Provedba jednakopravnosti: Odluka o konstitutivnosti naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini
Provedba jednakopravnosti: Odluka o konstitutivnosti naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans
Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans
Report 128 / Europe & Central Asia

Provedba jednakopravnosti: Odluka o konstitutivnosti naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini

Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine je u julu 2000. godine donio istorijsku odluku kojom se od dva entiteta, Federacije BiH i Republike Srpske (RS), trazi da izmijene svoje ustave kako bi se osigurala puna ravnopravnost tri "konstitutivna naroda" na čitavom području BiH.

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KRATAK PREGLED

Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine je u julu 2000. godine donio istorijsku odluku kojom se od dva entiteta, Federacije BiH i Republike Srpske (RS), trazi da izmijene svoje ustave kako bi se osigurala puna ravnopravnost tri "konstitutivna naroda" na čitavom području BiH.

Ova odluka vjerovatno nudi neponovljivu priliku da se ode sto je dalje moguće ali ipak ostane u okvirima Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma, te da se omogući da BiH postane funkcionalna multinacionalna drzava. Daytonski model onakav kakav je on sada, sa tri konstitutivna naroda i dva entiteta, sustinski je nestabilan. On se moze pogurati u jednom od dva pravca: u pravcu priznavanja prava trećeg i  najmalobrojnijeg naroda, Hrvata, na vlastitu mini-drzavu, ili u  pravcu pretvaranja oba entiteta u istinski i stvarno multinacionalne entitete. Odluka o "konstitutivnim narodima" predstavlja najbolji način da  se postojeći entiteti reformiraju u okviru daytonske tvorevine i da se BiH pokrene u ovom drugom pravcu.

Protivnici stvarne drzavnosti BiH brzo su osudili ovu odluku kao pokusaj da se obori Dayton. Posto su uspjele u jednoipogodisnjem odlaganju ozbiljne rasprave o provedbi, ove frakcije su sada odlučne da svoje feude zastite razvodnjavanjem budućih reformi sto je vise moguće.

Pristalice jedinstvene drzave BiH su, s druge strane, pozdravili odluku Suda kao političku i ustavnu prekretnicu, te apelirali na domaće  vlasti da se usaglase, odnosno na međunarodnu zajednicu da, ukoliko to bude potrebno, nametne dalekosezne reforme kojima bi se poboljsale daytonske strukture.

Visoki predstavnik, Vijeće Evrope i nekoliko zapadnih prijestonica su od januara 2001. godine entitete gurkali u pravcu razmatranja i utvrđivanja ustavnih promjena neophodnih za provedbu odluke Suda. Ovaj proces uključivao je formiranje multietničkih ustavnih komisija pri entitetskim zakonodavnim tijelima, rad političkih stranaka na izradi njihovih vlastitih prijedloga, konsultacije sa međunarodnim ustavnim ekspertima, period u kome se vodila javna debata, međustranačke pregovore, te, na kraju, mjesec dana intenzivnog pregovaranja u Uredu Visokog predstavnika (OHR).

Stranke su 27. marta 2002. godine u Sarajevu postigle politički dogovor, usaglasivsi se oko paketa pravila i principa koje treba ugraditi u ustavne amandmane u oba entiteta. Visoki predstavnik, ambasador Sjedinjenih Drzava i spanski ambasador (predstavnik Predsjednistva EU), koji su nadgledali maratonske sesije pogađanja, pohvalili su stranke zbog toga sto su imale hrabrosti da pristanu na kompromise, te se zavjetovali da će se pobrinuti da Sarajevski sporazum bude vjerno pretočen u provodive amandmane.

Iako taj sporazum nije predstavljao najbolje moguće tumačenje odluke Ustavnog suda, niti kompletan katalog svih potrebnih amandmana, njime je ponuđen prihvatljiv okvir zasnovan na kompromisu, sto je dosad u bh politici bila ruzna riječ. Nazalost, medeni mjesec se dosad pokazao manje sretnim od vjenčanja. Lideri stranaka iz RS-a koji su potpisali Sporazum vratili su se u Banja Luku i tamo rukovodili donosenjem paketa amandmana od strane Narodne skupstine (NSRS) u kojima je na nekoliko mjesta prekrsen Sporazum,   a na drugim mjestima dodate rezerve i 'manje' izmjene, te uvedeni novi amandmani koji su u suprotnosti sa duhom odluke Ustavnog suda, ili, u nekim slučajevima, sa samim Daytonskim sporazumom.

Jos drskiji od samih amandmana bio je način na koji ih je predsjedavajući NSRS progurao uprkos primjedbama poslanika Bosnjaka i Hrvata čiji je "konstitutivni" status tim amandmanima trebao biti zastićen, te neefikasnom "zavrtanju ruke" od strane predstavnika OHR-a.

Prihvatanje amandmana NSRS značilo bi odustajanje od ove sanse da se entiteti remodeliraju i da se BiH priblizi stvarnoj drzavnosti. Njime bi se na RS stavio lazni pečat multinacionalnog legitimiteta a da se pri tome ne bi osiguralo stvarno ispunjavanje zahtjeva Ustavnog suda za jednakim pravima u cijeloj zemlji.

Osim toga, njihovim prihvatanjem bila bi destabilizirana pozicija ne-nacionalističke koalicije Alijansa za promjene u Federaciji, jer bi je bosnjačke i hrvatske opozicione stranke optuzivale za izdaju zbog toga sto je potpisala  propali dogovor. Stranke Alijanse su se nadale da će pristajanjem na kompromise započeti sa osiguranjem nacionalne ravnopravnosti u entitetima, te pri tome pokazati kako je BiH spremna da vodi vlastite poslove. Ukoliko međunarodna zajednica dozvoli da se pokaze da su se ove stranke preračunale i u jednom i u drugom pogledu, to će pomoći da se na vlast vrate njihovi protivnici nacionalisti.

U ovom izvjestaju daje se prikaz istorijata predmeta "konstitutivnih naroda" i opsega odluke Ustavnog suda. Nakon toga se daje opis rasprave bez presedana o temeljnim aspektima Daytonskog sporazuma koja je u oba entiteta vođena u periodu nakon decembra 2001. godine. Iznosi se analiza Sarajevskog sporazuma, amandmana koje je donijela NSRS, te nacrta amandmana o kojima predstoji rasprava na Parlamentu Federacije, u smislu garancija potrebnih da bi se osigurala jednaka prava za "konstitutivne narode" i Ostale u BiH. Na kraju se analiziraju izmjene koje nisu konkretno regulirane Sarajevskim sporazumom, ali su predviđene odlukom Ustavnog suda.

ICG smatra da "simetrija u sustini" zahtijeva od oba entiteta da se zakonodavna tijela ovlaste ne samo da iznose primjedbe na zakone kojima  se krse "vitalni interesi", nego i da učestvuju u njihovoj reviziji. To znači uvođenje drugog doma u RS-u, čak i ako se njegova nadleznost ne bi protezala dalje od zakona koji se tiču tih "vitalnih interesa". Od sustinske vaznosti će takođe biti da  se zastupljenost "konstitutivnih naroda" u vladi RS-a zasniva na standardu koji neće biti nizi od onog dogovorenog u Sarajevu. Prihvatanjem bilo čega manjeg od toga legitimiziralo bi se 'etničko čisćenje', a ono bi značilo i vise od pukog isključivanja Ostalih iz vlade i tijela zaduzenih za zastitu "vitalnih interesa". Provedba odluke o "konstitutivnim narodima" u entitetskim sudovima, agencijama za provedbu zakona i lokalnim vladama nije nimalo manje vazna od osiguranja pravične zastupljenosti svih naroda u njihovim kabinetima i parlamentima.

Ni Visoki predstavnik ni Vijeće za provedbu mira (PIC), kojem on odgovara, ne bi trebali dopustiti  da ih srpski i hrvatski ekstremisti navedu na prihvatanje nedorečenih ili nepravednih paketa amandmana. Iako se čini da je Federacija spremna da usvoji paket amandmana koji  će  upotpunosti biti u skladu sa odlukom Suda i Sarajevskim sporazumom, pritisak ili nametanje bi se mogli pokazati neophodnim i u tom entitetu, kao sto je to sada potrebno u RS-u. Međutim, da bi se otpori prevladali, svako nametanje će trebati biti popraćeno mobilizacijom punog arsenala međunarodnog oruzja i poticaja. Ustavni amandmani nametnuti nesloznim stranama inače se neće odrzati, a BiH će ostati nefunkcionalna i  kivna zemlja koja ovisi o Zapadu.

Sarajevo/Brussels, 16. april 2002.

Executive Summary

In July 2000, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina made an historic ruling requiring the two entities, the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska (RS), to amend their constitutions to ensure the full equality of the country’s three “constituent peoples” throughout its territory.

This ruling offers a probably unrepeatable chance to push the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) to their limits and to permit BiH to become a functional multinational state. As it stands, the Dayton model of three constituent peoples and two entities is inherently unstable.  It can be pushed in one of two directions: towards recognising the right of the third and smallest people, the Croats, to have their own mini-state, or towards making both entities truly and effectively multinational.  The “constituent peoples” decision represents the best means to reform the existing entities within the Dayton architecture and to move Bosnia in the second direction. 

Opponents of effective Bosnian statehood quickly denounced this decision as an effort to overturn the DPA.  Having succeeded in delaying serious debate about implementation for a year and a half, these factions are now determined to protect their fiefdoms by diluting the consequent reforms to the greatest possible extent. 

Supporters of an integral Bosnian state, by contrast, hailed the Court’s decision as a political and constitutional watershed, and have urged the domestic authorities to agree or, if necessary, the international community to impose far-reaching reforms that would improve upon the Dayton structures.

Since January 2001, the High Representative, the Council of Europe and several Western capitals have nudged the entities towards considering and drafting the constitutional changes necessary to implement the Court’s decision.  This process included the establishment of multinational constitutional commissions attached to the entities’ legislatures, the engagement of political parties in drafting proposals of their own, consultations with international constitutional experts, a period of public debate, inter-party negotiations and, finally, a month of intensive haggling in the Office of the High Representative (OHR). 

The parties struck a political deal in Sarajevo on 27 March 2002, agreeing a package of precepts and principles to be embodied in both entities’ constitutional amendments.  Having superintended the marathon bargaining sessions, the High Representative, the U.S. Ambassador and the Spanish Ambassador (representing the EU presidency) praised the parties for having had the courage to compromise, and swore to see that the Sarajevo Agreement would be translated faithfully into workable amendments.

While this agreement did not represent the best possible interpretation of the Constitutional Court’s ruling, or a complete catalogue of all the required amendments, it offered an acceptable framework based on compromise – until now a dirty word in Bosnian politics.  Unfortunately, the honeymoon has so far proved less happy than the wedding.  The RS party leaders who had signed the agreement returned to Banja Luka to preside over the passage of a set of amendments by the National Assembly (RSNA) that violated the agreement in several places, added caveats and ‘minor’ changes in others, and introduced new amendments either contrary to the spirit of the Court's decision or – in some instances – to the DPA itself.   

Even more brazen than the amendments themselves was the manner in which the speaker of the RSNA forced them through: over the objections of Bosniak and Croat members whose “constituent” status they were meant to safeguard, and in the face of ineffectual hand-wringing on the part of OHR representatives. 

Acceptance of the RSNA amendments would mean abandoning this opportunity to remodel the entities and to bring Bosnia closer to effective statehood.  It would confer a bogus stamp of multinational legitimacy upon the RS without actually ensuring that the Constitutional Court’s demand for equal rights throughout the country was realised. 

Moreover, it would destabilise the position of the non-nationalist Alliance for Change coalition in the Federation, exposing it to accusations of treachery from Bosniak and Croat opposition parties for having signed up to a failed pact. By compromising, the Alliance parties hoped to make a start on ensuring national equality in the entities while showing that Bosnia was ready to manage its own affairs.  If the international community allows these parties to be shown up as having miscalculated on both counts, it will help to return their nationalist opponents to power.

This report recounts the origins of the “constituent peoples” case and the scope of the Court’s decision.  It then describes the unprecedented debate on fundamental aspects of the DPA that has occurred in both entities since December 2001.  It analyses the Sarajevo Agreement, the amendments enacted by the RSNA and the draft amendments awaiting debate in the Federation parliament in terms of the guarantees needed to ensure equal rights for Bosnia’s “constituent peoples” and “others”.   Finally, it analyses changes not specifically regulated by the Sarajevo Agreement, but mandated by the decision of the Constitutional Court.

ICG believes that “symmetry in substance” requires both entities to have legislative bodies empowered not only to object to laws that violate “vital interests”, but also to participate in their revision.  This means endowing the RS with a second chamber, even if its competence need not extend beyond legislation affecting such “vital interests”  It will also be essential to base representation of the “constituent peoples” in the RS government on no lesser standard than that agreed in Sarajevo.  To accept anything less would legitimise ‘ethnic cleansing’.  Nor would it be just to exclude Bosnia’s “others” from government or the bodies mandated to safeguard “vital interests”.  Implementation of the “constituent peoples” decision in the entities’ courts, law enforcement agencies and local governments is no less important than securing equitable representation for all nations in their cabinets and parliaments.

Neither the High Representative nor the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) to which he is accountable should allow themselves to be deterred by Serb and Croat extremists into accepting half-baked or unjust sets of amendments.  Although the Federation looks set to adopt a set of amendments fully in line with both the Court’s decision and the Sarajevo Agreement, pressure or imposition could prove necessary in that entity – as it is now required in the RS.  In order to overcome resistance, however, any imposition will need to be accompanied by mobilisation of the full arsenal of international weapons and inducements.  Otherwise, constitutional amendments imposed upon dissenting parties will not stick, and Bosnia will remain a dysfunctional and resentful Western dependency.

Sarajevo/Brussels, 16 April 2002

Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans

This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker talks to Crisis Group expert Marko Prelec about the precarious situation in the Western Balkans, as Serb separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the frozen Kosovo-Serbia dispute continue to stoke regional instability.

The Western Balkans, a region defined in part by not being in the European Union, also contains several countries that were devastated by war in the 1990s. Now it faces new troubles, driven in part by the legacies of the old. Bosnia and Herzegovina is confronted with calls for secession in the autonomous Serb-dominated region, Republika Srpska, as well as the ongoing electoral grievances of its Croat minority. Meanwhile, efforts to resolve Kosovo’s dispute with Serbia over its independence have come to a standstill, leaving minority communities on both sides of the border vulnerable.

This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker talks to Marko Prelec, Crisis Group’s Consulting Senior Analyst for the Balkans, about why ethnic tensions persist in the region and whether there is any risk of a return to conflict. They discuss the prospects for European integration, asking whether the promise of EU membership remains an effective incentive for resolving these longstanding disputes. They also consider what impact Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had for stability in the Western Balkans, a region where painful memories of war are still very salient today.



Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

For more of Crisis Group’s analysis, make sure to check out our Balkans regional page and keep an eye out for our upcoming report on the risk of instability in the Western Balkans.

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