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Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan
Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Winning the War on Polio in Pakistan
Winning the War on Polio in Pakistan
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Report 255 / Asia

Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan

Jihadi and criminal violence is wreaking havoc in Pakistan’s provincial capitals, eroding stability and public confidence in the government’s ability to restore law and order and enforce the writ of the state, while exposing Pakistan’s religious minorities to ever intensifying confessionally-driven violence.

Executive Summary

Endemic violence in Pakistan’s urban centres signifies the challenges confronting the federal and provincial governments in restoring law and order and consolidating the state’s writ. The starkest example is Karachi, which experienced its deadliest year on record in 2013, with 2,700 casualties, mostly in targeted attacks, and possibly 40 per cent of businesses fleeing the city to avoid growing extortion rackets. However, all provincial capitals as well as the national capital suffer from similar problems and threats. A national rethink of overly militarised policy against crime and militancy is required. Islamabad and the four provincial governments need to develop a coherent policy framework, rooted in providing good governance and strengthening civilian law enforcement, to tackle criminality and the jihadi threat. Until then, criminal gangs and jihadi networks will continue to wreak havoc in the country’s big cities and put its stability and still fragile democratic transition at risk.

Some of the worst assaults on religious and sectarian minorities in 2013 occurred in Quetta and Peshawar, including the 10 January suicide and car bomb attack that killed over 100, mostly Shias, in Quetta; the 16 February terror attack that killed more than 80, again mostly Shias, in Quetta’s Hazara town; and the 22 September bombing of a Peshawar church that killed more than 80 people, mostly Christians.

The provincial capitals of Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi and Lahore are bases of operations and financing for a range of extremist groups and criminal gangs that exploit poor governance and failing public infrastructure to establish recruitment and patronage networks. As urban populations grow, the competition over resources, including land and water, has become increasingly violent.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)’s capital, Peshawar, and Balochistan’s capital, Quetta, are hostage to broader regional security trends. The conflict in Afghanistan and cross-border ties between Pakistan and Afghan militants have undermined stability in KPK and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Military-dictated counter-insurgency policies, swinging between indiscriminate force and appeasement deals with tribal militants have failed to restore the peace, and instead further empowered violent extremists. Police in Peshawar, which has borne the brunt of militant violence and where violence is at an all-time high, lack political support and resources and appear increasingly incapable of meeting the challenge. Indeed, while militants and criminals frequently target that city, the force is powerless to act when they then seek haven in bordering FATA agencies, because its jurisdiction, according to the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, does not extend to these areas.

Balochistan’s location, bordering on southern Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban’s homeland, and longstanding Pakistani policies of backing Afghan Islamist proxies are partly responsible for the growth of militancy and extremism that now threatens Quetta. Aided by a countrywide network, Sunni extremists have killed hundreds of Shias there, while their criminal allies have helped to fill jihadi coffers, and their own, through kidnappings for ransom. Civilian law enforcement agencies cannot counter this rising tide of sectarian violence and criminality, since they are marginalised by the military and its paramilitary arms. Continuing to dictate and implement security policy, the military remains focused on brutally supressing a province-wide Baloch insurgency, fuelled by the denial of political and economic autonomy. The end result is more Baloch alienation and more jihadi attacks undermining peace in the provincial capital.

In Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city, which generates around 70 per cent of national GDP, much of the violence is driven by the state’s failure to meet the demands of a fast growing population and to enforce the law. Over the past decade, the competition over resources and turf has become increasingly violent. Criminals and militant groups attempt to lure youth by providing scarce services, work and a purpose in life. Demographic changes fuel ethno-political tensions and rivalries, accentuated by the main political parties: the mostly Sindhi Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) representing mohajirs and the predominately Pashtun Awami National Party (ANP) forging links with criminal gangs.

Like Quetta and Peshawar, Karachi is a major target of violent sectarian groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which has its home base in Punjab. Since the LeJ and other major jihadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (LeT/JD) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed conduct operations within and outside the country from bases in Punjab, the provincial government and police are central to any comprehensive counter-terrorism effort. It is imperative that both be reformed if the threat is to be addressed effectively. Countering jihadi networks also requires coordination and collaboration between the federal and provincial governments and law enforcement institutions.

Pakistani policymakers must acknowledge and address the socio-economic disparities that lead to crime and militancy in the urban centres. Stemming the spread of urban violence also requires efficient, accountable, civilian-led policing. Yet, the forces in all four provincial capitals are hampered by lack of professional and operational autonomy, inadequate personnel and resources and poor working conditions. Instead of relying on the military or paramilitary forces to restore order, the provincial governments should guarantee security of tenure for police officers, end all interference in police operations and raise police morale, including by acknowledging and supporting a force that has been repeatedly targeted by terrorists. It is equally important for all four provinces to reform and modernise the urban policing system to meet present needs.

Above all, the state must adopt a policy of zero tolerance toward all forms of militancy. Proposed plans by the federal and KPK governments to negotiate with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), without preconditions or a roadmap, are unwise. Such a strategy is bound to fail, as have successive military-devised peace deals with tribal militants in recent years that only expanded the space for jihadi networks in FATA, KPK and countrywide.

A Pakistani health worker administers the polio vaccine to a child during a vaccination campaign in Rawalpindi on 9 December 2014. AFP/Farooq Naeem
Report 273 / Asia

Winning the War on Polio in Pakistan

Pakistan remains the greatest impediment to a polio-free world. The link between the disease and Islamist anti-immunisation campaigns is clear but without an appropriate political response. The authorities must tackle extremist networks, step up health services, and make sure that health workers are safe.

Executive Summary

As the world marks Polio Day on 24 October, Pakistan remains the greatest impediment to a polio-free world. It has more cases than any other country, reflecting dual policy failures: to prioritise citizens’ health and to curb violent extremism. Despite signs of impressive improvement, with cases declining fast, there is a real risk of another spike unless steps are taken to fully reverse years of neglect to public health services. The prevalence of the disease and conflict is closely interlinked. With militant opposition to immunisation and attacks on polio workers undermining eradication efforts in the volatile FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) agencies, a coercive, military-led strategy should be replaced by a civilian-led approach that encourages community buy-in, respects rights and meets the needs of a marginalised population. Protecting and supporting polio workers and more closely involving communities in eradication efforts should be top priorities. The government should also remove misgivings about the vaccine, created by the anti-immunisation propaganda of Islamist parties and militant sympathisers.

With violent extremists attacking polio workers, particularly targeting women, in FATA, parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan provinces and Karachi, hundreds of children contracted the disease in 2014. Despite the relative decline in extremist violence, attacks continue, underscoring the importance of protecting the polio workers. Many parents have refused to immunise their children, either fearing militant reprisal or misled by Islamist parties and some mullahs into believing that the vaccine is an un-Islamic Western plot to harm the children.

Having already spanned the porous border with Afghanistan, the only other country where it is endemic, polio could again become a global health risk if its spread is not halted in Pakistan.

While the decline in cases, from 328 in 2014 to 38 as of October 2015, can be partly attributed to increased vaccination coverage of populations fleeing military operations in FATA’s North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Khyber agencies, these gains could prove fragile. Militant networks have yet to be dismantled, and, as demonstrated by the September attack on an airbase in Peshawar, their capacity to regroup, reorganise and resume strikes against the state and citizens remains intact.

The government has taken some steps after the 2014 wake-up call, when polio cases increased dramatically, stoking international concern about the disease’s possible spread beyond Pakistan. By the end of the year, the government and its partners in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) – a public/private initiative launched in 1988 by national governments and spearheaded by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to eradicate polio – had initiated measures to overhaul the eradication program, including through more comprehensive security assessments, better planning and improved coordination and communication between all actors.

Innovative methods, such as reducing reliance on police protection, instead using communities to protect vaccinators and employing vaccinators from within those communities, are being tried on a limited scale but with considerable success in some cities, including Pashtun-majority areas in Karachi that host scores of FATA internally displaced persons (IDPs) and some FATA agencies. However, efforts to convince many mullahs and Islamist leaders to stop misleading communities by depicting the vaccine as un-Islamic and a health risk have had mixed results at best; many parents still refuse to allow their children to be vaccinated

It is essential to maintain momentum. The key test will come in May 2016, when, at the end of the current low-transmission, relatively cool season, the temperature begins to rise and with it the risk of the virus spreading. It will be possible then to judge whether vaccination teams are reaching every child under five. If Pakistan is to make a durable transition out of its current polio-endemic status, it should complement eradication successes with wider routine immunisation coverage, through the Expanded Program on Immunisation (EPI), and significantly improved basic health care and sanitation. In the conflict zones, such as FATA, this requires better governance and security. Success countrywide will also depend on the government’s willingness to partner with civil society and local and international NGOs to protect children from contracting a disease that has been eradicated in most of the world.