Pakistan: No time to lose
Pakistan: No time to lose
Keeping Turmoil at Bay in Pakistan’s Polarised Polity
Keeping Turmoil at Bay in Pakistan’s Polarised Polity
Op-Ed / Asia

Pakistan: No time to lose

Given the fragility of Pakistan’s democratic transition, the need for electoral reforms is as urgent as ever, writes the International Crisis Group’s Samina Ahmed

IN APRIL 2002, General Pervez Musharraf held a referendum to extend his self-assumed presidency for another five years. The loaded question said it all: “Do you favour continuation of local government reforms, restoration of democracy; sustainability and continuity of reforms, elimination of sectarianism and completion of Quaid-i-Azam (Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the country’s founder) concept? Do you want to elect President General Pervez Musharraf for the next five years as the President of Pakistan?” In this case, the people’s response couldn’t have been clearer: they boycotted the referendum. 
Based in Islamabad, heading the International Crisis Group’s regional office, I drove around Islamabad on referendum day. The streets were as empty as the polling stations. “If the people don’t want me, I will go tomorrow,” the president had said, insisting that he had imposed military rule only to restore democracy. But he wasn’t taking any chances. The only compliant voters were state employees, warned of dire consequences if they failed to turn up and vote in Musharraf’s favour. People going about their business, and even young children playing in the streets, were corralled into voting – a novel experience indeed for many pre-teens. Citing an implausible 71 per cent voter turnout, the chief election commissioner reported that 97.5 per cent had voted for Musharraf; independent observers estimated the turnout at between 5 and 10 per cent.

While the blatant rigging angered most Pakistanis, the international community – far more concerned about retaining the military’s cooperation in the “war on terror” – gave Musharraf’s rigged referendum a pass. The stage was set for the military government to rig the national elections later that year, with the active involvement of the Election Commission of Pakistan, or ECP.

First, Musharraf issued a presidential ordinance placing a two-term limit on prime ministers, aimed primarily at preventing former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the military’s main opponents, from contesting. A second order required candidates for elected office to hold a bachelors degree or its equivalent, disqualifying hundreds of party leaders and office holders, including former parliamentarians from Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party and Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz. But the commission treated certificates from the madrasas (Islamic seminaries) as the equivalent of mainstream degrees, to the benefit of Musharraf’s allies in the MMA (Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, a six-party Islamist alliance), particularly the Taliban’s mentor, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam.

Confident that the political opposition had been suitably marginalised and that its civilian allies would win comfortably, the military then selectively rigged the polls to give the process a veneer of legitimacy. This was one of the occasions on which I represented the International Crisis Group as an accredited international election observer and witnessed at first hand the military’s many methods of stealing elections.

The intelligence agencies worked overtime, mapping constituencies and approaching candidates to either step down or join Musharraf’s civilian party, the Pakistan Muslim League, composed mainly of defectors from Sharif’s party. Tempted or frightened, many decided to cooperate. The mullahs particularly benefited from the military’s patronage. Despite strong opposition, the MMA, for instance, was allowed to use “the book” (the Koran) as their election symbol. A young man in Swat, a traditional constituency of the moderate parties that later became the hunting ground of the militants, told me: “The mullahs came to us with the book, saying if we didn’t vote for them, we’d burn in hell. We know now that we were fooled.”

Election day saw civil and military bureaucrats, fully supported by ECP officials, making sure that chosen candidates would win. Even Musharraf’s sympathisers were sacrificed at the altar of political expediency. In Northwest Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), a candidate for Musharraf’s party was told late on Election Day, by no less than the military governor, that he had won comfortably, only to wake up the next morning to see his rival, a local mullah, celebrating his victory. The ECP’s election tribunals, widely criticised for their lack of transparency and their delay in hearing and settling complaints, favoured the military’s handpicked candidates.

Courtesy of the poll rigging, the mullahs were allowed to rule half of Pakistan for the next six years. With the MMA running the governments of Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan, the two provinces that border Afghanistan, it is hardly surprising that Islamist militants have expanded their political and military clout and undermined Pakistani and Afghan security.

Because selective rigging in the 2002 polls did not prevent Benazir Bhutto’s party from winning the largest segment of the popular vote, or perhaps because he’d finally realised how unpopular he and his regime were, Musharraf resorted to all-out rigging in the 2005 local elections. Districts were gerrymandered, opposition candidates disqualified or coerced into stepping down and state resources poured into the coffers of Musharraf’s candidates. With the ECP’s knowledge and support, the “angels,” as they’re known in Pakistan, worked overtime; widespread ballot stuffing, intimidation and seizure of polling stations marred election day. One of my researchers was threatened at gunpoint in Sindh. Although I had my international observer card displayed prominently, ECP staff tried to prevent me from entering a polling station in Lahore, backing down when other observers joined me. Unsurprisingly, the military’s civilian clients swept the polls to control a local government system – supported with generous international largesse – which accomplished little more than lining the pockets of the nazims (mayors).

With military rule crumbling under the onslaught of democratic opposition, Musharraf made one last desperate attempt to prolong his stay. Because the growing opposition to military rule had led the superior judiciary to rethink the personal and institutional costs of continuing to side with military rule, Musharraf was concerned that the Supreme Court would bar him from contesting for the presidency. He sacked the chief justice and imposed martial law in November 2007. But the shift in popular sentiment had also led the generals to distance themselves from the president, and this, combined with international pressure from the United States in particular, forced Musharraf to withdraw emergency rule and step down as army chief.

Musharraf still opted to rig the 2008 elections with the ECP’s support. But this time he was more careful; blatant rigging, particularly after Bhutto’s assassination in December 2007, would have provoked serious protests. The end result of this selective rigging was a hung parliament in which the Pakistan Peoples Party leads a fragile coalition of the centre. Without a comfortable parliamentary majority, the elected government has been vulnerable to the pressures of unreliable coalition partners and forced to accept the military high command’s dictates on national security and defense policy.

The manner in which the 2008 election was held, including the ECP’s lack of independence, the flawed legal structure, an imperfect electoral roll and the general lack of transparency, all underscore the urgent need for comprehensive electoral reform. Given the fragility of the democratic transition, there is no time to lose.

IF IT lasts until 2013, when the next general elections are due, this will be Pakistan’s first democratically elected government since 1977 to complete a full term without being dismissed either by a military-manipulated intervention or a direct military coup. But early elections can’t be ruled out, particularly given the heightened tensions between the governing Pakistan Peoples Party and the opposition Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz. Some analysts believe that the opposition could, with the military’s support, push for early polls, which could then be rigged by an increasingly interventionist military high command.

The current parliament has reversed the constitutional distortions introduced by the military regime and reinforced parliamentary democracy with new provisions, including measures to strengthen the ECP. The eighteenth amendment to the constitution, passed unanimously by parliament, has enhanced the ECP’s independence by making the appointment of its key officials more transparent and subject to parliamentary oversight. While this is an encouraging move, it’s vital that parliament urgently builds on these reforms. It should grant the ECP complete financial autonomy and ensure that all federal and provincial executive authorities assist it in enforcing the electoral code of conduct as required by law.

The ECP itself needs to deal with the many shortcomings that hamper its ability to oversee credible elections. Highly inaccurate electoral rolls have been responsible for disenfranchising millions; polling procedures are often manipulated; accountability mechanisms for candidates and political parties are seldom employed; and the electoral code of conduct is routinely flouted. Dysfunctional electoral tribunals, characterised by corruption and prolonged delays, have proved incapable of resolving post-election disputes. These internal weaknesses will need to be removed if the ECP is to oversee credible elections and an orderly political transition. Some promising first steps have been taken, including revising and computerizing the electoral roll. But much more needs to be done.

There has yet to be a transition from one democratically elected government to the next in Pakistan’s history. The leadership both sides of the political divide should realise that flawed elections undermine civilian governments and political parties more than any other factor. If the transfer of power takes place through free, fair, transparent and democratic elections, regardless of which party forms government, it will entrench the gains made by the return to civilian rule. A flawed election, on the other hand, will reduce voter confidence in the ballot box and could encourage violence as the last option for political change. This would embolden extremist groups, as well as providing the military with an opportunity to undermine or even oust the civilian government.

The international community should support and engage with parliament and political parties in their efforts to reform the electoral institutions. Pakistan’s international partners must understand that the integrity of the electoral process requires not just technical proficiency but also a conducive political environment. Despite channelling significant funds to the ECP during Musharraf’s rule, the international community failed to push for substantive change to a corrupt and inefficient electoral body for fear that the military would push back. The democratic transition now provides the framework within which international assistance can play a major role in reforming the ECP. Given the significant risk of political instability in the event of another flawed election, it is in the international community’s interest to support a credible and peaceful political transition.

Commentary / Asia

Keeping Turmoil at Bay in Pakistan’s Polarised Polity

Kicked out of office, former Prime Minister Imran Khan keeps denying his successor’s legitimacy. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2022 – Spring Update, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to help Pakistan's new government ward off violence, expand the social safety net and promote electoral reforms.

Though Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Imran Khan was ousted through a democratic, constitutional process, he has denied the new government’s legitimacy, a tack that could lead to violence. The strategy Khan has relied on since parliament passed a no-confidence vote against him on 10 April has two goals: to undermine the coalition government led by Shehbaz Sharif and to galvanise popular support for new polls. Khan accuses his political opponents, now heading a new government, of conspiring with the U.S. to remove him, and is calling on his supporters to reject “foreign-imposed regime change”. He also bears grudges against the Supreme Court for upholding the constitutionality of the no-trust vote and against the country’s powerful military for refusing to back him in the standoff. Khan’s only hope for a political comeback seems to lie in building mass opposition to Sharif’s government and forcing it to hold general elections well ahead of the scheduled 2023 date. He assumes that the military high command would back new polls, much as his relations with the top brass have soured, in order to keep political turmoil at bay. Yet his own approach – his refusal to accept the authority of the apex election body, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) – dents the prospect of a peaceful post-election transfer of power.

The Sharif government has taken a resolutely different direction from that of its predecessor. It is seeking to re-engage with key diplomatic and trading partners, particularly the European Union and the U.S. In an effort to stem the economic downturn, worsened by the war in Ukraine, it has appealed to international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, for support. The coalition government has also taken tentative steps to improve democratic governance, including by removing some curbs on media freedom. Additionally, it has pledged to enact legislation reforming the electoral process prior to holding new polls.

The political, economic and diplomatic challenges confronting the new government are compounded by deteriorating security. Khan’s anti-Western rhetoric risks emboldening Islamist militant and jihadist forces in the country. Militant violence is already surging, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, straining relations between Islamabad and Kabul’s Taliban-led authorities. Political polarisation could worsen and erupt into violence, weakening parliamentary institutions, while sapping the state’s capacity to counter security threats.

To help lower these risks, the EU and its member states should:

  • Use the structured dialogues that are part of the EU-Pakistan cooperation framework to build a constructive working relationship with the new government on political, security and foreign policy issues of mutual concern, and pursue plans to hold the first official EU-Pakistan Security Dialogue. Repairing ties with Islamabad would help undo damage done by Khan’s conspiracy narrative.
     
  • Hold talks with the new government on the renewal of Pakistan’s status under the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+), which provides substantial trade benefits to Islamabad and is set to expire at the end of 2022, including by moving forward with the European External Action Service’s GSP+ mission that was put on hold amid the Pakistani political crisis.
     
  • Assist Sharif’s government in expanding the social safety net, with special attention to women and girls, and in rebuilding militancy-hit regions, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s tribal belt abutting Afghanistan, thus thwarting militants looking to take advantage of local alienation.
     
  • Promote electoral reforms to stop the forthcoming elections from sparking violence and prepare to send an election observation mission, as past missions have helped identify problems in the electoral process.
     

The Costs of Populist Rhetoric

Since his dismissal, Khan has relied on an anti-Western narrative to attack his opponents and incite his supporters. Addressing large rallies in Karachi, Peshawar, Lahore and other cities countrywide, and using social media to spread his message to his youthful supporters, Khan has alleged that the U.S., angered by his “independent foreign policy”, conspired to remove his government. He cites as evidence a diplomatic cable, which he calls a “threat letter”, sent by Pakistan’s then-envoy to Washington after a 7 March meeting with a top State Department official. Khan claims that the U.S. was antagonised by his refusal to cancel a trip to Moscow on 24 February, the day Russia invaded Ukraine, and by his opposition to the U.S. war in Afghanistan – he says he rejected Washington’s demands for military bases in Pakistan for operations next door.

Khan’s allegations are targeted at political opponents but also the judiciary and army. He has accused the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Pakistan Peoples Party, who now spearhead the coalition government, of conniving with the U.S. to remove his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government. Khan turned to these allegations when the opposition, supported by most of his coalition partners, moved to vote no confidence in his leadership. The charges formed the bedrock of the deputy parliament speaker’s case for dismissing the motion and President Arif Alvi’s case when on 3 April he dissolved the National Assembly. Had the dissolution stood, it would have required new polls within 90 days. But on 7 April, the Supreme Court reversed both actions as unconstitutional and the no-confidence motion went ahead, resulting in Khan’s removal on 10 April and Sharif’s election as prime minister the next day. Khan’s supporters subsequently took to social media to lambast the Court, but also Pakistan’s military leaders, who stayed neutral during the showdown.

Khan accused the new government’s entire top leadership of corruption, based on charges filed against them by his government.

Following his ouster, Khan opted to take to the streets, hoping to whip up popular sentiment against the Sharif government, as well as the PTI dissidents who had chosen to back it. Khan accused the new government’s entire top leadership of corruption, based on charges filed against them by his government. He insisted that they had bought the loyalty of those PTI lawmakers, both federal and provincial, who have lined up behind them. Most PTI members of the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, resigned en masse upon Khan’s instructions. Khan has since asked the Supreme Court to bar those who refused to quit, and other PTI dissidents in the Punjab assembly, from legislative office for life, and many of them have been forced into hiding by PTI supporters’ threats of violence. The Court has passed over this request, but on 17 May, it did rule that votes of party defectors on no-confidence motions, or elections for prime minister or chief minister (the top office in Pakistan’s provinces), cannot be counted. That decision has direct implications for Punjab, the country’s most populous and politically weighty province, where provincial lawmakers, including some two dozen PTI dissidents, chose Sharif’s son Hamza over Khan’s nominee as chief minister in mid-April.

In this atmosphere of heightened polarisation, Khan’s call on his supporters to march on Islamabad and to remain there until his demand for new elections is met could lead to deadly violence. Accepting Khan’s conspiracy narrative at face value, the PTI base is infuriated by their leader’s ouster. With such a ready audience, Khan’s inflammatory rhetoric aimed at besieging the federal capital could fuel bloodshed, paralyse the government and force a military intervention that would lead to new polls. Indeed, some analysts believe that may be Khan’s intent. The PTI used similar tactics in 2014, when its sit-in against Nawaz Sharif’s government saw party activists attack parliament and other government buildings, bringing the administration to a standstill. Addressing a rally in late April, Khan called on the army to endorse holding “early elections”. The military, however, took no sides in the lead-up to the prime minister’s ouster and seems disinclined to change its stance in the aftermath. Khan’s attempts while prime minister to intrude on the military’s jealously guarded institutional autonomy are likely one reason for the high command’s lack of support. His meddling included a reported attempt to nominate his own man as army chief to replace the incumbent, who is set to retire in November. Army officials, meanwhile, have long been concerned about the adverse implications of the former prime minister’s anti-Western conspiracy narrative and his criticism of the EU and U.S., both key diplomatic and trading partners.

Even before Khan was ousted, army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa tacitly rebuked his anti-West and pro-Russia rhetoric, saying Pakistan has “very cordial historic relations with both camps”. Since Khan left office, however, the military has become more explicit in repudiating his specific claims, one of which is that the high command endorsed his allegations of U.S. skulduggery at a 31 March meeting of the National Security Council. In mid-April, the military spokesman reminded journalists that the Council had issued a statement following the 31 March meeting; they could read it themselves to see that it contained no mention of a U.S. “conspiracy”. As for what Khan calls the “threat letter”, the spokesman explained that the State Department official had used undiplomatic language in the 7 March meeting with the Pakistani envoy, amounting to “interference” in Pakistan’s internal affairs. The envoy’s cable – the so-called letter – had merely informed the foreign ministry of this interaction. Islamabad then sent a demarche to Washington, but that is where the matter stopped. The spokesman further rejected Khan’s claim that the U.S. asked Pakistan to provide bases on its territory. He concluded by emphasising that the high command had stayed neutral in the political standoff in accordance with the military’s constitutional role. On 22 April, in another statement, the Council expressly denied the existence of a U.S. plot to oust Khan. Nonetheless, the ex-prime minister persists in saying the army backs his claims.

Khan’s relationship with the military could be damaged beyond repair if he opts to violently oppose the Sharif government at a time when militant attacks are surging. Attacks by Pakistani Taliban militants, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s merged tribal districts at the border with Afghanistan, have escalated in recent weeks, killing or injuring scores of soldiers. The spike in cross-border attacks and military casualties is straining Pakistan’s ties with its Afghan Taliban allies. For the first time since the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, Pakistani warplanes have reportedly attacked Pakistani Taliban targets in Afghan territory. At a time when the Pakistani Taliban are making a comeback, taking advantage of Afghan havens, the military high command is likely particularly concerned about Khan’s anti-Western rhetoric. His allegation that the Sharif government is “foreign-imposed” – in other words, forced upon an Islamic country by meddling Westerners – could give the Pakistani Taliban yet another rallying cry with which to raise funds, find new recruits and attack state institutions.

Opportunities and Constraints

The coalition government faces major economic challenges. GDP growth is low; the current account deficit is unsustainable; foreign exchange reserves are fast depleting; and soaring inflation rates, now driven up further by the Ukraine war and the sanctions on Russia, have raised fuel and food prices. Mending relations with the West, particularly the EU and U.S., its major trading partners, is therefore a top policy priority. Sharif and his cabinet ministers recognise that the EU, through the GSP+ and the trade benefits it provides, is a major source of much-needed assistance for Pakistan’s faltering economy, and hence they have vowed to strengthen diplomatic and trade relations with the bloc. Pakistan also needs U.S. support as it approaches the IMF and the World Bank for financial assistance, a task that the government should undertake with some urgency if it is to prevent an economic meltdown. Successful negotiations with the IMF for resumption of a multibillion-dollar loan program will require withdrawing Khan’s economically unviable populist measures, such as high subsidies for fuel and power. The government has been slow to act as prices rise and its indecision is further weakening the country’s floundering economy.

With poverty levels rising and food price inflation at an all-time high, if the government fails to provide social safety nets for the poorest and most vulnerable households, public anger could play into the opposition’s hands. The Sharif government has made some promising commitments. For instance, it has committed to continued support for the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), which provides targeted assistance in the form of cash transfers to women who head households falling below the poverty line. Islamabad should consider using savings made by discontinuing Khan’s financial awards to loyalist parliamentarians and tax amnesty schemes to increase both the amount of BISP cash transfers and the number of grantees.

The coalition government has also moved to reverse steps taken under Khan to reduce media freedom and civil space more generally. Intolerance of criticism was a hallmark of the PTI government, with female journalists in particular bearing the brunt of party activists’ social media attacks. It has yet to become clear, however, if the Sharif government’s commitment to protect freedom of expression and association will translate into durable action.

The Sharif government could be forced to accept the military’s policy preferences.

Like its predecessor, the Sharif government could be forced to accept the military’s policy preferences. This tendency is already evident in a crackdown on criticism of the military on social media websites. The military’s red lines have even determined the new cabinet’s formation. After agreeing to include in his cabinet Mohsin Dawar, the National Assembly member from North Waziristan, the founder of the civil society-led Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and an outspoken military critic, Sharif now seems to be backtracking. Still, Dawar accompanied the prime minister when he visited Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s North Waziristan district less than a fortnight after taking office. During the visit, Sharif pledged to improve civic facilities such as schools and health clinics. Such civic assistance should be targeted at women and girls, whose access to education, health care and other basic services has severely declined due to both militancy and military operations in this and other conflict-hit zones.

With general elections due no later than October 2023, time constraints will limit the coalition government’s capacity to carry out governance and economic reforms. It should therefore focus on the most pressing. Clarity on economic policies, including through successful negotiations with the IMF, could help address economic uncertainty, but given the tight timeline electoral reform requires a particularly urgent response. Rejecting Khan’s calls for elections before such reforms are enacted, the coalition partners intend to work in parliament to identify gaps and flaws in electoral laws and processes.

Khan’s rejection of the ECP’s neutrality and refusal to cooperate with parliament might make it difficult to obtain political ownership of the electoral reform process. The parliamentary coalition, composed of nine political parties with widely ranging ideological and regional constituencies, is fairly representative of public opinion. It should, however, also consult civil society, including women’s and rights groups, as it devises electoral reform. Moreover, respect for the ECP’s autonomy and authority will be crucial for any credible election. The ECP’s preparations for the general elections, which could be complete by May 2023, include delineating constituencies, possibly based on a new census. This exercise should ensure that all sidelined groups, including women, are properly represented. Close cooperation between the executive and election authorities will also be needed to address a sizeable gender gap, close to 20 per cent, in the registration of female and male voters. An aggressive drive, with donor support, is needed to ensure that women are issued computerised national identity cards, a prerequisite for registering as voters. The card is also required for access to financial assistance earmarked for women, such as through the BISP.

Moving Ahead

The EU should respond positively to the Sharif government’s stated desire to reset the diplomatic ties that the former prime minister’s anti-Western agenda adversely affected. Islamabad’s growing concerns about militant threats, including from across the Afghan border, offer new opportunities for a security dialogue on issues of mutual concern. The extension of badly needed economic assistance would be particularly helpful to the new government, as it faces an unprecedented economic crisis.

Brussels should also look into expanding bilateral trade and investment ties with Islamabad, notably by renewing Pakistan’s GSP+ status, while making clear that the renewal is tied to human rights, rule of law and democratic governance conditions that the EU will monitor closely in the coming months. To assess the progress Islamabad makes on these conditions and to use the leverage that renewal can bring, the European External Action Service should move forward with its GSP+ mission, which was postponed due to Pakistan’s political crisis. In its dialogue with Islamabad, the mission should particularly focus on issues pertaining to the protection of women and children, as well as the enforcement of the freedom of association and speech enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution.

The European Union should support the new government’s efforts to provide social safety nets to the poorest and most vulnerable households.

Further, the European Union should support the new government’s efforts to provide social safety nets to the poorest and most vulnerable households, worst affected by the economic crisis. It should provide financial and technical aid to assist Pakistan in giving all women computerised national identity cards to afford them access to existing social safety programs, such as the BISP, and to any new ones (as well as to the ballot box). Brussels should also work with Islamabad in helping residents of the conflict-hit zones of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, particularly the tribal belt on the border with Afghanistan. Women and girls, who have borne the brunt of both militancy and military operations, should be a key target of such assistance.

Finally, the EU should encourage parliamentary reforms of the electoral legal framework. It should, for instance, urge Pakistan to consider the recommendations of the 2018 election observation mission, particularly with regard to restrictions on freedom of speech and association. Brussels should also consider sending an election observation mission for the forthcoming general elections, which would, as in the case of past missions, advise the ECP and the incoming government on areas of particular interest for electoral reform. At the very least, a credible electoral process may curb the potential for electoral disputes to degenerate into violence.

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