Das Militär als Nutznießer
Das Militär als Nutznießer
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Op-Ed / Asia

Das Militär als Nutznießer

Separatismus kommt den Streitkräften politisch gelegen

Indonesiens Reformprozess, der Wandel vom autoritär geführten Staat zu einer Demokratie, steht still. Der beunruhigendste Aspekt ist der wieder rapide steigende politische Einfluss der Armee, der voranschreitet, ohne dass es Fortschritte in den Bereichen Rechenschaft, Haushaltstransparenz und zivile Kontrolle gäbe. Besonders offensichtlich ist das in der Militäraktion gegen die "Bewegung Freies Aceh" (GAM).

Es geht nicht darum, ob Indonesiens Regierung das Recht hat, mit Militärgewalt gegen eine Rebellenbewegung vorzugehen - sicher hat sie dieses Recht. Versuche, den Konflikt friedlich zu lösen, waren gescheitert. GAM stellte eine große Gefahr für die Sicherheitslage dar. Es war richtig, dass das Militär, nicht die Polizei, die Führungsrolle übernommen hat. Bedenklich ist, wie das Militär in Aceh eingesetzt wird und dass es kaum zivile Kontrolle gibt. Bedenklich ist, welche politischen Ziele der Aceh-Einsatz verfolgt und welche Konsequenzen er für andere Konfliktgebiete hat, zum Beispiel für die Provinz Papua, wo ebenfalls eine Separatistenbewegung bekämpft wird.

Die Militäraktion in Aceh kommt in der indonesischen Öffentlichkeit gut an. Eine durch Militärpropaganda von der Öffentlichkeit als "erfolgreich" bewertete Aceh-Offensive hat langfristige, negative Folgen für den Demokratisierungsprozess Indonesiens. Eine gestärkte Armee wird versuchen, wieder eine größere Rolle bei der Erhaltung der inneren Sicherheit zu gewinnen - auf Kosten der Polizei. Das Militär hat zwar vor einem Jahr akzeptiert, dass es bald seine bislang garantierten Parlamentssitze verliert. Aber nicht zuletzt durch die Aceh-Offensive kann es sein, dass die Streitkräfte hinter den Kulissen mehr politischen Einfluss haben werden als jetzt durch ihre Parlamentsfraktion.

Separatismus kommt den Streitkräften gelegen. Da Indonesien keine Bedrohung von außen erfährt, können nur Bedrohungen der Grenzen von innen starke, einflussreiche Streitkräfte rechtfertigen. Dass die Militärs dies sehr genau wissen, zeigt sich in den Südmolukken. Dort gibt es eine Separatistenbewegung, die nur ganz wenige Mitglieder und keine militärische Schlagkraft hat, also keine wahre Bedrohung darstellt. Aber in der Rhetorik der Generäle wird diese Bewegung immer in einem Atemzug mit den ernst zu nehmenden Separatistengruppen in Aceh und Papua genannt. So soll die Gefahr von innen als sehr hoch erscheinen.

Die Intensität der Aceh-Offensive ist eine Machtdemonstration des Militärs: gegenüber den Acehnesen, den Menschen in Papua und gegenüber der Öffentlichkeit im ganzen Land. Obwohl das zu einer Aufwertung der Streitkräfte führen wird, ist eine massive Militäraktion in Papua sehr unwahrscheinlich, sie würde die Kapazität der Armee übersteigen. Außerdem ist ein riesiger Militäreinsatz in Papua nicht notwendig, weil die Separatistenbewegung Papuas weit weniger schlagkräftig ist als die GAM in Aceh. Stattdessen wird die Armee wahrscheinlich ihre Bemühungen verstärken, in Papua gegen friedliche Anhänger der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung vorzugehen. Zudem wird Papua politisch genutzt werden, das Militär wird öfter über diesen "Konfliktherd" sprechen. So wollen die Generäle erreichen, dass ihre Rolle als Verteidiger der Integrität Indonesien unumstritten bleibt, also nicht von zivilen Politikern und von der Zivilgesellschaft in Frage gestellt wird. Die Aceh-Offensive hat den Weg dorthin und den Weg zu großem politischen Einfluss der Streitkräfte geebnet.

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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