيس الجمهورية، وسلطة تنفيذية فعالة، وجهاز قضائي مستقل، ورؤية اقتصادية، وسياسة لمعالجة شؤون اللاجئين. في حين يستمر لبنان في الصمود أمام التهديدات والضغوط الخارجية، فإنه منغمس في هذا التحدّي المرهق إلى درجة يسمح فيها لنفسه بالتردّي والانحلال على نحو بطيء لكن أكيد.

ثمة عدد من العوامل التي تعمل لصالح لبنان؛ فقد توقف عن كونه حلبة رئيسية تجري عليها محاولات تغيير موازين القوى الإقليمية؛ حيث حلّ محلّه كل من سورية، والعراق، واليمن وليبيا (إضافة إلى فلسطين) في لعب ذلك الدور التعس. القوة العسكرية والتنظيمية الكبيرة التي يتمتع بها حزب الله منعت أي محاولة لتحدّيه. ولا تزال الذكريات المريرة للحرب الأهلية بين عامي 1975 و1990 تشكّل تحصيناً للدولة والمجتمع ضد الانخراط مرة أخرى في صراع داخلي جدّي.

إلاّ أن الديناميكيات التي يشهدها لبنان اليوم تشبه على نحو غريب تلك التي سبقت الحرب الأهلية؛ فقد عادت ثقافة الميليشيات، التي سادت في الماضي، والتي تبددت ظاهرياً مع استيعاب المجموعات المسلّحة جزئياً في أجهزة الدولة، عادت إلى الظهور. والفوارق الاجتماعية والاقتصادية القديمة باتت أكثر عمقاً. وتدفُّق أعداد كبيرة من اللاجئين السوريين يعيد إلى الأذهان الموجة السابقة من اللاجئين الفلسطينيين، الذين أدى رفضهم من قبل شرائح واسعة من المجتمع اللبناني، وما تلا ذلك من تسييس لقضيتهم، إلى تحوّل ما كان في البداية مبعث قلق إلى تهديد رئيسي للأمن. وقد انخرط حزب الله في دور إقليمي أدى إلى تعميق الانقسام الطائفي، وأضاف هذا الدور إلى مبرر وجوده كحركة مقاومة ضد إسرائيل، والذي تمتع على أساسه بدعم واسع. ويشهد الجيش اللبناني، المؤسسة العابرة للطوائف والتي تعتبر العمود الفقري لما تبقّى من الدولة، حالة استقطاب متزايد.

وثمة مصدر آخر للقلق يتمثل في الإرباك غير المسبوق الذي تشهده الطائفة السنيّة، إحدى الطوائف الثلاث الأساسية في البلاد، إلى جانب الشيعة والمسيحيين. يعكس خطاب قيادتها المفترَضة والمتمثلة في تيار المستقبل، الإحباطات المتنامية لقواعدها، بينما تخفق في مخاطبة هذه القواعد بشكل فعّال. نظراً لتراجع اهتمامها وانخراطها في مخاوف ومشاكل هذه القواعد، فإنها أفسحت المجال لتيارات متنافسة، بعضها متطرّف أو حتى عنيف، لتمثيل هذه الطائفة التائهة، والمنقسمة والغاضبة، والمصابة بالذهول من قوة عزيمة حزب الله، وتطور الموقف الأمريكي حيال إيران والعنف المستمر ضد السنّة على أيدي النظامين في سورية والعراق. بالمقابل، فإن تحوّل الطائفة التدريجي نحو مواقف أكثر راديكالية، الأمر الذي يثير مخاوف وجودية من الأصولية السنية لدى الجماعات الأخرى، يسهم بتنامي الدعم الذي يحظى به حزب الله وانخراطه في سورية، بصرف النظر عن كلفة ذلك الصراع المتصاعد. كما أن إحجام الجيش عن التصدّي للنشاط الشيعي العسكري، في الوقت الذي يقوم فيه بقمع مثيله السني، كونه يشكّل خطراً أكثر إلحاحاً، يسهم في تعميق الانقسام.

الطبقة السياسية، التي نمت وتغذّت على الصراعات لعدة عقود، عازمة على الاكتفاء باحتواء الأزمة، وتفضّل تحاشي حدوث مواجهة دموية تعرف تماماً أنه لا يمكن الانتصار فيها وأنها ستكون مكلفة للجميع، تفضّل ذلك الاحتواء على معالجة الأسباب الكامنة للأزمة. في حين أن الاتفاقيات المحلية غير الرسمية التي عقدتها تشكل بدائل مؤقتة فعالة، فإنها تساعد في المحافظة على الوضع الراهن وحسب، بينما تسهم في الوقت ذاته بتآكله تدريجياً. التوترات الاجتماعية والطائفية تتصاعد مع التراجع الكبير في جودة الخدمات العامة المقدمة للبنانيين العاديين، وتضاؤل فرص العمل وتحقيق الذات أمام أغلبية السكان واقتصار ذلك على قلّة تتضاءل باستمرار. وبدلاً من حثّ السياسيين على تمثيل مصالحه من خلال مؤسسات الدولة، فإن الشعب اللبناني، القلق والمنهك، خفّض سقف توقّعاته، ولجأ إلى الالتفاف على مؤسسات الدولة واتّباع استراتيجيات المحافظة على البقاء. تؤدي هذه الاستراتيجيات إلى تنشيط شبكات الزبائنية والمحسوبية والفساد وقواعد لعبة تضمن بقاء ورسوخ الطبقة السياسية وبشكل يبقيها بعيدة عن المساءلة ويؤدي إلى تلاشي ما تبقى من الدولة.

من المرجح أن سوء الإدارة، مصحوباً بالسياسات غير الديمقراطية وغير الدستورية، سيفاقم المشاكل إلى درجة يصبح فيها التغيير الجذري الوسيلة الوحيدة لمعالجة هذه المشاكل. من مصلحة الطبقة السياسية الانتهازية تأجيل تلك اللحظة؛ لكن المفارقة هي أن هذا يمكن أن يشكل أيضاً دافعاً يمكن تحويله لمصلحة البلاد، إذا سمح الوقت والظروف الإقليمية بذلك. في حين أن الاستمرار في التأجيل والمماطلة في إصلاح النظام السياسي يشكّل استراتيجية ذات أفق مسدود، فإن أي بديل شامل قد يكون أخطر في البيئة المتفجرة السائدة اليوم.

تشمل الخطوات الصغيرة لكن البناءة التي يمكن اتخاذها: إجراء الانتخابات البرلمانية والرئاسية التي طال إجراؤها كثيراً، دون انتظار تدخل خارجي لتحديد نتائجها، كما كان الحال تاريخياً أو كذريعة تستخدم للتأجيل؛ وتبنّي سياسة حيال اللاجئين السوريين تقلّص التهديدات الأمنية وتضمن احترام كرامتهم وحقوقهم؛ وتطبيق محاكمات قضائية عادلة إزاء السجناء الإسلاميين وغيرهم؛ وإخضاع عناصر الأمن للمساءلة عن الانتهاكات التي تتم ممارستها ضد السجناء، واللاجئين والمجموعات الضعيفة الأخرى. أضف إلى ذلك أن لبنان بلد لا يزال يوفر بيئة متسامحة حيال النشاط الشعبي؛ وبالتالي فإن المنظمات غير الربحية الناشطة في مجال الصالح العام  والإصلاح السياسي ينبغي أن تفعّل دورها لتعزيز الحوكمة والقيم الديمقراطية، بما في ذلك محاربة الفساد وتعزيز سيادة القانون.

إذا أخفقت الطبقة السياسية والآخرون الذين يمكنهم التأثير في مسار لبنان في اتخاذ مثل تلك الخطوات الأساسية والبديهية، فإن البلاد لن تنجح إلاّ في تجاوز الحالات الطارئة التي تواجهها في الوقت الحاضر على حساب رهنها لمستقبلها.

بيروت/بروكسل، 20 تموز/يوليو 2015

Executive Summary

Lebanon survives against all odds in a troubled environment thanks to a remarkable immune system, but that resilience has become an excuse for a dysfunctionality and laissez-faire attitude by its political class that could ultimately prove the country’s undoing. Its Syrian neighbour, conjoined as if a Siamese twin, is drowning in blood, pushing waves of refugees across the border. Hizbollah, the Lebanese Shiite political party and armed movement, has been drawn into an increasingly vicious, costly and desperate regional sectarian struggle. Internally, stakeholders, fearing collapse of a flimsy political equilibrium, have failed to elect a president or empower the prime minister, preferring paralysis to anything they believe might rock the boat. Syria’s conflict is bringing out all kinds of problems, old and new, which in the long term have every chance of proving destabilising. Despite the urgency, expecting bold measures is unrealistic, but politicians could and should take a small number of concrete steps that together would help reduce tensions while waiting the years it may take for the Syrian conflict to abate.

The country “functions” by containing a slowly unfolding crisis through increasingly polarising security measures and informal arrangements between political rivals. These must compensate for the absence of a president, an efficient executive, a parliament that actively upholds the constitution, an independent judiciary, an economic vision and a refugee policy. While still holding up to external threats and pressures, Lebanon is so absorbed by this strenuous challenge that it is allowing itself, slowly but surely, to decay.

A number of factors play to its advantage. It has ceased to be a primary arena where attempts to shift the regional balance of forces play out; Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya have replaced it (as well as Palestine) in that unhappy role. Massive military and organisational strength has discouraged or quelled any attempt to challenge Hizbollah. And the bitter memories of the 1975-1990 civil war continue to inoculate polity and society against a recurrence of serious domestic strife.

That said, today’s dynamics bear an uncanny similarity to those that preceded the civil war. The militia culture of old, which on the face of it dissipated as armed groups were partially absorbed into the state, is resurgent. Longstanding socio-economic disparities are deepening. A large Syrian refugee influx evokes the earlier wave of Palestinian refugees, whose rejection by wide segments of society and subsequent politicisation gradually turned what started as a concern into a major security threat. Hizbollah has added a highly divisive sectarian regional role to its original raison d’être as a resistance movement against Israel, for which it used to enjoy wide support. The army, a cross-sectarian institution considered the backbone of what remains of the state, is increasingly polarising.

A new concern is the unprecedented disarray among Sunnis, one of the country’s three dominant communities along with Shiites and Christians. Their presumptive leadership, the Future Current party, echoes the growing frustrations of its base while failing to address them effectively; aloof and disinvested, it has opened space for competing claims, some radical or even violent, to represent this disoriented, fragmented and angry community, bewildered by Hizbollah’s assertiveness, the evolving U.S. attitude toward Iran and the relentless violence used against Sunnis by the regimes in Syria and Iraq. In turn, its gradual radicalisation, by stirring existential fears of Sunni fundamentalism among other groups, is contributing to growing Shiite support for Hizbollah and its involvement in Syria, regardless of the cost of that escalating conflict. The army’s reluctance to challenge Shiite militancy while suppressing its more immediately threatening Sunni counterpart is deepening the divide.

The political class, which has emerged from and lived off conflict for several decades, is intent on limiting itself to containing crisis, preferring to avoid a bloody showdown it knows would be unwinnable and costly to all over attempting to address its underlying causes. While the informal domestic agreements it has struck are relatively effective stopgaps, they merely help preserve the status quo, while enabling its gradual erosion. Social and sectarian tensions are rising, as the quality of public services declines dramatically for ordinary Lebanese, and opportunities for jobs and personal fulfilment are available for a decreasing few. Instead of exhorting its politicians to represent their interests via established institutions, a weary population has lowered its expectations, circumventing the state apparatus and resorting to survival strategies. These further invigorate informal networks, relationships based on patronage and corruption and rules of the game that ensure the political class remains entrenched, unaccountable and detrimental to what is left of the state.

Poor governance, along with undemocratic, unconstitutional politics, is likely to make the problems fester to the point at which radical change will be the only means to tackle them. A cynical political class has a vested interest in putting off that moment, but, paradoxically, this is also a motivation that can be turned to the country’s advantage, as long as time and regional circumstances permit. While continuing to dither is a dead-end strategy for fixing the political system, any extensive alternative would be far worse in today’s dangerous environment.

The kinds of small but constructive steps that are feasible, however, include holding long-overdue parliamentary and presidential elections without waiting for an outside intervention to determine their outcomes, as has historically been the case and the excuse for postponement; adopting a policy toward Syrian refugees that both minimises security threats and ensures respect of their dignity and rights; implementing a fair judicial process for Islamist and other prisoners; and holding security personnel accountable for abuses against prisoners, refugees and other vulnerable groups. Moreover, Lebanon is a country where popular activism is still tolerated; its non-profit organisations involved in promoting common good and public reforms must do more to enhance governance and democratic values, to include fighting corruption and promoting rule of law.

If the political class and others who can influence Lebanon’s course fail to take such basic, self-evident steps, the country will succeed in little more than surviving present-day contingencies by mortgaging its future.

Beirut/Brussels, 20 July 2015

Demonstrators carry a banner and flags during a protest against Israeli gas extraction that Lebanon says falls in disputed waters near the Lebanese-Israeli border, southern Lebanon, June 11, 2022. The banner reads " The Line 29 is a red line". REUTERS/Aziz Taher

Time to Resolve the Lebanon-Israel Maritime Border Dispute

Domestic politics in Israel and Lebanon could scuttle talks about their claims in the Mediterranean – and to the gas riches underneath. With the U.S. mediator’s help, the two countries should refocus on achieving an accord that serves their mutual interest and spares them a confrontation.

U.S.-mediated maritime border talks between Lebanon and Israel have entered a perilous new phase. The parties have been engaged for over a decade in indirect negotiations over the ownership of natural gas fields discovered, or presumed to exist, in disputed offshore territory. Israel is reportedly on schedule to start extracting gas from the area as early as September. These plans have prompted Hizbollah – the powerful Lebanese Shiite militia and party – to threaten attacks if Israel proceeds without first resolving the territorial dispute. While the two neighbours are reportedly closer than ever to an accord, political crises in both may delay the agreement or make reaching it impossible. Washington has invested significant political capital in fostering a compromise, and it should intensify its efforts to help the two negotiating teams clear the remaining hurdles. Israeli and Lebanese leaders, for their part, should keep their sights trained on concluding an agreement that carries clear mutual benefit, while avoiding a conflict with dangerous consequences for both countries.

Lebanon and Israel have conducted indirect negotiations over demarcating their maritime border since the two sides became aware more than a decade ago that lucrative gas deposits may lie off their shores. Originally in dispute were 860 sq km of waters between the southern boundary of the Lebanese claim (known as “line 23”), which it formally asserted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the boundary Israel sought to draw to the north (known as “line 1”). In 2012, U.S. mediator Frederic Hof proposed a compromise that would have split up the area at a ratio of 55 per cent for Lebanon and 45 per cent for Israel. But – without offering clear reasons – the Lebanese government failed to approve the proposal and the negotiations lapsed. When indirect talks resumed in late 2020, the Lebanese delegation presented new legal and hydrographical studies to support an expanded claim (bounded by what is known as “line 29”) encompassing an additional 1,430 sq km south of line 23; it did not, however, formalise the expanded claim by amending its prior UNCLOS filing, which remains pegged to line 23.

Lebanon’s subsequent insistence on staking its claim based on line 29 has brought previously undisputed gas reserves into play, setting the stage for the recent escalation of tensions. Under Lebanon’s original line 23 claim, the Karish field – the one from which Israel is preparing to extract gas as soon as September – lay far to the south in Israeli waters. By contrast, the new Lebanese claim would put the northern half of Karish in Lebanese maritime territory, turning the field into a source of contention. Predictably, Israel has rejected the new Lebanese position, and the parties have struggled unsuccessfully to narrow the gap between them – engaging first through five rounds of indirect talks at the UN base in Naqoura, a small city in southern Lebanon, and then via shuttle diplomacy conducted by U.S. mediator Amos Hochstein. Meanwhile, on the Israeli side, preparations have continued for Karish’s development, which is expected to add around 1.41 trillion cubic feet of gas to Israel’s proven reserves. The expected quantity of gas available at Karish falls well below the estimated size of the Leviathan and Tamar fields, which Israel is already exploiting, suggesting that Karish is not integral to Israeli energy security at present.

In June, Israel signalled that it could begin extraction at Karish in a matter of months. On 5 June, the London-listed company Energean – which Israel has enlisted to develop Karish on its behalf – deployed a floating production, storage and offloading facility to the field. Israeli officials point out that the company began its work at a spot clearly south of line 29, and also note that Lebanon has never amended its UNCLOS filing to bring its claim to that line. Thus, Israel argues, Lebanon has not formally claimed the area where Energean is working.

Hizbollah ... has vowed to defend the country’s maritime claims.

These arguments have triggered a harsh response in Lebanon – particularly on the part of Hizbollah, which has vowed to defend the country’s maritime claims. In several speeches, the party’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, maintained that the Karish field is disputed. He threatened to attack the offshore gas infrastructure if Israel began extracting gas before the two countries agreed on a border. On 2 July, Hizbollah’s military wing, the Islamic Resistance, deployed unarmed reconnaissance drones toward Karish, which the Israeli air force intercepted. Two days later, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati publicly denounced interference in the negotiations by non-state actors, saying it exposed Lebanon to “unnecessary risks”. Undeterred, Nasrallah spoke of military action if the dispute was not settled by September. On 31 July, Hizbollah released a video displaying its capacity to attack gas infrastructure. The same day, the group published footage of black-clad fighters patrolling unarmed near the Israeli-Lebanese border.

With Hizbollah putting its credibility on the line, and Israel doubtless reluctant to back down in the face of threats from a group that it characterises as a terrorist organisation, the risk of some form of escalation is significant. While Nasrallah expressed hope that the dispute can be resolved without a fight, Hizbollah’s brinkmanship – in marked contrast to the more cautious approach to Israel the group has taken in recent years – suggests that the organisation is prepared to take greater risks this time. Even a limited military confrontation could spin out of control, due either to miscalculation about the other side’s red lines or to operational error – such as a missile or drone attack aiming to inflict only material damage but causing casualties instead.

That said, there are grounds for hope that a confrontation can be averted. Despite the threat of conflict, or perhaps because of it, the two sides now appear closer to a deal than ever. During U.S. mediator Hochstein’s last visit to Beirut on 31 July, Lebanon reportedly proposed a compromise that moves its claim back from line 29 to line 23, on the condition that Israel cedes an additional 80 sq km south of line 23. This extra pocket of maritime territory would put the Qana prospect – a gas deposit of unproven potential to the north east of Karish – entirely within Lebanese waters. In practical terms, the suggested compromise treats Lebanon’s claim to line 29 as a bargaining gambit to secure its claim up to line 23, along with the entire Qana prospect.

Israel is reportedly ready to accommodate this proposal, which would entail giving up on the nearly 400 sq km north of line 23 it was supposed to receive under the 2012 Hof proposal, as well as Qana. It is possible that Israel may ask for a share of future proceeds from Qana should gas exploitation prove viable, or for territorial compensation north of line 23, which would mean an S-shaped rather than a straight demarcation line. While Israel’s official response to the Lebanese proposal remains unknown at this stage, a territorial swap would appear to be a more straightforward solution than a profit-sharing arrangement, given the antagonism between the two countries.

Israeli officials also told Crisis Group that they would welcome ... resolving disputes through negotiation, rather than violence.

Israel has good reason to make such substantial concessions. The energy crisis in Europe, triggered by the war in Ukraine, provides a window of opportunity to expand gas exports. But if that is the goal, securing stable access to the offshore reserves is imperative – and that will require an accommodation with Hizbollah and Beirut. While Israel may be confident that it can defeat Hizbollah in a military confrontation, private corporations are unlikely to undertake investments and expose staff and multi-million-dollar equipment if they risk being caught in the crossfire. Israeli officials also told Crisis Group that they would welcome the precedent a deal would set for the two countries resolving disputes through negotiation, rather than violence.

For Lebanon, wrapping up the negotiations swiftly would also be a win, not least because it would receive a far larger share of the disputed maritime area than appeared possible even a few months ago. A comprehensive solution to the demarcation issue would also clear the way for exploration in Lebanon’s promising southern waters. Until now, the international consortium commissioned to explore the area, led by French energy giant Total, has made clear that operations cannot proceed before the parties resolve their dispute. As for Hizbollah, despite its bellicose posture, it has never committed to defending any specific line, and has repeatedly stressed that the Lebanese government alone is responsible for reaching a settlement; that said, Hizbollah would likely take credit for helping Lebanon achieve a favourable outcome if a deal is struck.

Yet despite an accord being within reach and to clear mutual benefit, the process may still falter in the final stages because of dysfunctional domestic politics on both sides. Lebanon’s politicians have been unable to form a new government since the country’s elections on 15 May. Leaders are increasingly preoccupied with the debate over the succession of President Michel Aoun, whose term expires on 31 October, and the spectre of an open-ended constitutional crisis if no compromise on his replacement can be found. This matter has reduced Beirut’s bandwidth for the border negotiations, and indeed for major political decisions of any kind. There is also a risk of last-minute sabotage by leading Lebanese politicians, who have long competed with one another to claim personal credit for a successful outcome in the maritime talks. In Israel, the ruling coalition’s collapse has left a caretaker cabinet in charge that likewise finds it difficult to make big decisions. With elections approaching in November, hardliners may exploit any border compromise for political attacks.

It would be a missed opportunity for both sides, and a blow to regional stability, if an otherwise achievable agreement were to fall through for any of these reasons. After more than a decade and many false starts, the maritime border negotiations are tantalisingly close to a viable solution. As the parties move toward a deal, outside actors that have influence with key players in each system should urge them forward over the finish line. The U.S., whose shuttle diplomacy has contributed significantly to the process, should in particular redouble its efforts to get the deal done. It may need to hold more regular meetings with, and lean on, the two countries’ negotiators to get them to recognise the matter’s urgency. Washington should also encourage Lebanese interlocutors to dissuade Hizbollah from hardening its confrontational stance and Israel to hold off on gas extraction while the deal is hammered out – even as it works to maintain the talks’ momentum and keep them from being held hostage to political developments in either country.

Ultimately, it will fall to Israeli and Lebanese political leaders to make the deal happen. Their task may be difficult amid jockeying for electoral and partisan advantage. The prize, however, is well worth the trouble. The parties have the chance to make an agreement that is good for both countries, sets an important precedent for greater bilateral comity and averts the prospect of dangerous escalation. They should seize it.

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