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The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia
The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia
Op-Ed / Asia

The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia

Originally published in Southeast Asian Affairs 2011

Despite the steady weakening of major jihadi groups, the potential for low-tech, low-casualty terrorist violence in Indonesia remains high, facilitated by corruption and other shortcomings in key state institutions.  Every arrest of a terrorist suspect – and there were more than a hundred in 2010 – produces new information showing that extremist networks are more extensive than previously thought and that groups are constantly evolving and mutating, with older organisations like Jemaah Islamiyah losing ground to new alliances.

The fact that the only deaths at terrorist hands in 2010 were ten Indonesian police officers highlights an ideological shift among extremists that has been taking place for the last several years: Indonesian officials are now seen as at least as much the enemy as the U.S. and its allies. That shift has come about partly in recognition of the lack of public support for attacks on foreign civilians, partly through the influence on Indonesian radicals of the Jordanian writer Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and partly out of determination to avenge the deaths of mujahidin killed police raids.

It has produced a concomitant shift in Indonesian Government thinking. Particularly after a plot was discovered in mid-2009 against President Yudhoyono by the same team that bombed two luxury hotels in Jakarta, the government began to see terrorism as an issue of state security, not just an extraordinary crime. This in turn helped fast-track the establishment of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penganggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) and has led to a push by the Indonesian military for a greater role in counter-terrorism efforts.

The government made little headway during the year in terrorism prevention efforts, but it did acknowlege the need for better prison oversight after some twenty former prisoners were captured or killed in police operations during the year. The recidivists included several common criminals who had been recruited in prison. While plans remain under discussion for constructing a separate facility for terrorists, some steps were taken toward better monitoring of detainees. Several particularly high-profile suspects arrested during the year were isolated from their friends and held in separate police lock-ups while awaiting trial.

The year also saw increased cooperation in some areas between hardline but non-jihadi groups with more overtly jihadi organisations, particularly over the issue of “Christianization” – referring both efforts to convert Muslims as well as the alleged growth of Christian influence in traditional Muslim strongholds. With few other local drivers for recruitment, the increasing exploitation of “Christianization” is cause for concern, especially as officials both at the national and local levels appear to have no effective response. The manipulation of this issue was particularly apparent in November in the aftermath of the Mount Merapi volcanic eruption in Central Java.

Taken from “The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia” by Sidney Jones which first appeared in Southeast Asian Affairs 2011 edited by Daljit Singh (2011), pp. 91-92. Reproduced here with the kind permission of the publisher, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Briefing 139 / Asia

Indonesia: Tensions Over Aceh’s Flag

A dispute over a flag in Aceh is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Indonesia’s central government, heightening ethnic tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of the province and raising fears of violence as the 2014 national elections approach.

I. Overview

The decision of the Aceh provincial government to adopt the banner of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) as its official provincial flag is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Jakarta, heightening ethnic and political tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of Aceh and raising fears of violence as a national election approaches in 2014.

On 25 March 2013, the provincial legislature adopted a regulation (qanun) making the GAM’s old banner the provincial flag. It was immediately signed by Governor Zaini Abdullah. The governor and deputy governor are members of Partai Aceh, the political party set up by former rebel leaders in 2008 that also controls the legislature.

The central government, seeing the flag as a separatist symbol and thus in violation of national law, immediately raised objections and asked for changes. Partai Aceh leaders, seeing the flag as a potent tool for mass mobilisation in 2014, have refused, arguing that it cannot be a separatist symbol if GAM explicitly recognised Indonesian sovereignty as part of the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 that ended a nearly 30-year insurgency. Partai Aceh believes that if it remains firm, Jakarta will eventually concede, as it did in 2012 over an election dispute.

Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s government is torn. On the one hand, it does not want a fight with the GAM leaders; the 2005 peace agreement is the most important achievement of a president who, in his final term, is very much concerned about his legacy. It also is unwilling to provoke GAM too far, fearful that it will return to conflict, a fear many in Aceh discount as unwarranted but one that Partai Aceh has exploited with relish. On the other hand, it does not want to be branded as anti-nationalist as the 2014 election looms, especially as some in the security forces remain convinced that GAM has not given up the goal of independence and is using democratic means to pursue it. The president and his advisers also know that if they allow the GAM flag to fly, it will have repercussions in Papua, where dozens of pro-independence activists remain jailed for flying the “Morning Star” flag of the independence movement.

GAM leaders see little to lose by standing their ground. The flag is a hugely emotive symbol, and defying Jakarta is generally a winning stance locally. Some individual members of parliament see it as a way of regaining waning popularity for failing to deliver anything substantive to their constituencies. Also, Partai Aceh took a controversial decision to partner with Gerindra, the party of former army General Prabowo Subianto, for the 2014 election. Leaders like Muzakir Manaf, deputy governor and former commander of GAM’s armed wing, may want to use the flag issue to show they have not compromised their principles by allying with a man whose human rights record is often questioned.

Within Aceh, adoption of the GAM flag has sparked protests from non-Acehnese ethnic groups in the central highlands and south west. The GAM heartland has always been along the east coast; to highlanders like the Gayo, the flag thus represents the domination of the coastal Acehnese at their expense. The issue has revived a dormant campaign for the division of Aceh into three by the creation of two new provinces, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) for the central highlands and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS) for the south west. If GAM does not back down on the flag, support for that campaign by the intelligence services is likely to rise, and with it, the probability of increased ethnic tensions.

The options for breaking the stalemate seem to be as follows: the government concedes; GAM concedes, making slight changes to the flag by adding or removing an element; GAM agrees to limits on how or where the flag can be displayed; or the dispute is taken to the Supreme Court, thereby delaying any resolution.

In the meantime, the power of the GAM machinery in Aceh continues to grow.

Jakarta /Brussels, 7 May 2013