Bosna i Hercegovina: Državne institucije pod napadom
Bosna i Hercegovina: Državne institucije pod napadom
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans
Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans

Bosna i Hercegovina: Državne institucije pod napadom

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Pregled

Bosna i Hercegovina se suočava sa najgorom krizom od rata. Državne insitucije su pod napadom sa svih strana; nasilje vjerovatno nije izvjesno ali je moguće ako se ovo nastavi. Sedam mjeseci nakon izbora, nema državne vlasti i mala je šansa da će uskoro biti formirana. Vlast u većem od entiteta, Federaciji, je u martu formirana kontroverzno, prema glavnoj državnoj instituciji ilegalno, a protive joj se Hrvati koji su kreirali paralelni Hrvatski narodni sabor. Drugi entitet, Republika Srpska, je pozvao na referendum koji bi mogao dati potporu istupanju Srba iz institucija BiH. Sa takvim trendovima, isuviše je lako zamisliti bošnjačke partije kako upravljaju propalom državom čije su institucije napustili Srbi i Hrvati. Potrebni su kompromisi da bi svaka od BiH strana dobila dovoljno da proglasi pobjedu kako bi opravdala povlačenje sa ivice. Međunarodna zajednica se treba odmaći od prevelike uključenosti u lokalnu politiku kako bi mogla podesila svoje ciljeve prema realnoj procjeni svojih umanjenih snaga i kako bi na najbolji način garantovala stabilnost. Tada treba započeti rad na kreiranju konteksta za obnovu Dejtona i postizanje članstva u EU.

Svi uključeni dijele krivnju za krizu. Dvije rivalske Hrvatske demokratske unije (HDZ, HDZ 1990) koje predstavljaju veći dio hrvatske populacije, su prekršile federalni ustav blokiranjem formiranja vlada u četiri kantona pod njihovom kontrolom i odbijanjem slanja kantonalnih delegata u Dom naroda Federacije. Dva HDZa i najveći pobjednici Izbora iz oktobra 2010., Socijaldemokratska partija (SDP), su svi odbili razumne prijedloge za stvaranje koalicije date od strane međunarodne zajednice. SDP je tada formirala federalnu vladu u suprotnosti sa entitetskim ustavom i suprotno preporuci državne Centralne izborne komisije (CIK). HDZi su također odabrali opasan trenutak za kreiranje Hrvatskog Sabora. RS, posebno Predsjednik Dodik, provokativno je pozvao na referendum o zakonima nametnutim od strane Visokog predstavnika, međunarodnog guvernera BiH, posebno u vezi državnog suda i tužilaštva, pitanja koja su van nadležnosti RSa. Dodikov separatistički, nacionalistički govor na Narodnoj skupštini RSa je doveo u pitanje njegovu posvećenost pomirenju i multietničkoj BiH.

Visoki predstavnik je 27.marta suspendovao odluku CIKa o poništavanju formiranja federalnih vlasti. Ta suspenzija, koja je za posljedicu imala ometanje normalnog apelacionog procesa, je potkopala državna tijela – najdirektnije CIK – i vladavinu zakona. Bilo bi još gore kada bi se ta šteta pokušala neutralizirati pokušajem anuliranja odluke RSa o referendumu ili nametanjem sankcija srpskim zvaničnicima, ne samo zato što bi ti pokušaji bili osporeni nego bi to učinilo referendum još više destabilizirajućim.

EU je izgubila kredibilitet zbog svoje nemogućnosti da u zadnjih devet mjeseci ojača svoju delegaciju u BiH i obezbjedi novom šefu – koji još nije imenovan – adekvatan autoritet i nadležnosti za snažno upravljanje međunarodnom politikom. Doslovno sve međunarodne institucije u BiH su izgubile autoritet; za mnoge, uključujući i Ured Visokog predstavnika (OHR) se smatra da favoriziraju jednu od strana ili partiju. Lokalni lideri zahtjevaju podršku i OHRa i državnih institucija i ignorišu zaključke koji su im protivni. U zemlji nema autoriteta koji poštuju sve strane, nego samo regionalni ili jednostrani zaštitnici.

Od raspada Jugoslavije, Bošnjaci, Hrvati i Srbi su imali tri suprotna pogleda na to kakvu državu bi mogli dijeliti. Prema bivšem slovenačkom predsjedniku Milanu Kučanu, bliskom posmatraču, „ta tri koncepta se nikada nisu stvarno podudarila, a kamo li pomirila … onda su ta tri koncepta pretvorena u ratne ciljeve, ali se sam rat nikada nije u stvari završio; već je samo prekinut Dejtonskim mirovnim sporazumom.“. Dejton je kreirao labavu uniju u kojoj su dva entiteta zadržala veći dio upravnih nadležnosti a važne državne odluke su zahtijevale koncenzus tri glavne etničke skupine; mnoge pozicije su podijeljene prema etničkim kvotama. Ovaj sistem se brzo suočio sa nacionalističkim opstrukcijama. Međunarodna zajednica je kao mjeru za hitne situacije opremila Visokog predstavnika sa širokim ovlastima da bi država nastavila funkcionisati. Od tada, nadajući se da će državu učiniti funkcionalnijom, međunarodna zajednica je podržavala dalju centralizaciju dok je sve manje I manje odluka postignuto dogovorom lokalnih lidera. U stvari, ovo je promoviralo bošnjačku viziju na račun Srba i Hrvata. Također je dovelo do potpunog oslanjanja BiH na redovne intervencije Visokog predstavnika.

Kriza federalne vlade i referendum u RSu ukazuju na dvije strane opšteg problema u BiH. U Federaciji, sukobe se prava zajednice i vladavina većine. U RSu, sukob je oko uloge međunarodne zajednice u upravljanju BiH i balansa između državnih i entitetskih prerogativa. Obje krize predstavljaju napad na viziju budućnosti BiH koju nudi OHR i koju prihvata većina bošnjačkih partija. Ta vizija bi garantovala da se državu ne može sabotirati ili paralisati putem etničkog konflikta. Ipak, većina Hrvata i Srba to odbacuje.

Da bi se razriješio prvi dio neposredne krize i formirala neosporiva federalna uprava:

  • Visoki predstavnk bi trebao podići suspenzuju i dopustiti odluci CIKa da stupi na snagu; i
     
  • federalni Dom naroda bi se trebao sastati u punom sastavu, izabrati predsjednika i sa Predstavničkim domom, imenovati vladu koja je u skladu sa entitetskim ustavom; predsjednik i vlada bi se trebali baviti samo hitnim pitanjima do zvanične inauguracije;

Da bi se razriješio drugi dio neposredne krize:

  • Narodna skupština RSa bi trebala povući odluku o sprovođenju referenduma; ako se referendum ipak dogodi, Predsjednik Dodik bi trebao javno isljučiti bilo kakve jednostrane potupke koji bi doveli u pitanje BiH državni sud (Sud Bosne i Hercegovine), kao što je povlačenje srpskih predstavnika ili odbacivanje njegove nadležnosti.

Iako je ova situacija veoma zabrinjavajuća, međunarodna zajednica bi trebala izbjeći ishitrene odluke koje bi mogle produbiti krizu i pogurati strane do maksimalističkih pozicija. Ovo nije trenutak za površno upravljanje krizom putem tehničkih mjera ili sankcija. Umjesto toga se mogu upotrijebiti razgovori Savjeta bezbjednosti UN o BiH 9.maja i Evropski savjet vanjskih poslova 13.maja za pokretanje strateške revizije međunarodne politke. Ovo bi trebalo kulminirati prije planiranog referenduma sredinom juna u RSu. Konkretno:

  • međunarodna zajednica bi trebala održati konferenciju na visokom nivou da bi uspostavila svoje ciljeve u BiH, potvrdila svoju podršku Dejtonskom mirovnom sporazumu, uklonila Visokog predstavnika iz lokalne politike, napravila planove za relociranje njegovog ureda van BiH i dala EU kapacitete da bi postala vodeći čimbenik.

 

Sarajevo/Brisel, 6.maj 2011.

I. Overview

Bosnia faces its worst crisis since the war. State institutions are under attack by all sides; violence is probably not imminent but is a near prospect if this continues. Seven months after elections, there is no state government and little prospect for one soon. The authorities of the larger of the entities, the Federation, were formed controversially – a main state institution said illegally – in March and are disputed by Croats, who have created a parallel Croat National Assembly. The other entity, Republika Srpska, has called a referendum that could provide support for a Serb walkout of Bosnian institutions. With such trends, it is all too easy to imagine Bosniak parties overseeing a failed state whose institutions Serbs and Croats have abandoned. Compromises are needed so every Bosnian side can claim enough victory to justify retreat from the brink. The international community needs to step back from over-involvement in local politics to calibrate goals to a realistic appraisal of diminished powers and best guarantee stability. Then work needs to begin to create a context for renewing Dayton and achieving EU membership.

All involved share blame for the crisis. Two rival Croat Democratic Union parties (HDZ, HDZ 1990) that represent most of the Croat population, violated the Federation constitution by blocking formation of governments and refusing to send delegates to the entity’s House of Peoples from the four cantons they control. The two HDZs and the biggest winners of the October 2010 elections, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), all rejected reasonable internationally-brokered coalition proposals. The SDP then formed a Federation government in violation of the entity constitution and against the advice of the state-level Central Election Commission (CEC). The HDZs also chose a dangerous moment to create a Croat Assembly. The RS, in particular President Dodik, provocatively called a referendum on laws imposed by the High Representative, Bosnia’s international governor, especially regarding the state court and prosecutor, issues outside RS jurisdiction. Dodik’s divisive, nationalistic speech at the RS National Assembly called into question his commitment to reconciliation and a multi-ethnic Bosnia.

On 27 March, the High Representative suspended the CEC ruling annulling formation of the Federation authorities. That suspension, which had the consequence of disrupting the normal appeal process, has undermined state bodies – most directly the CEC – and the rule of law. It would be further detrimental if the harm were compounded by an attempt to annul RS’s referendum decision or to impose sanctions on Serb officials, not least because the attempts would likely be defied and make a referendum even more destabilising.

The EU has lost credibility due to its inability for the past nine months to strengthen its delegation in Bosnia and give a new head – who is yet to be appointed – adequate authority and powers to vigorously direct international policy. Virtually all international institutions in Bosnia have lost authority; many, including the Office of the High Representative (OHR), are seen as favouring one side or party. Local leaders demand support from OHR and state institutions alike and ignore rulings that go against them. There is no broadly respected authority in the country, only regional or partisan champions.

Since Yugoslavia broke up, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs have had three conflicting views on what kind of a state they can share. According to former Slovenian president Milan Kučan, a close observer, “these three concepts never really met, let alone reconciled … then these three concepts were turned into war aims, but the war itself never really ended; it was only interrupted by the Dayton peace agreement”. Dayton created a loose union in which the two entities retained most governing competencies, and important state decisions required consensus of the three major ethnic groups; many posts were assigned by ethnic quotas. This system soon encountered obstruction from nationalists; as an emergency measure, the international community endowed the High Representative with broad powers to keep the state running. Since then, it has supported further centralisation and less consensual decisions, hoping to make the state more functional. This in effect promoted the Bosniak vision at the expense of the Serbs and Croats. It also made Bosnia reliant on regular interventions by High Representatives.

The Federation government crisis and the RS referendum expose two sides of a general, Bosnian problem. In the Federation, community rights and majority rule collide. In RS, the contest is over the international community’s role in governing Bosnia and the balance between state and entity prerogatives. Both represent assaults on the vision of Bosnia’s future offered by OHR and accepted by most Bosniak parties. That vision would guarantee that the state could not be sabotaged or paralysed by ethnic conflict. Yet, most Croats and Serbs reject it.

To resolve half of the immediate crisis and form non-contested Federation authorities:

  • the High Representative should lift his suspension and allow the CEC decision to take effect; and
     
  • the Federation House of Peoples should meet in full composition, elect the president and, with the House of Representatives, name a government that complies with the entity constitution; the president and government should only transact urgent business until they have been officially inaugurated;

To resolve the other half of the immediate crisis:

  • the RS National Assembly should retract its decision to hold a referendum; if the referendum goes ahead, President Dodik should publicly rule out any unilateral acts challenging the Bosnian state court (the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina), such as withdrawing Serb representatives or rejecting its jurisdiction.


​​​​Even though the situation is deeply troubling, the international community should avoid hasty decisions that could deepen the crisis and push the parties to maximalist positions. This is not the time to try to micro-manage the crisis with technical measures or sanctions. Instead, the 9 May UN Security Council discussion on Bosnia and the 13 May European Foreign Affairs Council should be used to launch a strategic rethink of international policy. This should culminate before the planned mid-June RS referendum. Specifically:

  • the international community should convene a high-level conference to set its goals in Bosnia, reconfirm its commitment to the Dayton Peace Agreement, remove the High Representative from local politics, develop plans to relocate his office outside Bosnia and give the EU the capacities to become a leading actor

 

Sarajevo/Istanbul/Brussels, 6 May 2011

Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans

This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker talks to Crisis Group expert Marko Prelec about the precarious situation in the Western Balkans, as Serb separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the frozen Kosovo-Serbia dispute continue to stoke regional instability.

The Western Balkans, a region defined in part by not being in the European Union, also contains several countries that were devastated by war in the 1990s. Now it faces new troubles, driven in part by the legacies of the old. Bosnia and Herzegovina is confronted with calls for secession in the autonomous Serb-dominated region, Republika Srpska, as well as the ongoing electoral grievances of its Croat minority. Meanwhile, efforts to resolve Kosovo’s dispute with Serbia over its independence have come to a standstill, leaving minority communities on both sides of the border vulnerable.

This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker talks to Marko Prelec, Crisis Group’s Consulting Senior Analyst for the Balkans, about why ethnic tensions persist in the region and whether there is any risk of a return to conflict. They discuss the prospects for European integration, asking whether the promise of EU membership remains an effective incentive for resolving these longstanding disputes. They also consider what impact Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had for stability in the Western Balkans, a region where painful memories of war are still very salient today.



Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

For more of Crisis Group’s analysis, make sure to check out our Balkans regional page and keep an eye out for our upcoming report on the risk of instability in the Western Balkans.

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