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Why Trump Should Take It Slow With Kim Jong Un
Why Trump Should Take It Slow With Kim Jong Un
Sri Lanka's President Maithripala Sirisena (front) stands for the national anthem during a ceremony to swear in Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party, as Sri Lanka's new prime minister, Colombo, 21 August 2015. REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawat
Report 278 / Asia

Sri Lanka: Jumpstarting the Reform Process

Seven years after its civil war ended, Sri Lanka’s democratic space has reopened but strains are building from a powerful opposition, institutional overlaps and a weakened economy. To make reforms a real success, the prime minister and president should cooperate with openness and redouble efforts to tackle legacies of war like impunity, Tamil detainees and military-occupied land.

Executive Summary

The unexpected chance for lasting peace and reconciliation in Sri Lanka that followed President Maithripala Sirisena’s January 2015 election faces increasing turbulence. Initial moves by Sirisena’s government halted and began to reverse the slide into authoritarianism and family rule under Mahinda Rajapaksa. Its reform agenda is ambitious: restoring the rule-of-law and ending impunity for corruption and abuse of power; a new constitution; a complex package of post-war reconciliation and justice mechanisms agreed with the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC); and major policy changes to jump-start a beleaguered economy. Progress, however, has been slower than key constituencies expected and lacks the coherence and resources needed to sustain it. The “national unity” government expanded the political centre and isolated hard-line nationalists, but the window for change has begun to close. Seizing Sri Lanka’s unprecedented opportunity for reform requires bolder and better coordinated policies, backed by a public relations campaign to restore sagging popular support.

The stuttering progress strains ties between the government and the constituencies that brought it to power. Tamils in the north and east voted overwhelmingly for Sirisena but are increasingly doubtful he will fulfil his reconciliation and justice promises. Many Sinhala “good governance” activists criticise the failure to follow through on rule-of-law measures, continued cases of alleged nepotism and corruption and what they consider the lethargic pursuit of corruption and criminal investigations. As the budget deficit grows and currency reserves dwindle, belt-tightening has been blocked or scaled back due to protests. At the same time, strains are growing between Sirisena’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The small window for threading the political needles essential for reforms is shrinking. 

Institutional factors hamper progress: too few staff and too little expertise, particularly on reconciliation and transitional justice issues, multiple power centres and unwieldy, often overlapping ministries, and the different priorities and governance styles of president and prime minister. Governance reforms are slowed by need to work through bureaucrats and politicians implicated in past abuses, some of whom were given cabinet posts to help the government achieve the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to approve a new constitution.

Boldness is limited by Sirisena’s struggle to counter the faction loyal to ex-President Rajapaksa within his SLFP, especially in upcoming local elections. Reacting defensively to Sinhala nationalists’ attacks against Sirisena’s relatively modest reconciliation gestures and proposed constitutional reform and scared of giving opponents ammunition or angering the military and security services, the government has returned only a small portion of military-occupied land and released few Tamil detainees. 

Seven years after the end of the civil war in May 2009, issues of reconciliation and accountability remain largely unaddressed. The government appears to be backtracking on transitional justice plans, particularly the role of foreign judges and experts. The enormity of the crimes, especially in the final weeks of the war, makes them impossible to ignore but hard for the military and most Sinhalese to acknowledge or accept responsibility for. Mechanisms promised to the UNHRC feed Sinhala nationalist suspicions, while attempts to reassure Sinhalese and the military encourage doubts among Tamils about government willingness to pursue justice for wartime atrocities or back constitutional changes that satisfy legitimate Tamil aspirations for meaningful autonomy. 

To hold its coalition together and meet UNHRC obligations, the government must sequence reforms carefully, speeding progress on some fronts to rebuild public confidence, while committing resources to build support and institutional capacity for deeper and harder steps, particularly making progress on the critically important special court for prosecuting war crimes. Better communication and cooperation between president and prime minister, more transparent policymaking and clearer lines of authority are essential.

To rebuild confidence among Tamil communities in the north and east, the government must quickly release detainees and military-occupied land, begin credible inquiries into the fate of the disappeared, investigate and end abuses and repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). For these and other reforms to be sustainable, the president and prime minister will have to assert authority over the military and national security apparatus, including by developing a credible security sector reform plan. If they are serious about constitutional changes that will contribute to a lasting solution to the ethnic conflict, Sirisena and key ministers must make a much stronger public case for greater devolution of power.

Ending impunity and restoring rule-of-law are concern to the whole country, as seen in the popularity of good governance and anti-corruption citizen movements in the Sinhala south. To resonate more broadly with all ethnic groups and regions, measures for addressing the war’s legacy should be presented by the government and civil society as an integral part of the rule-of-law and good governance agenda. Moves to prosecute key cases of corruption and political killing under the Rajapaksa regime need to be backed by a sustained public relations campaign that articulates a broad vision of a reformed state, the links between the various initiatives and the benefits they bring all communities. 

As longstanding dysfunctional political dynamics reassert themselves, the government’s ability to distinguish itself from the Rajapaksa era, which is essential to its political survival, has begun to fade. If ethnic and religious chauvinists in all communities are not to grow stronger and belief in democratic reform that Sirisena’s election reflected and encouraged is to be rekindled, the government must make a concerted push to jump-start the flagging reform process.

Recommendations

To strengthen rule-of-law and democratic governance 

To the government of Sri Lanka: 

  1. Ratify the UN Disappearances Convention and pass enabling legislation criminalising disappearances; terminate the Paranagama commission on missing persons and transfer its investigation files to dedicated police investigation units. 
     
  2. Pass the pending Right to Information (RTI) Act and legislation to establish a well-resourced and empowered Audit Commission. 
     
  3. Repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and replace it, in consultation with lawyers and human rights defenders, with legislation in line with Sri Lanka’s international human rights obligations; and develop and publish guidelines for expediting cases against existing PTA detainees and releasing those against whom there is insufficient evidence to bring charges.
     
  4. Overhaul the Victims and Witness Protection Act, in consultation with human rights activists, to establish a well-resourced witness protection authority fully independent of police and security forces.
     
  5. End the longstanding conflict of interest in the Attorney General’s Department by establishing a permanent, independent special prosecutor for serious human rights cases in which state officials are alleged perpetrators. 
     
  6. Establish a clear focal point in the Attorney General’s Department, staffed by state counsels vetted for conflict of interest or involvement in past cover-ups, to oversee and prosecute emblematic cases of political killings and abduction currently under investigation.

To promote reconciliation, reestablish effective civil administration in the north and east and begin security sector reform

To the government of Sri Lanka: 

  1. Take immediate steps to end remaining military involvement in civil administration; remove the military from all shops, farms, hotels and other commercial businesses; and immediately suspend construction or expansion of military camps in the north and east.
     
  2. Establish, in consultation with communities and the military, transparent principles, processes and timetables for the return of military-occupied land or payment of compensation for land that is not to be returned. 
     
  3. End intimidating monitoring of civil society activists and ex-detainees by security services and appoint an independent, multi-ethnic, well-resourced internal affairs unit to investigate credible allegations of arbitrary detentions, abductions and torture in custody.
     
  4. Begin developing a longer-term plan for comprehensive security sector reform that includes job training for demobilised personnel; and devise and implement in the short term policies for handling individuals credibly alleged to be responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.  

To support constitutional reform needed for lasting political stability

To the government of Sri Lanka:

  1. Launch a public outreach campaign, led by the president and prime minster, in support of expanded devolution of power to provinces.
     
  2. Support a mixed electoral system that maintains proportionality and the influence of smaller, regionally-dispersed parties through use of double-ballots.

To address the complex demands of transitional justice processes

To the government of Sri Lanka: 

  1. Reaffirm publicly the government’s commitment to full implementation of the 1 October 2015 UN Human Rights Council resolution and take initial steps to build capacity and public support for effective transitional justice, by:
     
    1. launching a coordinated public outreach campaign – involving the offices of the president and prime minister, the Reconciliation Secretariat (SCRM), National Unity Office (ONUR) and national dialogue ministry – to promote the value of transitional justice mechanisms and highlight links to broader rule-of-law measures, beginning with immediate distribution of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) report in all three languages once Tamil and Sinhala translations are available;
       
    2. giving the public consultation process adequate resources and endorsement and presenting draft legislative proposals to it for popular input, with a transparent timeframe for final submission to the parliament; 
       
    3. publishing draft legislation for the Missing Persons Office and inviting active input from families of the missing and disappeared and other stakeholders;
       
    4. establishing a timeline for training judges, lawyers and investigators for participation in the special war crimes court and for passing legislation establishing command responsibility as a mode of criminal liability and incorporating war crimes and crimes against humanity into national law; and
       
    5. requesting the OHCHR to recommend international prosecutors and judges for participation in the special court as committed to in the resolution. 

Colombo/Brussels, 18 May 2016

Op-Ed / United States

Why Trump Should Take It Slow With Kim Jong Un

Originally published in Politico Magazine

Any successful deal with North Korea will require an extraordinary amount of patience and attention to detail.

After three months of palace intrigue, speculation and on-again-off-again pronouncements, the Singapore summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un is finally upon us. The core question is whether this historic meeting between two idiosyncratic leaders who were just months ago exchanging taunts like “Little Rocket Man” and “dotard,” and one-upping each other’s threats of nuclear annihilation, can help find a path toward denuclearization and stability for the Korean Peninsula.

We both worked in the Obama White House but this is not a partisan matter and we are rooting wholeheartedly for this administration’s success. Nobody will benefit if the leaders walk away from the summit disappointed and frustrated, and there’s certainly some risk of that. If the parties try to accomplish too much in Singapore, or if they fail to identify a realistic game plan for the period that follows, then they could return to the escalating standoff that characterized their relations throughout 2017. But toxic frustration is not the only alternative. As a senior U.S. diplomat recently told us, if the complete failure to reach agreement is on one end of the spectrum of possibilities, and a “bad deal” for the United States is on the other, there is plenty of space for a positive result in the middle.

We agree. In a report authored for International Crisis Group, we try to steer the parties toward a so-called “deep freeze” that each party might be able to claim as its own version of that middle ground.

First, during the summit, the two leaders should agree on a short declaration of principles that sets forth each party’s strategic priorities, putting off talk for now of a full-blown treaty — something impossible to do responsibly in the given time. In Washington’s case, the priority would no doubt be a commitment to denuclearization. Pyongyang, which above all else wants a redefined political and security relationship with Washington, might ask the United States to affirm that it harbors no “hostile intent” toward North Korea. The parties could commit to sustain the testing pause already in place and other confidence-building measures — perhaps a ratcheting back of some aspects of joint U.S-South Korean military exercises. And the leaders could commit to meet again.

It took Pyongyang 70 years to acquire a nuclear capability that it regards as fundamental to its security, and there are limits to how far and how fast it will go down a new path.

But while this would set a helpful frame for future talks, Washington and Pyongyang have generated similar documents in the past, and North Korea’s nuclear program has advanced anyway. So beyond the declaration, the parties need to come up with a plan for what needs to happen after the summit so that the odds for success are better this time around. Here again, the plan needs to be informed by a healthy dose of realism. It took Pyongyang 70 years to acquire a nuclear capability that it regards as fundamental to its security, and there are limits to how far and how fast it will go down a new path. The strategic implications are too great, the bilateral trust deficit is too deep, and the North Korean nuclear program is too big and advanced to follow the path that Libya took in 2003 and 2004, when it dismantled its nuclear infrastructure in short order and shipped much of it to Oak Ridge, Tennessee. That is why we believe it may be useful to aim for a way station that would move the parties in the direction of denuclearization without getting them all the way there in one fell swoop.

Our road map to a “deep freeze” would bring the parties to a verifiable cap on the production of nuclear weapons, plutonium and enriched uranium, and long-range missiles—i.e., missiles capable of striking the U.S. and whatever other missiles the parties agree should be part of the arrangement. We don’t set a time frame but this could be done even within the current presidential term if the parties set their minds to it. The plan has four steps:

  • The first step, which could be done very quickly, would be to flesh out and formally commit to the elements of the current pause that Pyongyang has carried out unilaterally. For example, while North Korea has ceased all missile and nuclear testing, it is not clear whether it intends to refrain from all short- and medium-range missile launches, or from space launcher development. These matters should be clarified.
     
  • The second step, which will take months to negotiate and implement, would involve measures to broaden the scope of the pause and make it more resilient. North Korea would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thereby committing itself not to test nuclear weapons. And it would permit outside observers or remote monitoring equipment to be introduced at key sites in North Korea, both to begin answering questions about its baseline capabilities and to create some practical obstacles to the resumption of paused activities. (It’s harder to do the wrong thing if observers are on site.)
     
  • The third step, the most challenging of the plan, would involve expanding the monitoring regime to encompass the entirety of North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile production capabilities, including the science and production base that support these capabilities. By the end of the third step, observers or monitors would be permitted wherever they need to be in order to form a comprehensive baseline of the North Korean nuclear and missile-related activities to be frozen. This step is more difficult than either of those preceding it because it would require North Korea to disclose the location of secret activities to the U.S., which theoretically could use that information for military purposes should relations revert to earlier form. North Korea will almost certainly insist on security guarantees before it permits this step.
     
  • The fourth step would be the establishment of a full production cap and freeze for nuclear weapons, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, long-range missiles and other programs and technology related to the capability to produce them. It might also include limits on the production and stockpiling of components required for nuclear and missile production, such as uranium mining, centrifuge production, and the manufacture of missile engines.
If Washington fails to balance its ambitions with a healthy dose of realism, it could come up empty handed.

In considering this plan, Washington would need to accept that North Korea is not going to move down this path unless it sees the United States taking corresponding measures. For this reason, while Washington has resisted an action-for-action framework for its engagement with Pyongyang, it is the only viable approach. As for what some of those measures might entail, on the political front, North Korea would like to see the United States enter into a peace agreement that ends the Korean War and afford it diplomatic recognition. On the security front, it might want to see the ratcheting back of U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, a written renunciation of any first strike by one party against the other, and a commitment not to deploy nuclear-capable bombers and submarines in or around the Korean Peninsula. On the economic front, sanctions relief (especially in key economic sectors like seafood and textiles) will be important. While some measures may be relatively straightforward for the United States to take early on in the process, it may hold others for later in the game.

Our plan might be seen as too little by some who want immediate results. We too want rapid results, but we also caution against magical thinking. North Korea won’t be threatened into giving up its nuclear weapons, and if Washington fails to balance its ambitions with a healthy dose of realism, it could come up empty handed — and risk a relapse into the crisis mode that characterized 2017. That scary period seems like a long way away from this week’s circus atmosphere in Singapore, but the parties could be back there very quickly if talks fail. We hope prudence and patience guide them instead, and they see that moving down a calibrated path in the right direction is better than racing back to a stand-off on the edge of a very dangerous cliff.

Contributors

Program Director, United States
StephenPomper
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Jon B. Wolfsthal
Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie