A Revival of the Six-Party Talks? Four Steps the DPRK Can Take to Resuscitate Diplomacy
A Revival of the Six-Party Talks? Four Steps the DPRK Can Take to Resuscitate Diplomacy
North Korea Plots a Course of “Heavy Agony” for 2022
North Korea Plots a Course of “Heavy Agony” for 2022
Commentary / Asia

A Revival of the Six-Party Talks? Four Steps the DPRK Can Take to Resuscitate Diplomacy

North and South Korean diplomats held informal talks during the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting last week in Indonesia and declared they would work together to “re-start the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible.” Wi Sung-lac (Wi Sŏng-nak), the ROK representative to the talks, and his DPRK counterpart Ri Yong-ho (Yi Yong-ho) described their meeting on 22 July as “frank, serious and constructive” and both reaffirmed their commitments to implement the September 2005 Joint Declaration to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.  ROK Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan (Kim Sŏng-hwan) and DPRK Foreign Minister Park Ui-chun (Pak Ŭi-ch’un) also met briefly the following day.

After the North-South meetings in Bali, media reported that DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan will visit New York around 28 July. If Kim visits the U.S., the first two-steps of China’s long-standing three-step proposal to recommence the Six-Party Talks nominally will have been completed. Beijing’s proposal has been on the table since 2009 and includes a North-South bilateral meeting, a U.S.-DPRK bilateral meeting, and a preparatory Six-Party meeting before a full plenary. However, a few significant obstacles remain.

Real progress in North Korean denucleariSation will require an improvement in inter-Korean relations. While Seoul no longer insists that Pyongyang take responsibility and apologize for the 2010 attacks against the ROKS Ch’ŏnan and Yŏnp’yŏng Island before going back to the Six-Party Talks, the Ministry of Unification reiterated on 25 July that an apology must precede inter-Korean reconciliation. Foreign Minister Kim on 25 July said Washington consulted with Seoul before deciding to issue a visa to Kim Kye-gwan, and although a bilateral U.S.-DPRK meeting is a necessary step to re-start the Six-Party Talks, the minister said it is not sufficient. Kim said the DPRK will have to take actions such as freezing its current nuclear activities and accepting IAEA inspectors before talks can resume.

While the DPRK government has said on numerous occasions it will return to the talks “without preconditions,” Seoul has insisted that the North show “sincerity” and the Obama administration has maintained that Pyongyang must “bargain in good faith” to implement the September 2005 Statement of Principles. In sum, Washington and Seoul have been waiting for DPRK actions, not just words, before returning to the bargaining table.

If the DPRK is serious about returning to the Six-Party Talks, there are four steps it could take to make it politically acceptable for Washington and Seoul to return to the talks. First, Pyongyang could inform the UN of its intention to comply with its obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540, which is binding on all member states and requires them to prevent the transfer of WMD to non-state actors. Resolution 1540 was adopted in 2004, and although the DPRK has not renounced it, Pyongyang simply has ignored it. The committee is prepared to assist the DPRK come into compliance, and since the DPRK asserts it is a “responsible nuclear state,” this step is long overdue.

Second, Pyongyang could announce a unilateral freeze of all nuclear facilities pending a safety review. Nuclear regulatory agencies are reviewing nuclear safety around the world following Japan’s nuclear disaster in March, and North Korean nuclear scientists and engineers probably have been reviewing their safety standards anyway, poor as they might be. A freeze can be lifted at any time, and the nuclear accident at Fukushima gives Pyongyang a face-saving pretext to halt its nuclear activities.

Although North Korea is not operating a nuclear reactor now, the uranium enrichment plant in Yŏngbyŏng disclosed last November could produce fissile material for a nuclear bomb.  North Korea has invited IAEA inspectors to the site, but this arguably would contravene the IAEA mission of “verifying through its inspection system that States comply with their commitments, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other non-proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes.”[fn] “The IAEA Mission Statement”Hide Footnote

The DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 2003, and has violated the safeguards agreement it ratified in 1992. Therefore, Pyongyang’s third step could be a proposal for an alternative monitoring arrangement with American, Chinese and Russian inspectors to verify the freeze in the spirit of “nuclear safety.” The freeze could then be extended and remain in place once the Six-Party Talks reconvene. China, Russia and the U.S. are nuclear weapons states and eventually could form a trilateral group to dismantle DPRK nuclear weapons—if Pyongyang disarms. Furthermore, a trilateral inspection team, although difficult to coordinate, would make Beijing a stakeholder in this process. China could no longer deny the existence of Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program, and if the DPRK were to renege on its denuclearization commitments and restart its uranium enrichment activities, Pyongyang would have to expel Chinese, Russian and American inspectors.

The fourth step could be renewed inter-Korean talks to transfer North Korea’s 12,000 fresh fuel rods out of the country as soon as possible. These fuels rods can yield up to about eight bombs worth of plutonium, but North Korea does not have a reactor to irradiate the fuel rods. The rods were fabricated for the T’aech’ŏn reactor that was under construction when the Agreed Framework was struck in 1994, but the reactor is in such disrepair that it would take years for North Korea to build a new reactor, irradiate the fuel rods and extract the plutonium from the spent fuel. The South had offered to buy the fuel rods and convert them for use in South Korean power reactors before the Six-Party Talks collapsed, and cash-strapped Pyongyang could use the money as it ramps up to celebrate next year’s arrival as a “strong and prosperous country.”

These steps are not costly for North Korea and easily could be reversed. However, they would be viewed as positive measures and as signs that Pyongyang is prepared to bargain in good faith and fulfill its denuclearization commitments. The inter-Korean talks in Indonesia are a positive step, and hopefully Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan will deliver more positive news in New York.

Workers plant rice at the Chongsan Cooperative Farm in the Kangso district of Nampho City on 12 May 2020. KIM Won Jin / AFP
Q&A / Asia

North Korea Plots a Course of “Heavy Agony” for 2022

The latest five-day plenum of North Korea’s ruling party focused on food insecurity, chief among the nation’s challenges. With the pandemic not yet tamed and other uncertainty on the international scene, Pyongyang may continue refraining from major provocations into 2022, but for how long is unclear.

North Korea has just completed its annual review of its own performance at the fourth plenum of the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party, held from 27-31 December 2021. What can we learn from this exercise about the state of the country?

Under Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang politics tick along on a system of five-year “congresses”, the most recent of which was held in January 2021 (and should run to 2026). These five-year cycles are then punctuated by fairly regular plenums, including the one that ended on 31 December. What we got in a lengthy article on 1 January was a report on that plenum, which amounts to a kind of annual review of the party’s performance, and an indicator of the challenges it has identified for the year ahead.

What happened this time is a little different from the usual modus operandi. Under previous chiefs and in Kim Jong-un’s pre-pandemic era, the North Korean leader would deliver a new year’s address either on television or via an editorial in state-run newspapers, and these would mark a waypoint in the country’s politics. In 2022, all we got was a report on Kim Jong-un’s contribution to the plenum; it was a comma compared to the full stops of years past.

The report gave little hope for immediate improvement ... as Kim [Jong-un] mentioned a ‘heavy yet responsible agony’ for the period to come.

It’s difficult to interpret exactly what this means and what new, if anything, has been decided by the five-day plenum. For one thing, the full text of Kim’s speech was not published, and for another, the signals it gave were rather mixed. There was abundant rhetoric about successes and breakthroughs as usual, but all suffused with a sense of insufficiency. Of one thing we can be relatively certain: 2021 was another tough year, in particular due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact. Perhaps not quite as tough as 2020, when the coronavirus first triggered fear, border closings and a steep economic downturn, but still very challenging. The report gave little hope for immediate improvement, either, as Kim mentioned a “heavy yet responsible agony” for the period to come.

From what was revealed, it appears the party hasn’t been able to make much progress toward the goals of the five-year economic plan outlined in January 2021. Although it is impossible to conclusively verify from the outside what is happening on the ground, the lack of progress must be clearly visible to the citizenry, many of whom will have seen no sign of promised improvements to “food, clothing, and housing” in a year during which COVID-19 containment measures have suffocated economic activity. But, as discussed below, it’s hard to tell exactly how much the country is suffering or, indeed, upon whom the burden is mainly falling.

Given the concern expressed in the plenum report about farming, we can assume a degree of difficulty for many North Koreans in getting food – either because it is in short supply or because market prices are out of reach for people who have seen their incomes fall. Kim delivered a long speech on what he called “our-style socialist rural development”, or in other words, what needs to be done to improve the agricultural system and bring North Korea closer to meeting the population’s food requirements. As always, the reported speech included a large measure of ideological conditioning of farmers and no shortage of exhortations for agricultural labourers to work harder. But it also touched upon agricultural modernisation and policies to remedy the worst effects of climate change, notably on production of North Korea’s staple crop, rice. It all indicates considerable concern for the state of the country’s agricultural performance.

How bad is the situation for ordinary people in North Korea?

From border regions – which are more accessible to outsiders thanks to cross-border cellular communications, and which we use as a rough proxy for other parts of the country outside Pyongyang – there is plentiful evidence of people facing difficulties in their daily lives. Because of a de facto zero-COVID-19 policy, the country’s border with China has been closed since January 2020, meaning large-scale cross-border trade and flows of people have stopped almost completely. The little reporting that has emerged from the North suggests that the closure has affected incomes, and thus demand seems to have switched from relatively costly rice to the cheaper alternative, corn, while market prices for manufactured goods have risen markedly as supplies dwindle. These phenomena have led to rising levels of poverty and food insecurity. North Korea’s northern neighbour and ally China may well already be sending humanitarian supplies, but if so, it is doing so (as ever) without fanfare, and it is impossible to identify who the beneficiaries are. Whatever the case, humanitarian assistance is no substitute for the restoration of cross-border trade.

North Korea is, however, nowhere near the famine that struck in the period 1995-1997, when as many as a million people may have perished. Back then, Pyongyang was forced to beg for international aid and had to open up its borders to deliveries of food and observers. Under Kim Jong-un since 2011, Pyongyang has taken significant steps toward deepening existing market mechanisms in the economy, even if in recent years it has sought to restore more state controls. The market economy as it is now constituted makes outright famine much less likely than it was in the 1990s, when the population’s reliance on the state’s rapidly disintegrating rationing system left millions at risk of starvation.

What have we learned about how Kim Jong-un has consolidated power over the last ten years?

Before Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, suffered a stroke in the summer of 2008, he had greatly enfeebled the ruling party. In his heyday, the elder Kim ran an autocratic dictatorship in which the executive implemented decisions and the party rubber-stamped them, at best. When he took power in 2011 after a period of co-rule, Kim Jong-un didn’t have the authority to do that, and therefore needed to bring existing elites along with him in a way that his father did not. As a result, he emphasised the role of the party as the organ of decision-making and administration, with the cabinet as the overseer of the economy. By regularising the role of party congresses and plenums, he seems to have invited a measure of collective, if mostly top-down, discussion among officials at the national, regional and local levels, as well as among those working in industry. In a recent visual indication of this institutionalising trend, Kim Jong-un has overseen the removal of some images of his father and grandfather from public spaces, replacing them with party symbols.

But this modest commitment to collective rule doesn’t make much difference to the governing system’s coherence: Kim Jong-un remains supreme leader, and he has now placed faithful lieutenants in all the key party and cabinet positions, freeing him from having to rely excessively on members of his father’s team to rule. In other words, there is still no sign of change in North Korea’s underlying personalist power structure, and since the brutal elimination of Kim’s uncle Jang Song-thaek in December 2013, also no indication of the emergence of anyone with an independent power base or the potential to construct one. If the regime can survive COVID-19 – which it has done so far, at least – it’s hard to see what could trip it up in the short to medium term.

Does the plenum report mean that North Korea will be focused on its internal problems in the coming year, and not on provoking the outside world?

It seems clear that North Korea plans to be internally focused in 2022. The plenum report didn’t mention military or foreign policy matters in any detail. Instead, it focused on the domestic economy, particularly agriculture. This is not, in all likelihood, because the leader wants to focus on agriculture, but because he has to: ensuring the country’s food security remains a major challenge. There’s also much uncertainty in the outside world, which could counsel a wait-and-see approach before Kim makes any major moves. South Korean elections in early March will result in a new leader for North Korea’s most direct rival. COVID-19 could wane, but it could also become an even bigger distraction.

Kim [Jong-un] continues to build and improve Pyongyang’s arsenal.

In any event, Kim continues to build and improve Pyongyang’s arsenal. He laid out the party’s priorities for military strengthening a year ago at the Eighth Congress, when launching the current planning cycle. These priorities, which continue to guide North Korea, were listed as: to keep developing nuclear technology, including tactical and “super-sized” warheads; to achieve accurate delivery of missiles within a radius of 15,000km (that is, the whole territory of the United States); to design hypersonic gliding flight warheads; to advance plans for solid-fuel intercontinental missiles; to possess a nuclear submarine and underwater-launch strategic nuclear weapon; to launch a military reconnaissance satellite; and to build reconnaissance drones with a 500km range (that is, the whole territory of South Korea).

Some of these goals are still remote. But in pursuit of others, North Korea has already done some new, high-profile military testing in 2021 and now also in 2022, including a launch on 5 January of what it claims was a hypersonic missile (possibly of the same make that was shown off at the country’s Self-Defence 2021 exhibition in October). There will certainly be more testing in the year to come, though the tempo and intensity could be affected by what happens with the pandemic and, correspondingly, the country’s economic health.

Does the plenum report suggest more of the same on the Korean peninsula for 2022?

On the whole, yes. But it is noteworthy that the plenum report quotes Kim Jong-un as saying that, as North Korea enters 2022, “we came to know what we can do”. This sentence seems to indicate he feels the country enjoys a degree of stability that was not there at the end of 2020, and that it is now a bit easier for North Korea to plan its international strategy. But it is not a statement of outright confidence, particularly given the unpredictable progress of the pandemic, which overshadows everything.

As best we can tell, North Korea's zero-COVID-19 policy has so far done a reasonably good job of controlling the virus. But the cornerstone of this strategy was sealing off its land borders. The closures have led not just to food insecurity and precipitously declining trade volumes, but also to the departure of much of Pyongyang’s diplomatic and NGO community, which opted to withdraw staff rather than operate under unworkable restrictions on freedom of movement into, out of and inside the country. Repeatedly, North Korea has seemed on the verge of reopening its borders to overland trade, but resurgences of the virus appear to have forced it to delay the measure and rely instead on modest volumes of goods coming into the west coast port of Nampo. There is now talk of a fresh attempt, but that seems unlikely in light of the omicron variant. Each new iteration of the pandemic poses potentially huge risks to a country that has rejected all attempts to supply it with effective vaccines.

The border closure will necessarily continue to affect all North Korea’s economic plans. Indeed, even the modest goal of upgrading the agricultural sector will involve imports of machinery, parts and chemical fertilisers. Any concerted new program of military testing will need hard currency, for which the only good source is trade with China.

What do current conditions mean for our understanding of North Korea?

Due to the pandemic and border closure, we presently know even less about what’s happening inside North Korea than usual. There are few diplomats, businesspeople, tourists or aid workers left. Organisations that maintain networks of citizen journalists inside North Korea or who rely on networks of resettled North Koreans in Seoul have less reporting to work with. These gaps directly affect how much information we have about the situation in the country, and the capacity to cross-reference anecdotal reports coming from the ground. The reopening of overland trade is a classic example. There are a handful of superficially plausible reports that the borders are going to reopen in January, but they’re very hard to cross-check.

For now, it seems likely that because of COVID-19, North Korea has for some time not been in a strong position to “provoke” the outside world as it has often done in the past. There is little to indicate that it has really wanted to, either, though that may be more a consequence of the pandemic forcing the state to review its priorities than its leadership’s tactical preferences. But the 5 January missile test is a reminder that we will be hearing from Pyongyang again.

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