Report / Europe & Central Asia 10 Maj 2002 3 minutes Uređivanje Organa Reda: Dalji Plan Reforme U BiH Uprkos vise od sest godina nametnutih reformi izvrsenih po na1ogu Misije UN u Bosni i Hercegovini (UNMIBH), 1oka1na po1icija se jos uvijek ne moze smatrati osposob1jenom za provođenje zakona. Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Sačuvaj Print Download PDF Full Report Also available in English English Bosnian KRATAK PREGLED Uprkos vise od sest godina nametnutih reformi izvrsenih po na1ogu Misije UN u Bosni i Hercegovini (UNMIBH), 1oka1na po1icija se jos uvijek ne moze smatrati osposob1jenom za provođenje zakona. Prečesto - bas kao i njihove ko1ege u pravosudnom sistemu - naciona1no pristrasni, nekva1ifikovani, nedovo1jno p1aćeni, i ponekad korumpirani po1icajci provode zakon se1ektivno, u okviru nefunkciona1nog sistema koji je jos uvijek pod kontro1om ispo1itiziranih i naciona1no opterećenih ministarstava unutrasnjih pos1ova. "Produzena ruka zakona" je nedos1jedna i nedovo1jno čvrsta, i ona bo1uje od pravosudnih podje1a koje pogoduju organizovanom krimina1u, kao i od naciona1no-po1itičkih manipu1acija kojima se osigurava postojanje jednog zakona za dobro uvezane pripadnike većinskih popu1acija, a drugog za manjine koje su 1isene ikakve moći. Krimina1ci najviseg reda obav1jaju svoje pos1ove re1ativno nekaznjeni, etničko nasi1je se to1erise, a korupcija je siroko rasprostranjena. U1oga po1icije ne doziv1java se na način da ona "s1uzi i stiti" sve 1jude, nego da s1uzi i stiti "svoje", bi1o da su to pripadnici iste naciona1nosti, ko1ege i1i po1itički moćnici. Jos uvijek se odrzava doktrina iz doba komunizma da po1icija postoji kako bi brani1a rezim, s tom raz1ikom sto je radnička k1asa zamijenjena nacijom kao toboznjim predmetom zastite. Čak i "umjereni" po1itičari očekuju - a to im se često i dozvo1java - da utiču na istrage, zapos1javanja i raspodje1u budzeta. Građani znaju da ne samo da nisu jednaki pred zakonom nego nisu jednaki ni pred onima koji taj zakon sprovode. Da bi po1icija istrazi1a s1učajeve koji uk1jučuju bogate i moćne pojedince neophodno je da se izvrsi međunarodni pritisak i nadzor. Čak i uz međunarodno insitiranje i pomoć, istrage su često zbr1jane. Ovo je najvid1jivije u s1učajevima koji uk1jučuju nastavak i1i konso1idaciju ratnih "dostignuća", kao sto su "etničko čisćenje", prisvajanje javnih dobara i odrzavanje naciona1no- teritorija1nih podje1a. Nasi1je koje se provodi protiv povratka izbjeg1ih i rase1jenih 1ica raste i opada uporedo sa po1itičkim cik1usom, a1i s1učajevi se često ostav1jaju nerijeseni nakon sto se u početku pokaze ozbi1jna zabrinutost za njih. Na s1ičan način, većina osumnjičenih za ratne z1očine uziva praktičnu zastitu "svojih". Ovi jednostavni a1i efikasni metodi simbo1izirani su i zastićeni kontinuiranim zapos1javanjem po1icajaca koji su bi1i saučesnici u ratnim z1očinima. Sistemi provođenja zakona i pravosuđa će ostati kompromitovani sve dok ovi po1icajci ne budu uk1onjeni. Uk1anjanje ovih i drugih recidivističkih i opstrukcionističkih e1emenata teče sporo. Do toga do1azi samo onda kada to zatrazi međunarodna zajednica, a čak i tada do1azi do odugov1ačenja od strane domaćih v1asti. Oni koji su smijenjeni na zahtjev često mijenjaju funkcije unutar ministarstava unutrasnjih pos1ova, bivaju nagrađeni od strane drzavnih kompanija i1i dobivaju neku izbornu funkciju. Pojednici koji snose krivicu rijetko bivaju krivično gonjeni. Ipak stvari bi mog1e biti i gore. Ko1iko god progres isao sporo, međunarodna zajednica je od samog početka ozbi1jno shvati1a reformu po1icije, sasvim sigurno mnogo ozbi1jnije nego reformu sudstva. U Dejtonu su Ujedinjene nacije dobi1e zadatak da provedu reformu po1icijskih snaga koje su bi1e dio ratnih masinerija njihovih vođa. Međunarodne po1icijske snage (IPTF) UNMIBH-a su nakon početne dezorijentiranosti i nedostatnog kapaciteta, vremenom poče1e ob1ikovati svoje resurse i sprovoditi svoj mandat, ozbi1jno se prihvativsi s1ijedećih zadataka: provjera po1icajaca, oduzimanje ov1astenja za obav1janje po1icijskih pos1ova nečasnim s1uzbenicima, uk1jučujući i ratne z1očince, obezbjeđivanje zapos1javanja pripadnika "manjinskih grupa", teznja da se depo1itiziraju po1icijske komande, stvaranje novih "sve- bosanskih" organa za provođenje zakona kao sto je Drzavna granična s1uzba (DGS), te posredovanje pri ostvarivanju međuentitetske i regiona1ne saradnje. UNMIBH je u pos1jednje vrijeme bio aktivan na mnogim po1jima i započeo je brojne progame za poprav1janje stanja. Nakon tri godine intenzivnog rada na reformama, bosanska po1icija počinje opravdavati od1uku donesenu u Dejtonu da po1icijske snage treba da budu reformirane umjesto potpuno zamijenjene. A1i mandat UNMIBH ističe krajem 2002. godine. Evropska unija (EU) je u februaru 2002. godine od1uči1a da osigura nastavak misije. Po1icijska misija EU (EUPM) je zaduzena da nastavi tamo gdje je Misija UN sta1a. Jos uvijek ima dosta pos1a da se uradi, obzirom na činjenicu da mnogi programi UN-a nisu imp1ementirani u potpunosti i1i su bi1i podrivani od strane opstrukcionističkih po1itičkih e1ita i1i nepos1usnih po1icijskih s1uzbenika. Ako Bosna i Hercegovina ze1i u budućnosti imati sposobne po1icijske snage koje će si moći priustiti, koje će s1uziti i stititi sve građane, bez obzira na njihovu naciona1nost i1i mjesto boravka, od po1itičkog i etnički motiviranog nasi1ja, progona i "pravde" - kao i od rastućeg organizovanog krimina1a - onda ne smije doći do smanjenja obima kako samog nadzora rada po1icije tako ni reformi. Da bi se ovo postig1o, EUPM i Ured Visokog predstavnika (OHR), kojem će EUPM biti podređen, treba1i bi razmotriti s1ijedeće, opće preporuke. Čitav set deta1jnih preporuka dat je u zak1jučku ovog izvjestaja. Sarajevo/Brisel, 10. maj 2002 Download pdf to continue reading the full report Executive Summary Despite more than six years of increasingly intrusive reforms carried out at the behest of the UN Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the local police cannot yet be counted upon to enforce the law. Too often – like their opposite numbers in the judiciary – nationally partial, under-qualified, underpaid, and sometimes corrupt police officers uphold the law selectively, within a dysfunctional system still controlled by politicised and nationalised interior ministries. The ‘long arm of the law’ is inconsistent and infirm, suffering from jurisdictional divisions that do not hinder organised crime and from national-political manipulations that ensure there is one law for well- connected members of majority populations and another for powerless minorities. Top-tier criminals ply their trades with relative impunity, ethnic violence is tolerated and corruption is widespread. The role of the police is not seen as being to ‘serve and protect’ everyone, but to serve and protect ‘one’s own kind’, whether they be co-nationals, colleagues or political masters. The communist-era doctrine that the police exist to defend the regime persists, except that the working class has been replaced by the nation as the ostensible beneficiary. Even ‘moderate’ politicians expect – and are often allowed – to influence investigations, recruitment and budgetary allocations. Citizens know they are not only unequal before the law, but unequal before its enforcers. Getting the police to investigate cases that involve the moneyed or powerful invariably requires international pressure and supervision. Even with international insistence and assistance, investigations are often botched. Nowhere is this more evident than in cases involving the continuation or consolidation of wartime ‘achievements’: ‘ethnic cleansing’, the appropriation of public assets and the maintenance of national-territorial divisions. Violence against returning refugees and displaced persons waxes and wanes with the political cycle, but cases are frequently left unresolved after an initial show of serious concern. In similar vein, most war crimes suspects enjoy the effective protection of ‘their own’. These unsophisticated but effective methods are symbolised and safeguarded by the continued employment of police officers who were complicit in war crimes. The law enforcement and criminal justice systems will remain compromised until these officers have been purged. Removal of these and other recidivist or obstructionist elements has been slow. It only takes place when ordered by the international community and, even then, is often circumvented by the domestic authorities. Those who are removed frequently switch jobs within the interior ministries, are rewarded with plum posts in publicly-owned companies, or gain elected office. Culpable individuals are rarely prosecuted. Yet matters could be much worse. However halting the progress, the international community has taken police reform seriously from the outset – and certainly more seriously than it has heretofore taken judicial reform. At Dayton, the United Nations was tasked to reform police forces that had been part and parcel of their respective masters’ war machines. After initial disorientation and incapacity as it built up its resources and sought to flesh out its mandate, UNMIBH’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) began in earnest: screening officers, de-authorising reprobates and war criminals among them, ensuring that ‘minority’ recruits are hired, seeking to depoliticise police commands, creating new, all- Bosnian law-enforcement bodies such as the State Border Service (SBS), and facilitating inter-entity and regional co-operation. UNMIBH has latterly been active across a broad field and has initiated numerous remedial programs. After three years of intensified reform efforts, Bosnia’s police forces have begun to justify the decision taken at Dayton that they should be reformed rather than replaced. But the UNMIBH mandate expires at the end of 2002. The European Union (EU) decided in February 2002 to provide a follow-on mission. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) is charged with picking up where the UN will leave off. There is plenty of work still to be done, as many of the UN's programs have not been fully implemented or have been subverted by obstructionist political elites and recalcitrant police officers. If Bosnia & Herzegovina is eventually to have affordable and competent police forces that serve and protect all citizens, regardless of nationality or place of residence, from politically and ethnically motivated violence, persecution and ‘justice’ – as well as from rampant organised crime – then there must be no diminution of either oversight or reform. To make this happen, EUPM and the Office of the High Representative (OHR, to which EUPM will be subordinate) should consider the following, general recommendations. The full set of detailed recommendations is given in the Conclusion of this report. Sarajevo/Brussels, 10 May 2002 Related Tags More for you Podcast / Europe & Central Asia Bosnia and Herzegovina After the Elections Briefing / Europe & Central Asia Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Hot Summer