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Not Too Late for Afghanistan
Not Too Late for Afghanistan
There’s No Shortcut to Peace in Afghanistan
There’s No Shortcut to Peace in Afghanistan
Commentary / Asia

Not Too Late for Afghanistan

International intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was not an altruistic whim. After all, the Afghan people had long been abandoned to years of fratricidal civil war, followed by Taliban rule, at the end of the Cold War.

Rather this was - and is - about global security. The further we get from 11 September, the more it needs to be repeated: if we don’t confront extremism at its source, it comes to our shores. Abandoning Afghanistan is not an option.

Today, British troops are bearing the brunt of a belated move to Afghanistan’s restive southern provinces. This is coming as something of a shock to the British public and media, having been sold the line that Afghanistan was a “success story” before attention and resources moved to Iraq.

Afghanistan was “won” so speedily back in 2001 by co-opting local warlords and commanders. The failure to quickly expand international peacekeepers beyond Kabul in the aftermath meant a terrible loss of momentum. Indeed this year, there will be more than three times as many foreign troops in Afghanistan as there were in 2002 or 2003.

These numbers are the exact reverse of what should have happened. This is not hindsight. The International Crisis Group was arguing for more boots on the ground to help enforce the peace back in 2002, when they would have been gratefully received by the local population.

But it is obviously more important now to look forward. Those nations prepared to go to the dangerous south should be applauded, and they should get every kind of backup they need in terms of troop numbers, equipment and domestic support. And far more pointed questions should be directed at those members of NATO not prepared to put their fighters in the areas of greatest need in Afghanistan. The importance of the move south cannot be overstated: quite simply, without stabilising the south, you will not stabilise Afghanistan.

So, what can be done at this stage to help ensure success? Above all, policies towards Pakistan, the West’s slippery “ally” in the war on terror, need to come under closer scrutiny. It was the sanctuary of this international border that allowed Taliban leadership to survive the 2001 war and regroup in the intervening years.

Today, Taliban leadership and spokespeople operate brazenly in areas bordering Afghanistan’s Pashtun belt in the south and east. Its fundamentalist religious schools, never reformed despite countless promises by President General Musharraf, offer almost limitless recruits.

Such a state of affairs is unlikely to change under Pakistan’s military dictatorship, reliant as it is on support from the very Islamist parties that built up - and continue to back - the Taliban. Afghans simply cannot understand why more is not being done in to pressure Pakistan, leading to the most bizarre rumours, even amongst highly educated Afghans, that the foreigners are not really interested in regional stability but are here for more nefarious designs.

At the same time the current insecurity is not solely a cross-border phenomenon. Within Afghanistan a dangerous level of disillusionment has set in amongst the population, largely due to the notorious figures that were co-opted by the West and Karzai government.

Many are the very same warlords and commanders whose corruption and brutality caused the population to welcome the Taliban in the first place. Today, they reap the benefits of a culture of impunity and a large number also have a hand in the flourishing opium trade.

It is truly horrifying that many of those currently in power have absolutely no desire to see the spread of the rule of law threaten their trade. This is what lies at the heart of much of the current conflict in drug-ridden and lawless Helmand, often simplistically and mistakenly blamed solely on the “Taliban”.

Ultimately, stability in Afghanistan will not be brought about by the gun. But robust international military commitments can offer the time and space for Kabul – and the international community – to put in the good administrators and build up the institutions that can offer sustainable security and services to the population.

International commitment to building up the police and judicial system has been dismally slow and under-resourced to date. Building the rule of law must now become the priority.

The Afghan government’s side of the deal must be a genuine war on corruption and abusive officials, tackling the narcotics industry from the very top and ending the climate of impunity. Kabul must be firmly told that business as usual is unacceptable.

Afghanistan, as the British public are only now discovering, might not be on the inevitable road to success. But given international security and economic support, failure and its devastating consequences may yet be averted.


Former Deputy President and Chief Operating Officer
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Former Senior Analyst, South Asia
Op-Ed / Asia

There’s No Shortcut to Peace in Afghanistan

Originally published in Foreign Policy

Washington’s latest idea of a transitional government would be worse than the dysfunctional status quo.

If there is one thing the United States should have learned after two decades in Afghanistan, it’s that there are no quick fixes. That has proved true for the war, and it’s true for any possibility of a negotiated peace. But faced with the decision whether to comply with a May 1 deadline for pulling out all troops under a deal the U.S. government signed with the Taliban in February 2020, Washington is now searching for a shortcut to an Afghan political settlement. There isn’t one.

U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has delivered to the Afghan government and Taliban a draft Afghanistan Peace Agreement—the central idea of which is replacing the elected Afghan government with a so-called transitional one that would include the Taliban and then negotiate among its members the future permanent system of government. Crucial blank spaces in the draft include the exact share of power for each of the warring sides and which side would control security institutions.

At the same time, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken wrote to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, in a letter that soon leaked, saying it was “urgent” to “accelerate peace talks” and move “quickly toward a settlement.” The letter states that the United States has asked Turkey to host a high-level meeting between the Afghan sides “in the coming weeks to finalize a peace agreement.” The letter also references a U.S.-proposed 90-day reduction in violence (a concept short of a cease-fire) while diplomacy continues—which suggests that Washington knows an agreement within weeks is unlikely.

Chances that Taliban leaders or Ghani would agree to anything like the U.S. draft peace agreement are vanishingly small. But if they do, the result will be worse than this gambit failing.

Chances that Taliban leaders or Ghani would agree to anything like the U.S. draft peace agreement are vanishingly small. But if they do, the result will be worse than this gambit failing.

For the Taliban, the draft has too many hallmarks of the existing government setup: It includes a commitment to holding elections and keeping in place the constitution devised under U.S. auspices in 2004 until a new one is written. The available evidence of Taliban thinking points to their rejecting any arrangement that would make them appear co-opted into a system they have long opposed in exchange for a partial share of power.

For Ghani, the proposal is premised on him relinquishing power. That brutal fact, plus the rough-edged tone of Blinken’s letter, has whipped up a political tempest in Kabul. Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh reacted most bluntly, saying Afghanistan would “never accept a bossy and imposed peace.” Ghani knows that the main Afghan enthusiasts of the transitional government idea are his political opposition and the country’s former mujahideen, who sense opportunity to gain power as it is parceled out.

In the unlikely event the new U.S. peace plan materializes, the power-sharing arrangement it envisions would be prone to collapse. A body comprising multiple factions plus the Taliban—at a stage of the peace process before they’ve even begun to hash out core issues that divide them—would be less functional and less stable than the fragile government in place now. The hard work of negotiating the structure of a future Afghan state will not be eased by prematurely erasing the current one. And if a fractious transitional government fails, the cease-fire the U.S. plan promises would evaporate with it.

The U.S. proposal reflects a boiling over of Washington’s frustrations with Ghani. The Afghan leader’s critics have accused him of obstructing a peace process that has sapped his government of its already tenuous authority. The past several Afghan elections have been bitterly contested, the country’s politics are deeply corrupt, and service provision is increasingly limited to population centers, with the Taliban insurgency operating freely throughout much of the countryside.

The U.S. proposal reflects a boiling over of Washington’s frustrations with Ghani.

But however much Ghani has contributed to slowing the process, dismantling the elected government is unlikely to hasten peace. The Taliban have not moved any faster. It took over a year of bilateral negotiations and numerous U.S. concessions for the Taliban to sign a four-page agreement spelling out a tight timeline for U.S. and NATO withdrawal and more ambiguous Taliban promises to prevent Afghanistan being used as a launching pad for terrorists. And the Taliban remain coy about details of the political vision they seek to realize. Official Taliban statements that their movement will accept some degree of power sharing are contradicted by internal messaging emphasizing victory and ascendance.

After delays for which the United States was as much to blame as any other party, Afghan talks finally commenced last September in Doha, Qatar. They’ve progressed haltingly, at least in part because the parties are waiting for a new U.S. government to signal whether it will stay committed to a process the previous one catalyzed.

The slow pace now clashes with the deadline for withdrawing foreign troops. That’s a problem the U.S.-Taliban deal caused by decoupling the withdrawal timetable from any requirement of progress in negotiations. But it’s also a problem that can’t be solved by demands to speed up the hard slog of reaching a political settlement.

It will be difficult to get the peace process in Doha to produce results, but it’s too soon to jettison a process that has taken years to set up and has only just begun. Instead of promoting a new plan that has almost no chance of being accepted and that would further weaken the Afghan state, Washington should put its energy into testing whether the Doha process can be made to work.

It will be difficult to get the peace process in Doha to produce results, but it’s too soon to jettison a process that has taken years to set up and has only just begun.

This should include rallying the regional powers, especially Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, and India—who all have links to actors in the Afghan conflict—around generating momentum for the existing process. A high-level meeting of this group, which Washington has asked the United Nations to convene, is a good idea, but these stakeholders need a better peace plan to coalesce around than the new U.S. proposal.

If the United States wants to give the talks a real chance, then it will need to keep troops in Afghanistan beyond May 1 to maintain leverage for forging a settlement and to forestall a downward security spiral that would spike the process.

Ongoing talks would provide the best argument Washington could make to regional powers, especially Pakistan, for why they should help pressure the Taliban to let the deadline slip.

But if talks break down—as they probably will, given how divided the parties are and how rarely peace processes succeed—then it will be better to have even a dysfunctional Afghan government still standing than to have replaced it with a stopgap transitional one whose existence would not survive the end of negotiations. And if the Biden administration plans to pull out U.S. forces soon, then it’s better not to risk leaving such wreckage behind.


Program Director, Asia
Senior Analyst, Afghanistan