The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils
The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
The U.S. and the Taliban after the Killing of al-Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri
The U.S. and the Taliban after the Killing of al-Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri
Briefing 19 / Asia

The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils

The Emergency Loya Jirga, or grand national assembly, held from 10 to 21 June 2002 in Kabul was a small but critical step in Afghanistan’s political development.

I. Overview

The Emergency Loya Jirga, or grand national assembly, held from 10 to 21 June 2002 in Kabul was a small but critical step in Afghanistan’ political development. It was an opportunity to accord national legitimacy to the peace process begun at Bonn in November 2001 but it produced mixed results. From a narrow perspective, it was a success: representatives from across Afghanistan came together to elect, or rather anoint, a head of state, and the major armed factions kept their hats in the political ring rather than resort to violence. Given the last three decades of war and turmoil, this is significant.

However, the Loya Jirga also failed in important respects: the opportunity to assert civilian leadership, promote democratic expression, and draw authority away from the warlords was squandered. An all-consuming concern for short-term stability caused key Afghan and international decision-makers to bow to undemocratic sectarian demands. The Transitional Authority that resulted will be hampered by their compromises. The imperatives of the Coalition forces to root out terrorism continue to overshadow their concerns for long-term stability and participatory governance in Afghanistan. Unless U.S. political and military goals in Afghanistan can be reconciled, today’s successes may become tomorrow’s problems.[fn]The ambiguities of the Loya Jirga process, including the prospect that political realities would make it impossible to satisfy fully the high expectations with which many Afghans approached it, were foretold in ICG Afghanistan Briefing, The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward, 16 May 2002. That preview concluded that ultimately “legitimacy of the Loya Jirga will be based much less on the fairness of the process than on the fairness of the outcome”. On both scores the process has to be accorded mixed marks.Hide Footnote

The Taliban’s collapse precipitated the return of Afghanistan’s regional commanders and warlords – the same cast of characters that was responsible for the civil war in the early 1990s.[fn]There was occasional inter-factional fighting between mujahideen groups even during the war against the Soviet occupation force and the Soviet-backed Afghan government. Many of these groups and their leaders have been in conflict with each other since the 1970’s.Hide Footnote  This has meant an uneasy peace as they compete for power and resources. Tensions in this still-fractured nation are high, and stability is far from assured. The assassination of Vice President Haji Qadir underscores the vital need for arrangements to ensure security and promote reconciliation.

The Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA)[fn]Throughout the Loya Jirga, some delegates referred to the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) as the Islamic Transitional Administration. It remains unclear whether the official name of the Afghan Government, prior to the approval of a new Constitution, will include the term “Islamic.” The use of “Afghan Transitional Administration” (ATA) by ICG is not intended to reflect a position on this issue.Hide Footnote  faces enormous challenges and perils in the next two years:

  • a new constitution must be written and approved;
     
  • the legal, logistical, and cultural grounds for “free and fair” elections must be prepared;
     
  • national armed forces must be trained and deployed while up to 200,000 faction-based soldiers are demobilised; and
     
  • a multi-billion dollar reconstruction program must be implemented.

All this must be done as the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban continues; heavily armed, largely unaccountable factions compete; and the economy remains moribund.

Within Afghanistan, the forces of democratisation are welling up from a long suppressed population – but they are up against warlordism, lingering ethnic and factional tensions, a deeply conservative bent within society, and virtually unprecedented post-war reconstruction needs. The international community’s commitment will also be challenged. Conflicts or potential conflicts like those between India and Pakistan and in Iraq, and others yet unknown, as well as Afghan internal strife, will distract attention and undermine the continued availability of military, political, and economic resources critically needed to carry Afghanistan through its transition.

Kabul/Brussels, 30 July 2002

Podcast / Asia

The U.S. and the Taliban after the Killing of al-Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri

This week on Hold Your Fire! Richard Atwood speaks with Crisis Group’s Asia Director Laurel Miller about U.S. policy in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s foreign relations and what the killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in the Afghan capital Kabul says about the threat from transnational militants in Afghanistan a year into Taliban rule.

On 31 July, a U.S. drone strike killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in the Afghan capital Kabul. Zawahiri appears to have been living in a house maintained by the family of powerful Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani. His death came almost a year after U.S. troops pulled out of Afghanistan and the Taliban routed the former Afghan security forces and seized power. The Taliban’s uncompromising rule over the past year has seen girls denied their right to education, many other rights and freedoms curtailed and power tightly guarded within the Taliban movement. The Afghan economy has collapsed, owing in large part to the U.S. and other countries’ freezing Afghan Central Bank assets, keeping sanctions against the Taliban in place and denying the country non-humanitarian aid. Levels of violence across the country are mostly down, but Afghans’ plight is desperate, with a grave humanitarian crisis set to worsen over the winter. The Taliban’s apparent harbouring of Zawahiri seems unlikely to smooth relations between the new authorities in Kabul and the outside world. 

This week on Hold your Fire! Richard Atwood speaks with Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director Laurel Miller about U.S. policy in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s broader foreign relations after Zawahiri’s killing. They discuss what his presence and death in Kabul mean for U.S. policy and what they say about the threat posed by transnational militants sheltering in Afghanistan. They look into how countries in the region are seeking to protect their interests in Afghanistan, including by engaging with the de facto Taliban authorities, and how those countries – particularly Pakistan, which has faced an uptick of violence in the past year – view the danger from foreign militants in Afghanistan. They also look in depth at Washington’s goals in Afghanistan a year after the withdrawal and what balance it should strike between engaging the Taliban or seeking to isolate them. Just over a year after the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, they reflect back on Washington’s decision to pull out troops. 

Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

For more on the situation in Afghanistan, check out Crisis Group’s recent report Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban.

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