Main opposition party faced disarray amid contention over leadership and govt-instigated fragmentation; reports emerged of ruling party youth wing receiving further military training.

Govt-sponsored efforts ousted leader of main opposition party. Opposition fell into disarray as faction of National Congress for Freedom (CNL) removed party head Agathon Rwasa, with govt recognising parallel leadership. Interior Minister Martin Niteretse denied Rwasa permission for 2 March extraordinary congress, instead allowing ten govt-backed CNL dissidents to convene one in Ngozi province 10 March while Rwasa was not in country. Delegates chose Nestor Girukwishaka, senior executive allegedly close to ruling party, as new CNL head, while Niteretse 18 March officially recognised him as party’s President. Police, intelligence services and ruling-party youth wing Imbonerakure barred pro-Rwasa MPs from attending meeting, with human rights group Ligue Iteka reporting 42 CNL members arrested during day. CNL described congress as “masquerade” while Rwasa said govt had worked with “political mercenaries” from party as ploy to sideline him ahead of 2025 legislative elections; govt interference left CNL adrift with two separate leaderships under Girukwishaka and Rwasa. 

Imbonerakure continued to bolster force with alleged paramilitary training. Locals 6 March reported Imbonerakure members, predominantly from western provinces, undertook military-style training in Cibitoke province, with reports of gunshots and armed parades. Defence ministry said exercises were military training for soldiers but local sources suggested events were paramilitary drills for ruling party youth wing. 

In another important development. Police 17 March discovered decapitated body in Bukinanyana commune in Cibitoke province and arrested four Imbonerakure members as suspects. 

Ongoing clashes spread northward in North Kivu as ruling party head accused former President Kabila of supporting insurgents; Angola continued DRC-Rwanda diplomatic efforts.

Clashes between govt-allied forces and M23 rebels in North Kivu continued. As front froze west of provincial capital Goma despite sporadic mortar exchanges, M23 6 March expanded assault northward; rebels posed increasing threat to Lubero town and seized control of several others including Nyanzale 6 March, despite resistance from pro-govt Wazalendo militia groups. Fighting triggered further displacement with UN official 13 March saying violence had displaced 250,000 in one month. Strategic town Sake (25km north west of Goma) remained under Wazalendo and army control, although largely deserted; military blamed Rwandan troops for 16 March mortar shell that wounded eight UN peacekeepers in Sake town. Meanwhile, after 28 March meeting in Rutshuru in which several people linked to political movement of former President Kabila appeared alongside Corneille Nangaa, head of pro-M23 politico-military group Congo River Alliance, ruling party chief Augustin Kabaya accused Kabila of supporting insurgents, claiming former president had fled country.

Angola attempted to induce DRC-Rwanda de-escalation of crisis. Angolan President Joao Lourenço 11 March hosted Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Angola’s capital Luanda to discuss crisis, mirroring Congolese counterpart President Tshisekedi’s Feb trip to Angola; later, FMs from all three countries 21 March convened in Luanda, reportedly attempting to organise future summit between Kagame and Tshisekedi.

Other armed groups continued to take heavy toll on civilians in Ituri and North Kivu. In Ituri, clashes between CODECO militia, which claims to defend interests of Lendu ethnic group, and ZAIRE militia from rival Hema people 5 March claimed seven lives in Djugu territory. In North Kivu, according to military authorities Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces militants 23-24 March killed at least thirteen civilians in twin attacks on Sayo district of Beni city, setting houses ablaze. 

In other important developments. Constitutional Court 12 March passed verdicts on electoral disputes from Dec parliamentary election, invalidating over 40 results, and predominantly benefiting pro-Tshisekedi ruling coalition. Govt 13 March announced resumption of executions citing need to combat perceived treachery and treason amid M23 conflict, spurring international condemnation.

Authorities expressed concerns over military intervention of southern African regional body in eastern DR Congo (DRC).  

In letter to AU Chair, FM Biruta 3 March expressed reservations about AU support to southern African bloc (SADC) mission in DRC, alleging force’s collaboration with DRC forces and anti-Rwanda armed groups carried risk of exacerbating conflict; Biruta urged political process rather than military intervention; AU next day, however, endorsed SADC mission. Meanwhile, in 25 March interview, President Kagame addressed accusations of Rwandan military presence in eastern DRC, citing factors including anti-Kigali Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) as potential reasons for such presence, without directly acknowledging or denying existence of Rwandan troops in region. While stating readiness for dialogue over future of eastern DRC, Kagame criticised Congolese authorities and also South Africa (who contribute troops to SADC mission) for collaborating with FDLR. Earlier, Kagame 11 March visited Angolan capital Luanda to discuss DRC crisis amid Angolan diplomatic efforts (see DR Congo).

Political manoeuvring intensified ahead of 2026 general elections, with appointment of President Museveni’s son as army chief. 

Inter-govt tensions over succession continued. President Museveni 21 March appointed son, Lt-Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, as head of military, in move widely seen as grooming him for succession but also stalling Muhoozi’s informal campaign for presidency in 2026, when Museveni is expected to seek re-election. In lead up to appointment, Muhoozi continued campaigning efforts for newly formed Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU) as part of his presidential ambitions, including in Masaka district 15 March. 

Authorities warned that Allied Democratic Force remained threat. Military 18 March heightened alertness after receiving intelligence that suspected Islamic-State-affiliated Allied Democratic Force fighters had entered country from DR Congo, warning against large gatherings in churches, bars and other public places.

In other important developments. Viral social media campaign exposed corruption within parliament; under banner #UgandaParliamentExhibition, leaks from govt’s financial system made public on social media sparked outrage from late Feb through March; disclosures revealed mass corruption among parliamentarians across political spectrum including misuse of public funds on personal projects, wastage on foreign travel and excessive spending on partisan political activities. Meanwhile, court 12 March dismissed LGBTQ+ rights advocacy group Sexual Minorities Uganda’s petition seeking govt registration amid ongoing tensions around anti-LGBTQ+ laws. 

Asmara rejected UN human rights official’s accusation it maintains troops in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, and President Isaias Afwerki hosted his Somali counterpart amid deepening bilateral ties.

Govt denied maintaining troop presence in Ethiopia. Ministry of Information 15 March rejected late Feb statement from UN Assistant Sec-Gen for Human Rights Ilze Brands Kehris to Human Rights Council, in which she accused Asmara of maintaining troops in Tigray, where they have committed human rights violations; Asmara accused official of “parroting” disinformation of Tigray People’s Liberation Front (ruling party in Ethiopia’s Tigray region) and denied maintaining troop presence in Tigray. 

Eritrea and Somalia strengthened relations. Somali President Mohamud 17-18 March visited capital Asmara in second trip to country since Ethiopia 1 Jan signed Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland to build naval port. He and President Isaias Afwerki 17 March discussed issues including bilateral relations, counterterrorism and regional affairs as pair sought to deepen ties, possibly to counter Ethiopia’s regional ambitions.

Hostilities in Amhara intensified, insurgency continued in Oromia region, and tensions simmered between govt and Tigray leaders over slow implementation of peace process.

Army struggled to contain Amhara nationalist militias amid worsening insecurity. Fighting between federal forces and Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano reached major towns for first time since hostilities intensified in Aug 2023; notably, Fano 29 Feb-1 March attacked regional capital Bahir Dar. Fano members 3 March killed four security officers, including Shewa Robit town’s police commander and head of Peace and Security Office, in North Shewa Zone. Fano 5 March confirmed kidnapping 270 youths from South Ethiopia People’s Region allegedly affiliated with govt forces. Conflict spilled into Oromia, raising fears of interethnic conflict; notably, Fano 7 March reportedly killed at least nine civilians in Oromia’s Dera woreda, North Shewa Zone. Clashes between Oromo and Amhara ethnic militias 9-21 March in Amhara’s Oromo Special Zone and North Shewa Zone killed 27. Deteriorating security crippled economic activity.

Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) made gains as govt shifted attention to Amhara. Govt-insurgent clashes continued in Oromia region. OLA 4 March reportedly made gains in Gelana district, West Guji Zone, forcing hundreds to flee to South Ethiopia People’s Region. In significant shift, govt reportedly planned to redeploy troops from Oromia to Amhara, suggesting it views latter conflict as more pressing.

Situation in Tigray region remained fragile amid halting progress on peace deal. Govt and Tigray regional leaders 11 March expressed commitment to 2022 Pretoria peace agreement during deal’s first Strategic Review, held under AU auspices in capital Addis Ababa. Region’s ruling party Tigray People’s Liberation Front 13 March raised concern about growing trust deficit, however, due to slow implementation of deal, including resolution of disputed territories and removal of Eritrean and Amhara troops from region. Tigray Interim Administration 25 March accused Amhara of incorporating “Tigray land” (referring to disputed territories) “into its educational curriculum and regional map” and called for its reversal. Clashes same day occurred in Amhara-controlled Raya Alamata town, South Tigray Zone; Amhara and Tigray authorities traded blame for violence. 

Disruptions in oil exports harmed economy, raising risk of currency collapse and political turmoil in lead-up to planned December polls; localised clashes persisted. 

Lack of oil revenue hurt economy and could fuel political turmoil. Authorities remained unable to restart oil exports following damage in Feb to main oil pipeline, which carries 65-75% of country’s crude to market through Sudan; repairing pipeline could prove near impossible due to fighting in Sudan. Disruption of oil production led to collapse of South Sudanese pound against USD from 1100 in early Feb to 2000 by 25 March. Central Bank and Ministry of Finance 29 March announced measures to stabilise exchange market. Economic meltdown and collapse of President Kiir’s patronage system could follow if production is not restored and govt is unable to find lender to bail it out.

Array of actors warned about lack of preparedness for polls and risk of violence. Deputy Chairman of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), Nathaniel Oyet Perino, 1 March said conditions for credible elections, slated for Dec, were not in place. UN head of peacekeeping operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, 5 March warned of “potential for violence with disastrous consequences” if polls not managed carefully, concluded country is “not ready for elections”. Minister of Presidential Affairs 19 March said Kiir rejected extension of transitional period and vowed elections would take place. Coalition of Opposition Parties 25 March filed petition demanding revocation of $50,000 registration fee for parties registering candidates, move they say is designed to restrict opposition participation. 

Intercommunal violence continued. Armed attackers 5 March killed UN Mission in South Sudan staff member in Abiemnhom county, Ruweng Administrative Area. Armed youth suspected of allegiance to Nuer spiritual leader Gai Machiek 9 March reportedly killed nine Misseriya and stole over 300 cattle in Kuerchiedieng village, Unity state. Armed youth suspected to be from Anyuak community 19 March killed fifteen, including Boma County commissioner, in Nyat village, Greater Pibor Administrative Area.

Sudanese army (SAF) made significant gains against paramilitary forces (RSF) and fighting reignited in North Darfur, amid rising risk of famine.

RSF lost ground amid SAF offensive. SAF recaptured much of Omdurman city from RSF, with its forces 12 March taking control of national radio and television headquarters. Offensive 17 March reached Signal Corps in Bahri city, which risks becoming next epicentre of fighting; SAF could also attempt to retake capital Khartoum, increasing danger of protracted urban warfare. SAF launched multi-pronged offensive into RSF-controlled El Gezira state; paramilitary holds state capital Wad Madani, critical for maintaining its positions in Khartoum. Sudan Liberation Movement under Darfur governor Minni Minawi 24 March announced group was joining SAF to expel RSF from Khartoum and El Gezira. Meanwhile, violence 15 March broke out in North Darfur’s capital El Fasher, with SAF conducting airstrikes on RSF positions; fighting could engulf state in conflict, drawing in armed groups from Darfur that have so far remained neutral. 

Various diplomatic efforts continued, albeit without clear results. AU High-Level Panel for Sudan 6 March met separately with members of former President Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) and Forces for Freedom and Change-Democratic Bloc in Egyptian capital Cairo. Panel next day separately met RSF and civilian coalition Taqaddum in Ethiopia; both criticised panel’s talks with NCP, indicating challenge of bridging Sudan’s polarised political landscape. UN Security Council 8 March urged cessation of hostilities during Muslim holy month Ramadan; RSF next day welcomed call, but SAF 10 March ruled out truce unless RSF leaves civilian locations. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello 11 March embarked on regional tour, 26 March said he hoped for restart of talks around 18 April, though RSF and SAF remained sceptical about U.S. mediation. Rumours circulated of secret RSF-SAF meetings in Cairo, which RSF denied. Regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development 26 March appointed Special Envoy for Sudan.

Humanitarian agencies warned of looming hunger crisis. World Food Program head 6 March warned conflict risks triggering “world’s largest hunger crisis”, with “over 25 million people across Sudan, South Sudan and Chad trapped in a spiral of deteriorating food security”. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 29 March called for immediate action “to prevent famine”.

China maintained naval presence in East China Sea as Japan labelled Beijing’s expanding power “serious concern”, while Tokyo continued to deepen defence ties with U.S. and broader region. 

Beijing continued maritime presence. As of 31 March, Japan spotted 121 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone with ten vessels in its territorial sea over four days. Tokyo 9 and 10 March scrambled fighter jets in response to Chinese military aircraft with anti-submarine and maritime surveillance capabilities patrolling Western Pacific waters and crossing Miyako Strait – strategic outlet for Chinese navy and key international waterway. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi 5 March said that China’s rapidly expanding military power was “serious concern”.

U.S. and Japan conducted joint exercises. U.S. and Japan late Feb commenced Resilient Shield 2024, utilising computer simulations of ballistic missile defence envelope for both nations. U.S. marines and Japanese troops held three-week amphibious training exercise “Iron Fist 24” 27 Feb-19 March amid concerns about Chinese military activity around Japan and Taiwan. Reports during March indicated Japan’s interest in cooperating with Australia, U.S. and UK security partnership dubbed “AUKUS” on advance capabilities, such as artificial intelligence and underwater technologies. 

Tokyo deepened regional security cooperation. Japan’s FM Yoko Kamikawa and Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar 7 March pledged to enhance cooperation in Indo-Pacific in response to China’s growing military and economic influence. Japan 19-20 March hosted multilateral meeting with defence ministers of fourteen South Pacific island nations, aiming to strengthen its involvement in regional security issues. 

U.S. and South Korean conducted military drills as North Korea resumed missile testing, while Russia vetoed renewal of UN panel tasked with monitoring sanctions compliance. 

Following seasonal alliance military drills, Pyongyang launched missiles. U.S. and South Korea 4-14 March held annual Spring exercises, which passed off without dramatic North Korean response; this may indicate some form of distress inside North Korea – with domestic media focused on agricultural challenges – but there is chance North Korea may respond more forcefully to drills in coming months. Following exercises, leader Kim Jong Un 18 March supervised live-fire drill of multiple rocket launchers and Pyongyang same day fired three short-range ballistic missiles into waters off peninsula’s east coast. State media 20 March reported successful test of solid-fuel engine for intermediate-range hypersonic missile.

Russia wielded veto to block renewed mandate for UN Panel of Experts. Vote on renewal of UN Panel of Experts on North Korea sanctions – tasked with monitoring compliance with sanctions – was delayed and thrown into doubt after Russia 12 March proposed changes, including sunset clause for sanctions and reducing reporting period from every six months to annual. U.S. and its allies remain steadfast in opposition to alterations to sanctions or reporting framework, arguing sustained pressure on North Korea is essential. Russia 28 March vetoed renewal, ensuring panel’s mandate will expire 30 April; U.S. accused Russia of silencing body because it began reporting on “Russia’s blatant violations of the UN Security Council resolutions”. In further sign of Russia’s lack of sanctions enforcement and compliance, Financial Times 26 March reported that Russia 7 March began “first documented direct seaborne deliveries” of oil to North Korea in contravention of 2017 UN sanctions, possibly in part payment for munitions deliveries. 

South Korea issued stern warning against Pyongyang’s provocations. Speaking at ninth West Sea Defence Day, which commemorates North Korean provocations in West Sea, South Korean President Yoon 22 March cautioned Pyongyang against reckless provocations and emphasised resolve of South Korea govt and military to push back against aggression; Yoon also pledged to further enhance trilateral security cooperation with U.S. and Japan.

Dispute between Taiwan and China over jurisdiction of waters around Kinmen Islands persisted as Beijing maintained military activity around Taiwan and U.S. continued support for Taipei. 

Tensions persisted with Beijing around Kinmen Islands. Following 14 Feb incident in which two Chinese nationals drowned off coast of Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands, Chinese vessels continued patrols in restricted and prohibited waters around islands. Negotiations between China and Taiwan early March faltered, with Taiwan’s coast guard stating Chinese officials made demands incompatible with Taiwan’s legal system. Taiwan and China 14 March jointly conducted rescue mission after fishing vessel capsized near Kinmen; China 17 March rescued two fishermen, reportedly with Taiwan’s assistance. Four Chinese coast guard ships 15 and 16 March entered Kinmen’s waters, reportedly loitering for hours on 16 March; Taiwan’s coast guard patrol shadowed the vessels and broadcast warnings until they left.

China maintained military activity around Taiwan. As of 31 March, Taiwan detected 470 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which at least 172 crossed unofficial “median line” or entered Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone; Taiwan spotted 270 Chinese naval vessels in surrounding waters. Taiwan’s Defence Ministry 8 March clarified that any intrusion by China across Taiwan’s territorial borders is considered act of aggression. USS John Finn 5 March completed its second transit of Taiwan Strait in 2024.

U.S. continued diplomatic and military support to Taiwan. U.S. President Biden 7 March made his first reference to Taiwan during a State of Union address, emphasising U.S. commitment to peace and stability in Taiwan Strait; White House 11 March allocated $100mn for Taiwan’s military assistance, marking first standalone mention of island in budget report. Taiwan 14 March confirmed U.S. Army Special Forces are stationed on Taiwan’s outlying islands for training and exchange purposes. Meanwhile, Australia and Malaysia 5 March issued joint statement recognising importance of peace in Taiwan Strait. South Korea’s envoy in Taiwan 6 March announced visits from significant South Korean figures to Taiwan are expected to increase. Russian President Putin 18 March claimed Taiwan is part of China, triggering prompt refutation by Taiwan. 

Taliban and Pakistan engaged in first serious military confrontation as Islamabad launched cross-border strikes in response to deadly militant attack, prompting Taliban heavy fire. 

Pakistan launched airstrikes, raising risk of armed conflict with Taliban. Amid mounting tensions between Islamabad and Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers, six militants 16 March rammed explosive-laden vehicle into military checkpoint in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhthunkwa province before conducting suicide bombings, killing seven soldiers (see Pakistan); Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) Hafiz Gul Bahadur affiliate claimed responsibility. Blaming Taliban for arming and hosting militants and “being involved in incidents of terrorism”, Pakistan 18 March launched retaliatory airstrikes, claiming targets were TTP groups in Afghanistan’s Paktika and Khost provinces (east); strikes marked first time Pakistan has acknowledged carrying out attack on Afghan territory since Taliban takeover in 2021 (previously suspected cross-border attacks as in April 2022 were unclaimed). Taliban forces same day retaliated by firing heavy weaponry into Pakistan’s Kurram district, killing Pakistani captain. While relative calm late March returned to border, risk of resumption of hostilities remained high, particularly if TTP launches another major attack in Pakistan; statements by Pakistani officials vowing to deport Afghan citizen card holders from 15 April also bode ill for bilateral relations.

Resistance groups and Islamic State staged attacks. After National Resistance Front (NRF) 26 Feb reportedly fired rockets at Kabul airport, allegedly targeting Taliban military installation, group continued its attacks, including ambush 27 March on Taliban checkpoint in capital Kabul in which NRF claimed three Taliban members were killed. Afghanistan Freedom Front 11 March declared month-long Ramadan ceasefire. In Kandahar city (south), Islamic State’s local branch (ISKP) 21 March claimed explosion inside bank allegedly targeting Taliban members, killing three by Taliban estimates and as many as 21 according to BBC; Taliban-affiliated media reported attacker underwent training in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, which it claimed had become key staging ground for ISKP. Suspected ISKP terror attack in Russian capital Moscow 22 March killed scores (see Russia). 

In another important development. Uzbekistan’s FM Bakhtiar Saidov 12 March met senior Taliban in capital Kabul to discuss trade; Taliban media suggested Uzbekistan may soon accept Taliban ambassador (see Uzbekistan). 

Govt faced mounting economic challenges as opposition activity remained in lull, Myanmar’s conflict continued to spill over border, and peace talks in Chittagong Hill Tracts resumed with ethnic armed group.

Economic hardship persisted as opposition mobilisation remained subdued. Activity of opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies remained at low ebb due to difficulties of mobilising during Ramadan, although BNP may attempt to resume large-scale anti-govt demonstrations from late April or May, potentially prompting renewed crackdown. Govt meanwhile faced challenges of high inflation and rapidly increasing food prices: PM Sheikh Hasina 6 March instructed Rapid Action Battalion to intensify campaigns against food hoarders and 15 March fixed prices for 29 agricultural products. Due to depleted foreign currency to pay for energy imports, power shortages continued and could increase in summer amid higher temperatures. 

Hostilities in Myanmar spilt over border, raising prospect of new refugee influx. Myanmar’s military 5 March carried out airstrikes close to border, causing panic among Bangladeshi residents. Over 175 Myanmar Border Guard Police members 12 March crossed into Bangladesh’s Bandarban district to escape Arakan Army’s offensive in Rakhine state (see Myanmar). Conflict continued to raise prospect of new influx of Rohingya fleeing violence as hundreds, possibly thousands, gather in boats along Naf River; Dhaka, however, insisted no new refugees will be accepted and detained over 400 Rohingya. Authorities 1 March relocated 1,141 Rohingya from Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char island, which now hosts 30,000. Rohingya continue to die at sea trying to flee: boat carrying estimated 150 Rohingya 20 March capsized off Indonesia’s Aceh, with only 75 rescued.   

Peace talks resumed in Chittagong Hill Tracts in south east. Govt delegation and Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) – which claims to represent six Kuki-Chin subgroups, largest of which is Bawm – 5 March held face-to-face talks after first round in Nov. KNF issued six demands, including establishing Kuki-Chin territorial council; two sides reportedly agreed to meet in April, while KNF pledged to refrain from conducting attacks in meantime. If govt rejects KNF’s demands, communal tensions between Bawm and Marma communities could escalate, risking deadly clashes and further involvement of army or other armed groups. 

Opposition parties decried crackdown ahead of national polls starting in April, ethnic conflict in Manipur in far north east rumbled on and tensions with China surfaced over disputed territory in north east. 

Concerns rose about unlevel playing field ahead of election. Election Commission 16 March announced dates for national polls, which will be held in seven phases from 19 April to 4 June. Signs emerged raising concern that polls may not be entirely free and fair. Notably, federal investigative agency 21 March arrested leader of opposition Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal for allegedly accepting bribes in exchange for granting licenses to alcohol contractors; AAP claimed no wrongdoing and accused govt of attempting to weaken opposition ahead of elections, as protesters rallied in capital New Delhi. Opposition Congress Party 21 March alleged govt agencies had frozen all of its bank accounts, making it impossible to fight election, calling it “assault on democracy”. 

Insecurity in Manipur state persisted. Security forces 8 March rescued junior army officer abducted in Thoubal district. Ahead of national elections, Manipur’s chief electoral officer 16 March said no special voting arrangements had been made for estimated 10,000 displaced in neighbouring Mizoram state and some 60,000 displaced in Manipur’s relief camps. Indigenous Tribal Leaders forum 26 March pleaded with Kuki-Zo tribal people not to comply with state govt’s order to deposit licensed arms ahead of national elections, asserting necessity to defend “our right to life and land”.    

Security forces targeted Maoist militants. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), security forces 15 March killed three Maoists and 27 March killed six Maoists in Bijapur district. In Maharashtra state (west), security forces during 25-hour operation 19 March killed four Maoists in Gadciroli district. 

India-China relations remained tense. During visit to Arunachal Pradesh state (north east), PM Narendra Modi 9 March remotely inaugurated strategically-important tunnel close to disputed border known as Line of Actual Control. China, which claims sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh, 11 March issued statement saying it “strongly deplores” visit. India 19 March asserted state “was, is and will always be an integral and inalienable part of India”. 

Harsh weather curtailed militant activity in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) as PM Modi visited for first time since 2019, praising region’s “progress” while local parties reiterated demands for long-overdue elections.

Militant attacks and security operations remained at low ebb. Due to inclement weather amid snowfall and avalanches in higher reaches of region, militant activity remained subdued during March but may step up once weather improves ahead of national elections (see India). Low-intensity blast 26 March occurred in Poonch town; police arrested two suspects. 

PM Modi addressed region in rare visit amid demands for overdue polls. Ahead of national elections in April-June, PM Narendra Modi 7 March visited Kashmir valley for first time since abrogation of Article 370 in 2019. During his address, Modi claimed “Kashmir is touching new heights of progress and prosperity after the abrogation of Article 370”, while Lieutenant Governor asserted that “the ecosystem of [militancy] has been dismantled”. Despite govt’s claim of new era of peace in J&K, delayed elections are contributing to local frustration and unrest. J&K’s regional parties, National Conference and Peoples Democratic Party, 12 March urged Chief Election Commissioner to hold regional and national elections simultaneously in union territory; Election Commission ruled it out on security grounds. Home Minister Amit Shah 20 March said elections would be held before 30 Sept deadline set by Supreme Court. 

Authorities permitted Chief Cleric to lead prayers for first time in months. J&K administration 6 March told High Court that Chief Cleric Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was “a free man” and not under house arrest, permitting Farooq to lead prayers at Jama Masjid in Srinagar city on 8 March for first time since Oct when he was placed again in detention. At a sermon, Farooq 15 March requested authorities to “unconditionally release thousands of Kashmiri political prisoners”.

Protests in Ladakh continued. Protesters in Ladakh 6 March held rally calling for granting of statehood and its inclusion in Sixth Schedule of the Constitution for safeguards, after talks between Ladakh’s representatives and New Delhi 4 March failed to make any progress. 

Military launched first acknowledged airstrikes in Afghanistan since Taliban takeover after deadly militant attack, triggering Taliban retaliation.

Military launched airstrikes in Afghanistan, raising risk of armed conflict. Amid mounting tensions between govt and Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers, six militants 16 March rammed explosive-laden vehicle into military checkpoint in Khyber Pakhthunkwa province’s North Waziristan before conducting suicide bombings, killing seven soldiers; Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) Hafiz Gul Bahadur affiliate claimed responsibility. Blaming Taliban for arming and hosting militants and “being involved in incidents of terrorism”, Pakistan 18 March launched retaliatory airstrikes, claiming targets were TTP groups in Afghanistan’s Paktika and Khost provinces (east); strikes mark first Pakistan has acknowledged carrying out on Afghan territory since Taliban takeover in 2021 (previously suspected cross-border attacks such as in April 2022 were unclaimed). Taliban authorities same day retaliated by firing heavy weaponry into Pakistan’s Kurram district, killing Pakistani captain. While relative calm late March returned to border, risk of resumption of hostilities remained high, particularly if TTP launches another major attack in Pakistan; statements by Islamabad vowing to deport Afghan citizen card holders from 15 April also bode ill for relations. Meanwhile, suicide bombing on bus carrying Chinese engineers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bisham sub-district 26 March killed five.

Political turmoil continued following disputed elections in Feb. Formation of new govt following 8 Feb elections was accompanied by claims of widespread electoral manipulation by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by imprisoned former PM Imran Khan. Security forces 3 March detained scores of PTI supporters staging protests countrywide against “theft of the public mandate”; Shebhaz Sharif of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) same day won PM election in national assembly. Election Commission 4 March ruled that newly-formed Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) party – which PTI-backed independent parliamentarians joined in mid-Feb – was not eligible for dozens of reserved seats; after seats were redistributed, PML-N tally in parliament rose to 123 seats, overtaking PTI as largest party. U.S. Assistant Sec of State Donald Lu 20 March said if election commission fails to investigate irregularities, it would “retard our ability to have the type of relationship we want” with Pakistan.

As elections lingered on horizon, govt’s authoritarian legislation faced opposition and communal tensions persisted in Northern Province; govt secured next portion of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan.

Political jockeying intensified as elections appeared increasingly likely. With presidential elections required by mid-Oct, and parliamentary elections possible before or soon after, negotiations for possible electoral alliances intensified. President Wickremesinghe held discussions with leaders of current ruling party, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), even as quiet efforts continued to reconcile Wickremesinghe and former allies in opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB). Frontrunner, leftist National People’s Party (NPP), held series of rallies countrywide.

Govt’s anti-democratic laws met opposition at home and abroad. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk 1 March expressed concern over new or proposed laws to severely restrict rights to freedom of assembly, association and expression. UN Human Rights Council “Core Group” 4 March warned of Online Safety Act’s potential “chilling effect on freedom of expression” and cautioned govt on proposed “Commission on Truth, Unity and Reconciliation”, calling for “inclusive participatory process to build trust in advance of any legislation”. Civil society organisations 14 March met with Wickremesinghe to explain opposition to draft Non-Governmental Organisations Act, which permits authorities to monitor, collect information and restrict activities. 

Communal tensions persisted in north. After “Core Group” 4 March noted “with concern reports of increased tensions around land seizures” in North and East, police 8 March arrested eight Tamil Hindus at worship site in Northern Province’s Vavuniya district despite court order permitting prayer ceremony; police 19 March released them amid reports of mistreatment in detention. Govt 4 March announced bill aimed at “formally managing the discovery and preservation of the nation’s antiquities and archaeological heritage”, likely through granting even stronger powers to Archaeology Department, which has seized land used by Tamils and Muslims in north and east. 

Govt secured next part of IMF loan. IMF 21 March announced new staff level agreement with govt, paving way for disbursement of third instalment of $300mn loan; govt figures 16 March showed economy grew by 4.5% in last quarter of 2023, despite overall negative economic growth of -2.4% in 2023.

China brokered talks between regime and ethnic armed groups in northern Shan state aimed at resuming border trade, while regime lost more territory to Arakan Army in west and Kachin Independence Army in far north. 

In north, regime and Three Brotherhood Alliance engaged in talks. As 11 Jan ceasefire held in Shan state (north), regime negotiators early March met Three Brotherhood Alliance in Kunming city, China, for further negotiations on reopening China-Myanmar border trade worth billions annually, which mostly ceased after alliance’s Oct offensive; sticking points include sharing of revenue between sides. In southern Shan state, after Pao National Liberation Army aligned with resistance in Jan, regime 3 March launched destructive offensive to recapture Hsihseng town from group.

In Rakhine state (west), Arakan Army continued to capture regime positions. Arakan Army 4 March captured Ponnagyun town, barely 30km from state capital Sittwe, and 7 March claimed Ramree town – its first in central Rakhine state – located close to major Chinese infrastructure projects in neighbouring Kyaukpyu township, including oil terminal, twin gas and oil pipelines, and proposed deep-sea port and Special Economic Zone. Arakan Army also continued attacks in northern Rakhine, including in Rathedaung, Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships, and 17 March seized Rathedaung. Group 12 March seized Aung Thapyay Border Guard Police post in far northern Maungdaw, prompting 179 regime personnel to flee into Bangladesh. Regime shelling 9 March killed five Rohingya residents in Aung Mingalar ward.

In Kachin state (north), Kachin Independence Army stepped up offensive. After embarking on wave of attacks late Feb against regime positions that for over decade have encircled its Laiza headquarters, Kachin Independence Army-led forces 7-9 March seized total twenty camps in Momauk and Waingmaw townships, and assassinated head of regime-aligned Lisu People’s Militia Force. KIA offensive could impact already-strained communal relations between Jinghpaw majority, which leads KIA, and minority groups in Kachin state, including Shanni and Lisu. 

Regime’s conscription drive sparked tensions and recruitment race. Regime’s decision in Feb to enforce dormant military service law reportedly triggered killings of at least dozen local officials tasked with overseeing process, and sparked conscription race with ethnic armed groups, as latter reported increase in recruits. 

Security operations and militant attacks persisted in south, while military battled Communist insurgents.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). In Maguindanao del Sur province, soldiers from army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team 9 March clashed with Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) during operation to apprehend BIFF commander Kagi Karialan (who evaded capture) in Datu Saudi Ampatuan town, killing two suspected BIFF members. Militant ambush 17 March killed four soldiers in Datu Hoffer; military blamed jihadist group Daulah Islamiyah, but BIFF 19 March claimed attack in retaliation for 9 March security operation. Region 27 March marked anniversary of signing of Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro, which could boost momentum for implementation of key parts of peace deal.

Clashes continued between Communist rebels and military. Hostilities between security forces and communist rebels in Luzon (Quezon, Batangas) in north, Mindanao (Bukidnon/Lanao del Sur) in south and Visayas (Panay island) in centre during March claimed five civilian and combatant fatalities, and two injuries. Interior and Local Government Secretary Benjamin Abalos Jr. 18 March declared Surigao del Norte province insurgency-free after its provincial govt and law enforcement agencies dismantled remaining forces of Communist militant group New People’s Army (NPA).

Maritime encounters and stern warnings heightened tensions between Philippines and China in South China Sea (SCS); Manila proactively engaged U.S. and regional countries.

Manila and Beijing engaged in war of words amid maritime incidents in SCS. Philippines 5 March accused China of “dangerous manoeuvres and blocking” that led to collision between one of its ships and Chinese Coast Guard vessel during Philippine resupply mission to BRP Sierra Madre on disputed Second Thomas Shoal, injuring four Philippine sailors. U.S. same day denounced China’s “provocative” and “dangerous” moves and reiterated that its Mutual Defence Treaty with Philippines extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, including Coast Guard, anywhere in SCS. Philippine Senate 7 March passed bill to align country’s maritime zones with 2016 award of Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal that invalidated Beijing’s vast territorial claims in SCS; China protested that act violates its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights. Philippines 11 March reported spotting about 50 Chinese vessels within its Exclusive Economic Zone in SCS, many surrounding disputed Scarborough Shoal. In another maritime incident, China Coast Guard vessel 23 March used water cannon on civilian boat supplying Philippine troops on Second Thomas Shoal, damaging vessel and injuring crew; Manila 25 March summoned China’s envoy to protest “aggressive actions”. China’s defence ministry 24 March warned Philippines to “stop making any remarks” that could lead to escalation or risk China’s “resolute and decisive measures”. President Marcos 28 March announced plans for counter-measures against China Coast Guard’s “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous” actions.

Manila courted ties with Washington and regional states. Philippine FM Enrique Manalo 4 March called on regional neighbours to uphold rule of law in SCS, referring to Manila’s victory in Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling. Marcos 19 March met U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken to discuss cooperation and security matters amid heightened tensions with China; Blinken called U.S. security commitment to Philippines “ironclad”. China’s foreign ministry responded that U.S. “has no right to intervene” in SCS issues. India’s FM S. Jaishankar 26 March called for defence cooperation with Philippines. South Korea 26 March expressed “grave concern” over China’s use of water cannons in SCS.

Election Commission proceeded with its bid to ban Move Forward Party (MFP), while peace process between govt and main southern separatist group awaited next step amid violence in deep south.

Election-winning party faced prospect of dissolution. After Constitutional Court 31 Jan ruled that election-winning MFP must desist from attempting to amend Thailand’s lèse-majesté law, Election Commission 12 March requested Constitutional Court to disband MFP and 18 March submitted petition to court in that vein. Constitutional Court next day asked Election Commission to submit further documents. If court eventually accepts case and dissolves MFP, party’s executives will be banned from politics for ten years. MFP’s dissolution could trigger protests, considering ban of MFP’s progenitor, Future Forward Party, sparked months-long nationwide demonstrations in 2020.

Deep south peace process technical talks continued. Following first meeting in Feb in over a year between delegations of govt and main southern separatist armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional, four expert observers of dialogue 2 March issued public statement, identifying themselves for first time, “to underscore the significance of commitments achieved thus far between the main parties”; sides 20 Feb and 7-8 March held technical-level talks. Thai delegation 24 March said talks remain on track in spite of continued violence, with technical talks expected late April. 

Violence continued in deep south. Notably, militants 9 March detonated 25kg IED targeting car transporting three rangers in Cho Airong district, Narathiwat province. Militants 10 March threw pipe bombs targeting Subdistrict Administration Organisation chief at café in Thung Yang Daeng district, Pattani province; motorcycle-borne militants 18 March shot and killed deputy chief of Subdistrict Administration Organisation in same district. As authorities 14 March surrounded two militants in apartment who refused to surrender, pair engaged in 30-minute gun battle that left both dead in Saiburi district, Pattani province. Militants 22 March staged 45 IED and arson attacks across Pattani, Narathiwat, Songkhla and Yala provinces; one female migrant worker from Myanmar was killed by shrapnel in Mayo district, Pattani.

Anglophone conflict persisted while jailed separatist leaders appealed for Nigerian help; political tensions bubbled ahead of 2025 elections.

Low-level violence persisted in Anglophone regions. Separatist groups continued to enforce weekly “Monday ghost town” strikes and engage in skirmishes with govt troops, resulting in casualties on both sides. Notably, separatist militia 15 March ambushed govt forces patrol in Wainama village, Bui division (North West region), causing unconfirmed number of casualties. Meanwhile, jailed Anglophone separatist leaders turned to Nigeria for help, as prominent figure Sisiku Ayuk Tabe and nine others 2 March petitioned Nigeria’s National Assembly to support their release; petitioners were extradited from Nigeria in Jan 2018 and following year Cameroonian military tribunal sentenced them to life imprisonment; in 2019 court in Nigerian capital Abuja ruled arrest and deportation illegal, although then-Nigerian President Buhari took no action. Petition highlighted links between Anglophone conflict and Nigeria, as Nigerian Biafra separatists 5-8 March claimed to have attacked Cameroonian soldiers in Bakassi Peninsula. 

Far North violence decreased slightly although sporadic incidents persisted. Soldiers 4 March successfully repelled Boko Haram attack in Kolofata commune, Mayo Sava department, and 11 March killed two suspected jihadists caught stealing food from farm in Nguetchewe town, Mayo Tsanaga department.

Political positioning continued ahead of 2025 presidential election. Ruling party tightened grip on political landscape while opposition factions contemplated united front for polls; but plans over potential coalition threatened after govt 12 March banned two emerging opposition groupings, Alliance Politique pour le Changement (APC) and Alliance pour une Transition Politique (APT), accusing them of clandestine activities and prohibiting them from further political actions. Trial of seventeen individuals, including former foreign intelligence chief Léopold Maxime Eko Eko and pro-govt business mogul Amougou Belinga, charged with Jan 2023 abduction, torture and murder of whistleblowing journalist Martinez Zogo began 25 March; case, which has so far been marked by administrative interference reflecting broader power struggles within govt, will likely be key political issue in lead-up to 2025 elections.

Political tensions rose over arrest of opposition leader; army clashed with rebels in north east while self-defence group resisted disarmament.   

Opposition faced further govt crackdown ahead of 2025 elections. Police 3 March arrested Crépin Mboli-Goumba – lawyer and key figure in opposition coalition Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC) – at airport of capital Bangui and detained him for 72 hours on charges of contempt of court over his Feb accusations of judiciary corruption. After BRDC condemned arrest and lawyers called for court boycott, security forces 6 March released Mboli-Goumba pending trial; court 27 March sentenced him to one-year suspended prison sentence and fine; arrest raised further concerns over govt’s attempts to limit opposition in lead-up to 2025 presidential elections.

Army clashes with rebels continued in north east. Clash between military and 3R fighters near Yaloké town 4 March killed soldier and civilian, leading to intercommunal unrest in local community with two mosques attacked. Coalition of Patriots for Change rebels 7 March attacked Ndah town, forcing army withdrawal until Russian paramilitary Wagner group intervened with airstrikes. Wagner supported military through increased deployment in north east amid speculation that U.S. private security company Bancroft has presence in region’s rural areas.

Tensions persisted in south east as self-defence militia refused to disarm. After late Feb violent clashes between Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) rebels and Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG) ethnic self-defence militia in several villages in Haut-Mbomou prefecture that caused at least ten casualties, Defence Minister Rameaux Claude Bireaux 5 March visited regional capital Obo to persuade AAKG to disarm; group, however, demanded UPC lay down weapons first. Next day, Wagner mercenaries arrived in Obo and exchange of fire 14 March between AAKG and govt soldiers in city raised concerns over potential escalation of clashes.

In other important developments. Amid deepening of Russian influence, President Touadéra 1 March finished three-day visit to Serbian capital Belgrade, an ally of Moscow, culminating in three cooperation agreements covering diplomacy, defence, and mining. Wagner mercenaries 27 March conducted police checkpoints in Bangui.

Aftermath of death of staunch govt opponent continued to roil internal politics; opposition struggled to mobilise for May presidential elections. 

Tensions remained high after death of President’s cousin Yaya Dillo. Conflicting reports about Dillo, who led Socialist Party without Borders (PSF) and died in security forces shooting late Feb at party headquarters in capital N’Djamena, sparked speculation about his demise and divisions within ruling elite. Govt 1 March insisted Dillo was killed while resisting lawful arrest but opposition same day labelled killing an execution; authorities 1 March reportedly demolished PSF headquarters, potentially eliminating evidence, and although PM Masra 4 March pledged international investigation, much remained unclear.  

Democratic opposition struggled to build political weight against Déby. Ahead of 6 May presidential vote, Constitutional Council 24 March approved ten candidates, and excluded ten others including prominent opponents of military-led govt, notably Nassour Ibrahim Neguy Koursami and Rakhis Ahmat Saleh over “irregularities” in their applications; transitional President Mahamad Déby and recently-appointed PM Masra both cleared to run for office. Earlier, opposition struggled to mobilise behind one figure with some parties supporting Koursami’s candidacy and others that of influential former PM Padacké. 

Security in hinterland remained stable, but sporadic violence persisted. Unidentified gunmen 1 March attacked community radio journalist’s home near Mangalmé town (Guera region), killing journalist and two family members. Inter-communal clashes remained prominent; tensions in Djourf Al-Ahmar department (Ouaddaï region) escalated as Mouro and Birgit communities 17 March clashed as part of decades-long tensions, with govt reporting 42 civilians killed during unrest. Meanwhile, govt 25 March announced explosive device killed seven soldiers near Lake Chad in west, saying they suspected Boko Haram jihadists from Nigeria.

In another important development. In wake of Déby’s Jan visit to Russia, France attempted re-engagement with govt; French President Emmanuel Macron’s envoy Jean-Marie Bockel 7 March reassured Déby about continued presence of French troops, with force crucial for regime stability but unpopular with some political actors and civil society groups. 

Regional body for Central African states lifted sanctions and re-admitted govt while national dialogue preparations continued. 

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) bloc readmitted govt. Body 9 March decided to lift sanctions on govt and said Libreville could rejoin after its membership was suspended Sept 2023 following previous month’s coup that removed President Ali Bongo. 

Preparations for national dialogue grew amid conflicting views about its nature. In 8 March decree, transitional President Gen. Nguema announced 2-30 April convening of “inclusive” national dialogue in capital Libreville, as part of preparation for new Constitution. However, opposition raised concerns over issues with representation at dialogue and asked for postponement.

Jihadist-related attacks and counter-insurgency operations continued to exact high toll on civilians; govt used forced enrolment to silence opponents and signed security agreement with Mali and Niger. 

High-level violence persisted, with at least 100 civilians reported killed in one day. Following late Feb surge of violence that saw hundreds of civilians killed by jihadist fighters and reportedly state security forces, further conflict reported: special police and al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 8 March clashed in Piela commune, Gnagna province (East region), resulting in four insurgent deaths, while same day drone strikes killed around ten Islamic State Sahel Province militants near Touka-Bayel village, Seno province (Sahel region). Next day, JNIM attacked Tessoague village, Koulpelogo province (Centre-East region), killing at least 27 including two civilian auxiliaries (VDPs). JNIM militants 26 March attacked govt forces in Sanaba town (Boucle du Mouhoun region), leading to deaths of at least eleven soldiers and twenty insurgents. Meanwhile, reports emerged that suspected soldiers 16 March allegedly killed at least 100 civilians in several villages in Kompienga province (East region) during apparent attempt to relieve area from JNIM blockades in place since 2022; observers suggested attacks may have been retaliation for locals’ alleged support to militants and Feb series of jihadist killings.

Govt continued repressive measures against civil society. Concerns grew over authorities forcing opponents to join VDPs following late Feb abduction of Rasmane Zinaba and Bassirou Badjo, activists and members of Balai Citoyen civil group, amid suspicions govt obliged them to enrol with civilian auxiliaries; UN 5 March condemned continued “enforced disappearances” and “forced mobilisation.” Govt 7 March released former FM Ouédraogo, who reported military keepers had told him to spread word about consequences of criticising military authorities; next day Daouda Diallo, another civil society actor forced into VDP enrolment in Dec 2023, also released. 

Security agreement announced with Mali and Niger. Alliance of Sahel States 6 March announced creation of joint counterterrorism force to combat regional jihadist insurgency and address shared security needs.

Govt-sponsored inter-Malian dialogue took initial steps amid ongoing stifling of civic and political rights; jihadist and other armed violence continued.

Initial phase of dialogue approved, albeit without main rebel and jihadist groups. Piloting Committee 4 March submitted terms of reference for Inter-Malian dialogue process to transitional President Col. Goïta, following approval from representatives from capital Bamako, regions and diaspora; participants agreed on five thematic committees covering peace and reconciliation, security, economic development, geopolitical issues and political reforms. Several key actors remained outside process including main rebel and jihadist groups; govt 8 March imposed initial six-months long financial sanctions on two leaders associated with al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), and four from Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), coalition of armed groups from 2015 Algiers Accord. 

Concerns rose over restrictions on civil and political freedoms. Govt 6 March dissolved influential group Coordination of Movements, Associations and Sympathizers (CMAS) – led by well-known figure and vocal govt critic Imam Mahmoud Dicko – and 13 March shut down Association of Malian Students. National Human Rights Commission 6 March expressed concerns about “serious threats” to political freedoms, especially freedom of association; UN human rights body 13 March also condemned moves. Meanwhile, over 80 political parties and civil society groups 31 March called for end to transition and organisation of presidential elections as soon as possible.

Violence by jihadist and other armed groups remained high. Notably, Islamic State Sahel Province militants 6 March attacked army base in Labbezanga, Gao region, leaving at least four attackers dead; JNIM shelling targeted airports in Gao city 16 March and Timbuktu city two days later, causing injuries and material damage. Alliance of Sahel States 6 March announced creation of joint counterterrorism force to combat regional jihadist insurgency and address shared security needs. Meanwhile, Dozo militia 8 March reportedly abducted and killed around 30 Fulani near Kingolola village, Segou region.

In other important developments. Hundreds 16 March protested high cost of living and insecurity in Ménaka city. Officials 19 March visited Russia’s capital Moscow for discussions on security cooperation and expanding partnership in commerce, transportation, and more.

Govt severed military accords with U.S. and moved closer to Sahelian partners; jihadist violence continued.

Niamey distanced itself militarily from Washington. After U.S. diplomatic delegation 12 March visited capital Niamey and met PM Zeine and others, authorities 16 March “denounced with immediate effect” its military accords with Washington; govt accused delegation of disrespect of diplomatic protocol and intention to limit Niamey’s sovereignty in choice of international partners; uncertainty grew over whether 1,000 U.S. military personnel, many based at Agadez military base, will remain in country; govt and U.S. ambassador 27 March discussed future plan for “disengagement” of U.S. forces. Earlier, Alliance of Sahelian States 6 March announced creation of joint counterterrorism force to combat regional jihadist insurgency and address shared security needs.

Jihadist-related violence persisted in Tillabery. In Tillabery region (south west), Islamic State Sahel Province militants 3 March attacked convoy of trucks near Koutougou Haoussa village, killing around seven people and burning seven vehicles; militants 19 March ambushed military position near Teguey town killing 23 soldiers and wounding seventeen, with some 30 assailants killed. In Diffa region (south east), military 13 March killed ten alleged Islamic State West Africa Province militants in airstrike near Assaga village.

In important regional developments. After West African regional bloc ECOWAS lifted sanctions on govt in Feb, land borders between Niger and Nigeria re-opened 22 March; border with Benin, however, remained closed, although 2,000km-long Niger-Benin pipeline began transporting crude oil from Niger’s Agadem field to Benin in early March.

Govt’s peace efforts with FARC dissidents and ELN remained fragile, armed group Gaitanista Self-Defence Force expressed interest in talks, and violence in countryside persisted at high levels.

Govt partially cancelled ceasefire with FARC dissidents, who responded with show of force. President Petro 17 March cancelled bilateral ceasefire with dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) in Cauca, Nariño and Valle de Cauca departments along Pacific coast. Decision followed 16 March incident in Toribío municipality (Cauca), in which members of local FARC-EMC front fired at civilian population, killing elderly woman. In show of force, FARC-EMC 30 March posted video announcing creation of new regional bloc, which they said would work to consolidate armed group’s presence in Valle del Cauca, Huila, Tolima and Quindío departments, latter two being places where EMC has only recently established itself. Govt and dissidents set to hold extraordinary session 3 April aimed at de-escalating crisis.

Govt-ELN tensions persisted over regional dialogue, Gaitanistas agreed to talks. Tensions between govt and guerrilla group National Liberation Army (ELN) ran high over former’s plan to open peace dialogue in Nariño, initially set to include regional ELN front and other armed groups. ELN central command condemned initiative, accusing govt of trying to undermine group’s coherence; strong reaction laid bare deep fractures within ELN. National and local govt in Nariño 9 March inaugurated dialogue with civil society, but walked back plans to include armed groups. Meanwhile, Petro 18 March called on armed group Gaitanista Self-Defence Force to engage in talks or “be destroyed”; group next day accepted offer for dialogue, though next steps remain unclear. 

Confrontations between armed groups continued, exacting heavy toll on civilians. Notably, UN 15 March reported displacement or confinement of 7,000 people in Nariño, where FARC-EMC fronts clashed with separate dissident FARC faction Segunda Marquetalia and ELN. UN report on children and armed conflict, made public 25 March, found 61% increase in incidents of conflict violence affecting minors from 2021-2023, compared with 2019-2021. 

In another important development. Petro 26 March threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Israel if it doesn’t comply with UN Security Council resolution calling for ceasefire in Gaza (see Israel/Palestine).

Violence continued at high levels despite state of emergency, with unknown gunmen shooting Ecuador’s youngest mayor; efforts to tackle corruption continued.

President renewed state of emergency amid precarious security situation. President Noboa 7 March extended nationwide state of emergency, in place since Jan, for additional 30 days to address criminal violence; renewal is second and last time such extension is permitted. Violence continued at high levels, however. Notably, unknown gunmen 24 March shot dead country’s youngest mayor, Brigitte García, in San Vicente town (Manabí province) alongside her communications director, Jairo Loor; death marked latest in string of attacks on political figures in Ecuador. Riot in military-controlled prison in Guayaquil city, reportedly sparked by “internal revolt” against alleged mistreatment of inmates, 27 March left at least three prisoners dead. Gunmen 30 March shot dead nine people and injured ten others in Guayaquil. Kidnappings and extortions increased fivefold between 1 Jan and 8 March compared to same period last year. Meanwhile, authorities prepared for 21 April referendum that, among other things, will propose measures to tighten security and reform constitution.

Police arrested twelve as part of Attorney General’s corruption probe. Office of Attorney General Diana Salazar 4 March announced arrest of twelve people, including judges and politicians, as part of so-called “Purge” investigation into officials suspected of ties to criminal groups; operation spawns from Salazar’s wider “Metastasis” investigation into high-level corruption across Ecuador. President of Guayas’ Court of Justice Hugo González 8 March resigned after Attorney General’s office announced he was implicated in “Purge”; Hugo González denies wrongdoing. 

Authorities blocked opposition coalition from registering their banned candidate or her replacement in bid to clear field of President Maduro’s strongest opponents for presidential poll. 

Authorities blocked opposition from registering candidate for election. Govt-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) 5 March announced presidential poll would be held 28 July, resulting in election timetable compressed into under five months. Candidates 21-25 March registered their candidacy, leading to frenzied negotiations within opposition. Main opposition candidate María Corina Machado and opposition coalition Unitary Platform 22 March jointly announced that retired academic Corina Yoris would replace Machado as opposition’s unity candidate after govt refused to lift ban on her candidacy. Yet CNE, which had already annulled all but two of Unitary Platform’s parties, blocked Corina from registering, sparking outcry from opposition; move laid bare threat Machado and her substitute posed to Maduro if allowed to run. 

Opposition party within coalition unilaterally registered their candidate. CNE 26 March announced that Manuel Rosales, whose Un Nuevo Tiempo is one of Unitary Platform’s four main parties, had registered his candidacy; Rosales perceived as lesser threat to Maduro’s re-election prospects. Opposition negotiator Stalin González 26 March justified decision, saying opposition’s abstentionism in past polls had “left Venezuelans without an option”. Next day, however, Unitary Platform managed to register retired diplomat Edmundo González as placeholder unity candidate; substitution permitted until 20 April. Meanwhile, President Maduro 25 March registered his candidacy alongside a dozen others, many of whom are allied with govt or suspected of acting in its interests.

International community condemned govt. Regional govts, including oft-discreet Colombia and Brazil, and U.S. 26 March expressed concern about situation. U.S. set to decide by 18 April whether to snapback sanctions on oil and gas sectors in light of Maduro’s violations of govt-opposition agreement in Barbados, though re-imposition may be delayed or partial. 

In another important development. Lawmakers 21 March approved creation of new Venezuelan state in disputed Essequibo area, oil-rich region administered by Guyana, as govt used issue to foment nationalist sentiment; law also allows candidates for elected office to be barred for not supporting Venezuela’s claim.

Ruling party swept to victory in local elections; two years after President Bukele first introduced state of exception, Legislative Assembly once more renewed measure.

President Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party claimed victory in local elections. Salvadorans 3 March cast their votes for mayors, municipal councils and twenty deputies for regional political forum Central American Parliament. Nuevas Ideas was widely expected to win after govt-controlled Legislative Assembly reduced number of municipalities from 262 to 44 in June 2023 to firm up presidential control at local level. Nuevas Ideas secured 28 out of 44 mayorships, four political parties allied to Bukele won fifteen and opposition party Nationalist Republican Alliance secured one. Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), guerrilla group turned political party that has headed govt twice, failed to win any mayorships or seats in Legislative Assembly; defeat prompted party’s Sec-Gen Óscar Ortiz 4 March to announce it would undergo “total reorganisation”. With elections over, govt expected to focus on improving economy amid hesitations from international financial institutions over future loans after country designated Bitcoin as legal tender.

Authorities extended state of exception. Legislative Assembly 8 March extended state of exception for another 30 days. 27 March marked two years since Bukele first introduced security measures to tackle gangs. Rights group Amnesty International same day said that as of Feb 2024, human rights organisations and media reports had registered “327 cases of enforced disappearances, more than 78,000 arbitrary detentions… a situation of prison overcrowding of approximately 148%, and at least 235 deaths in state custody”; group accused govt of “reducing gang violence by replacing it with state violence”.

As election season officially began, leading presidential contenders outlined their security policies amid uptick in political violence.

Mexico kicked off election campaign. Campaign season 1 March officially began, with leading presidential contenders 4 March outlining their security agendas. Opposition candidate Xóchitl Gálvez called for an end to President López Obrador’s “hugs, not bullets” policy, withdrawal of armed forces from policing and continued use of military for combatting organised crime. Ruling MORENA party’s candidate Claudia Sheinbaum vowed continuity with current administration, saying she would double down on social programmes to address root causes of crime and consolidate National Guard’s integration into army; she also proposed upping National Guard’s investigative and intelligence capacities while improving coordination between different levels of govt and with prosecutors. Meanwhile, López Obrador 12 March accused opposition of plotting “electoral fraud and a technical coup” with help of electoral institutions; head of Electoral Tribunal 18 March denied allegations.

Guerrero and Chiapas states witnessed more political violence. In Guerrero, unknown gunmen 3 March shot dead Alfredo González, mayoral contender in Atoyac town; MORENA candidate for mayoralty of Chilapa city, Tomás Morales, was killed 12 March. In Chiapas, Institutional Revolutionary Party candidate for mayoralty in San Juan Cancuc town found dead 14 March. Meanwhile, criminal violence continued, particularly in Michoacán state. Notably, landmine explosion 5 March killed three farmers in Tumbiscatío municipality; unknown gunmen 17 March killed and decapitated three police officers on road connecting Pátzcuaro and Uruapan towns; and armed group clashes 26 March erupted in Apatzingán municipality, terrorising local community.

Police in Guerrero shot student, sparking outrage. Police 7 March fatally shot student from Ayotzinapa teachers’ college in Guerrero, same institution attended by 43 students that went missing in 2014. Police alleged student and several others were caught driving stolen car. Incident triggered violent protests. Authorities 13 March arrested two officers allegedly involved in shooting.

Crackdown on dissent continued, ruling party claimed victory in regional polls, and Managua strengthened ties with China.

Crackdown on civil society and religious organisations persisted. Authorities 5 March closed fifteen NGOs and one university amid ongoing crackdown on civil society. Religious persecution also continued: according to report presented 6 March before Human Rights Council in Geneva, authorities have detained 55 religious figures and exiled 44 since April 2018. Regime 12 March proposed suspending relations with Vatican after Pope Francis 10 March called govt a “dictatorship” led by an “unbalanced” president. Authorities 27 March convicted eleven pastors who work with U.S.-based missionary group to between twelve and fifteen years in prison on money laundering charges.

Ruling party won local polls in autonomous Caribbean regions. Local elections 3 March took place in Nicaragua’s two autonomous regions, which are located along eastern Caribbean Coast and home to number of Indigenous groups. Ahead of poll, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 23 Feb released report expressing concern about unfair electoral conditions, notably citing govt’s cancellation of Indigenous party YATAMA’s legal status and detention of party leaders, Brooklyn Rivera and Nancy Henriquez. Ruling party 4 March claimed victory in polls, which saw low turnout and were marked by incidents of violence and voter coercion around polling stations.

West imposed more restrictions on Nicaragua. U.S. 14 March imp0sed arms restrictions on Nicaragua, 21 March sanctioned Attorney General Wendy Carolina Morales Urbina for her role in govt’s “unjust persecution of political prisoners and civil society”. Amid growing pressure from West, Nicaragua continued to strengthen ties with China and Russia. Notably, delegation from Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament 11 March visited Nicaragua to strengthen cooperation. 

Protests broke out in Cuba amid electricity and food shortages.

Demonstrators 17 March took to streets in at least five locations across Cuba, including second biggest city Santiago de Cuba, in response to prolonged power outages and food shortages. Protests were largest since anti-govt demonstrations erupted in July 2021 over worsening economic crisis and govt’s handling of COVID-19 pandemic. U.S. Embassy in Cuba 17 March urged govt “to respect the human rights of the protestors and address the legitimate needs of the Cuban people”. Foreign ministry 18 March summoned U.S. chargé d’affaires over comments and pointed to decades-long U.S. trade embargo in fuelling Cuba’s “difficult economic situation”. President Diaz-Canel, meanwhile, called for calm and accused “mediocre politicians and social media terrorists” in U.S. state of Florida of provoking unrest; U.S. dismissed allegations as “absurd”. Some analysts fear that deteriorating living conditions, including extensive power rationing, and poor economic outlook could fuel more protests in coming months.

Gangs launched coordinated attacks across Port-au-Prince, targeting critical sites, freeing over 4,700 inmates and forcing thousands to flee; outside pressure yielded agreement to form new govt.

Chaos erupted in capital as rival gang coalitions launched coordinated attacks. Gang violence dramatically escalated after G9 and Gpèp rival gang coalitions late Feb joined forces and launched coordinated offensive in capital Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas. Gangs throughout March targeted critical sites, including police stations, ports, airport and govt buildings; 18 March attacked several upscale neighbourhoods in Pétionville commune, killing at least fifteen. In response, mobs 20 March killed at least two suspected gang members in Pétionville commune. Police 26 March reported deaths of seventeen suspected gang members, including leader of Delmas 95 gang, since 29 Feb. Violence displaced thousands and forced tens of thousands more to flee Port-au-Prince amid ever-worsening humanitarian crisis. 

Plan to form transitional council moved forward after initial difficulties. Several political parties 5 March agreed to create transitional govt led by rebel leader and ex-convict Guy Philippe, who has ties to gangs. Outside partners subsequently stepped up efforts to form more representative govt as foreign support for Henry collapsed. Leaders from CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) and other countries 11 March called emergency meeting in Jamaica, same day announced transitional government comprised of seven-member presidential council and two non-voting civil society representatives would be established; council tasked with appointing new PM, creating path toward elections and preparing for Kenya-led security mission. Henry that night announced he would resign after council is installed. Formation initially held up by disagreements, though council members 27 March issued first statement, announcing preparations for their installation and pledging to devise plan that can restore order. Meanwhile, G9 leader Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier 29 March said he would consider laying down weapons if gangs are included in peace talks.

Kenya halted plans to deploy security mission. Kenyan govt 12 March paused plans to deploy police in Haiti, citing changes to conditions on the ground. Kenyan President Ruto next day said Nairobi would resume preparations when presidential council is installed. Only $10.8mn has been deposited in UN-managed trust fund to cover mission, estimated to cost $600mn.

Tribal factions struck temporary ceasefire to calm deadly hostilities.  

After tribal clashes in Feb in restive Highlands Region killed over 40 people, two warring tribal factions – known as Yopo Alliance and Palinau Alliance – from Enga province 13 March struck three-month unconditional ceasefire after negotiations in capital Port Moresby; agreement reportedly acknowledged that long-running hostilities had caused “displacement of thousands of people” and precipitated “humanitarian crisis”.

UN personal envoy continued careful diplomacy to explore potential common ground between parties for return to formal talks.

Prospects of new round of negotiations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for settlement remained uncertain. UN Sec-Gen’s Personal Envoy to Cyprus Maria Angela Holguin 11 March returned to island for second round of meetings with Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides and “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) leader Ersin Tatar, as well as political parties, civil society, and religious representatives from both communities. Holguin 16 March called for “transforming the hardships of the past into the foundation for a sustainable future”, while indicating that she was carrying on with her mission to explore whether common ground for negotiations existed. Meanwhile, in reference to 1974 Turkish invasion of island, Turkish President Erdoğan 19 March said “perhaps if we had pushed south […] there would be no more south and north, and Cyprus would be completely ours”, triggering strong rebuke from Republic of Cyprus and Greece. Christodoulides 21 March said that positive steps regarding enhancement of Türkiye’s relations with EU was dependent on “concrete progress” on Cyprus issue. 

Govt struck agreements with Iraq, including to ban Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and continued operations against PKK in northern Iraq and northern Syria, and Islamic State (ISIS) at home.

Security forces targeted PKK in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, security forces 4 and 19 March announced killing of two of PKK’s “youth leaders” in Sulaymaniyah province. Clashes with PKK 19 March killed Turkish soldier and injured four others in northern Iraq; Türkiye same day responded with round of airstrikes in Metina, Zap, Gara, and Qandil regions (see Iraq). In Syria, security units 22 March carried out operation against People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Qamishli (see Syria). Meanwhile, signalling possible escalation in coming months, President Erdoğan 18 March claimed that Iraqi border would be entirely secured by summer and that “job half-done” in Syria would “certainly” be completed; FM Hakan Fidan same day announced intention in summer to cut off “PKK/YPG” transit route between Iraq and Syria. 

Govt and Iraq laid groundwork for upgraded security and economic cooperation. Senior Turkish delegation led by FM Fidan 14-15 March visited Iraqi capital Baghdad and jointly met senior Iraqi ministers as well as leader of Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces and Kurdistan Regional Govt’s Interior Minister. Meeting established joint Iraqi-Turkish permanent commissions on counterterrorism, water governance, trade, oil trade and transportation, and Baghdad also designated PKK as “banned organisation”, which Turkish officials hailed as pivotal diplomatic win. In addition to bolstering fight against PKK, Ankara hopes improved ties can advance Development Road Initiative, a major trade infrastructure project aiming to connect Iraq’s Basra city to Türkiye; Ankara and Baghdad are reportedly in talks for joint summer offensive against PKK along part of the project’s planned route. 

Authorities targeted alleged Islamic State (ISIS) members. Security forces detained over 400 individuals during March; following ISIS-claimed attack in Moscow 23 March, security forces detained nearly 150 individuals across 30 provinces (see Russia).

Relations with Greece remain on course for enhancement. Erdoğan 4 March conveyed birthday wishes to Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Greek vice-FM Alexandra Papadopoulou 11 March met Turkish vice-FM Burak Akçapar in Ankara as part of Turkish-Greek Political Dialogues format.

Al-Shabaab continued to drive insecurity, while police deployment to Haiti faced setbacks.

Al-Shabaab militants remained threat, particularly along porous Somalia border. Group of Al-Shabaab insurgents 2 March crossed border and attempted to establish temporary camp in Fafi area of Garissa county; security forces subsequently killed five and arrested four group members. Bomb at hotel 25 March killed at least two police officers and civilian in Mandera town. Meanwhile, court 7 March sentenced two Somali men, arrested in 2018 in possession of explosives and accused of planning to bomb key sites in capital Nairobi, to 25 years in prison. 

Nairobi-led multinational mission to Haiti faced delays. Escalation in Haiti (see Haiti) caused setback to govt’s deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police to lead UN-backed mission. After acting Haitian PM Ariel Henry resigned, Foreign Ministry Principal Secretary Korir Sing'Oei 12 March announced govt would wait until new administration is in place before deploying police; President Ruto next day, however, indicated Nairobi would still lead mission. Earlier, govt 1 March signed reciprocity agreement with Haiti in order to counter Jan-announced objection by Nairobi High Court.

Political tensions continued, including accusations govt curtailing freedoms. Busia County Senator Okiya Omtatah 22 March said “goons” attacked his vehicle with stones after he left court, but he escaped unharmed; senator had been prominent in holding govt accountable, including over housing levy; earlier, Ruto 19 March signed amended housing bill (that includes new tax) into law, bypassing court’s late Jan decision to suspend measures as unconstitutional amid continued executive-judiciary tensions. Meanwhile, Interior Cabinet Secretary Kithure Kindiki 18 March said police would arrest anyone heckling political leaders, raising concerns over restrictions on political rights and free speech. 

Jihadist attacks continued in northern Cabo Delgado province, although slowed mid-month; Oct general election preparations progressed haltingly.

Islamic State-affiliated militants focused on Ibo and Quissanga districts. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) continued to target security forces and civilians in Cabo Delgado province with dozens of attacks between late Feb and 6 March; militants also appeared to be systemically looting areas and re-supplying its base in Mucojo town, Macomia district, including taking food and goods from Quissanga town 2 March; next day, insurgents attacked nearby Quirimba island, Ibo district, leaving nine soldiers dead. ISMP fighters involved in Feb assault on southern Chiúre district returned north early March; free movement of militants highlighted weakness of security forces, whose blanket orders to evacuate some areas worsened humanitarian situation and angered locals. UN 8 March reported over 110,000 displaced since uptick in militant operations began late Dec. Attacks subsequently slowed mid-month amid fasting for religious month of Ramadan that began 11 March. Heavy rains which limited security operations may also have curbed militants’ movements; end of religious holiday on 10 April and of rainy season could see levels of violence rise again in coming weeks. Meanwhile, govt 13 March said it had identified new leadership in ISMP, mainly based in Macomia and Quissanga districts. Earlier, President Nyusi 3 March announced Algeria pledged support in anti-terror fight in Cabo Delgado. 

Preparation for Oct polls faced challenges. Electoral commission 15 March began registering voters, open until 28 April; insecurity and technical glitches delayed process in some areas including parts of Cabo Delgado, while reports emerged that officials were prioritising voters from ruling FRELIMO party; meanwhile, pro-govt Naparama militia members 8 March beat to death three election officials in Chiúre after mistaking them for insurgents. Both FRELIMO and main opposition RENAMO continued to struggle to designate respective presidential candidates.

Political tensions increased ahead of May general elections, with continued electoral violence in KwaZulu-Natal province.

Ahead of May elections, tensions ran particular high between ruling African National Congress (ANC) and former President Zuma’s newly formed uMkhonto weSizwe party (MKP), predominately in key battleground KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province. Amid inflammatory statements and rhetoric, electoral violence continued to plague build-up to polls; notably, in KZN capital Durban, unidentified gunmen 2 March killed MKP organiser in Umlazi township, while ANC accused MKP of being responsible for aggravating strike by municipal workers in eThekwini municipality; industrial action ran late Feb to mid-March and caused unrest and destruction of infrastructure, while on-duty municipal worker died after strikers allegedly attacked her. Also, ANC members 16 March clashed with members of opposition Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) during cultural ceremony in KwaNongoma town, injuring sixteen. Election commission 28 March announced Zuma barred from being candidate in election due to 2021 conviction for defying court order, further raising political tensions. Amid polling suggesting ANC may get under 50% of vote nationally for first time since transition from apartheid system to democracy in 1994, deputy secretary general of party Nomvula Mokonyane 13 March said ANC not in talks over coalition.

Govt crackdown continued with mass evictions and discussion of law restricting civil society; relations with U.S. strained amid adjustment of sanctions. 

Repression continued including removals of those living on state-owned land. Govt kept up campaign to remove people living in “illegal” dwellings on state-owned land, with police arresting thousands of settlers since measures began mid-Jan, drawing opposition from civil society as well as some in ruling ZANU-PF party; criminal actors took advantage of situation, with local NGO 11 March reporting gang had attempted to violently enforce evictions in village with gold mining opportunities in Insiza district, Matabeleland South province, leading to clashes with villagers. Meanwhile, parliament 1 March began process to pass controversial Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill that critics argue will be used to control civil society organisations.

Washington lifted broad sanctions and imposed targeted ones. U.S. treasury 4 March removed broad program of sanctions, imposed new penalties against eleven people, including President Mnangagwa and his wife, and three companies for corruption and human rights abuses under Global Magnitsky measures; spokesperson for Mnangagwa – who became first sitting head of state to be sanctioned under program that blocks access to U.S. visas, property and services – 6 March condemned “illegal coercive measures”. In sign of worsening tensions, U.S. aid chief Samantha Power 8 March decried “unacceptable” intimidation following alleged Feb harassment, detainment and deportation of U.S. aid staff in capital Harare; govt accused workers of interfering and violating sovereignty.

Political tensions rose as Puntland suspended recognition of Mogadishu-based central govt over contentious constitutional review; Al-Shabaab made territorial gains.

Puntland withdrew recognition of federal govt over constitutional review process. After parliament 30 March passed first four chapters of draft constitution, Puntland state govt 31 March revoked “recognition and confidence in” federal govt institutions; in sign of rising political temperature, Puntland cabinet said it would have power of “independent state” until dispute resolved and new federal system approved through referendum. Earlier, tensions mounted as President Mohamud promoted updated constitution despite lead opposition figures accusing him of seeking to boost his chances at 2026 election; notably, former federal Presidents Sheikh Sharif and Farmajo and current Puntland President Said Deni 22-23 March met in Puntland capital Garowe to discuss opposing proposed changes.

Al-Shabaab took over towns in centre, political dispute turned deadly in Hirshabelle. In Mudug region (centre), group 9-14 March gained control of Amara, Bacadweyne, Caad, Shabellow and Xinlabi towns with no fighting; military abandoned positions after clan militias withdrew from area amid dispute with federal govt, highlighting ongoing challenge of organising anti-militant operations. Militants 14-15 March also launched attack on hotel in downtown Mogadishu, leading to ten-hour siege with three soldiers and five insurgents reportedly killed. Meanwhile, clashes between Hirshabelle state govt forces and those calling for separate Hiraan state (one of two regions that make up Hirshabelle) 13 March killed at least six in Beledweyne city; violence came after Hirshabelle-appointed governor of Hiraan region tried to enter city.

Tensions with Ethiopia appeared to publicly ease. Although no major breakthrough reached, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa pursued dialogue to address tensions over Jan-announced Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. After Kenyan President William Ruto late Feb separately hosted both President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his Ethiopian counterpart PM Abiy Ahmed, technical teams from Mogadishu and Addis Ababa early March travelled to Kenya’s capital Nairobi for shuttle discussions.

In other important developments. Govt 4 March officially joined East African Community (EAC) regional body. Increase in piracy incidents off Somali coast in Indian Ocean raised concerns of resurgence in attacks on vessels in region.

Signing of electoral law ended uncertainty around Nov 2024 party and presidential elections and removed source of tension between govt and opponents.

Approval of bill paves way for vote, opposition welcomed move. President Bihi 9 March signed electoral bill and other related measures into law, ending months of tensions and speculation that polls due to be held Nov 2024 would be delayed. Main opposition party Waddani welcomed developments and Waddani candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro 21 March met Bihi and cabinet members, as sides prepare to move forward with elections where vote for political parties and presidency will be held concurrently.

Troop movements continued but calm remained along Sool region frontline. Govt troops and Dhulbahante clan militias conducted movements along frontline in Sool region; lull in fighting between sides however held.

In another important development. Technical committee aiming to finalise Jan-announced Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding over sea access and diplomatic recognition conducted meetings with stakeholders, including in coastal areas, at Berbera port and with opposition parties.

President Tebboune announced early elections to be held in Sept as diplomatic ties with Morocco further deteriorated.

Early presidential elections announced for Sept. President Tebboune 21 March announced presidential elections to be held on 7 Sept, three months ahead of schedule, providing no immediate explanation for rescheduling. Tebboune has not officially announced re-election bid, but is likely to run for second term if his health allows, having secured army support. Unexpected rescheduling of elections raised questions among electorate.

Morocco announced plan to confiscate Algerian embassy properties in Rabat. Morocco 13 March issued decree ordering expropriation of Algerian embassy buildings in Morocco’s capital Rabat amid deteriorating relations between neighbouring countries over Western Sahara question. Algerian foreign ministry decried Moroccan “provocations” and vowed to retaliate against Rabat’s plan to use confiscated Algerian properties to expand administrative buildings of Moroccan foreign ministry.

Algerian Hirak movement activist fined and given suspended sentence. Algerian court 13 March issued six-month suspended sentence and 50,000 dinar ($372) fine to prominent pro-democracy activist Karim Tabbou. Sentence is part of broader campaign of harassment of pro-democracy Hirak movement.

Cairo continued to warn Israel against a possible ground invasion in Rafah and secured major financial deals with IMF, EU and World Bank.

Egypt pursued high-level diplomacy to prevent attack on Gaza’s Rafah city. President Sisi 13 March met Dutch PM Mark Rutte, in subsequent press conference warned Israel against launching ground invasion in Rafah, said it would threaten lives of more than a million Palestinians; 15 March, said that Egypt was working to reach ceasefire in Gaza, increase aid and allow for displaced people to return home. While threat of immediate invasion of Rafah seems to have temporarily receded, despite Israel’s repeated warnings that it might soon happen, authorities continue to worry about potential consequences of all-out attack for domestic stability and Sinai, due to possible forced displacement of Palestinian refugees.

Major financial foreign deals helped stabilise economic outlook. PM Mostafa Madbouly 6 March unveiled a new deal with International Monetary Fund (IMF), which agreed to $8 billion loan, in return for floating currency, spending cuts and levelling playing field between public and private sector firms. Announcement took place on same day as authorities let Egyptian pound float, triggering devaluation of official exchange rate from around 30 to the dollar to around 50 to the dollar. European delegation led by Ursula von der Leyen 17 March visited capital Cairo, presented EU financial support package worth $7.4 billion to support country’s green and digital transitions, investment in various other areas and, most importantly, migration control. World Bank 18 March confirmed deblocking $6 billion lending package to support country. Ratings agency S&P next day upgraded Egypt outlook from stable to positive.

In other important developments. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry 5 March met Somali Foreign Minister Ali Mohamed Omar in Cairo, re-affirmed Egypt’s support for Somalia’s stance against Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland on red sea access. Shoukry 18 March met with U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello in Cairo, highlighted country’s diplomatic efforts through neighbouring countries and other channels to promote de-escalation, secure sustainable ceasefire, and support Sudan’s unity.

Amid poor economic outlook and stalled political process, new feud emerged about currency depreciation. 

Political process remained deadlocked despite nominal pledges to unify country. During meeting in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh, foreign ministers of member countries of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 3 March expressed “support for the efforts of the United Nations to reach a political solution, hold elections and unify state institutions” in Libya. Libya’s Parliament Speaker Aghela Saleh, head of Presidential Council Mohamed Mnefi, and head of Tripoli-based High State Council Mohamed Tekkala 10 March met in Egypt’s capital Cairo under Arab League aegis, agreed to form “technical committee” to resolve contentious points of electoral legislation. Despite pledges to break deadlock, UN envoy’s efforts to resolve disagreements in draft electoral laws and address contentious issue of appointing new interim government stalled. 

Move to depreciate currency sparked political recriminations. In wake of rising foreign currency exchange rate on black market, Parliament speaker Aghila Saleh 14 March issued decree imposing 27% tax (labelled as fee) on foreign currency exchange, stating this was a means to raise money for “development projects and debt”. Move faced opposition in parliament, with deputy parliament speaker Fawzi Nuweiri 15 March declaring he opposed what amounts to devaluation of currency. In televised speech PM Abdul Dabaiba 18 March also rejected proposed tax on foreign currency exchange, claiming that Libya’s economy is strong with a surplus, low inflation, and high foreign reserves; accused Central Bank of mismanagement and blamed Speaker of Parliament for trying to cover costs of Khalifa Haftar’s spending in eastern Libya through tax. Central Bank 19 March, however, ordered banks to comply with imposition of tax on foreign currency purchases.

Thousands protested against deteriorating economic situation, authorities continued preparations for Oct presidential elections, and EU increased support toward migration control.

Protestors rallied against worsening economic and social situation in Tunis. Nearly 2,000 people 3 March demonstrated in capital Tunis to protest against deteriorating social and economic outlook, in show of force organised by Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT). Several trade unionists claimed that break between UGTT and President Saïed’s regime is far from complete; UGTT move may be bid to extract concessions from Saïed in run-up to Oct presidential elections, in particular to obtain pay rises in public sector. Following Feb local elections, 279 local councils held their first meeting on 1 March; councils next day designated members of regional councils in each governorate. A national council comprising members of regional councils is due to be set up shortly; although its prerogatives are not legally clear, it will likely deal with economic and development issues.

Crackdown on dissent continued in lead-up to Oct elections. Mondher Zenaidi, a former minister under former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in the 2000s, 6 March published a Facebook post criticising Saïed’s record and implying that he would run in Oct presidential elections; judiciary two days later issued international arrest warrant against him in connection with corruption case linked to privatisation operation in 2005. Independent High Authority for Election and Central Electoral Commission for Russia 15 March signed a memorandum of cooperation in Russia’s capital Moscow; cooperation officially aims at establishing joint cooperation to support electoral processes.

Migrants continued to flee Tunisia by boat, EU stepped up migration support. Media reports 15 March revealed 34 migrants reported missing off the south-eastern coast of Tunisia, 34 others rescued, and two found dead. European Commission 14 March disbursed 150mn euros in budgetary support for Tunisia to improve migration control, even though Tunis failed to meet EU’s own eligibility criteria.

Expert opinion recommending EU court to cancel partnership deal over Western Sahara dealt blow to Morocco; Polisario threatened to sue Spain over possible airspace management transfer.

EU legal adviser backed cancellation of Morocco-EU partnership agreement over Western Sahara. Advocate General for EU Court of Justice Tamara Ćapeta 21 March recommended court to cancel 2019 EU Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Morocco as agreement failed “to treat territory of Western Sahara as ‘separate and distinct’ from Morocco”. Ćapeta highlighted that agreement should treat Western Sahara as separate territory from Morocco, also recommended that EU negotiates with Morocco (and not necessarily with Polisario Front) as “administering power” on behalf of local population. Overall, she recommended case be sent to lower court for further discussion. Court of Justice will issue ruling based on this recommendation in coming weeks. 

Polisario threatened legal action against Spain over airspace management transfer. Polisario front representative in Switzerland’s Geneva city 10 March threatened to sue Spain before international judicial bodies if it goes ahead with plans to transfer management of Western Sahara airspace to Morocco.

Jihadist violence continued in north, while political tensions remained high over constitutional and electoral reforms. 

Jihadist insurgency persisted. Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) insurgents continued to carry out attacks in northern Alibori, Atacora and Borgou regions. In Karimama commune in Alibori, JNIM 6 March allegedly planted explosive device that killed two civilians in Chutes de Koudou village while police 15 March killed two suspected militants in Karimama town. In Borgou, police 21 March killed three alleged JNIM militants in Angaradebou village, Tchaourou commune. 

Tensions between opposition and President Talon’s govt continued. Opposition legislators in National Assembly 1-2 March blocked passage of draft revisions to Constitution submitted by ruling party amid persistent concerns that Talon will attempt to run for third term, despite President’s claims he will not. Parliament 5 March modified Electoral Code placing tougher conditions on running for presidency, leading to opposition and civil society criticism.

In other important regional developments. Land border between Benin and Niger remained closed despite West African regional bloc ECOWAS lifting sanctions on latter in Feb; however, 2,000km-long Niger-Benin pipeline began transporting crude oil from Niger’s Agadem field to Benin in early March while officials from both countries 3-9 March met in Benin to discuss containers with goods for Niger blocked at Cotonou port due to fines.

Jostling continued ahead of 2025 presidential election with announcement of first candidacies. 

Opposition party African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) 9 March announced former President Laurent Gbagbo as candidate for 2025 presidency polls, despite his ineligibility due to 2018 criminal conviction for looting Central Bank of West African States during 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis. Main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) leader Tidjane Thiam 11 March confirmed good relations with Gbagbo. Meanwhile Philippe Legré, member of ruling party Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace’s (RHDP) executive board and governor of Bas-Sassandra region, 16 March said President Ouattara would be RHDP candidate for 2025 election. 

Junta announced formation of new govt amid questions over regime stability and future of transition. 

New administration composed of technocratic and junta-friendly ministers. Junta 13 March announced 29-member cabinet following Feb dissolution of govt amid internal power struggles. Junta-allied Defence, Security and Foreign Ministers among fourteen who kept posts from previous administration; both former PM Goumou and former Justice Minister Charles Wright, whose tensions with one another may have contributed to Feb dissolvement of govt, lost posts. Meanwhile, PM Bah 25 March said elections “cannot effectively be held” in 2024; civil society remained concerned transitional govt would continue past proposed Dec 2024 end date due to lengthy process of finalising Constitution and organising elections; first draft of new Constitution, promised for March, yet to be circulated.

Popular pushback continued against lack of services and repression. Electricity blackouts led to demonstrations and unrest, with police allegedly killing two youths during protests related to power cuts in Kindia city 12 March and another in capital Conakry 14 March; in response to lack of supply, President Doumbouya 16 March sacked several senior electricity officials. Meanwhile, in apparent attempt to pursue conciliatory tone, Bah 6 March met with journalists and subsequently said he would consult with Doumbouya about lifting media constraints, with govt having removed internet restrictions in Feb.

Series of mass abductions by bandits and jihadists underlined widespread insecurity; violence also continued in South East and Niger Delta, while deepening economic crisis heightened social tensions.

Criminal groups kidnapped hundreds and killed dozens in North West and North Central. In Kaduna state, gunmen 7 March abducted scores of students and a staff member from schools in Kuriga town, Chikun area, demanding 1bn Naira (roughly $650,000) for their return; govt 24 March said all 137 students rescued alive from neighbouring Zamfara state, but staff member died in captivity. In Kaduna state, daily reports of bandit attacks 8-17 March saw at least 190 abducted and unconfirmed number killed, mostly in Kajuru and Birnin Gwari areas; in Niger State, armed group 21 March killed 29 people in attack on local market in Rafi area.

Jihadist-related insecurity continued in North East. In Borno state, UN 6 March reported jihadists 29 Feb kidnapped over 200 internally displaced people near Gamboru Ngala town; local sources said between 113 and 319 were abducted amid conflicting reports over whether Boko Haram or Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) were responsible. Military continued operations against jihadists reporting hundreds killed, while reports also emerged that former fighters had threatened to rejoin insurgency.

Violence continued in South East and flared in Niger Delta. Security forces continued operations against Biafran separatists in South East. Notably, troops 7 March killed twenty members of Indigenous People of Biafra armed wing Eastern Security Network, destroying major camp at Mother Valley in Orsu area, Imo state. In Niger Delta, clashes between communities over land dispute in Bomadi area of Delta state killed sixteen soldiers on peace mission 14 March, causing widespread outrage.

Deepening economic malaise heightened social tensions, risking unrest. Fears over cost of living crisis-related insecurity grew following late Feb stampede at food auction site in Lagos city that killed seven, with food inflation at over 35%. In suburb of federal capital Abuja, residents 3 March looted food items from govt warehouse. Crushes at relief distribution centre in Nasarawa state 22 March and charity giving event in Bauchi state 24 March left ten people dead.

Presidential elections held peacefully, paving way for victory of opposition leader. 

Elections held peacefully, Bassirou Diomaye Faye set to become new president. Presidential poll held 24 March with both ruling party and opposition candidates competing after delay from original 25 Feb date had sparked constitutional crisis; election day ran peacefully across country. Electoral commission 25 March said Faye, candidate for opposition PASTEF party, won polls and Constitutional Court 29 March confirmed results; Faye took 54.3% of the vote, beating eighteen others including ruling coalition candidate Amadou Ba who took 35.8%, avoiding need for run-off and completing remarkable victory for figure little known several years ago and released from prison earlier in March (see below). Opposition supporters 25 March and in following days celebrated results in capital Dakar. 

Popular support rallied behind Faye after several key figures released from prison. National Assembly 6 March passed amnesty law for people arrested between Feb 2021 and Feb 2024 for political crimes or participation in protests. Those released included Faye and most popular opposition figure Ousmane Sonko, whose 14 March release was welcomed by thousands of supporters in Dakar; Sonko, barred from running as candidate due to May 2023 conviction for defamation, pledged support for Faye’s candidacy. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 15 March rejected disqualified candidate of Senegalese Democratic Party Karim Wade’s attempt to delay March election, while Wade subsequently endorsed Faye before polling day. 

Govt extended state of emergency in northern region amid continued jihadist violence; legislature passed new Constitution, causing political tensions.

National Assembly 12 March renewed emergency security measures in Savanes region in north, first imposed in June 2022 and extended twice before, for further twelve months amid continued violence in area; notably, Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 6 March killed eight civilians in Nagouni commune. Ahead of 20 April legislative elections, parliament 25 March passed bill adopting new Constitution, shifting political system to one where lawmakers will choose president for single six-year term, replacing direct presidential election for two five-year terms. Opposition and civil society denounced moves as power grab by current President Gnassingbé and called for protests; Gnassingbé 29 March asked National Assembly to submit law to second reading due to “interest aroused” by bill. 

Tensions escalated between High Representative and Bosnian Serb leader over proposed changes to election law, with latter threatening to paralyse state-level decision-making.

Crisis erupted days after European Council 21 March approved opening of formal negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to join bloc. High Representative Christian Schmidt, responsible for overseeing implementation of Dayton peace accords, 26 March imposed changes to state-level Election Law, designed to clamp down on fraud and abuse. In response, Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik 28 March threatened to paralyse decision-making in BiH and withdraw from armed forces and other state organs unless number of demands are met, including withdrawal of legislation within seven days and expulsion of Schmidt from country, alongside UK, German and U.S. ambassadors. Republika Srpska lawmakers 29 March subsequently adopted their own version of election law, which Dodik said would come into force on 16 April if demands not met. U.S. Embassy in capital Sarajevo same day condemned move, warning law would “usurp state-level competencies and create a parallel electoral system” and accused Dodik of launching “direct attack on the state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

Pristina faced pressure to resolve currency issue, PM Kurti alleged Serbian troop movements near border, and electoral authorities set date for referendum on removal of ethnic Albanian mayors in north.

Govt maintained firm stance on currency issue. During 13-15 March trip to Kosovo, U.S. Special Envoy Gabriel Escobar urged govt to suspend new regulation banning use of Serbian dinar, primary currency for cash and commercial transactions among Kosovo Serbs. PM Kurti 19 March insisted he would not reverse decision, saying Central Bank’s move was designed to tackle “financing of terrorism and other illegal activities”. Kosovo and Serbia chief negotiators 25 March met in Belgian capital Brussels to discuss issue but failed to reach agreement.

Prime Minister accused Belgrade of troop movements along border. PM Kurti 21 March shared footage of Serbian Army units near Kosovo border, claiming Belgrade was “waiting for the best possible opportunity to invade Kosovo”; Belgrade 22 March dismissed accusations as “disinformation campaign”. NATO-led force same day said situation is “calm but fragile”.

Authorities backed referendum on removal of ethnic Albanian mayors in north. Central Election Commission 9 March approved referendum on whether to dismiss ethnic Albanian mayors in four Serb-majority northern municipalities, whose election in April 2023 (boycotted by Serbs) triggered violent protests. Vote slated for 21 April, after which govt is expected to announce new elections.

Efforts to advance peace deal with Azerbaijan continued amid tense debates about border villages; Yerevan sought closer ties with West as relations with Russia cooled.

Tensions over settlements erupted after border commission meeting. Amid stepped-up peace efforts in recent weeks, Azerbaijan and Armenia 7 March conducted seventh meeting of sides’ border delimitation commissions; parties agreed to finalise draft regulation for commissions’ activities and delimitation procedures “as soon as possible”. After meeting, Azerbaijani Deputy PM Shahin Mustafayev 9 March said Yerevan should return four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages it has held since early 1990s before sides start delimiting and demarcating border; villages are strategically positioned along highway leading to Georgia and near pipeline supplying Russian gas to Armenia. PM Pashinyan 18 March acknowledged govt had “decided to adjust the border”, warning of another war if sides refuse to compromise; issue set to fuel domestic discontent. Meanwhile, U.S. Senior Adviser for Caucasus Louis Bono and NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg visited Armenia and Azerbaijan separately during month to discuss peace agreement.

Armenia pivoted further away from Russia and towards West. Armenia-Russia relations continued to cool as former sought to reduce dependence on Russian security assistance. Notably, Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan 6 March said Armenian border guards should replace Russian guards at Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport; and Pashinyan 12 March floated leaving Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Meanwhile, Grigoryan 21 March announced Pashinyan will meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in Brussels on 5 April. Meeting to focus on trilateral cooperation aimed at strengthening Armenia’s “economic resilience” and steps that lay groundwork for future EU integration; Azerbaijan 27 March criticised upcoming talks as “one-sided” and “biased”. 

Baku accused Yerevan of massing troops along border. Azerbaijan 31 March accused Armenia of troop build-up along border; Armenia same day denied allegation, while EU Border Observation Mission reported “no unusual movements”.

Efforts to advance peace deal with Armenia continued amid tense debates about border villages; authorities cracked down on media.

Tensions over settlements erupted after border commission meeting. Amid stepped-up peace efforts in recent weeks, Azerbaijan and Armenia 7 March conducted seventh meeting of sides’ border delimitation commissions; parties agreed to finalise draft regulation for commissions’ activities and delimitation procedures “as soon as possible”. After meeting, Deputy PM Mustafayev 9 March said Yerevan should return four non-enclave Azerbaijani villages it has held since early 1990s before sides start delimiting and demarcating border; villages are strategically positioned along highway leading to Georgia and near pipeline supplying Russian gas to Armenia. Armenian PM Pashinyan 18 March acknowledged govt had “decided to adjust the border”, warning of another war if sides refuse to compromise. Meanwhile, U.S. Senior Adviser for Caucasus Louis Bono and NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg visited Azerbaijan and Armenia separately during month to discuss peace agreement.

Baku criticised upcoming EU-U.S.-Armenia talks. Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan 21 March announced Pashinyan will meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in Brussels on 5 April. Meeting to focus on trilateral cooperation aimed at strengthening Armenia’s “economic resilience” and steps that lay groundwork for future EU integration. Azerbaijan 27 March criticised upcoming talks as “one-sided” and “biased”.

Baku accused Yerevan of massing troops along border. Azerbaijan 31 March accused Armenia of troop build-up along border; Armenia same day denied allegation, while EU Border Observation Mission reported “no unusual movements”.

Media crackdown continued. Police 6 March raided offices of online opposition platform Toplum TV, its partner organisation Institute for Democratic Initiatives and newly-founded Third Republic Platform, reportedly arresting at least ten people; court 9 March sentenced seven individuals to four months’ pre-trial detention. Toplum TV’s Editor-in-Chief Khadija Ismayil 8 March accused authorities of attempting “to silence the media”; U.S. same day urged authorities to halt “crackdown on free expression”.  

Breakaway regions voted in Russia’s presidential election, political camps stepped up preparations for October parliamentary polls, and new legislation sought to clamp down on LGBTQ+ rights.

Tbilisi condemned Russia for holding presidential elections in breakaway regions. Voters in breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia 15-17 March cast their ballots in Russian presidential election, voting overwhelmingly in support of incumbent Vladimir Putin. Foreign Ministry and EU 18 March condemned “illegal” polls in “occupied regions”. NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg 18 March visited capital Tbilisi, where he criticised Russia’s conduct of elections in breakaways and discussed ways to enhance partnership with “one of NATO’s closest partners”; PM Kobakhidze same day reiterated Georgia’s dedication to NATO integration. Meanwhile, speaker of South Ossetia’s de facto parliament 17 March said de facto authorities and Russia were “discussing” possibility of South Ossetia’s integration into Russian Federation.

New parties emerged ahead of October parliamentary elections. Ruling and opposition forces stepped up election preparations. Notably, former members and close allies of ruling Georgian Dream party 18 March held founding congress of new political party, People’s Power, whose main goal is to “finally prosecute” opposition United National Movement (UNM) party for alleged crimes committed during UNM rule 2004-2012; many view movement’s transformation into a political party as attempt to bolster Georgian Dream in election. Meanwhile, divided opposition also ramped up electoral preparations, with former chairman of UNM and founder of opposition Mtavari TV 11 March announcing new Akhali party.

Ruling party sought to crackdown on LGBTQ+ rights. Georgian Dream’s parliamentary leader Mamuka Mdinaradze 25 March unveiled draft legislation that would prohibit people from changing gender, outlaw same-sex couples from adopting children, and ban education and public gatherings it says “popularise” same-sex relationships. Mdinaradze said legislation designed to protect “family values and minors”. Human rights institution Council of Europe 28 March condemned “homophobic” bill amid fears move could endanger Georgia’s path toward EU membership.

Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility for deadliest terrorist attack on Russian soil in over two decades, days after President Putin won re-election; Ukrainian attacks intensified.

Terrorist attack in Moscow killed and wounded hundreds. Militants 22 March entered concert hall in capital Moscow, opening fire and setting premises ablaze. ISIS immediately claimed responsibility for attack, which killed at least 143 people and wounded hundreds more. Authorities swiftly announced number of arrests, including four Tajik citizens suspected of perpetrating attack, who 24 March appeared in court bearing signs of abuse. Putin 25 March suggested “radical Islamists” carried out attack but insinuated Ukrainian and Western involvement, a claim echoed by top officials; such suggestions could lay groundwork for Kremlin to justify future aggression in Ukraine. Kyiv repeatedly denied any role.

Putin secured fifth presidential term. Russia 15-17 March held presidential election. According to official data, poll saw record turnout and landslide victory for Putin. Opposition 17 March organised “Noon Against Putin” rally; according to campaign website, thousands were to head to polling stations across Russia at midday to “show others and see for ourselves that there are many of us”, while remaining concealed from authorities.

Ukraine launched cross-border incursions and more drone attacks. Three Ukrainian army units that include Russian nationals 10 March began conducting cross-border incursions into Belgorod and Kursk regions, which continued sporadically throughout March; Russian forces repelled attacks. Ukraine intensified shelling of Belgorod’s capital and other populated areas in region, killing over sixteen and wounding scores; governor of Belgorod 19 March announced evacuation of 9,000 children. Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries and other infrastructure persisted.

EU imposed more punitive measures. EU High Representative Josep Borrel 18 March said EU should use 90% of revenues from frozen Russian assets in Europe to buy weapons for Ukraine, announced sanctions on 30 Russian officials over death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny. European Commission 22 March proposed increasing tariffs on grain imports from Russia and Belarus to reassure farmers and some member states concerned about influx of cheap Ukrainian products.

Minsk maintained pressure on opposition as tensions with its western neighbours persisted.

Crackdown on dissent continued despite opposition. Minsk court 14 March sentenced Roman Catholic religious instructor Uladzislau Beladzed, 22 March sentenced journalist Ihar Karney, both to three years in prison on extremism charges. 27 Nobel Peace Prize laureates 20 March called for “immediate release of political prisoners in Belarus”; letter also urged EU govts to take stronger action to end “brutal repression”.

Tensions between Belarus and its western neighbours remained high. Defence Ministry 11 March launched large-scale “combat readiness” check of its armed forces, involving live-fire exercises and movement of military hardware on public roads; Lithuania 14 March said check was “routine” and “no reason to worry”, despite one mechanised brigade partially relocating to border near Lithuania and Latvia. Belarus 14 March responded to Lithuania’s Feb closure of additional border crossings with temporary import bans, mainly on food products. President Lukashenko 26 March dismissed claims Minsk is planning attack on Suwalki Gap, corridor linking Poland to Lithuania, after video surfaced allegedly showing him discussing area with military commander.

Breakaway Transnistria region accused Moldova and Ukraine of drone attack on military base, and voters from breakaway cast their ballots in Russian presidential election. 

De facto authorities in breakaway Transnistria 17 March claimed that a kamikaze drone launched from Ukraine’s Odesa region struck helicopter at military base in de facto capital Tiraspol; Chișinău same day dismissed incident as “an attempt to provoke fear and panic”, while Kyiv accused Moscow (which supports Transnistria) of “trying to carry out provocations and manipulate the information space”. Meanwhile, 46,182 people from Transnistria cast their ballots in Russian presidential election (see Russia), compared with over 73,000 voters six years ago; Russia’s incumbent president Vladimir Putin received 97% of vote. 

Ukrainian forces hastily built defensive lines in preparation for more Russian advances, Moscow pounded country with missile attacks, and Czech initiative sought to boost waning ammunition stocks.

Ukraine rushed to build defensive lines following Russian advances. After Russia captured Avdiivka town and nearby settlements in eastern Donetsk region in Feb, its offensive slowed significantly. President Zelenskyy 11 March announced Ukraine was building 2000km of defensive lines in preparation for stepped-up advances, though military analysts warned about slow progress, which may force Ukrainian troops to fortify defensive lines while under fire from Russians. Russian forces late March gradually advanced west of Avdiivka, with some reports suggesting they seized control of two more villages, albeit at high cost. Meanwhile, Ukraine 5 March sunk Russian patrol vessel using domestically produced naval drones, 23 March claimed to have inflicted damage on three landing ships and one intelligence ship from Russian Black Sea fleet in Crimean port of Sevastopol. Ukraine has disabled one third of fleet’s combat ships since full-scale invasion.

Russia hailed missiles on Ukraine, notably targeting energy infrastructure. Moscow escalated attacks in north using ballistic missiles and guided aviation bombs, forcing authorities mid-March to begin evacuating civilians. Beginning 21 March, Russian forces launched massive missile and drone attacks on energy infrastructure, leaving over one million Ukrainians without power; strikes hit several major power facilities, including country’s largest dam. Russian Ministry of Defence 22 March said attacks were in response to Ukrainian shelling and cross-border incursions (see Russia). Meanwhile, during secret visit to Odesa region by Zelenskyy and Greek PM Mitsotakis, ballistic missile 6 March struck near their convoy; attack raised concerns about Russian intelligence awareness of foreign dignitaries’ movements.

In other important developments. Parliament made headway clarifying thousands of queries to pending mobilisation law, which is likely to come up for vote in early April. Czech President Pavel 7 March pledged to deliver 800,000 shells in 2024 via internationally-funded, Czech-led initiative; announcement came amid halting U.S. military assistance and delays in expansion of European ammunition production. China’s Ambassador to Switzerland 18 March said Beijing was considering participation in Ukraine peace summit organised by Bern; Moscow 13 March ruled out Russian participation.

Lawmakers adopted contentious foreign agent’s law amid widespread concern about threat to civil society; Tajik-Kyrgyz border talks continued to progress.

Parliament adopted controversial “foreign representatives” legislation. Lawmakers 14 March voted in favour of controversial “foreign agents” draft law in its third and final reading. Move sparked condemnation; in joint letter to President Japarov, over 30 domestic and foreign civil society organisations 20 March warned proposed amendments risk dealing “devastating blow” to Kyrgyzstan’s “vibrant civil society” and could endanger “international development and economic assistance programmes”. Meanwhile, court in capital Bishkek 12 March placed eight of eleven reporters from Temirov Line media outlet, detained in Jan for allegedly calling for “mass riots”, in pre-trial detention until 13 May; court ordered transfer of three others to house arrest.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agreed on over 10km of border. Kyrgyz-Tajik talks on border delimitation and demarcation 12-17 March took place in Tajikistan’s Sughd region. Kyrgyz officials 17 March announced sides had agreed on just under 11km of border and signed protocols; parties agreed to hold next meeting in Kyrgyzstan.

Tajik and Russian leaders pledged to intensify joint counterterrorism efforts following terrorist attack in Russian capital; Tajik-Kyrgyz border talks continued to progress.  

Russian authorities charged four Tajik citizens in connection with terrorist attack. Following 22 March deadly terrorist attack in Russian capital Moscow, for which Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility, Russian authorities arrested four Tajik citizens, who appeared in court 24 March to hear charges, bearing visible signs of abuse (see Russia). President Rahmon 24 March condemned attack during call with Russian President Putin; Kremlin afterwards said pair had agreed to intensify joint counterterrorism efforts. Tajik authorities next day began questioning suspects’ relatives; according to 29 March media reports, Tajik authorities reportedly detained at least nine people in connection with attack. Meanwhile, Russia witnessed uptick in anti-Tajik sentiment, with migrants reportedly subjected to verbal abuse and harassment from law enforcement. 

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan agreed on over 10km of border. Tajik-Kyrgyz talks on border delimitation and demarcation 12-17 March took place in Sughd region. Kyrgyz officials 17 March announced sides had agreed on just under 11km of border and signed protocols; parties agreed to hold next meeting in Kyrgyzstan.

Delegation headed to Afghanistan for trade talks. 

Delegation led by FM Bakhtiyor Saidov 12 March visited Afghan capital Kabul for meetings with senior Taliban officials amid growing efforts by regional actors to deepen engagement; talks reportedly focused on boosting economic ties, regional connectivity and water management. Taliban media suggested Uzbekistan may soon accept Taliban ambassador.

Gaza faced “imminent famine” as Israel targeted and restricted aid and reiterated threat to invade Rafah amid stalled ceasefire talks; Israel intensified crackdown on West Bank and clashed with Hizbollah in north.

Amid imminent famine in Gaza, Israel killed thousands more and restricted aid. Israel continued its war, killing at least 32,700 since Oct and displacing two million; UNRWA head 13 March reported 12,300 of those killed were children, a higher toll than all children killed in conflict worldwide from 2019-2022. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) 18 March warned “famine is imminent as 1.1 million people, half of Gaza, experience catastrophic food insecurity”. Israel continuously blocked and restricted aid supplies in March, as starvation/dehydration killed at least 27 children in northern Gaza, and Israeli forces mid-March killed dozens of Palestinians waiting for aid delivery in Gaza city. Israel 24 March banned UNRWA food aid deliveries to north. Meanwhile, Israeli PM Netanyahu repeatedly reiterated intention to invade Rafah, currently sheltering 1.5 million Palestinians, to eliminate remaining Hamas forces despite U.S. opposition; Israeli forces 18 March for second time besieged al-Shifa hospital, where over 30,000 have sought shelter, claiming Hamas re-organised itself there; following Israeli withdrawal, reports of alleged atrocities surfaced. Ceasefire negotiations continued. Hamas 15 March reiterated demand for 40-day ceasefire leading to end of hostilities, withdrawal of Israeli troops and detainee exchange, which Israel rejected as “unrealistic”. Stop-start talks thereafter continued, offering hope deal could avert Rafah offensive. UN Security Council 25 March called for “immediate ceasefire” during Ramadan; Israel rebuked U.S. for its abstention. 

Israel ramped up crackdown in West Bank and East Jerusalem. Settler violence remained high, while Israel deployed around 15,000 additional soldiers to West Bank during Ramadan and intensified crackdown on Muslim worshippers in East Jerusalem. Israeli forces continued raids, killing at least 434 since 7 Oct; notably, Israeli drone strike 20 March killed four in Jenin refugee camp. 

Internal divisions wracked Israeli govt. Israel’s war cabinet remained paralysed as signs of instability in PM Netanyahu’s coalition grew, including over looming military conscription law requiring ultra-Orthodox Jews to serve. 

Israel-Hizbollah attacks escalated. Israel expanded attacks against Hizbollah deeper into Lebanese territory, highlighting risk of expanded war (see Lebanon).

Thousands of protestors in capital Amman rallied in support of Palestine amid Israel’s onslaught in Gaza.  

Thousands of pro-Palestine protestors beginning 23 March gathered in capital Amman in front of Israeli embassy, demanding abrogation of 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty, expressing support for Hamas and condemning Israel’s assault on hospitals in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine). As protestors 25 March breached security cordon, riot police dispersed crowds with tear gas and struck demonstrators with batons, and arrested at least 200. Demonstrations continued in following days.

Cross-border strikes between Hizbollah and Israel persisted as Israel sought to secure Hizbollah’s retreat from border, while tensions during Ramadan in April risk triggering expanded conflict.

Israel continued strikes deep inside Lebanese territory. Lebanon continued to face spectre of all-out war as Israel and Hizbollah engaged in cross-border hostilities amid Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine). Following first on 26 Feb, Israel 11, 12 and 24-26 March continued to expand strikes to eastern Lebanon, which hosts several key communities aligned with Hizbollah and has not witnessed such attacks since 2006 war. In retaliation, Hizbollah 12 March launched over 100 rockets into northern Israel, and further major missile salvos in response to subsequent Israeli attacks. Israeli drone strike 13 March killed Hamas member outside Tyre city – major urban centre in south. Israeli air strike 26 March killed seven rescue workers, prompting UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL to express “deep concern” over escalating conflict. Israel 31 March killed senior Hizbollah commander, Ismail al-Zin, in Kounine village. Growing severity of strikes, as well as increasing proximity to (and killing of) civilians, risk propelling Hizbollah and Israel towards an open-ended, disastrous war – even though both sides have at times taken clear steps since Oct to avoid massive escalation. Various diplomatic missions continue to seek to find terms for settlement between parties, but Hizbollah repeatedly asserted it will not entertain discussions until ceasefire is reached in Gaza. Further heightening conflict risk, Ramadan – which ends in mid-April – could see rising tensions between Palestinians and Israel, including at Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade, which could provoke further violent actions by Hizbollah or Palestinian armed groups in Lebanon.

Economic crisis and presidential vacuum continued. Amid severe economic hardship, govt struggled to secure funding for its national emergency plan to deal with consequences of spillover from Hamas-Israel war, including providing shelter and supplies for displaced people. Presidential vacuum that has prevailed since 1 Nov 2022 continued with little apparent prospect of resolution as parliament did not hold presidential election session, reflecting deadlock between political factions. Army 11 March claimed it had rescued twenty refugees from sinking boat off coast of Tripoli city.

Tit-for-tat strikes continued between Iran-backed groups and Israel, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continued to battle regime in north west and Türkiye signalled potential operation in north.

In south, Iran-aligned forces and Israel exchanged attacks. Notably, Israeli airstrike 1 March killed three, including Iranian adviser in Banias town, Tartous province. Missiles from Nawa town, Deraa province 16, 17 March targeted Israeli-occupied Golan Heights; Israeli retaliatory strikes 17, 19 March struck targets near capital Damascus. Israel stepped up attacks late March: airstrike 26 March killed seventeen, including advisor of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Iranian-backed fighters, in Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal; Israel 29 March killed dozens of Hizbollah and regime soldiers in Aleppo province. After hiatus since mid-Feb, Iranian-backed groups 26 March resumed attacks on U.S. forces by launching drone at base at Conoco gas field.

In north west, deadly clashes between HTS and regime continued. Notably, regime 7 March launched thirteen drones at HTS positions, killing civilian and HTS member near Darat Izza; HTS ambush 17 March killed two regime soldiers in western Aleppo governorate. Meanwhile, protests against HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani late Feb erupted across Idlib and Aleppo provinces, sparked by reports of torture in HTS prisons. HTS 5 March opened fire on protestors in Darat Izza town, Aleppo province. HTS-backed Syrian Salvation Govt next day released 420 detainees.

In north east, Türkiye threatened new invasion. Turkish President Erdoğan 4 March vowed to launch new operation in Iraq and northern Syria to implement 30-40 km deep security corridor along border. Signs of intra-Kurdish tensions re-emerged after assailants 1-11 March burnt offices of Kurdish National Council (KNC), part of Turkish-backed Syrian National Coalition, in Aleppo and Hasakah provinces; KNC blamed reported Democratic Union Party (PYD)-affiliate, Revolutionary Youth movement.

In east, tribal militias and SDF clashed. Tribal militias, backed by regime and Iran, intensified attacks on SDF; attack 15 March killed SDF member in Diban town, Deir ez-Zor province. Unidentified drones 6 March killed three Iran-backed forces near al-Mayadeen town, Deir ez-Zor. Islamic State (ISIS) attack 6 March reportedly killed eighteen truffle foragers in Deir ez-Zor province.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed concern over growth and opacity of Iran’s nuclear activity, as regional tensions between Iran-backed groups and U.S. ebbed in Iraq and Syria but remained in Red Sea.

Nuclear watchdog, U.S. and European states spotlighted Iran’s nuclear program. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi 4 March told first Board of Governors meeting of 2024 “Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium continues to increase, even though level of uranium enriched to 60% has fallen slightly”, further noting that IAEA had “lost continuity of knowledge” on key components in nuclear infrastructure, and expressed frustration at lack of “progress in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues”. U.S. and E3 (UK, France and Germany) 6-7 March raised series of related concerns. U.S. intelligence community’s annual threat assessment 11 March asserted “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device”.

Anti-U.S. attacks largely halted in Iraq and Syria, Houthis continued strikes on shipping. Lull in attacks on U.S. forces by Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria since early Feb appeared to largely hold in March, with exception of drone late March targeting U.S. forces in Syria, while Houthis in Yemen continued attacks in Red Sea/Gulf of Aden (see Iraq, Syria and Yemen). Amid tit-for-tat attacks between Iran-backed groups and Israel in Syria, Iran 26 March confirmed death of IRGC “military advisor” in Syria during alleged Israeli strikes. Meanwhile, U.S. sanctioned numerous Iranian/Iran-linked entities. Notably, U.S. 6 March designated four entities and vessels for their role in Qods Force-linked network supporting Houthis. U.S. 26 March sanctioned nine entities, individual and tankers for “facilitating commodity shipments and financial transactions for the IRGC-Qods Force, the Houthis and Hizbollah”. G7 statement 15 March warned “we are prepared to respond swiftly” were Iran to provide ballistic missiles to Russia, including “with new and significant measures”.

Elections saw record low turnout. Iran 1 March held elections for parliament and Assembly of Experts with 41% turnout, a record low for legislative races since 1979. Substantial vetting of candidates meant outcome was dominated by conservatives, who have tightened their grip over parliament and body to select Supreme Leader.

Tensions mounted between Baghdad and Erbil as Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) announced regional election boycott, while Türkiye struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); lull in attacks by Iran-backed groups persisted.

Relations between Baghdad and Erbil remained under stress. KDP 18 March announcedboycott of Kurdistan’s June parliamentary elections over Federal Supreme Court ruling in Feb to annul minority seats in parliament, most of which are allocated to KDP-dominated areas; minority Christian and Turkmen parties also announced boycott. KDP’s decision may have also been motivated by Supreme Court mandating Baghdad to centrally disburse Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employee salaries. In sign of deteriorating ties, KRG PM Barzani’s deputy chief of staff 18 March said KDP was considering “outright exit from Iraq’s political process”.

Govt banned PKK to boost ties with Türkiye, which continued attacks on group. Ahead of expected visit by Turkish President Erdoğan in April – which would mark his first visit in over twelve years – high-level Turkish delegation led by FM Fidan 14-15 March visited Iraqi capital Baghdad and jointly met senior ministers, chairman of Hashd al-Shaabi, and KRG interior minister. Meeting established joint permanent commission on counterterrorism, water governance, trade and transportation, and Baghdad also designated PKK as “banned organisation”. Signalling possible escalation of anti-PKK campaign in coming months, Erdoğan 18 March announced that Iraqi border would be entirely secured by summer. Meanwhile, Turkish airstrike 8 March reportedly killed two civilians in Duhok governorate. Turkish security forces 4 and 19 March announced killing of two of PKK’s “youth leaders” in Sulaymaniyah governorate, while clashes with PKK 19 March killed Turkish soldier; Türkiye same day responded with round of airstrikes in Kurdistan. Türkiye 23 March “neutralised” twelve PKK members in Metina region (see Türkiye).

Iran-backed Iraqi groups refrained from attacking U.S. Pressure from Iran and Iraqi govt appeared to prevent attacks by Iran-backed groups on U.S. assets, continuing lull since early Feb; hiatus could end, however, with potential Israeli offensive in Gaza’s Rafah (see Israel-Palestine). Islamic Resistance in Iraq 1, 5, 6, 11, 20 March claimed launching drones at Israeli targets.

Saudi Arabia pursued diplomatic efforts to end Gaza war, while U.S.-Saudi talks on normalisation with Israel reportedly continued.

Jeddah city 5 March hosted second Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting since Gaza war as Riyadh continued to lead coordination of “Arab contact group” comprising Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestinian Authority to work towards plans for so-called “day after” Gaza war. King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center 20 March pledged additional $40mn for UN Relief Agency for Palestinians (UNRWA). Meanwhile, senior Saudi and U.S. officials reportedly continued talks on Saudi-Israeli normalisation of relations, as U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 21 March said sides made “good progress”; Riyadh reportedly wants unilateral recognition of Palestinian state by U.S. or European states and U.S. security guarantees, both of which remain unlikely in current political climate.

Houthis caused first fatalities in attacks on international shipping amid ongoing U.S-UK airstrikes; Houthi bombing in al-Bayda killed civilians, sparking protests, while local mediation sought to reopen roads.

In Gulf of Aden, Houthi attacks caused first fatalities as group vowed wider strikes. In Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Houthis continued attacks targeting merchant vessels as well as U.S. and UK warships, 5 March vowing more “painful” attacks and 14 March announcing targeting of shipping in Indian Ocean. Notably, Houthi missile strike 6 March killed three crew members on Barbados-flagged ship in Gulf of Aden. U.S. and UK continued strikes on Houthi targets; notably, 11 March conductedsix airstrikes and 27 March struck Saada province. In rare engagement, Houthi and Hamas representatives 15 March met in Lebanon’s capital Beirut to discuss coordinating actions in Red Sea, while reports circulated of secret U.S.-Iran talks held in Jan in Oman’s capital Muscat to de-escalate Houthi attacks. EU naval mission in Red Sea began operations: notably, Italian destroyer 2 and 12 March intercepted Houthi attacks. Houthis 19 March announced launching missiles at Israeli city Eilat, which for first time hit open ground near city. Bloomberg 21 March reported that China and Russia agreed safe passage for their ships through Red Sea in exchange for “political support” for Houthis. 

Houthi bombing in centre tarnished growing popularity. Houthis 19 March bombed residential buildings in Radea district, al-Bayda governorate, allegedly in retaliation for ambush, reportedly killing twelve and sparking protests. Houthi-run Interior Ministry next day condemned bombing as individual act; attack negatively impacted Houthis’ popularity for their stance on Gaza war, and may provoke tribal retaliation. 

Local bid to open roads during Ramadan made modest progress. In sign of growing public dissatisfaction with roads closed since 2015, media, tribal leaders and activists called for reopening of roads during Muslim holy month Ramadan. After Marib governor late Feb opened Marib-Sana’a road and called on Houthis to do same, Houthis refused, suggesting opening Sana’a-Khwalan-Marib road instead. Renewed clashes 12 March suspended mediation between Houthis and Southern Transitional Council to reopen al-Dhale-Ibb road.