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North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea
North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
DNI Clapper’s Rescue Mission to the DPRK
DNI Clapper’s Rescue Mission to the DPRK
Report 198 / Asia

North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea

The sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and artillery attack against a South Korean island highlight that stability on the peninsula is threatened by more than the nuclear issue. A resumption of talks to address maritime delimitation and confidence-building measures – within the context of recalibrated deterrence – are needed to avoid further deterioration towards conflict.

Executive Summary

The Yellow Sea off the Korean peninsula has become a potential flashpoint for a wider conflict. An escalating series of confrontations by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has seen the sinking of a Republic of Korea (ROK) naval vessel and the shelling of civilian settlements on an island near the boundary. The disputed nature of this maritime boundary, known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL), as well as the volatility of DPRK politics has created a serious risk that any further provocation might turn into a wider conflict. While international attention is once again focused on the North’s nuclear program, there is an urgent need to implement measures that could reduce the possibility of a clash in the Yellow Sea becoming something worse.

The Northern Limit Line, drawn up after the Armistice of 1953, has never been recognised by the DPRK. The boundary, which is not considered an international maritime boundary because both Koreas regard this dispute as domestic, crosses an area of fishing grounds that are important to the ailing Northern economy and are close to busy Southern ports. The disputed aspect of the line, the economic importance of the area, the ambiguities of the rules of engagement and the long history of violent confrontations have made it a flashpoint for conflict.

The sinking in March 2010 of the ROK vessel Ch’ŏnan and the shelling in November of Yŏnp’yŏng Island are the most recent and deadly of the confrontations in this area. Relations are at their worst point in more than a decade with much of the progress of recent years undone. The South has found itself hamstrung, unable to respond to North Korea with any force for fear of precipitating a wider confrontation. Impatience is growing and there are demands from the right in Seoul for more robust terms of military engagement in the event of future clashes.

The DPRK appears to have heightened tensions as part of a transition in power from Kim Jong-il, the sickly 68-year-old leader, to his 28-year-old son Kim Jŏng-ŭn. While almost nothing is transparent in this hereditary dictatorship, it appears that the attacks are an effort to give the inexperienced heir some appearance of military and strategic prowess. They also signal to potential rivals among North Korean elites that Kim Jong-il is willing to take on the South to promote his son and he would therefore have no problem confronting domestic opponents.

Pyongyang politics aside, the disputed boundary represents a grave risk. Negotiations on common exploitation of marine resources, particularly the crab that is fished in the area, have come to nothing and there has been little progress on various confidence building measures that could help prevent future crises, for example: the use of common radio frequencies, or better signalling of intent by vessels and a naval hotline. While in past talks the North has been willing to discuss economic cooperation, it has done little to address security issues.

The response to the attack against the Ch’ŏnan culminated in the U.S. and South Korea organising combined and joint military exercises in the area, with a U.S. aircraft carrier participating for emphasis. Military exercises and clear signalling to Pyongyang that it cannot attack its neighbours with impunity are necessary to restore deterrence and prevent escalation on the Korean peninsula. North Korea would lose an all-out war against South Korea and its ally the United States, but Seoul is constrained in retaliating forcefully because it has so much to lose. Even talk of using force rattles markets and impacts the South Korean leadership, which must take into account the mood of its electorate. Pyongyang, isolated from global markets and domestic political forces, does not face such constraints. Rather the disparity permits it to provoke the South at very little cost even while falling behind in the overall balance of conventional forces.

The Ch’ŏnan sinking and Yŏnp’yŏng Island attack are two extraordinary examples of deterrence failure where the North has exploited weaknesses in Seoul’s defence posture. In the ongoing period of succession in Pyongyang, and Seoul’s adjustment of its defence posture and rules of engagement, there is a real danger that the North will continue its asymmetric attacks in the Yellow Sea or elsewhere in the South. As the sinking of the Ch’ŏnan showed, the North is able to carry out stealthy attacks using mini-submarines and torpedoes, but it has other lethal asymmetric capabilities as well.

While the restoration of robust deterrence is the most urgent task, it alone is not sufficient to prevent conflict. Recalibrating the South’s deterrent posture will require revised rules of engagement and close alliance cooperation with the U.S. While Crisis Group recommends both Koreas cease live fire artillery drills in the area near the NLL, this does not suggest Seoul should abandon its right to self-defence and the use of retaliatory force against any attacks. Retaliation can be delivered with other weapons systems, such as ground-based precision-guided munitions or air strikes from ROK fighters. Live fire artillery drills on the five islands are not necessary for their defence, and the North is much more likely to be deterred by other weapons systems and revised rules of engagement that enable their use.

In addition to deterrence, the DPRK’s interlocutors must prioritise the potential flashpoint that is the NLL because of its critical security implications for the region. The two Koreas have failed to establish an equitable maritime boundary and should submit the issue for arbitration through the International Court of Justice or a tribunal possibly under the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

China was initially very reluctant to pressure North Korea because it believes clashes in the Yellow Sea are a natural consequence of the unsettled inter-Korean maritime boundary and did not in themselves constitute a serious regional security threat. Of greater concern to Beijing has been a stepped-up U.S. military presence in the region and large-scale U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan military exercises. But China’s assessment of conflict risks evolved following the live fire drills at Yŏnp’yŏng Island on 20 December, driving its shift from a very muted and cautious approach to making more bilateral and multilateral efforts to push all sides to address the issue, aside from at the Security Council where it blocked action. Given the choice between war or a heightened U.S. military presence, Beijing has made the pragmatic decision to go along with the latter in the short term. China’s approach to clashes in the disputed areas of the Yellow Sea will be a test of its willingness, capacity and credibility in addressing regional conflict risks.

Likewise, Washington should make it clear to Seoul that the NLL is not a maritime boundary, and that the two parties must seek a peaceful resolution of this dispute in accordance with international law. Furthermore, the U.S. must clarify its intention to fulfil its alliance commitments and emphasise that attacks will not be tolerated. At the same time, Washington and Seoul must be prepared to engage Pyongyang and return to the Six-Party Talks to implement all commitments to denuclearise the Korean peninsula and establish a regional peace regime.

Seoul/Brussels, 23 December 2010

Commentary / Asia

DNI Clapper’s Rescue Mission to the DPRK

On 8 November 2014, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea released U.S. citizens Kenneth Bae and Matthew Miller into the custody of James Clapper, the director of national intelligence (DNI), for a return flight to the United States. Bae had been detained for two years after being convicted by a DPRK court for committing “hostile acts against the DPRK”. Bae, a Christian missionary, was suspected of having proselytised against the regime, calling for a “religious coup d’état”. Miller was arrested in April 2014 and convicted in September 2014, also for committing “hostile acts against the DPRK”. Miller reportedly tore up his tourist visa upon arrival at Pyongyang’s Sunan International Airport and asked for political asylum.

Some people expressed surprise at the sudden release of Bae and Miller. But Jeffrey Fowle, another detained American citizen, was released in late October. Fowle had been arrested for allegedly leaving a Bible in the toilet at the Ch’ŏngjin Seamen’s Club, a restaurant and bar for foreign sailors (and North Koreans with cash). Clearly, the detention of the Americans no longer served the purposes of the regime, but Pyongyang apparently requested a visit by a high-level U.S. government official before agreeing to their release. The Obama administration would have been sensitive about sending a high-level official because of possible criticism at home and because Pyongyang could manipulate the visit for propaganda purposes. The administration pointed out that DNI James Clapper was selected for the mission to emphasise that the visit was not to include broader diplomatic discussions.

Some analysts have speculated that Pyongyang decided to release the Americans because the regime is worried about international criticism of the DPRK’s human rights record. The UN General Assembly is preparing to vote on a draft resolution that could include a recommendation for the referral of senior DPRK officials to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The DPRK’s economic dependence on China could also help explain Pyongyang’s recent international outreach and so-called “charm offensive”.

While the DPRK certainly is motivated to deflect international criticism of its sorry human rights record and to diversify its international partners, the impact of Clapper’s visit on the DPRK’s internal affairs should also not be overlooked. The Obama administration was very careful to consider the impact of a high-level visit on perceptions and audience costs within the Washington Beltway. But was the administration as prudent regarding the way Clapper’s visit would be portrayed in Pyongyang?

Washington is right to be concerned about the manipulation of visits by high-level officials. The Korean Workers Party and state media are very adept at stage-managing visits and controlling media reports to ensure that visitors are perceived to be “paying their respects to the peerlessly great men of the Kim ruling family”. In addition, high-level visits can be portrayed as Washington’s recognition of the DPRK as a “nuclear state”, which is a regime priority. To counter this, the Obama administration has been clear it will not engage diplomatically with the DPRK until it is confident that Pyongyang will return to the Six-Party Talks and bargain in good faith to fulfill its previous denuclearisation commitments.

Many analysts have pointed out that the DPRK leadership is hyper-rational and only acts out of self-interest. The Obama administration has said there is no quid pro quo, and that Obama’s personal letter delivered by Clapper to Kim Jong-un “did not contain an apology in any way, shape or form”. But what was the price for sending Clapper? Certainly Pyongyang must have believed it got something out of the deal.

If past behaviour is a guide, the DPRK sought a written apology or admission of wrongdoing. (The most famous case is the capture of the USS Pueblo in January 1968. Negotiations dragged on for almost a year before the crew was released.) The contents of Obama’s letter are unknown; however, even if the president did not “admit, assure, and apologise” for the crimes of Bae and Miller, the regime can cite Clapper’s visit as an admission that Bae and Miller were spies.

That the DPRK has been reaching out to the international community does not mean it is becoming more liberal. The benefits of economic opening, trade, foreign direct investment, and technology transfers should be obvious even to the most conservative hardliners in Pyongyang. However, the Kim family regime has been nervous about subversive ideas entering North Korea from abroad. So the DPRK leadership faces a dilemma. Opening up is necessary for economic prosperity and successful implementation of the pyŏngjin line—the DPRK’s strategy to develop the economy and nuclear technologies simultaneously. However, opening up also raises the risk of social and political instability.

Since Kim Jong-un has been consolidating his power, the regime has increased internal security in the form of increased surveillance against threats from “enemies who wish to topple the DPRK”. Under these conditions, internal security institutions have a strong incentive to provide “more security”, which can be quantified by the number of people arrested, imprisoned, and executed.

We may never know how the DPRK government will depict Clapper’s visit in its internal communications, but if the regime is consistent with past practice, it will describe Clapper as having gone to Pyongyang to “admit, assure, and apologise” for the “crimes against the DPRK”. From Pyongyang’s perspective, Clapper’s mission “proves that Bae and Miller are guilty as charged” and the DNI went to pick up agents who were conducting espionage on behalf of U.S. intelligence agencies.

The Obama administration claims it selected Clapper for the mission, but could Pyongyang have insisted on Clapper? If the DPRK insisted on the DNI and no one else, then sending Clapper to release the Americans probably is worth the cost of Pyongyang’s internal propaganda victory. However, considering the potentially increased risk that future American tourists could be charged with espionage, sending someone outside of the U.S. intelligence community might have been more appropriate assuming Pyongyang did not make Clapper’s presence a condition of the release of the two Americans.