U.S.-DPRK Basketball Diplomacy: Maybe President Obama Should Pick up the Phone
U.S.-DPRK Basketball Diplomacy: Maybe President Obama Should Pick up the Phone
North Korea Plots a Course of “Heavy Agony” for 2022
North Korea Plots a Course of “Heavy Agony” for 2022
Commentary / Asia

U.S.-DPRK Basketball Diplomacy: Maybe President Obama Should Pick up the Phone

The last couple of years have been tough for North Korea watchers seeking new policy prescriptions for dealing with Pyongyang. The Six-Party Talks appear dead and Pyongyang has no consistent and formal diplomatic processes with either Seoul or Washington. Back channel efforts have failed. President Obama fulfilled his promise to reach out to adversaries by sending a secret delegation to Pyongyang twice in 2012, but this effort was rebuffed. The Lee Myung-bak administration also held secret meetings with DPRK officials in October 2009 and June 2011 to seek an inter-Korean summit, but without success.

More recently, former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt led a delegation to Pyongyang in January 2013, but the group was widely criticised for visiting in the wake of the DPRK’s Ŭnha-3 launch the previous month. DPRK media described the delegation as having paid respect to former leaders Kim Il-sŏng and Kim Jŏng-il as great men, and as having recognised the DPRK as a great power in science and technology.

And now basketball genius (I’m not joking) Dennis Rodman, former National Basketball Association (NBA) champion and winner of seven consecutive NBA rebounding titles, has returned from a well-publicised trip to Pyongyang. Rodman was part of a group that included three Harlem Globetrotter players and Vice Media. This group, especially Rodman, is facing severe criticism. Rodman has been denounced for having called Kim Jŏng-ŭn a “friend for life” and an “awesome guy.” Professor Robert Kelly at Pusan National University sums up the view that high profile foreign visitors do a disservice by providing domestic propaganda value that lends credibility to the regime. While I tend to agree with Kelly, I think the Rodman visit is different and opens a window of opportunity to bring change to North Korea.

For there to be change in North Korean thinking, North Koreans first must question the country’s governance, organising principles and sŏn’gun ideology. One way is to encourage information inflows into the country, but radio and television tuners are fixed so they can only receive state broadcasts, and citizens do not have access to the internet or other means of communicating with the outside world. With limited opportunities to expose North Koreans to information that contradicts the state’s narrative and official sŏn’gun ideology, the U.S. government and others should not dismiss outright Dennis Rodman’s suggestion of “basketball diplomacy.” The Rodman visit was very important to the leadership. Kim Jŏng-ŭn snubbed former U.S. presidents and other heads of state, as well as a former high-level U.S. government official and the executive chairman of Google, but Kim turned out for Rodman and appeared giddy as they sat next to each other and watched the game.

The visit, access and North Korean media coverage reflect the importance of sports to the Kim Jŏng-ŭn regime. On 4 November 2012, a Sunday, an “enlarged” Politburo meeting was convened in Pyongyang to establish the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission. Several high-level officials from the party, military and the cabinet were present and the meeting received extensive media coverage. According to KCNA, the Politburo decided:

To put the DPRK on the level of a sports power is an important work to boost the national capabilities in every way, demonstrate the indomitable spirit and dignity of   Sŏn’gun Korea to the whole world and make all service personnel and people push ahead with the building of a thriving socialist nation full of great national pride and self-esteem as the developing revolution requires with a historic turn being effected in accomplishing the revolutionary cause of chuch’e.

The committee is chaired by Chang Sŏng-t’aek, Kim Jŏng-ŭn’s uncle, and aims “to control the overall sports work of the country in a unified manner.” KCNA reported that Kim Il-sŏng “wisely led the work of putting sports on a mass basis, developing sports technique and providing material conditions for it …thereby laying a solid foundation for the development of chuch’e-based physical culture and sports.”

Kim Jŏng-il is also credited with having made a great contribution by “putting culture and sports on a mass basis…as required by the era of sŏn’gun.” As for the party, KCNA reported:

The Workers’ Party of Korea unrolled a far-reaching plan to turn the DPRK, socialist political and military power, into an economic power and sports power, indicated the concrete direction and ways of carrying out the plan, and saw to it that wise measures were taken to bring about a radical change in the physical culture and sports of the country by making the sports wind rage across the country.

Given the state’s sports agenda, it is even easier to criticise the Rodman trip. The Kim regime sees sports as an instrument to increase social control and help achieve a totalitarian unity that is anathema to those who prefer an open and pluralistic society. The North Korean state is unmatched in the realm of social control. There is no civil society. There are extensive, redundant and overlapping institutions for monitoring and surveillance including the neighborhood watch units or inminban (人民班), the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of People’s Security, the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau, and the Defence Security Command. No activities outside the purview of party and state control are tolerated.

The State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission was established as yet another institution to monitor and control the lives of every North Korean and to bring glory to the Kim family regime. To contribute to this agenda is deplorable, and most analysts have interpreted Rodman’s visit in this context. But perhaps the Rodman visit offers an opportunity to deliver a Trojan horse of subversion.

North Korea’s leaders want their system to survive, and any changes they make are intended to strengthen the system, not to reform it. They have learned from Gorbachev’s “mistakes” of seeking political reforms and restructuring to improve the Soviet system. The North Korean leadership apparently views sports exchanges as furthering its own agenda.

However, “basketball diplomacy” could have unintended consequences for the regime, just as Gorbachev’s perestroika did for the USSR and the lifting of travel restrictions did for East Germany. Personal exchanges are probably the best way to expose North Koreans to different types of governance and social organisation, which is the first step in the thought process that results in questioning the regime.

First, the Rodman visit is subversive because the image of Kim Jŏng-ŭn embracing Rodman can be perceived as the leadership tolerating or accepting someone who is different. South Korea’s Daily NK reported that North Koreans in the provinces were stunned to see Kim embracing an American with numerous tattoos and body piercings and likened it to Kim embracing a “goblin or gangster.”

Why not systematize all this with a ‘Basketball Development Foundation’? A few former NBA players could serve on the board, to give it allure. I have no doubt its funding would not prove to be a problem, especially if the institution received an explicit or tacit endorsement from President Obama, which the North Korean leadership also seeks for its commitment to “basketball diplomacy.”

In a short amount of time, this foundation could host basketball development clinics in Pyongyang, but only on the condition that North Korean teams participate in clinics and tournaments outside North Korea as well, and at no cost to North Korea. You want basketball diplomacy? Sure, we’ll fund an all-expenses-paid trip for three weeks for North Korean basketball teams to attend a camp and tournament on the beach at Waikiki. That would give the North Koreans a chance to bow in front of the Duke Kahanamoku statue, and with plenty of kimch’i in Honolulu, they’d feel right at home. Tournaments in Sydney, Vancouver, Hong Kong, Manila, etc., could be held. I would even suggest a game at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjŏm between a KPA team and other national military teams, along with a game featuring mixed teams and players from the North Korean national team and NBA players like LeBron James and Kobe Bryant. If Kim Jŏng-ŭn wants basketball diplomacy, I say, “Bring it!”

Once Kim Jŏng-ŭn makes a strategic decision to return to real diplomacy, abandon sŏn’gun, and embark on denuclearisation, President Obama can call Kim to discuss the details of the annual Obama-Kim Basketball Tournament for Peace. Just as ping-pong diplomacy helped thaw relations between the U.S and China in the 1970s, basketball diplomacy, with appropriate implementation, could help thaw relations between the U.S and North Korea.

Workers plant rice at the Chongsan Cooperative Farm in the Kangso district of Nampho City on 12 May 2020. KIM Won Jin / AFP
Q&A / Asia

North Korea Plots a Course of “Heavy Agony” for 2022

The latest five-day plenum of North Korea’s ruling party focused on food insecurity, chief among the nation’s challenges. With the pandemic not yet tamed and other uncertainty on the international scene, Pyongyang may continue refraining from major provocations into 2022, but for how long is unclear.

North Korea has just completed its annual review of its own performance at the fourth plenum of the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party, held from 27-31 December 2021. What can we learn from this exercise about the state of the country?

Under Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang politics tick along on a system of five-year “congresses”, the most recent of which was held in January 2021 (and should run to 2026). These five-year cycles are then punctuated by fairly regular plenums, including the one that ended on 31 December. What we got in a lengthy article on 1 January was a report on that plenum, which amounts to a kind of annual review of the party’s performance, and an indicator of the challenges it has identified for the year ahead.

What happened this time is a little different from the usual modus operandi. Under previous chiefs and in Kim Jong-un’s pre-pandemic era, the North Korean leader would deliver a new year’s address either on television or via an editorial in state-run newspapers, and these would mark a waypoint in the country’s politics. In 2022, all we got was a report on Kim Jong-un’s contribution to the plenum; it was a comma compared to the full stops of years past.

The report gave little hope for immediate improvement ... as Kim [Jong-un] mentioned a ‘heavy yet responsible agony’ for the period to come.

It’s difficult to interpret exactly what this means and what new, if anything, has been decided by the five-day plenum. For one thing, the full text of Kim’s speech was not published, and for another, the signals it gave were rather mixed. There was abundant rhetoric about successes and breakthroughs as usual, but all suffused with a sense of insufficiency. Of one thing we can be relatively certain: 2021 was another tough year, in particular due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact. Perhaps not quite as tough as 2020, when the coronavirus first triggered fear, border closings and a steep economic downturn, but still very challenging. The report gave little hope for immediate improvement, either, as Kim mentioned a “heavy yet responsible agony” for the period to come.

From what was revealed, it appears the party hasn’t been able to make much progress toward the goals of the five-year economic plan outlined in January 2021. Although it is impossible to conclusively verify from the outside what is happening on the ground, the lack of progress must be clearly visible to the citizenry, many of whom will have seen no sign of promised improvements to “food, clothing, and housing” in a year during which COVID-19 containment measures have suffocated economic activity. But, as discussed below, it’s hard to tell exactly how much the country is suffering or, indeed, upon whom the burden is mainly falling.

Given the concern expressed in the plenum report about farming, we can assume a degree of difficulty for many North Koreans in getting food – either because it is in short supply or because market prices are out of reach for people who have seen their incomes fall. Kim delivered a long speech on what he called “our-style socialist rural development”, or in other words, what needs to be done to improve the agricultural system and bring North Korea closer to meeting the population’s food requirements. As always, the reported speech included a large measure of ideological conditioning of farmers and no shortage of exhortations for agricultural labourers to work harder. But it also touched upon agricultural modernisation and policies to remedy the worst effects of climate change, notably on production of North Korea’s staple crop, rice. It all indicates considerable concern for the state of the country’s agricultural performance.

How bad is the situation for ordinary people in North Korea?

From border regions – which are more accessible to outsiders thanks to cross-border cellular communications, and which we use as a rough proxy for other parts of the country outside Pyongyang – there is plentiful evidence of people facing difficulties in their daily lives. Because of a de facto zero-COVID-19 policy, the country’s border with China has been closed since January 2020, meaning large-scale cross-border trade and flows of people have stopped almost completely. The little reporting that has emerged from the North suggests that the closure has affected incomes, and thus demand seems to have switched from relatively costly rice to the cheaper alternative, corn, while market prices for manufactured goods have risen markedly as supplies dwindle. These phenomena have led to rising levels of poverty and food insecurity. North Korea’s northern neighbour and ally China may well already be sending humanitarian supplies, but if so, it is doing so (as ever) without fanfare, and it is impossible to identify who the beneficiaries are. Whatever the case, humanitarian assistance is no substitute for the restoration of cross-border trade.

North Korea is, however, nowhere near the famine that struck in the period 1995-1997, when as many as a million people may have perished. Back then, Pyongyang was forced to beg for international aid and had to open up its borders to deliveries of food and observers. Under Kim Jong-un since 2011, Pyongyang has taken significant steps toward deepening existing market mechanisms in the economy, even if in recent years it has sought to restore more state controls. The market economy as it is now constituted makes outright famine much less likely than it was in the 1990s, when the population’s reliance on the state’s rapidly disintegrating rationing system left millions at risk of starvation.

What have we learned about how Kim Jong-un has consolidated power over the last ten years?

Before Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, suffered a stroke in the summer of 2008, he had greatly enfeebled the ruling party. In his heyday, the elder Kim ran an autocratic dictatorship in which the executive implemented decisions and the party rubber-stamped them, at best. When he took power in 2011 after a period of co-rule, Kim Jong-un didn’t have the authority to do that, and therefore needed to bring existing elites along with him in a way that his father did not. As a result, he emphasised the role of the party as the organ of decision-making and administration, with the cabinet as the overseer of the economy. By regularising the role of party congresses and plenums, he seems to have invited a measure of collective, if mostly top-down, discussion among officials at the national, regional and local levels, as well as among those working in industry. In a recent visual indication of this institutionalising trend, Kim Jong-un has overseen the removal of some images of his father and grandfather from public spaces, replacing them with party symbols.

But this modest commitment to collective rule doesn’t make much difference to the governing system’s coherence: Kim Jong-un remains supreme leader, and he has now placed faithful lieutenants in all the key party and cabinet positions, freeing him from having to rely excessively on members of his father’s team to rule. In other words, there is still no sign of change in North Korea’s underlying personalist power structure, and since the brutal elimination of Kim’s uncle Jang Song-thaek in December 2013, also no indication of the emergence of anyone with an independent power base or the potential to construct one. If the regime can survive COVID-19 – which it has done so far, at least – it’s hard to see what could trip it up in the short to medium term.

Does the plenum report mean that North Korea will be focused on its internal problems in the coming year, and not on provoking the outside world?

It seems clear that North Korea plans to be internally focused in 2022. The plenum report didn’t mention military or foreign policy matters in any detail. Instead, it focused on the domestic economy, particularly agriculture. This is not, in all likelihood, because the leader wants to focus on agriculture, but because he has to: ensuring the country’s food security remains a major challenge. There’s also much uncertainty in the outside world, which could counsel a wait-and-see approach before Kim makes any major moves. South Korean elections in early March will result in a new leader for North Korea’s most direct rival. COVID-19 could wane, but it could also become an even bigger distraction.

Kim [Jong-un] continues to build and improve Pyongyang’s arsenal.

In any event, Kim continues to build and improve Pyongyang’s arsenal. He laid out the party’s priorities for military strengthening a year ago at the Eighth Congress, when launching the current planning cycle. These priorities, which continue to guide North Korea, were listed as: to keep developing nuclear technology, including tactical and “super-sized” warheads; to achieve accurate delivery of missiles within a radius of 15,000km (that is, the whole territory of the United States); to design hypersonic gliding flight warheads; to advance plans for solid-fuel intercontinental missiles; to possess a nuclear submarine and underwater-launch strategic nuclear weapon; to launch a military reconnaissance satellite; and to build reconnaissance drones with a 500km range (that is, the whole territory of South Korea).

Some of these goals are still remote. But in pursuit of others, North Korea has already done some new, high-profile military testing in 2021 and now also in 2022, including a launch on 5 January of what it claims was a hypersonic missile (possibly of the same make that was shown off at the country’s Self-Defence 2021 exhibition in October). There will certainly be more testing in the year to come, though the tempo and intensity could be affected by what happens with the pandemic and, correspondingly, the country’s economic health.

Does the plenum report suggest more of the same on the Korean peninsula for 2022?

On the whole, yes. But it is noteworthy that the plenum report quotes Kim Jong-un as saying that, as North Korea enters 2022, “we came to know what we can do”. This sentence seems to indicate he feels the country enjoys a degree of stability that was not there at the end of 2020, and that it is now a bit easier for North Korea to plan its international strategy. But it is not a statement of outright confidence, particularly given the unpredictable progress of the pandemic, which overshadows everything.

As best we can tell, North Korea's zero-COVID-19 policy has so far done a reasonably good job of controlling the virus. But the cornerstone of this strategy was sealing off its land borders. The closures have led not just to food insecurity and precipitously declining trade volumes, but also to the departure of much of Pyongyang’s diplomatic and NGO community, which opted to withdraw staff rather than operate under unworkable restrictions on freedom of movement into, out of and inside the country. Repeatedly, North Korea has seemed on the verge of reopening its borders to overland trade, but resurgences of the virus appear to have forced it to delay the measure and rely instead on modest volumes of goods coming into the west coast port of Nampo. There is now talk of a fresh attempt, but that seems unlikely in light of the omicron variant. Each new iteration of the pandemic poses potentially huge risks to a country that has rejected all attempts to supply it with effective vaccines.

The border closure will necessarily continue to affect all North Korea’s economic plans. Indeed, even the modest goal of upgrading the agricultural sector will involve imports of machinery, parts and chemical fertilisers. Any concerted new program of military testing will need hard currency, for which the only good source is trade with China.

What do current conditions mean for our understanding of North Korea?

Due to the pandemic and border closure, we presently know even less about what’s happening inside North Korea than usual. There are few diplomats, businesspeople, tourists or aid workers left. Organisations that maintain networks of citizen journalists inside North Korea or who rely on networks of resettled North Koreans in Seoul have less reporting to work with. These gaps directly affect how much information we have about the situation in the country, and the capacity to cross-reference anecdotal reports coming from the ground. The reopening of overland trade is a classic example. There are a handful of superficially plausible reports that the borders are going to reopen in January, but they’re very hard to cross-check.

For now, it seems likely that because of COVID-19, North Korea has for some time not been in a strong position to “provoke” the outside world as it has often done in the past. There is little to indicate that it has really wanted to, either, though that may be more a consequence of the pandemic forcing the state to review its priorities than its leadership’s tactical preferences. But the 5 January missile test is a reminder that we will be hearing from Pyongyang again.

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