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Provedba jednakopravnosti: Odluka o konstitutivnosti naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini
Provedba jednakopravnosti: Odluka o konstitutivnosti naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini
Report 128 / Europe & Central Asia

Provedba jednakopravnosti: Odluka o konstitutivnosti naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini

Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine je u julu 2000. godine donio istorijsku odluku kojom se od dva entiteta, Federacije BiH i Republike Srpske (RS), trazi da izmijene svoje ustave kako bi se osigurala puna ravnopravnost tri "konstitutivna naroda" na čitavom području BiH.

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KRATAK PREGLED

Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine je u julu 2000. godine donio istorijsku odluku kojom se od dva entiteta, Federacije BiH i Republike Srpske (RS), trazi da izmijene svoje ustave kako bi se osigurala puna ravnopravnost tri "konstitutivna naroda" na čitavom području BiH.

Ova odluka vjerovatno nudi neponovljivu priliku da se ode sto je dalje moguće ali ipak ostane u okvirima Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma, te da se omogući da BiH postane funkcionalna multinacionalna drzava. Daytonski model onakav kakav je on sada, sa tri konstitutivna naroda i dva entiteta, sustinski je nestabilan. On se moze pogurati u jednom od dva pravca: u pravcu priznavanja prava trećeg i  najmalobrojnijeg naroda, Hrvata, na vlastitu mini-drzavu, ili u  pravcu pretvaranja oba entiteta u istinski i stvarno multinacionalne entitete. Odluka o "konstitutivnim narodima" predstavlja najbolji način da  se postojeći entiteti reformiraju u okviru daytonske tvorevine i da se BiH pokrene u ovom drugom pravcu.

Protivnici stvarne drzavnosti BiH brzo su osudili ovu odluku kao pokusaj da se obori Dayton. Posto su uspjele u jednoipogodisnjem odlaganju ozbiljne rasprave o provedbi, ove frakcije su sada odlučne da svoje feude zastite razvodnjavanjem budućih reformi sto je vise moguće.

Pristalice jedinstvene drzave BiH su, s druge strane, pozdravili odluku Suda kao političku i ustavnu prekretnicu, te apelirali na domaće  vlasti da se usaglase, odnosno na međunarodnu zajednicu da, ukoliko to bude potrebno, nametne dalekosezne reforme kojima bi se poboljsale daytonske strukture.

Visoki predstavnik, Vijeće Evrope i nekoliko zapadnih prijestonica su od januara 2001. godine entitete gurkali u pravcu razmatranja i utvrđivanja ustavnih promjena neophodnih za provedbu odluke Suda. Ovaj proces uključivao je formiranje multietničkih ustavnih komisija pri entitetskim zakonodavnim tijelima, rad političkih stranaka na izradi njihovih vlastitih prijedloga, konsultacije sa međunarodnim ustavnim ekspertima, period u kome se vodila javna debata, međustranačke pregovore, te, na kraju, mjesec dana intenzivnog pregovaranja u Uredu Visokog predstavnika (OHR).

Stranke su 27. marta 2002. godine u Sarajevu postigle politički dogovor, usaglasivsi se oko paketa pravila i principa koje treba ugraditi u ustavne amandmane u oba entiteta. Visoki predstavnik, ambasador Sjedinjenih Drzava i spanski ambasador (predstavnik Predsjednistva EU), koji su nadgledali maratonske sesije pogađanja, pohvalili su stranke zbog toga sto su imale hrabrosti da pristanu na kompromise, te se zavjetovali da će se pobrinuti da Sarajevski sporazum bude vjerno pretočen u provodive amandmane.

Iako taj sporazum nije predstavljao najbolje moguće tumačenje odluke Ustavnog suda, niti kompletan katalog svih potrebnih amandmana, njime je ponuđen prihvatljiv okvir zasnovan na kompromisu, sto je dosad u bh politici bila ruzna riječ. Nazalost, medeni mjesec se dosad pokazao manje sretnim od vjenčanja. Lideri stranaka iz RS-a koji su potpisali Sporazum vratili su se u Banja Luku i tamo rukovodili donosenjem paketa amandmana od strane Narodne skupstine (NSRS) u kojima je na nekoliko mjesta prekrsen Sporazum,   a na drugim mjestima dodate rezerve i 'manje' izmjene, te uvedeni novi amandmani koji su u suprotnosti sa duhom odluke Ustavnog suda, ili, u nekim slučajevima, sa samim Daytonskim sporazumom.

Jos drskiji od samih amandmana bio je način na koji ih je predsjedavajući NSRS progurao uprkos primjedbama poslanika Bosnjaka i Hrvata čiji je "konstitutivni" status tim amandmanima trebao biti zastićen, te neefikasnom "zavrtanju ruke" od strane predstavnika OHR-a.

Prihvatanje amandmana NSRS značilo bi odustajanje od ove sanse da se entiteti remodeliraju i da se BiH priblizi stvarnoj drzavnosti. Njime bi se na RS stavio lazni pečat multinacionalnog legitimiteta a da se pri tome ne bi osiguralo stvarno ispunjavanje zahtjeva Ustavnog suda za jednakim pravima u cijeloj zemlji.

Osim toga, njihovim prihvatanjem bila bi destabilizirana pozicija ne-nacionalističke koalicije Alijansa za promjene u Federaciji, jer bi je bosnjačke i hrvatske opozicione stranke optuzivale za izdaju zbog toga sto je potpisala  propali dogovor. Stranke Alijanse su se nadale da će pristajanjem na kompromise započeti sa osiguranjem nacionalne ravnopravnosti u entitetima, te pri tome pokazati kako je BiH spremna da vodi vlastite poslove. Ukoliko međunarodna zajednica dozvoli da se pokaze da su se ove stranke preračunale i u jednom i u drugom pogledu, to će pomoći da se na vlast vrate njihovi protivnici nacionalisti.

U ovom izvjestaju daje se prikaz istorijata predmeta "konstitutivnih naroda" i opsega odluke Ustavnog suda. Nakon toga se daje opis rasprave bez presedana o temeljnim aspektima Daytonskog sporazuma koja je u oba entiteta vođena u periodu nakon decembra 2001. godine. Iznosi se analiza Sarajevskog sporazuma, amandmana koje je donijela NSRS, te nacrta amandmana o kojima predstoji rasprava na Parlamentu Federacije, u smislu garancija potrebnih da bi se osigurala jednaka prava za "konstitutivne narode" i Ostale u BiH. Na kraju se analiziraju izmjene koje nisu konkretno regulirane Sarajevskim sporazumom, ali su predviđene odlukom Ustavnog suda.

ICG smatra da "simetrija u sustini" zahtijeva od oba entiteta da se zakonodavna tijela ovlaste ne samo da iznose primjedbe na zakone kojima  se krse "vitalni interesi", nego i da učestvuju u njihovoj reviziji. To znači uvođenje drugog doma u RS-u, čak i ako se njegova nadleznost ne bi protezala dalje od zakona koji se tiču tih "vitalnih interesa". Od sustinske vaznosti će takođe biti da  se zastupljenost "konstitutivnih naroda" u vladi RS-a zasniva na standardu koji neće biti nizi od onog dogovorenog u Sarajevu. Prihvatanjem bilo čega manjeg od toga legitimiziralo bi se 'etničko čisćenje', a ono bi značilo i vise od pukog isključivanja Ostalih iz vlade i tijela zaduzenih za zastitu "vitalnih interesa". Provedba odluke o "konstitutivnim narodima" u entitetskim sudovima, agencijama za provedbu zakona i lokalnim vladama nije nimalo manje vazna od osiguranja pravične zastupljenosti svih naroda u njihovim kabinetima i parlamentima.

Ni Visoki predstavnik ni Vijeće za provedbu mira (PIC), kojem on odgovara, ne bi trebali dopustiti  da ih srpski i hrvatski ekstremisti navedu na prihvatanje nedorečenih ili nepravednih paketa amandmana. Iako se čini da je Federacija spremna da usvoji paket amandmana koji  će  upotpunosti biti u skladu sa odlukom Suda i Sarajevskim sporazumom, pritisak ili nametanje bi se mogli pokazati neophodnim i u tom entitetu, kao sto je to sada potrebno u RS-u. Međutim, da bi se otpori prevladali, svako nametanje će trebati biti popraćeno mobilizacijom punog arsenala međunarodnog oruzja i poticaja. Ustavni amandmani nametnuti nesloznim stranama inače se neće odrzati, a BiH će ostati nefunkcionalna i  kivna zemlja koja ovisi o Zapadu.

Sarajevo/Brussels, 16. april 2002.

Report 232 / Europe & Central Asia

Bosnia’s Future

While the physical scars of the 1992-1995 Bosnia war have healed, political agony and ethnic tension persist. Real peace requires a new constitution and bottom-up political change.

Executive Summary

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, or Bosnia) poses little risk of deadly conflict, but after billions of dollars in foreign aid and intrusive international administration and despite a supportive European neighbourhood, it is slowly spiralling toward disintegration. Its three communities’ conflicting goals and interests are a permanent source of crisis, exacerbated by a constitution that meets no group’s needs. The political elite enjoys mastery over all government levels and much of the economy, with no practical way for voters to dislodge it. The European Union (EU) imposes tasks BiH cannot fulfil. A countrywide popular uprising torched government buildings and demanded urgent reforms in February 2014, but possible solutions are not politically feasible; those that might be politically feasible seem unlikely to work. Bosnia’s leaders, with international support, must begin an urgent search for a new constitutional foundation.

The international project to rebuild Bosnia has had success: war’s physical scars are largely gone, and the country is peaceful. The political agonies, however, show the intervention’s limits. Years of well-intentioned reforms, imposed or urged, have left a governing structure leaders circumvent, ignore or despise. May’s floods left scores dead and thousands homeless, exposing the price of poor governance. With growing frequency, Bosnians ask the questions that preceded the 1992-1995 war: shall it be one country, two, or even three; if one country, shall it have one, two or three constituent entities, and how shall it be governed?

The heart of the problem is in Annex 4 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, known as the constitution (and in several changes imposed by courts and international officials). It defines BiH as a state of two entities, in effect but not explicitly federal, but also the state of three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs), and yet, simultaneously, of all citizens. A suffocating layer of ethnic quotas has been added, providing sinecures for officials increasingly remote from the communities they represent. The tensions created by constitutional schizophrenia are pushing BiH to the breaking point. A new design is needed: a normal federation, territorially defined, without a special role for constituent peoples, but responsive to the interests of its three communities and the rights of all citizens.

The state administration’s need to reform is made acute by a 2009 decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that in effect requires BiH to change the ethnicity-based way it chooses its chief executive and part of its legislature. Existing proposals try to squeeze the constituent peoples into an ostensibly ethnicity-blind structure on top of which a complicated network of indirect elections would allow party leaders to choose the executive with as little democratic input as possible. The EU and the outside world support this tinkering with Dayton to satisfy the decision, though such proposals have manifestly failed. Bosnians need to rebuild their political structure from the bottom up.

There is no consensus on where to start, but Bosnia may have to break from its political system based on constituent peoples and their rights. Crisis Group has not reached this conclusion lightly. It reflects long experience and observation that no one has been able to frame a broadly attractive vision on the existing flawed basis. With stresses and frustrations accumulating in all communities, Bosnia must conceive new foundations to survive. Agreement may take years and much experimentation and debate, but the search should begin.

BiH is home to three political communities: those primarily loyal to the Bosnian state, usually but not always Bosniaks; those loyal to Republika Srpska (RS), usually Serbs; and those desirous of Croat self-government, usually Croats. Giving the Croats what they want, their own entity to make a three-entity Bosnia, is absolutely rejected by Bosniaks. Building virtual representative units for the three communities, possibly with new emphasis on municipalities as basic building blocks, is intellectually plausible but requires a leap of faith few seem ready to take. A purely civic state is inconceivable to Serbs and Croats.

Neither leaders nor civil society have deeply explored alternatives to three constituent peoples in two entities; any consensus would take time. Nevertheless, the goal should be clear. The head of state should reflect Bosnia’s diversity, something a collective does better than an individual. The same body could be the executive government. Some decisions should require consensus, others a majority. All three communities should be represented, not necessarily in equal numbers. There should be no ethnic quotas; representation should reflect self-defined regions and all their voters. Poorly performing, unnecessary state agencies and ministries should be slimmed or abolished, with powers reverting to the entities; but the state would need new ministries and agencies required for EU membership. The ten cantons in the larger of BiH’s two entities, the Federation (FBiH), are an underperforming, superfluous layer. They could be abolished, their powers divided between the municipalities and the entity government.

Political culture is part of the problem; an informal “Sextet” of party leaders in effect controls government and much of the economy. A multi-ethnic coalition persists, election to election, with only minor adjustments. Membership is earned by winning opaque intra-party competitions in which voters have little say. Change in this system can only come from within: Bosnians should join parties and participate in genuine leadership contests. Sextet power is further buttressed by control of hiring, investment and commercial decisions at state-owned firms, a situation that chokes private investment and growth.

Bosnia is unimaginable without the work of international officials who did much to shape political institutions and implement peace, but the international community has become more obstacle than help. BiH is trapped in a cycle of poorly thought-out, internationally-imposed tasks designed to show leaders’ readiness to take responsibility but that put that moment forever out of reach. The only way to encourage leaders to take responsibility is to treat the country normally, without extraneous tests or High Representatives. The EU could signal a new start by stating it will receive a membership application – the first of many steps on the long accession road. It should then be an engaged, not over-didactic partner in Bosnia’s search for a way to disentangle the constitutional knot.