Afghanistan: Elections and the 
Crisis of Governance
Afghanistan: Elections and the 
Crisis of Governance
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Briefing / Asia 5 minutes

Afghanistan: Elections and the 
Crisis of Governance

President Hamid Karzai’s re-election on 2 November 2009, following widespread fraud in the 20 August presidential and provincial polls, has delivered a critical blow to his government’s legitimacy.


I. Overview

President Hamid Karzai’s re-election on 2 November 2009, following widespread fraud in the 20 August presidential and provincial polls, has delivered a critical blow to his government’s legitimacy. The deeply flawed polls have eroded public confidence in the electoral process and in the international community’s commitment to the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Concentration of power in the executive to the exclusion of the legislature and judiciary has also resulted in a fundamental breakdown in governance while strengthening the hand of the insurgency. To restore stability, vigorous constitutional reform under the aegis of a loya jirga must be undertaken; an impartial commission of inquiry into the flawed elections should be formed; the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) should be restructured to restore credibility; and prompt steps must be taken to strengthen institutions.

The presidential and provincial polls, the second set of elections since the ouster of the Taliban eight years ago, were held at a time of escalating insurgency and severe economic stagnation. Insecurity hampered candidates’ mobility and drove down voter turnout. An under-resourced security sector, combined with Taliban military gains, severely limited the ability of Afghan and international forces to protect candidates and voters. Violence during the campaign and on election day and vote rigging brought into clear focus the challenges that lie ahead in planning for the 2010 parliamentary and district council elections. 

Allegations of systemic fraud emerged even before Karzai and his chief challenger, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, each declared victory. Reports of intimidation, ballot stuffing, ghost polling stations and interference by staff of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and candidate agents surfaced countrywide, but especially where insecurity led to an absence of female electoral staff, candidate agents and election observers. 

Although the elections were held for the first time ostensibly under sole Afghan stewardship, UNAMA through the United Nations Development Programme’s Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) program was heavily involved in planning, preparations and logistics. The international community was thus perceived by Afghans as an active participant in the flawed process. When the U.S., European Union and UNAMA representatives quickly declared the elections a qualified success, these early endorsements may have cost them what little currency they had left with the Afghan public. The head of UNAMA’s failure to take decisive corrective action when evidence of fraud surfaced has badly damaged the UN’s standing in the country. Most Afghans believe that the political expedience of the rubber stamp was preferred to an honest assessment of systemic flaws in a process the international community had helped put in place and then failed to remedy.

Preliminary results released on 16 September 2009 indicated Karzai as the winner over Abdullah by 54.6 to 27.7 percent. A protracted investigation into claims of electoral fraud eventually led the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) on 18 October 2009 to disqualify nearly a quarter of the overall votes cast, necessitating a run-off between the two top candidates. Following intense pressure primarily from the U.S., Karzai agreed to face Abdullah in a second round of polls. However, Abdullah ultimately withdrew from the contest, citing concerns about electoral fraud, given the government’s failure to enact any meaningful reform of the electoral institutions.

Karzai’s retention of power under these circumstances has bolstered the impression that the international community is disinterested in or incapable of checking the corruption that has metastasised under his watch. To ensure against a further decline in public confidence, the international community must press harder for anti-corruption measures and for the appointment of respected individuals to the cabinet and provincial governorships. 

The electoral fraud was a direct consequence of failure to build the capacity of government institutions. Since the 2004 presidential vote, the international community – UNAMA in particular – repeatedly turned a blind eye to the looming crisis of credibility rooted in an unsound process. The August vote laid bare disagreements between different international actors and within the new American administration, whose lack of clear policy in Kabul undermined their ability to press for necessary changes ahead of the elections. The polls severely damaged UNAMA’s ability to function effectively, weakening its internal morale and sharply eroding Afghan confidence in Kai Eide, the Special Representative of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (SRSG). The UN’s mission to bring stability to the country has been severely jeopardised. His effectiveness as head of mission will always remain in doubt. If UNAMA’s credibility is to be restored, Eide must step down.

The international community has too often acted as if the election cycle was merely a box to check off. It needs to recognise that impending decisions about military strategies, troop levels and state-building concepts may matter little if it does not cauterise the damage. The measures that should be urgently put in place and vigorously supported specifically by the U.S. and the UN include:

  • restrictions on the size of the cabinet, and thorough vetting of cabinet and provincial governor appointees, barring nominees with demonstrated links to armed groups or criminal activities from joining the government; 
  • the formation of an impartial commission of inquiry composed of respected Afghan and international experts to conduct a thorough public review of the 20 August 2009 elections; the National Assembly’s use of its full sanctioning powers against those suspected of abusing their offices to influence the polls; and vigorous criminal prosecution by the attorney general and courts of those involved in flagrant violations of the law, whether candidates, IEC staff or government officials;
  • consultations among relevant Afghan and international actors to achieve consensus on immediate steps to strengthen the machinery for the 2010 elections, including the timely delineation of district boundaries for district council elections; enhanced penalties for misuse of state resources during the campaign; clarification of the shape and scope of the IEC and ECC to build sustainable mechanisms to enforce electoral standards and arbitrate disputes; and reconstitution of the IEC Secretariat and IEC Board with the involvement of parliament and other stakeholders in the appointment process; 
  • convocation of a loya jirga with the express purpose of undertaking constitutional reform, including consultations on the role of the Supreme Court; separation of powers by enhancing the independence of the judiciary and legislature; and the strengthening of provincial and district level governance through a meaningful devolution of authority and resources; and
  • resignation of UNAMA chief and SRSG Eide, since he has lost the confidence of many on his staff and the necessary trust of many parts of the Afghan polity, accompanied by a thorough re-evaluation of UN ELECT’s advisory role with the view to ensuring more robust support for Afghanistan’s electoral institutions and processes.

Kabul/Brussels, 25 November 2009

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