The devolution of authority over some police functions to civilian auxiliaries and private security organisations should be a source of concern to those concerned about police reform in Indonesia. While much donor aid is going into community policing, the trend in parts of Indonesia seems to be to allow local civilian groups, untrained and unaccountable, to provide protection or fight crime instead of the police. The trend is worrisome under any circumstances, but particularly so given political tensions in the lead-up to the 2004 elections.

The dependence on civilian security groups is the product of three factors:

• the perceived breakdown in law and order following the collapse of the Soeharto government in 1998, combined with general distrust of the police, which has led in many parts of Indonesia to vigilantism and a demand for protection from private groups;
   
• a massive decentralisation program that has given far more political and economic power to local government, particularly at the sub-provincial level; and
   
• a shortage of police to cope with post-Soeharto problems, particularly after the formal separation of the police from the armed forces in 1999.

This report focuses on civilian groups on the neighbouring islands of Bali and Lombok.

In Bali, traditional ritual guards – pecalang – have taken on both a security role, as a police partner, and a political role, as the protectors of President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s party, the PDI-P. But as an ethnically Balinese force at a time of growing anti-migrant sentiment on Bali, the pecalang may prove to be a liability in maintaining law and order.

In Lombok, just east of Bali, traditional religious leaders – tuan guru – have acquired their own private militias – pam swakarsa – the size of which is an indication of an individual’s mass following. As support from tuan guru is essential for anyone with political aspirations on the island, these militias have frequently been turned into protection forces for candidates. They are even more problematic when they also take on, as they tend to do, a crime-fighting role in the absence of an effective police force.

In both Bali and Lombok, following the fall of Soeharto in 1998, these groups were welcomed as part of a broader decentralisation program to reduce the role of the military in providing internal security. The public perception was that they were empowering local residents to protect their villages from crime and infiltration by political provocateurs. Over five years, however, they have become increasingly involved in extortion and violence to the detriment of legal and political reform in both provinces. While their standing has ebbed and flowed, they are likely to gain in influence in the run up to the 2004 elections as political parties rely on them to help with their mass mobilisation campaigns.

Jakarta/Brussels, 7 November 2003