CrisisWatch

Tracking Conflict Worldwide

CrisisWatch is our global conflict tracker, an early warning tool designed to help prevent deadly violence. It keeps decision-makers up-to-date with developments in over 70 conflicts and crises every month, identifying trends and alerting them to risks of escalation and opportunities to advance peace. In addition, CrisisWatch monitors over 50 situations (“standby monitoring”) to offer timely information if developments indicate a drift toward violence or instability. Entries dating back to 2003 provide easily searchable conflict histories.

Global Overview

Outlook for This Month August 2023

Conflict Risk Alerts

Resolution Opportunities

Trends for Last Month July 2023

Deteriorated Situations

Improved Situations

Conflict in Focus

Our monthly conflict tracker highlights one conflict resolution opportunity in August. 

  • The Colombian government’s June ceasefire agreement with the National Liberation Army (ELN) is set to take full effect in August and will last for 180 days, making it the longest bilateral ceasefire ever concluded with the guerrilla group.

CrisisWatch identified five deteriorated situations in July.

  • In Niger, presidential guards seized power from President Bazoum, extending the coup belt spanning the Sahel and deepening instability in the region.
     
  • A crackdown on anti-government protests in Kenya left over 20 people dead as tensions spiked over tax hikes and the rising cost of living.
     
  • In a major blow to Ukraine’s economy and global food security, Moscow withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative before launching a flurry of attacks on the country’s ports and grain facilities.
     
  • Judicial and other interference in Guatemala’s presidential poll sparked a political crisis and protests as external actors decried manoeuvres to alter the country’s electoral process.
     
  • President Lasso imposed emergency measures in Ecuador following the assassination of a local mayor and a fresh spate of prison violence, prompting a violent backlash from criminal groups.

Aside from the scores of conflict situations we usually cover, we tracked significant developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Moldova, Nile Waters, Peru and Senegal.

Eritrea

Eritrean forces’ continued presence in Ethiopia’s Tigray region hindered peace process; President Isaias attended summits in Egypt and Russia amid efforts to boost international standing.

Eritrean forces maintained strategic positions in Tigray. Coalition of regional and international civil society organisations 10 July published report warning that peace deal in Ethiopia’s Tigray region is “marred by significant gaps” (see Ethiopia), including continued presence of Eritrean troops who were supposed to withdraw under terms of accord. Though Asmara mostly withdrew its forces in Feb 2023, it has maintained strategic positions in region and could still disrupt peace process, especially if Amhara-controlled Western Tigray is returned to Tigray’s administration.

Asmara’s efforts to bolster its international standing continued. In bid to play more active role in regional affairs, President Isaias 13 July attended Sudan’s Neighbouring States Summit in Egypt’s capital, Cairo, to discuss possible solutions to Sudan crisis. Summit ended with plan to establish ministerial mechanism, aimed at facilitating comprehensive peace agreement. Isaias 28 July met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on sidelines of Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg; leaders reportedly held “extensive discussions on bilateral ties and international matters of mutual importance”, including war in Ukraine.

Ethiopia

Violence in Oromia continued unabated, Amhara Fano militia stepped up attacks on govt forces, and Tigray's top commander announced demobilisation of over 50,000 troops.

Clashes between insurgents and govt forces persisted in Oromia region. Fighting raged in Oromia between govt forces and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) following failed talks in May, with sides stepping up operations in bid to strengthen their respective negotiating positions should talks resume. Hostilities notably occurred in West Hararghe and Arsi zones, where OLA operations have been rare. Month also saw OLA, as well as unaffiliated bandits, increase kidnappings for ransom.

Violence intensified in Amhara region. Discontent with federal govt in Amhara simmered as clashes between, on one side, Fano militia and defected Amhara paramilitaries and, on the other, federal and regional forces late July escalated in North Shewa, North Wollo and Gondar zones; notably, Fano gunmen 26 July ambushed army in Gondar. Month saw spike in assassinations of local officials, likely perpetrated by Fano: notably, gunmen 3 July shot police chief and his deputy in Dejen District (East Gojam Zone); gunmen 14 July killed police commander of Debre Berhan town (North Shewa).

Tigray-Amhara tensions persisted over territorial dispute, Tigray demobilised over 50,000 troops. PM Abiy 6 July pressed Tigray and Amhara to resolve territorial disputes through peaceful consultations (Western and parts of Southern Tigray have been under Amhara’s administration since Nov 2020); Amhara regional authorities next day announced plans for referendum to settle issue but offered few details, such as who would organise vote or be eligible to cast a ballot. Tigray official 13 July reportedly said holding referendum while parts of region remain under Amhara’s control would be illegal. Meanwhile, Tigray’s top commander Tadesse Worede 26 July announced demobilisation of over 50,000 Tigray forces and urged federal govt to ensure withdrawal of Amhara and Eritrean forces.

In other important developments. Authorities in Gambella region 20 July imposed curfew after ethnic Anuak militias killed scores, mostly Nuer community members, in Gambella city. Ethiopia and Egypt 13 July agreed to seek final deal on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam within four months (see Nile Waters).

Nile Waters

Egyptian and Ethiopian leaders agreed to resume talks on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

On sidelines of Sudan’s Neighbouring States Summit in Egypt’s capital, Cairo (see Sudan), Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi 13 July agreed to restart GERD talks, with aim of reaching final deal on filling and operation of dam within four months. Pact came after Ethiopia promised to ensure Egypt and Sudan receive sufficient water flows during fourth annual filling, which may last until Sept; war-torn Sudan’s role in forthcoming talks not yet clear.

South Sudan

President Kiir announced candidacy in 2024 presidential election amid chorus of international and local voices warning that country lacks conducive environment for free and fair poll.

Govt began election campaigning. Ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM-IG) pushed forward with preparations for presidential election scheduled for Dec 2024 amid hopes it will provide international legitimacy and end sanctions regimes. President Kiir 4 July confirmed election would take place and announced he would run for president at rally in Wau city, Bahr el Ghazal state.

Array of actors raised concerns about elections. International and local actors raised concerns about lack of political will to hold competitive elections as well as lacklustre implementation of revitalised peace deal (R-ARCSS). Notably, head of UN mission in South Sudan 6 July said country is “not yet ready” for “free, fair and credible elections”. Leader of R-ARCSS signatory party National Democratic Movement 9 July said credible elections “will not be possible…under the current conditions and (given) status of implementation of the R-ARCSS”. Prominent members of VP Machar’s Sudan’s People Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) also voiced concern, as did holdout opposition leader of National Salvation Front Thomas Cirillo on 10 July. Several other holdout opposition leaders and civil society organisations 13 July issued statement accusing govt of organising “sham election”. SPLM-IO deputy chairman 23 July reiterated party “is ready for elections that are free, fair and credible, not sham elections”. SPLM-IG pressed ahead despite warnings, though one SPLM-IG official 10 July claimed party is discussing further extension of transitional period.

Govt and opposition forces clashed in Greater Upper Nile region. SPLM-IG and SPLA-IO 1 July clashed in Wunkur county, located in disputed territory between SPLM-IG-controlled Ruweng Administrative Area and SPLA-IO-controlled Panyikang county (Greater Upper Nile). SPLA-IO area commander in Longechuk county in Upper Nile 2 July confirmed defection to govt.

Sudan war fuelled more displacement and raised food prices. As of 26 July, over 193,000 people had crossed into South Sudan from Sudan since April. Conflict continued disrupting food supplies along border, causing food scarcity and high prices in north.

Sudan

Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) gained upper hand in Khartoum amid heavy fighting with army, Darfur witnessed high levels of ethnic targeting, and diplomatic disarray hindered peace efforts.

RSF entrenched its superior position in capital Khartoum as war intensified. Fighting continued to escalate between army under Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Burhan and RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” as conflict 24 July turned 100 days old. RSF gained upper hand in capital Khartoum and sister city Bahri, seizing control of strategic sites as army suffered significant battlefield losses. Notably, RSF 15 July repelled major army offensive trying to break its two-month siege of army headquarters in Bahri. Paramilitary’s momentum prompted speculation it could soon win war for Khartoum.

Darfur region saw high levels of ethnic targeting. Amid fighting between army and RSF in various areas of Darfur, South and West Darfur states witnessed numerous attacks on civilians, notably perpetrated by RSF and affiliated tribal militias on members of other ethnic groups. In West Darfur, epicentre of ethnic conflict involving Arab Rizeigat (from which most RSF personnel come) and non-Arab Masalit tribes, UN 13 July reported bodies of at least 87 Masalit had been discovered in mass grave; International Criminal Court same day launched investigation of alleged war crimes in Darfur. In South Darfur, RSF 18 July seized control of Kaas town, displacing thousands.

Fighting continued in Kordofan states and spilled into Blue Nile state. After settling into uneasy stalemate, hostilities between army and RSF 20 July resumed in North Kordofan state capital, El Obeid. In South Kordofan state, rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North throughout July clashed with army, reportedly taking control of several towns and pushing into Blue Nile, where sides notably fought around al-Kurmuk locality.

Competing mediation tracks failed to yield results. Various, uncoordinated diplomatic initiatives continued throughout month, producing little. Notably, regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development 10 July convened talks, calling for end to war, while Egypt 13 July hosted leaders from Sudan’s neighbouring countries, announcing its own initiative with the same goal. Meanwhile, army conveyed several messages hinting at interest in talks, while Hemedti 28 July said he would reach peace deal with army “in 72 hours” if it replaces leadership.

Kenya

Crackdown on anti-govt protests left over 20 people dead as tensions spiked over tax hikes; spate of Al-Shabaab attacks continued.

Nationwide protests turned deadly. Opposition-led protests resumed across country to denounce rising cost of living after govt late June raised fuel and energy taxes. Police 7, 12, and 19 July cracked down on protesters in several cities and towns, leaving over 20 people dead and arresting over 300, including nine senior opposition figures. Opposition leader Raila Odinga 25 July denounced “unprecedented police violence” and said opposition would file charges for “police atrocities” against govt at International Criminal Court. President Ruto and Odinga 28 July met in Mombasa city; govt and opposition politicians next day announced they would set up joint committee to resolve differences.

Inter-communal clashes erupted in western counties amid protests. Amid opposition-led protests, clashes 12 July erupted between Ruto’s Kalenjin community and Odinga’s Luo community in disputed Sondu town, located along border between Kericho and Kisumu counties; violence killed three and left dozens injured.

Al-Shabaab attacks continued along Somalia border. Amid spate of Al-Shabaab attacks in eastern counties since May, Interior Minister Kithure Kindiki 5 July announced delay in planned reopening of border with Somalia. Al-Shabaab militants same day ambushed police at Ogorwen location in Mandera county, reportedly leaving six officers dead; 23 militants also killed. Security forces vehicle 10 July hit explosive device in Fafi area, Garissa county, with two dead. Suspected Al-Shabaab militants 14 July killed two police officers and one teacher in raid on Wargadud police camp in Mandera county.

Mozambique

Islamic State militants launched significant attacks on security forces in coastal areas, prompting govt to step up counter-insurgency operations; Southern African regional force’s mandate extended by another year.

Islamic State insurgents increased pressure on security forces in coastal districts. Suspected Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) combatants 30 June-1 July launched attacks in border area between Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia districts, notably killing at least ten special unit soldiers in Cobre village; 6 July ambushed Rapid Intervention Unit convoy near Mbau town, Mocímboa da Praia district, killing seven police officers and looting weapons; and 18 July attacked military position in Cobre village, Macomia district, killing unknown number of soldiers. Violence continued to impact civilians despite ISMP’s apparent drive to avoid casualties; militants 16 July robbed and beheaded two fishermen in Litamanda village, Macomia district.

Govt forces redoubled counter-insurgency efforts in Macomia. Govt forces supported by soldiers from Rwanda and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM) in July stepped up counter-insurgency drive launched in June along Macomia coast. Military prevented some traders and civilians from entering district with large amount of goods amid reports ISMP militants have been resupplying in district; restrictions may escalate tensions between troops and civilians, particularly in areas affected by food insecurity.

Southern African bloc renewed mission’s mandate. During extraordinary Troika summit, Southern African Development Community 11 July renewed SAMIM’s mandate for additional year; assessment circulated during summit proposed mission’s complete withdrawal by July 2024 or July 2025, while stressing work still needed to empower Mozambican forces to replace foreign military personnel in areas reclaimed from insurgents.

Election preparations continued. Ahead of municipal elections scheduled for 11 Oct, 23 political parties, coalitions, and citizens groups registered by 14 July deadline; registration of candidates opened 20 July. Main opposition party RENAMO 25 July said it was open to coalitions with other parties for local elections, but reported no formal contact underway.

Zimbabwe

Ahead of general elections set for 23 August, opposition candidates continued to face restrictions, and President Mnangagwa enacted bill critics say will be used to prohibit criticism of govt.

Govt and opposition remained at loggerheads weeks before elections. Police 7 July banned main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) rally scheduled for 9 July in capital Harare, citing lack of suitable facilities; ban upheld in court 9 July after CCC contested decision. High Court 12 July barred former ruling party official and late President Mugabe loyalist, Saviour Kasukuwere, from running for president, saying he has lived outside of country for over 18 months, and Supreme Court 28 July confirmed his disqualification; Kasukuwere’s camp denounced attempt by ruling party to exclude him from race. Elisabeth Valerio 19 July won appeal against electoral commission’s decision to bar her from running for president, becoming only female candidate in presidential election. EU observer mission 22 July arrived in country.

Controversial “patriotic bill” signed into law. President Mnangagwa 14 July enacted Criminal Law Code Amendment Bill criminalising “wilfully damaging the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe”, de facto prohibiting criticism of govt. Opposition, lawyers, and human rights groups continued to oppose bill, saying it may be used to curtail freedoms ahead of August votes. Notably, NGO Amnesty International 15 July denounced “brutal assault on civil space”

Somalia

Al-Shabaab continued to launch significant attacks amid stalled govt offensive and drawdown of AU troops, while tensions persisted at regional level with unclear consequences on counter-insurgency drive.

Al-Shabaab conducted several deadly attacks. Al-Shabaab militants early July repeatedly crossed Shabelle river to launch incursions between Bulo Burte and Beledweyene cities in Hiraan region (Hirshabelle state, centre). In attempt to pressure South West state authorities to stop detaining those who travel to Al-Shabaab-held areas, group 11-21 July laid siege to Baidoa city (Bay region), causing food and fuel shortages. Al-Shabaab attacked bases handed over in June by African Union mission (ATMIS) troops to Somali forces. Notably, militants 13 July briefly captured Geriley base in Gedo region (Jubaland state, south), and 19 July targeted Arbacow base in Lower Shabelle region (South West state), but did not overrun it. Al-Shabaab 24 July killed at least 20 soldiers in suicide attack on military training centre in capital Mogadishu. Second phase of govt’s offensive in July remained on hold with small-scale operations mainly in Galmudug state’s Galgaduud region (centre) and Jubaland state’s Lower Juba region (south).

Govt sought greater acceptance of political reforms plan. In effort to obtain greater support for decisions agreed by federal govt and member states in May, notably shift to presidential system, President Mohamud 12-13 July held consultations with senior opposition politicians; participants did not reach full agreement on key issues including election harmonisation and timelines, and Somalia’s governance model.

Political tensions persisted in several regions. Standoff continued between Hirshabelle state President Ali Guudlaawe and Ali Jeyte, who proclaimed new Hiraan state after Guudlaawe in June sacked him as regional governor of Hiraan; Jeyte 22 July said he had fallen out with Guudlaawe over approach to Al-Shabaab. Following election-related violence in Puntland state in June, Puntland parliament 25 July passed constitutional amendments that some opposition leaders opposed, notably allowing for direct election of president and VP. In contrast, Gedo region showed signs of de-escalation. Jubaland state officials early July travelled to Gedo for talks with regional authorities, and Ahmed Buulle 26 July pledged to hand over office to governor appointed in June by Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe.

Somaliland

Fighting between govt forces and Dhulbahante clan militias continued in Las Anod, and electoral authorities announced election roadmap despite opposition.

On-and-off clashes continued around Las Anod town, Sool region. Fighting between Somaliland forces and Dhulbahante militiamen 8 July damaged Las Anod hospital, injuring staff; NGO Doctors Without Border 24 July announced withdrawal of services from hospital. Heaving fighting and artillery exchange also reported mid-July and around 29 July on outskirts of town. Dhulbahante clan 6 July replaced 33-member committee tasked with governing SSC-Khatumo region with new 45-member grouping. Delegation of Somali traditional elders attempting to mediate in conflict mid-July left Somaliland after three-month mission without concrete results.

Electoral commission set election dates despite opposition. Electoral commission 17 July scheduled political parties election for Dec 2023 and presidential vote for Nov 2024, which means one and two-year delay respectively; opposition parties previously demanded presidential vote be held before political parties election, and rejected full two-year extension of Bihi’s term. House of Representatives 23 July elected Yasin Haji Mohamud ‘Faratoon’ as new speaker after previous speaker defected to Dhulbahante in June. Somaliland forces late July clashed with newfound militia group upset over electoral process in Gacan Libaax mountains (Togdheer region).

Burkina Faso

All-military approach to jihadist insurgency led to large numbers of casualties among army auxiliaries and local communities; pro-regime groups voiced support for new constitution.

Civilians continued to bear the brunt of spreading violence. Conflict actors continued to target civilians suspected of collusion with opposing side. Notably, presumed al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) combatants 1 July killed 11 civilians near Partiaga town, Tapoa province, and unidentified jihadists 5 July killed 15 civilians in Sorgha town, Gnagna province (both East region). Soldiers and army auxiliaries (VDPs) 8 July killed around 12 ethnic Fulani passengers on bus near Dedougou city, Mouhoun province, Boucle du Mouhoun region. Military 8-9 July also reported killing around 90 jihadist militants near Partiaga (Tapoa) and Ougarou town (Gnagna) (both East region) and near Sofikel town, Seno province (Sahel region). Several attacks led to heavy casualties on govt’s side, particularly among VDPs. Notably, JNIM 7 July killed around 16 VDPs and two civilians, while losing ten of their own, in Kogossablogo village, Namentenga province (Centre-North region).

Demonstrators rallied in favour of new Constitution. Amid rumours that transitional authorities are looking to adopt new constitution and delay elections scheduled for July 2024, thousands 1 July demonstrated in capital Ouagadougou to demand constitutional revision; gathering also reported same day also in second-largest city Bobo-Dioulasso.

In other important developments. West Africa’s regional bloc ECOWAS 9 July held summit in Guinea-Bissau, regretted Ouagadougou and other West African transitional regimes’ “very limited” cooperation with ECOWAS mediators; also reiterated call on transitional authorities to restore constitutional order and voiced concern over humanitarian situation of people displaced from “front line countries”, including Burkina Faso, to neighbouring coastal states. Ouagadougou and Bamako 31 July warned military intervention against coup leaders in Niger would be considered “declaration of war” against them (see Niger).

Mali

In likely attempt to assert power, Interim leader Col. Goïta conducted major cabinet reshuffle, while new constitution entered into force; violence remained elevated in central and northern regions.

President reshuffled cabinet, sidelining prominent figures of the transition. Interim President Col. Goïta 1 July carried out govt reshuffle, bringing 13 new ministers into govt. Reshuffle saw Goïta loyalists replace several ministers loyal to PM Choguel Maïga, and 2015 peace agreement signatory groups lose two out of four ministries; reshuffle also strengthened Goïta at the expense of four other colonels at the heart of power since May 2021 coup, including defence minister, Col. Sadio Camara.

IS Sahel faced resistance from signatory armed groups, rival jihadists in north. Presumed Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) militants 6 July attacked UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) convoy near Ouatagouna town, Gao region, killing three civilians and wounding 14 people, including three peacekeepers. Also in Gao, al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 8-9 July engaged IS Sahel fighters in Hourara, Tandadjdadjorane and Fitili villages, reportedly taking over some bases. 2015 peace accord signatory, Movement for the Salvation of Azawad, 11 July killed around ten civilians suspected of collusion with IS Sahel in Inazole village, Ménaka region.

Violence remained high in centre as govt sustained offensive against jihadists. In Mopti region (centre), govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group early July conducted air and group operation against JNIM in Sévéri village, killing at least seven militants. Also in Mopti, JNIM 2 July killed 28 ethnic Dogon Dan Na Ambassagou militiamen in Nouh-Bozo and Bangassi villages. In Ségou region, army 12 July allegedly killed at least 20 JNIM militants as they tried to ambush supply convoy in Sokolo area; and JNIM 27 July reportedly killed at least 12 civilians in Tiouga village.

In other important developments. Constitutional Court 21 July endorsed constitutional referendum, and Goïta next day promulgated new constitution. MINUSMA 3 July presented plan for mission’s withdrawal to FM Abdoulaye Diop; MINUSMA-govt joint working groups tasked with carrying out withdrawal by 31 Dec set up 11 July. Bamako 31 July expressed support for coup leaders in Niger (see Niger).

China/Japan

China maintained maritime presence in East China Sea and conducted drills with Russia, as Japan and NATO deepened ties.

Military activity continued in East China Sea. As of 25 July, Japan had spotted 98 Chinese vessels in its contiguous zone over course of month, detecting six vessels in its territorial sea over just two days. Chinese flotilla comprising five warships 16 July set off to join Russian naval and air forces in drill in Sea of Japan aimed at “safeguarding the security of strategic waterways”, according to China’s defence ministry; China and Russia 23 July completed joint naval drill Northern/Interaction 2023 in Sea of Japan. Following four-year hiatus due to coronavirus pandemic, exchange program between Japanese and Chinese military personnel 16 July resumed. At NATO summit in Lithuania on 12 July, NATO and Japan announced new partnership program intending to advance cooperation in areas such as cyber-security and to increase NATO’s engagement in Indo-Pacific region. Chinese embassy in Japan 24 July said NATO’s plan to expand into region violates UN rules and urged Tokyo to avoid actions that jeopardise trust.

China protested Japan’s activities at nuclear plant. China announced its opposition to Japan releasing treated water from its Fukushima nuclear plant as both China and Hong Kong placed restrictions on seafood imports from Japan; Japan has cited International Atomic Energy Agency assessment that its activities are consistent with international safety standards and that treated water will have negligible radiological impact on people and environment.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea successfully tested solid-fuelled inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) for second time and threatened to down U.S. spy jets, while U.S. serviceman defected to north.

North Korea launched solid-fuelled ICBM. Pyongyang 12 July launched its three-stage solid-fuelled Hwasong-18 ICBM for second time after first launch in April; missile, which marked most lofted North Korean ICBM flight test to date and one with longest flight time at 74 minutes, fell into sea east of Japanese territory. Justifying launch, Pyongyang cited various frustrations related to U.S. and South Korea, including Washington Declaration announced in April, Nuclear Consultative Group and deployment of U.S. strategic assets to peninsula. North Korea 24 July fired two short-range ballistic missiles into waters off eastern coast.

North Korea threatened to down U.S. spy planes. Kim Jong-un’s sister Yo-jong in vitriolic statement 10 July warned that North Korea would shoot down U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that violate country’s claimed exclusive economic zone, following earlier statement published by defence ministry. Both statements accused U.S. of “crossing the Korean Maritime Military Demarcation Line”, referring to inter-Korean maritime border, “and invading [DPRK’s] economic zone from the sea”; Kim’s statement asserted U.S. had violated North’s Exclusive Economic Zone on 10 July, entering periphery of 200-nautical mile zone in far south east; U.S. denied allegations.

U.S. serviceman fled across border to North Korea. Private Second-Class Travis King, 23-year-old U.S. serviceman, 18 July fled across inter-Korean border during tour of Korean War truce village of Panmunjom, marking first defection to North Korea by member of U.S. military in decades. North Korea did not comment on case during July.

Chinese and Russian delegations visited North Korea. On anniversary of North’s “victory” in Korean War on 27 July, Russian delegation led by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chinese delegation led by Politburo member Li Hongzhong visited North Korea, marking first high-level visits to Pyongyang from any country since outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic; trips also signalled Beijing and Moscow’s implacable support for North Korea.

Taiwan Strait

China maintained military activities around island and vowed stern response as presidential candidate of Taiwan’s ruling party planned U.S. visit in August, raising prospect of heightened tensions.

China continued military activity as Taiwan held military drills. As of 26 July, Taiwan during month had spotted 411 Chinese military aircraft entering its air defence identification zone (ADIZ), of which at least 156 either crossed unofficial maritime demarcation “median line” or were detected in south-western ADIZ; Taiwan detected 162 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters throughout month. Notably, China 21-22 July sent 37 aircraft and seven navy vessels around Taiwan. Earlier, Taiwan 3-4 July test fired anti-tank and Stinger missiles. China 12-14 July conducted large-scale exercises with fighter jets, bombers and warships south and south west of island; during drill, U.S. Navy patrol plane flew through Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s army 13 July deployed armoured vehicles, drones and Javelin anti-tank missiles while rehearsing for anti-landing drill scheduled for 27 July in Bali, New Taipei – beach vulnerable to attack by China. Taiwan 24-27 July held its annual Han Kuang military exercises. U.S. House of Representatives 14 July passed National Defense Authorization Act 2024, $876.8bn bill that includes provisions for U.S. to “help Taiwan meet its self-defense needs.”

Beijing warned of strong reaction to U.S. visit by ruling party official. Beijing lodged formal protest with Washington over ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s presidential candidate William Lai Ching-te’s planned stopover in U.S. in August en route to Paraguay, vowing “strong and resolute” action in response to “U.S. indulging and supporting Taiwan independence separatists”. In response, U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken cautioned Beijing against using transit as “pretext for provocative action”; China’s warnings raise prospect of increased military activity.

Taiwan’s opposition articulated interpretation of “1992 consensus”. Kuomintang presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih 4 July affirmed his support for version of “1992 consensus” echoing party’s long-held position of “one China, different interpretations”; he stated opposition to both “one country, two systems” and President Tsai Ing-wen’s “stigmatisation” of consensus. William Lai Ching-te same day proposed four “pillars” of peace, beginning with Taiwan continuing to build up its defence capabilities.

Afghanistan

Countrywide violence remained at low ebb as UN warned of worsening humanitarian crisis, Taliban imposed new restrictions on women, and tensions grew with Pakistan.

Shia religious commemoration passed without Islamic State attacks. Amid Shia religious commemoration of Ashura, during which Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) targeted Shia Hazaras in past, interim authorities 18 July announced restrictions on large gatherings ostensibly as precaution against ISKP attacks. While ISKP did not claim attacks during July, British media 11 July reported arrest of two British brothers planning to travel to Afghanistan to join ISKP and Iran 21 July claimed senior Islamic State leaders from Iraq, Syria and Libya had moved to Afghanistan; Taliban rejected claim.

UN sounded alarm over humanitarian crises. UN early July stated that critical funding gaps were threatening country’s humanitarian program; World Food Programme had stopped giving assistance to 8m food-insecure Afghans and additional 1.4m new and expecting mothers, toddlers and pre-schoolers are no longer receiving food. Additionally, estimated 7.6m people will lack access to life-saving health care. Acting FM Amir Khan Muttaqi 8 July dismissed claims country is facing economic crisis as “propaganda”.

Taliban imposed new draconian restrictions on women. Minister for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice 2 July announced that approximately 12,000 beauty salons would be closed countrywide, which will cost 60,000 women their jobs. As authorities late July began enforcing ban, dozens of women who work in salons protested decree in capital Kabul, prompting security forces to disperse crowd with water cannons and firing in air. Afghan Examination Authority 19 July barred women from annual university entrance exams.

Militant attacks in Pakistan strained Taliban-Pakistan relations. Following deadly attacks on military installations in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province mid-July (see Pakistan), senior Pakistani officials criticised Taliban for harbouring Pakistani Taliban (TTP). Taliban Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoub 21 July stated TTP relocated to Afghanistan during U.S. “occupation” and prior to Taliban takeover, Pakistan had never accused U.S.-backed Afghan govt of complicity in TTP activities. Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan 19 July met with Taliban FM.

Bangladesh

Anti-govt rallies ahead of 2024 elections turned violent, deadly power struggle persisted in Rohingya camps, and ethnic militant group agreed to ceasefire in Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Tensions between govt and opposition turned violent. Ahead of polls slated for Jan 2024, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 12 July gathered approximately 50,000 supporters in capital Dhaka, demanding govt’s resignation and caretaker govt to oversee elections. Ruling Awami League same day held rally in Dhaka, reiterating PM Sheikh Hasina would oversee polls. BNP and Awami League 18-19 July held rallies in Dhaka and other cities, resulting in clashes that killed one BNP supporter and injured hundreds in Lakshmipur city; police claimed BNP supporters attacked officers and filed charges against 8,000 countrywide. Opposition accused police of arresting more than 500 supporters before “grand rally” in Dhaka on 28 July. Police 29 July violently clashed in Dhaka with BNP supporters. During Dhaka by-election, Awami League supporters 17 July allegedly attacked independent candidate as police stood by, fuelling opposition claims that free elections under govt are impossible. Twelve Western countries 19 July condemned violence against candidate; Dhaka 26 July summoned their ambassadors in protest. Police 20 July denied Jamaat-e-Islami permission to hold rally in Sylhet, citing threat of violence; police 28 July detained 21 Jamaat supporters in Chattogram.

Deadly feuding between armed groups continued in Rohingya camps. Clashes between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation spiked. Ahead of visit by International Criminal Court prosecutor 6 July, ARSA allegedly killed sub-mahji facilitating meetings; Rohingya Solidarity Organisation next morning allegedly killed at least five ARSA members in retaliation. Camp violence has killed at least 48 Rohingya refugees in 2023, up from 40 in 2022. After UN coordinator 18 July raised security concerns, home affairs minister said govt was considering sending army to camps. Despite recent increases in U.S., EU, UK and Australian funding, Joint Response Plan remained chronically under-funded; health NGOs have warned of scabies outbreak.

Local authorities in Chittagong Hill Tracts struck truce with militants. Ethnic insurgent group Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) 19 July agreed to ceasefire after negotiations with Bandarban District Council, with further talks likely; KNF emerged in mid-2022 and has killed at least five soldiers in recent months.

India

Manipur state in far north east remained restive amid mounting evidence of widespread sexual violence, while tensions with China persisted over disputed Himalayan border.

Evidence of widespread sexual violence in Manipur sparked national outrage. Video 19 July went viral showing mob of Meitei men parading and sexually assaulting two naked Kuki women on 4 May – one day after ethnic clashes erupted; families of assaulted women said they had filed case in May but no action had been taken. Internet shutdown had prevented evidence from surfacing but Manipur’s chief minister 20 July said there were “hundreds of such cases” of sexual violence. Responding to shocking video, PM Modi 20 July finally addressed situation in Manipur but veered into vague political rhetoric. Meanwhile, region remained restive: Meitei men 6 July shot dead elderly Kuki woman, while radical Meitei outfit Arambai Tenggol 7 July allegedly killed and mutilated woman from Maring Naga community; following latter’s killing, police arrested nine Meitei men, likely to prevent Naga tribes – which have largely remained on sidelines of unrest – from becoming involved.

Relations with China remained fraught amid high-level meeting. In third meeting since March, FM S. Jaishankar 14 July met Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on sidelines of East Asia Summit in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta; Jaishankar called for troop disengagement along two remaining friction points on Line of Actual Control, while Wang Yi hoped to find solution “acceptable to both sides”; two sides agreed to hold military commander talks soon. Meanwhile, councillor from Ladakh’s Chushul area 10 July alleged Chinese troops had erected four tents in eastern Ladakh’s “buffer zone” and 12 July removed them following Indian army’s objections.

India boosted defence ties with France and U.S. PM Modi 13-14 July visited France and finalised several arms deals, including purchase of 26 Rafale Marine fighter jets. U.S. 20 July said it was working with India on co-producing advanced weaponry to address China’s “coercion and harassment”.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

India approved land allotment scheme in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), Supreme Court addressed case challenging autonomy revocation, and security operations against militants continued.

India and Pakistan exchanged stern rhetoric. India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh 26 July asserted “We can go to any extreme to maintain the honour and dignity of the country”, and referenced “crossing the [Line of Contact]”; Pakistan same day replied India’s practices of “stoking hyper-nationalism and reaping electoral gains need to end”.

Local politicians challenged central govt plan to allot land to landless people. Federally run authorities of J&K 3 July approved plan to give 1,360 sq ft of land to each person identified under landless scheme; former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti 5 July alleged govt wanted to “settle outsiders” and “import slums”, citing 2021 census that showed J&K’s homeless population was only 19,045; govt clarified only 2,711 people on 2018-2019 list would receive land, but Mufti’s party maintained govt’s figures showing spike in homelessness were inflated. Given that land remains highly contentious issue in region, allotment policy could have far-reaching implications, such as legitimising militancy.

Supreme Court prepared to hear Article 370 case. Supreme Court 11 July announced that from 2 August it would hear petitions in case challenging federal govt’s 2019 decision to revoke special semi-autonomous status of J&K known as Article 370 and bifurcate J&K into two federally administered Union Territories. Govt 10 July filed affidavit claiming J&K has witnessed “unprecedented era of peace, progress and prosperity” since 2019; court, however, said filing would have “no bearing on the constitutional challenge” regarding revocation.

Govt continued anti-militant operations. Security forces 10 July foiled infiltration attempt from Pakistan and killed two militants in Rajouri district. Security forces 12 July arrested five Lashkar-e-Tayyeba associates in Budgam district. Militants 13 and 18 July killed five migrant labourers in Shopian and Anantnag districts. Militants 18 July killed one forest guard in Pulwama district. Security forces same day killed four militants attempting to infiltrate Poonch district; numerous infiltration attempts may indicate militants seeking to take advantage of inclement weather and annual Hindu pilgrimage to Amarnath cave that diverted security forces’ attention.

Pakistan

Govt maintained intense pressure on former PM Imran Khan as elections approached, while Islamic State killed dozens in suicide attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa amid spate of militant assaults.

Imran Khan faced raft of allegations and court cases. Islamabad High Court 4 July ruled that case alleging Khan had concealed details of gifts received during his term as PM was “inadmissible” but Supreme Court 26 July rejected Khan’s plea to halt criminal proceedings. Supreme Court Registrar 10 July rejected petition to dissolve Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party following 9 May unrest; reports continued that govt was contemplating trying Khan and other PTI leaders in military courts for alleged roles in May unrest. Prosecutor 21 July told Anti-Terrorism Court Lahore that Khan was “guilty of inciting attacks” on military installations on 9 May, per Punjab police investigation; judge extended Khan’s pre-arrest bail until 8 August. In further blow to Khan, 57 members of PTI 17 July left to form new party ahead of elections. Interior minister 20 July warned Khan could be arrested if he did not cooperate with investigations into alleged use of diplomatic channels for political purposes; defence minister 21 July said Khan could be charged with treason and disqualified from election. Supreme Court 24 July barred authorities from arresting Khan until 9 August in case pertaining to killing of lawyer.

Deadly militant attacks roiled provinces bordering Afghanistan. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bajaur district, Islamic State suicide bomber 30 July detonated explosives at political rally of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party, killing at least 54 people and wounding 200. Elsewhere in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 20 July shot dead two police officers in Peshawar’s Regi Model Town area Two TTP suicide bombers 20 July attacked govt compound in province’s Bara neighbourhood, killing four police officers. In Balochistan province, TTP 2 July killed four security personnel after storming highway checkpoint in Zhob district. Militants belonging to newly established Tehreek-e Jihad Pakistan 12 July assaulted military base in Zhob, killing nine soldiers. Amid surge in attacks, Pakistan’s army 14 July expressed concern about militant safe havens in Afghanistan, vowing “effective response” (see Afghanistan).

Sri Lanka

Govt hoped to show commitment to inter-ethnic reconciliation with new policies, which Tamil leaders, families of disappeared and rights groups criticised; govt pursued economic reforms.

Govt unveiled policies purportedly to resolve country’s ethnic conflict. Ahead of President Wickremesinghe’s official visit to India 20-21 July, govt announced series of mostly repackaged policies designed to demonstrate its commitment to inter-ethnic reconciliation and lasting political solution to ethnic conflict. In meeting with Tamil parliamentarians on 18 July, Wickremesinghe presented 15-page document listing policies on land, detainees, missing persons, reparations and development initiatives for Northern and Eastern provinces; govt also included plan to strengthen provincial powers, established in Thirteenth Amendment that was drafted in 1987. Tamil leaders, who have almost universally criticised Thirteenth Amendment as inadequate, 18 July rejected proposal, which fell short of full implementation. Discussions at all-party meeting convened by president 26 July indicated lack of parliamentary consensus for his plans. Meanwhile, govt held series of meetings on proposed National Unity and Reconciliation Commission; families of forcibly disappeared and human rights organisations denounced plan as designed to win international support without addressing underlying factors that generated civil war. Sinhala nationalist activists 23 July disrupted peaceful commemoration of 40th anniversary of anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo, which riot police later violently dispersed.

Parliament endorsed govt’s debt plan and economic reforms. Parliament 1 July approved govt’s Domestic Debt Restructuring plan, designed to complement and encourage debt restructuring with international creditors that is needed to meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) target for debt reduction; plan has generated widespread criticism for effectively imposing losses on workers’ retirement funds while leaving banks and their shareholders untouched. In brief visit 28 July, French President Emmanuel Macron reiterated support for expedited debt restructuring and economic recovery, a message echoed by Japanese FM Hayashi Yoshimasa during 29 July meeting with Wickremesinghe. Further progress was made in achieving reforms required by IMF’s bailout plan as parliament 19 July passed anti-corruption bill and bill to guarantee independence of Central Bank.

Cambodia

Ruling party won national election that excluded opposition and leader Hun Sen announced resignation after 38 years in power.

PM Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) claimed “landslide” victory in national elections held 23 July. U.S. same day called polls “neither free nor fair” and EU next day criticised elections that were held in “restricted political and civic space” and “excluded important sectors of the opposition”; Election Commission in May had ruled that main opposition Candlelight Party could not partake in polls on “concocted administrative grounds”, according to Human Rights Watch. Hun Sen 26 July announced resignation as PM after almost four decades in power and intention to hand position to his son Hun Manet on 10 August, but said he would continue as head of ruling party.

Myanmar

Regime troops battled resistance forces, junta extended state of emergency and delayed election, and Thai FM visited deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi in first contact since her 2021 detention.

Clashes continued in several parts of country between military and ethnic armed groups and post-coup resistance forces. In south east, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and its allies continued to target roads and bridges. Following late June attack on bridge between Mon State’s Thaton township and Bago region’s Kyaukkyi township that killed four regime officials, KNLA and People’s Defence Forces 6 July blew up 20m bridge from Kyaikto town to Kyaiktiyo Pagoda. In Kachin state (north), following mounting tensions amid growing military deployments in area, fighting early July erupted in area close to Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) headquarters, displacing around 500; military helicopter 8 July attacked KIO position as sides clashed for several days along main road from state capital Myitkyina to Chinese border. In Shan state (north), KIO launched offensive on Kutkai township, clashing with regime for first time in five months. In Yangon, regime security forces 7 July shot two men arrested on suspicion of involvement in killing of pro-junta singer; activists alleged soldiers executed them.

Regime hinted elections delay until 2025 before extending state of emergency. Junta immigration and population minister Myint Kyaing 2 July said 2024 census and national ID cards are required for voter lists, suggesting national election will only take place after Oct 2024 census sometime in 2025; junta 31 July extended state of emergency by six months.

Regime granted first meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, and discussed border unrest with India. Thailand’s FM Don Pramudwinai 11 July announced he met deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyitaw prison two days earlier. Statement by regional bloc ASEAN ahead of 14 July meeting said some members considered Don’s efforts “positive development”, implying others do not. Senior Indian officials 30 June-1 July met regime counterparts in Naypyitaw to discuss crime and unrest along shared border amid allegations that Kukis in India’s Manipur state have received support from Chin brethren in Myanmar (see India).

Philippines

Political and criminal violence continued in south, while military battled communist rebels.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In Jolo town, Sulu province, police 3 July busted gang that allegedly peddled illegal drugs and gave part of its earnings to Abu Sayyaf Group. Unidentified gunmen 12 July ambushed former mayor of Rajah Buayan municipality and her father in Lambayong town, Sultan Kudarat. Gun attack 13 July killed retired police officer and wounded his wife and brother-in-law in Isabela City, Basilan province. In Maguindanao, military 13 July seized camp of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters unit in village of Salman, Ampatuan town, Maguindanao del Sur province.

Clashes continued between military and Communist militants. Hostilities between military and communist New People’s Army in Luzon Island in north (Bicol), Mindanao Island in south (Bukidnon, Caraga), and Visayas Islands in centre, especially Negros Occidental, killed at least eight combatants and civilians and injured one.

Marawi rehabilitation continued. Marawi Compensation Board 4 July began accepting compensation claims from families who lost properties and family members during 2017 Marawi siege; board chairperson said it has so far received around 12,000 claims for July and August.

South China Sea

Philippines protested China’s “dangerous” maritime harassment in South China Sea (SCS) as U.S. and EU showed support for Manila, while Beijing and ASEAN discussed code of conduct.

Tensions persisted between China and Philippines. Philippine Coast Guard 6 July accused Chinese coast guard of “dangerous manoeuvres”, as Philippine ships were “constantly followed, harassed and obstructed by the significantly larger Chinese coast guard vessels” near Second Thomas Shoal. In response to Chinese activities, Philippine Coast Guard 7 July said it will intensify patrols in Iroquois Reef, while military 13 July said it will deploy more assets to Kalayaan island group, eastern part of Spratly archipelago. China announced large no-sail zone for military exercises 29 July-2 August, spanning area including Paracel Islands and Macclesfield Bank. U.S. Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group 4 July transited SCS after conducting port visit to Vietnam 25 June.

Manila received diplomatic support for position in SCS dispute. Philippines 12 July marked seventh anniversary of its legal victory over China on South China Sea Arbitration at the Hague Tribunal, as FM Enrique Manalo said Tribunal’s decision affirmed correctness of Philippines taking “the path of principle, the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes”; U.S. and EU reaffirmed their support and stressed that ruling is legally binding. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 31 July declared readiness “to strengthen the cooperation with the Philippines on maritime security in the region”, following meeting with President Marcos, Jr. in Manila.

Beijing and regional bloc inched toward code of conduct. China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 13 July completed second reading of code of conduct for SCS at ASEAN Regional Forum. Joint working group had missed 2022 deadline to reach agreement but agreed to attempt to conclude accord within three years.

Thailand

Parliament blocked election-winning Move Forward Party (MFP) from leading next govt, sparking protests in capital Bangkok as prospect of MFP’s dissolution grew; insecurity persisted in deep south.

MFP failed to win parliamentary majority amid pressure from establishment. MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat 13 July fell short in bid to become Thailand’s 30th PM, securing 324 votes in lower house but support of only thirteen senators. As MFP sought to amend Article 112 of Criminal Code, or lèse-majesté law, to reduce penalties and permit only palace to lodge complaints, Constitutional Court 12 July accepted petition that claimed amendment was tantamount to attempt to overthrow democratic system with king as head of state. Election Commission 12 July referred to Constitutional Court case alleging Pita violated election law by running for office when he was aware that he was ineligible, which could result in up to three years’ imprisonment. Pita 15 July said he would step aside and allow coalition partner Pheu Thai to take lead in forming next govt if he failed to win second round of voting. During second round on 19 July, parliamentarians voted that Pita could not be renominated because of regulation that prohibits resubmission of failed motion in same session; Constitutional Court same day suspended Pita from parliamentary duties while it decided election law case. MFP supporters 19 July gathered in Bangkok to signal displeasure with Constitutional Court, Election Commission and senate; further protests of hundreds occurred at various Bangkok locations over following days. Constitutional Court 25 July accepted petition to rule on constitutionality of second vote.

Insecurity persisted in deep south. Fourth Region Army commander Lt Gen Santi Sakuntanark 1 July said army planned to reduce troop numbers in four southernmost provinces and lift state of emergency over next four years. In Pattani province, dozens of rangers and police 5 July surrounded suspected insurgents in Khok Pho district but suspects opened fire, killing assistant village chief; returning fire, security forces killed one suspected insurgent. In Yala province, IED attack on ranger patrol 15 July killed one ranger and wounded two others in Bannang Sata district.

Niger

Presidential guards deposed President Bazoum, extending coup belt and resulting instability sweeping West Africa.

Presidential guards staged coup overthrowing Bazoum. Presidential guards 26 July sealed off presidential palace in capital Niamey and detained President Bazoum. Putschists 26-27 July suspended constitution, dissolved govt and state institutions and closed borders, claiming “continued degradation of the security situation” and “poor economic and social governance” pushed them to act. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Abdou Sidikou Issa, 27 July said military would not intervene against coup leaders, purportedly to avoid bloodbath in Niamey, de facto backing putschists. Head of Presidential Guard, Gen. Abderrahmane Tchiani, 28 July appeared on state TV and declared himself head of new ruling junta, National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP). Thousands of pro-junta protesters 30 July marched in Niamey waving Russian flags and stormed French embassy, drawing tear gas from French security. CNSP 31 July detained head of Bazoum’s party and four ministers. Coup prompted international condemnation. Notably, West Africa’s regional bloc ECOWAS 26 July condemned “attempt to seize power by force” and called on putschists to free Bazoum “immediately and without any condition”; 30 July imposed sanctions, including national assets freeze, and threatened force if coup leaders fail to reinstate ousted Bazoum within a week.

Low-level insecurity persisted in Tillabery region (south west). Al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 4 July killed three civilians in Ourogo village, Say department. Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) fighters 7 July killed one gendarme and wounded another in Ayorou department. JNIM 14 July ambushed transport convoy under military escort near Niakatire locality, Torodi department, killing one gendarme and four civilians, and wounding 19 others; two militants also killed. Meanwhile, reports around 10 July emerged that Nigerien and French forces 6-7 July captured two high-level IS Sahel leaders; observers 12 July however claimed reports were case of mistaken identity.

Cyprus

As UN continued efforts to find common ground, Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leadership voiced support for differing solution models.

UN continued engagement to foster dialogue. UN Sec Gen António Guterres 5 July asserted that positive shift in Greece-Türkiye relations was opportunity for settlement in Cyprus. UN 7 July adopted two reports, namely Secretary General’s Report on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, and Secretary General’s Report on UN Mission in Cyprus. In former, Guterres stated “the absence of substantive dialogue continues to deepen the difference of views on the way forward”. In latter, Guterres urged parties to return to negotiations, adding that further economic integration between two sides was needed; he also called upon Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to cease antagonistic rhetoric. Meanwhile, Republic of Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar 18 July visited anthropological laboratory of Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, agreed to meet again at UN General Assembly in Sept. In his 20 July visit to north of island, Turkish President Erdoğan attended opening ceremony of new terminal at Ercan/Tymbou airport, declaring days of airport being used for international flights were “not far off”.

Parties articulated alternative visions of solution. In response to UN Security Council press statement 10 July that articulated “goal of returning to formal negotiations based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation”, “TRNC” 12 July said statement was “unfortunate and unrealistic” and asserted its support for two-state solution; Türkiye next day voiced support for “TRNC”’s position, adding that Turkish Cypriots no longer sought outdated solution model, referring to federation. Republic of Cyprus and Greece during month, however, rejected two-state formula: notably, Republic of Cyprus Defence Minister Michalis Giorgallas 2 July said that Turkish narrative for two state solution cannot be part of any discussion in new negotiations, while Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 31 July said “any partitionist thoughts of two states is completely off any agenda”.

Türkiye

Security forces struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), primarily in northern Iraq and northern Syria, while govt invested diplomatic capital in improving ties with Greece, Egypt and Gulf states.

Military continued operations against PKK. Hostilities remained concentrated in northern Iraq and northern Syria. Notably in Iraq, clashes with PKK 9 July killed two Turkish soldiers, while forces claimed to “neutralise” (arrest or kill) several high-ranking PKK members, including alleged PKK mastermind of 2019 assassination of Turkish diplomat on 5 July, PKK’s special forces chief on 13 July, member of PKK’s regional administrative council on 16 July. Violence within Türkiye remained limited, as military carried out operations in rural areas of Şırnak and Hakkari provinces. Interior ministry 26 July said security forces had apprehended two PKK members in Istanbul allegedly plotting “sensational attack”.

Dialogue with Greece regained forward momentum. Having concluded respective elections, Ankara and Athens reiterated willingness to cooperate. Greek FM Giorgos Gerapetritis 4 July announced readiness to start talks on resolving long-standing issues in Aegean dispute. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler and Greek counterpart Nikos Dendias next day held phone call in which both sides agreed on restarting contacts for confidence-building measures. President Erdoğan and Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 11-12 July agreed to foster “positive momentum”, pledged to “activate multiple channels of communication” and to schedule High-Level Cooperation Council meeting in Greece this year. In response to wildfires on Greek island Rhodes, Türkiye 21 July sent three firefighting aircraft.

Govt sought to mend fences across region and beyond. Türkiye and Egypt 4 July realised pledges to reinstate ambassadorial representation. During Gulf visit, Erdoğan 17-21 July signed trade, investment and security deals which notably included record-breaking defence deal with Saudi Arabia, and issued declaration with Qatar and United Arab Emirates to enhance bilateral relations. Russian President Putin 8 July cancelled state visit to Türkiye, citing Erdoğan’s decisions during visit by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to release prisoners of Ukraine war and cooperate with Kyiv on strategic industries. During NATO Summit, govt agreed to back Sweden’s membership.

Crackdown on Islamic State (ISIS) persisted. Security forces during July detained at least 107 individuals with alleged links to ISIS.

Algeria

Ruling party remained plagued by divisions, and tensions with Morocco remained elevated.

Internal divisions continued to plague ruling party. Amid disagreements within ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) over support for President Tebboune’s candidacy in 2024 presidential election, 11th party congress remained unscheduled. Meanwhile, power struggle between FLN’s sec gen, Abou El Fadl Baadji, and president of FLN parliamentary group, Latifi Ahmed Salah, continued. After removing Salah from his role in June, Baadji 10 July took him to FLN’s disciplinary committee for “insubordination, transgression and political deviation” as he refused to cede duties.

Israel recognised Western Sahara as part of Morocco, drawing Algeria’s ire. At Non-Aligned Movement summit held in Azerbaijan, Algeria’s permanent representative to UN, Ambassador Amar Bendjama, 5 July called for decolonisation of Western Sahara. Moroccan counterpart, Ambassador Omar Hilal, retorted that Western Sahara was “an agenda of adversity, hostility and destabilisation” for Algiers. Meanwhile, Algiers 20 July denounced Israel’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara as “blatant violation of international law” (see Western Sahara). Moroccan King Mohammed VI 29 July welcomed Israel’s move while calling for “return to normality” with Algeria and “opening of borders between the two neighbouring, sister countries and peoples”.

In other important developments. After Tebboune 17-21 July visited China to gain support for membership to BRICS bloc of emerging economies, Algiers 21 July applied to join alliance, also submitted request to become shareholder member of BRICS Bank with $1.5bn. Algiers 24 July said it had summoned Danish and Swedish envoys to condemn recent desecrations of Koran in Copenhagen and Stockholm.

Egypt

Amid significant economic, social and political challenges, Cairo turned to foreign policy, restoring full diplomatic ties with Türkiye and agreeing to resume talks with Ethiopia on GERD.

Successful privatisation round not enough to quell Gulf and IMF wariness. PM Mustafa Madbouly 11 July announced Egypt had sold assets worth $1.9bn, including $1.65bn in foreign currency; Gulf investors played limited role, signalling continued wariness toward purchasing Egyptian assets. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 13 July welcomed sales as important step consistent with reform program, however reiterated call on Cairo to implement structural reforms to improve long-term economic sustainability.

Repression of critics continued to mar national dialogue initiative. National dialogue coordinator Diaa Rashwan 12 July announced that Board of Trustees would meet same day to finalise proposals before submitting them to President Sisi for approval. Journalist Khaled Dawood and human rights lawyers Ahmed Ragheb and Naged El-Bori, 18 July froze participation to dialogue to protest sentencing of researcher Patrick George Zaki to three years in prison on charges of “disseminating false news”. Board of Trustees same day urged Sisi not to enforce verdict, and Sisi 19 July pardoned Zaki.

Cairo restored full diplomatic relations with Türkyie, resumed talks with Ethiopia. Cairo and Ankara 4 July exchanged ambassadors for first time since 2013, with Cairo appointing Amr el-Hamamy as ambassador to Türkiye, and Salih Mutlu Sen becoming Türkiye’s ambassador to Egypt. Outstanding issues, such as stance on Libya and fate of Muslim Brotherhood leaders living in Türkiye, remained unresolved. Sisi and Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed 13 July met for first time since 2019, agreed to resume negotiations on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) with aim of reaching final deal on filling and operation of dam within four months (see Nile Waters). Egypt 13 July hosted leaders from Sudan’s neighbouring countries, announced initiative to end conflict (see Sudan).

In other important developments. In North Sinai, group of detainees 30 July reportedly seized weapons inside police facility in el-Arish city and killed four security forces, while wounding several others.

Libya

Parliament approved roadmap for selection of new unity govt before elections, drawing UN’s ire, and oil revenue distribution took centre stage.

Parliament adopted controversial plan to appoint new unity govt. East-based House of Representatives (HoR) 25 July approved roadmap paving the way for appointment of supposed unity govt before presidential and parliamentary elections; HoR presented plan as part and parcel of broader roadmap agreed to in June by HoR and Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) representatives forming UN-backed “6+6” committee. UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 26 July criticised “unilateral” initiative going counter to UN-backed efforts to enable elections as soon as possible, and warned it could “inflict serious negative consequences for Libya and trigger further instability and violence”. In response, HoR accused UN of misleading public opinion when describing decision as “unilateral”.

Rival factions set up joint committee on oil revenue distribution. Head of east-based govt, Osama Hamad, HoR chairman Aguila Saleh, and eastern strongman Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar late June-early July made separate calls for “fairer” redistribution of oil revenues, threatening to close off oil production should Tripoli fail to put portion of oil revenues at direct disposal of eastern authorities. In response, Tripoli-based Presidency Council Chairman Mohamed Menfi around 6 July agreed to form committee tasked with “distributing oil revenues” and including representatives from eastern and western Libya. UN, EU and most western embassies in following days welcomed decision.

Struggle for control of Central Bank led to kidnapping, oil field closure. Gunmen 11 July kidnapped former finance minister and prominent figure from eastern Libya, Farj Bou Matari, at Tripoli airport. Tribesmen close to Haftar 13 July shut down oil production at El Feel and El Sharara oil fields to protest Matari’s abduction, who was released 15 July. Tripoli-based oil ministry next day said production had resumed at oil sites. Kidnapping likely linked to claims that Bou Matari early July enjoyed tentative backing of rival assemblies, HSC and HoR, to replace Siddiq al-Kebir as Central Bank governor.

Tunisia

Security forces expelled Sub-Saharan migrants to desert areas while European Union reached migration control deal with Tunis.

Authorities expelled Sub-Saharan migrants to border areas amid spike in tensions. Clashes between Tunisians and Sub-Saharan migrants 3 July left one Tunisian man dead in coastal city of Sfax. As disturbances went on for several days, with local rights activists reporting beatings and arbitrary detentions of migrants by locals, authorities allegedly expelled around 1,200 sub-Saharans from Sfax and took them further south to remote areas near borders with Libya and Algeria. NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) 6 July said migrants left “with little food and no medical assistance” at Tunisia-Libya border. Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique 12 July reported death of two migrants in Haouza area near Algeria, and Libyan authorities late July announced finding several bodies of migrants on border with Tunisia. UN experts 18 July urged authorities to “halt any further deportations”, saying “collective expulsions are prohibited under international law”, and reiterated concern about “reports of racist hate speech in the country”.

EU, Tunisia signed partnership largely focused on migration control. European Commission President Ursula von Der Leyen and President Saïed 16 July signed partnership agreement, with European Union (EU) allocating €105mn to Tunisia to reinforce border management and speed up repatriation of irregular Tunisian migrants. HRW 19 July urged EU to suspend migration control funding to Tunisian security forces, citing latter’s “serious abuses” against Sub-Saharan migrants.

In other important developments. Tunis Court of Appeal 13 July released political opponents Chaïma Issa and Lazhar Akremi, who had been detained since Feb as part of crackdown on govt critics; next day banned them from traveling abroad and appearing in public following prosecutor’s office’s request. On two-year anniversary of Saïed’s power grab, over 300 people 25 July rallied in capital Tunis to denounce crackdown on fundamental freedoms and demand release of political prisoners.

Western Sahara

In new diplomatic victory, Morocco secured Israel’s recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Israel recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Israel 17 July recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, also announced appointment of military attaché in Rabat liaison office, which suggests impending full upgrade of diplomatic relations. Algiers 20 July criticised move as “blatant violation of international law” that “can in no way legitimise sovereignty over occupied Sahara lands” (see Algeria). Moroccan King Mohammed VI 29 July welcomed Israel’s decision while calling for “return to normality” with Algeria and “opening of borders between the two neighbouring, sister countries and peoples”.

EU-Morocco fishing deal expired. Fishing protocol to EU-Morocco association agreement 17 July expired and was not renewed pending EU Court of Justice’s final decision on legality of including Western Sahara in protocol; expiration leaves European trawlers without license to fish in Moroccan and Western Saharan waters.

Ecuador

Govt imposed emergency measures following assassination of mayor and fresh spate of gang violence in Ecuador’s prisons, prompting violent backlash from criminal groups.

In port city of Guayaquil, clashes 22 July erupted between rival gangs in Litoral prison and continued for several days, leaving 31 inmates dead and 14 injured. Meanwhile, inmates from 13 prisons across country 24 July went on hunger strike, demanding better food and sanitary conditions, with some taking guards hostage. As unrest soared, President Lasso 25 July declared 60-day state of emergency throughout Ecuador’s jails and authorised deployment of 2,700 soldiers to wrest back control of Litoral prison. Authorities 25 July announced armed forces had re-established “total control” of Litoral and all prison hostages were released following day. Emergency declaration triggered violent backlash from criminal groups: notably, gunmen in Guayaquil city 25 July looted store and burned bus; and in Esmeraldas city inmates took 15 prison guards and two other staffers hostage while armed assailants attacked police unit. Only two days before, Lasso 24 July had declared another emergency in Manabí and Los Ríos provinces, as well as Durán city, after gunman 23 July killed mayor of Manta city (Manabí) in shooting that left one other woman dead and four wounded. Violence prompted key presidential contenders in upcoming Aug election to promise tougher security policies amid escalating criminal gang violence.

Peru

Large anti-govt protests took place in Lima and other departments across country.

Amid simmering political tensions, notably since former President Pedro Castillo’s arrest in Dec 2022, tens of thousands 19 July marched in capital Lima and other departments, while others blocked highways around provincial towns, namely in Puno and Cusco; protests were largely peaceful, though riot police in Lima fired tear gas at protesters attempting to enter Congress carrying rocks and bottles. Protesters were calling for President Boluarte’s resignation, as well as closure of Congress, early general elections, work on a new constitution and Castillo’s release, signalling widespread distrust with country’s main democratic institutions. Fresh protests took place 29 July, which marks Independence Day, with police briefly clashing with protesters and attacking at least three journalists. During the Independence Day speech in Lima, Boluarte called for a great “national reconciliation” and urged Congress to delegate legislative powers to executive for 120 days to tackle crime with greater efficiency.

Venezuela

As Maduro govt further harmed prospects for competitive 2024 poll, international actors stepped up efforts to reach deal on improving electoral conditions in return for sanctions relief.

Trend toward unfair presidential vote in 2024 persisted. International actors continued to condemn govt’s late June announcement that opposition front runner María Corina Machado is barred from candidacy in 2024 presidential election; U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 6 July said Caracas could take number of steps toward free and fair vote but that Machado’s disqualification “sends the opposite message”. In another worrying move, National Assembly president and chief govt negotiator Jorge Rodríguez 13 July said there would be no European Union (EU) electoral observation mission during polls; decision significant as EU observers’ presence was key condition for opposition’s participation in 2021 regional and local elections. Opposition Voluntad Popular party 27 July said govt confiscated passport of its candidate Freddy Superlano as he attempted to travel to Colombia.

Efforts to push through U.S.-Venezuela deal on electoral conditions ramped up. Amid growing concern about competitiveness of elections, several meetings between govt, opposition and international actors in July raised hopes of a deal that would see govt improve electoral conditions; in return, Washington would ease sanctions and provide guarantees for transfer of Venezuelan assets frozen abroad to UN-managed fund to finance improvements in public services. Opposition’s chief negotiator Gerardo Blyde 10-13 July visited U.S. to discuss deal; French President Emmanuel Macron 17 July organised meeting between Blyde and VP Delcy Rodríguez on sidelines of EU-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) summit in Brussels, attended by presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia; post-meeting statement highlighted need for negotiated solution and confirmed broad details of U.S.-Venezuela deal to improve electoral conditions.

In another important development. Former head of military intelligence Hugo Carvajal 19 July arrived in U.S. to face drug charges after being extradited from Spain; Washington accuses Carvajal of trafficking along with other senior officials, including President Maduro.

El Salvador

Ruling party named President Bukele as their candidate for 2024 presidential poll, and Congress voted to allow mass trials for alleged gang members.

Political parties held primaries to select candidates for Feb 2024 general election. Ruling party Nuevas Ideas 9 July nominated Bukele and VP Félix Ulloa as presidential and vice presidential candidates in Feb 2024 poll despite constitutional ban on consecutive presidential re-election; should Salvadorans vote for Nuevas Ideas, Bukele will be able to further consolidate power at all levels of govt. Two main opposition parties – conservative ARENA and leftist FMLN – 16 July announced Joel Sánchez and Manuel Flores as their respective candidates, with Hilcia Bonilla and Werner Marroquin as running mates.

Congress passed legislation enabling mass trials for alleged gang members. Legislative Assembly 12 July approved state of exception’s sixteenth extension. Congress 26 July passed bill allowing courts to try alleged gang members in mass trials and increasing sentences for gang leaders from 45 to 60 years; up to 900 people can now be tried simultaneously if they hail from same region or are accused of belonging to same criminal group. Civil society and international bodies continued to raise concerns about human rights abuses under state of exception. Notably, a coalition of human rights groups 14 July denounced govt for third time at Inter-American Commission of Human Rights over arrest of innocent people and deaths of inmates; govt denied allegations.

Honduras

Castro administration enforced more punitive policies in response to latest wave of violence; UN experts arrived amid stepped-up anti-corruption efforts.

Govt renewed state of emergency amid growing criticism. Govt continued to pursue tough security measures after June deadly prison riot and mass killings, with military police placed in charge of penitentiary system, deployment of soldiers in hotspots and restrictions on movement; in Cortés department (north west), night-time curfew in San Pedro Sula city began 4 July following similar measures late June in nearby Choloma city. Govt 5 July extended state of emergency for additional 45 days, prompting criticism. Notably, president of Union of Small Enterprises 5 July said curfews put 25,000 jobs at risk, while UN human rights office 7 July said militarisation of public security was detrimental to fundamental rights, drawing particular attention to reports of violence perpetrated by military police against prison inmates.

Momentum for creation of anti-corruption commission grew. Team of UN experts 9 July arrived to provide technical assistance for establishment of International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity (CICIH); mission will remain in country for six months. Civil society groups continued to urge govt to approve reforms established by UN before CICIH starts operating. In significant step, Congress 12 July repealed decrees known as “Impunity Pacts”, which granted its members protection from prosecution for corruption.

Mexico

Criminal violence remained rampant, while President López Obrador’s attacks on opposition front runner in 2024 presidential poll prompted condemnation from electoral authorities.

Criminal groups stepped up attacks on state forces, increasingly using explosives. Gunmen 3 July shot at interior minister of Tamaulipas state (north) on main road, though official was unharmed. Criminal group Los Ardillos 10 July orchestrated thousands-strong protest in Chilpancingo city, Guerrero state (south west), over arrest of two of its members; protesters blocked main roads, forced their way into state legislature and took 13 police officers and officials hostage, released them following day. Several improvised explosive devices (IED) in Tlajomulco de Zúñiga city, Jalisco state (centre), 11 July killed four police officers and two civilians; Jalisco Cartel dominant in state has increasingly used IEDs in neighbouring Michoacán.

Attacks on journalists and disappearances continued. Police 8 July found body of Luis Martín Sánchez Iñiguez, local correspondent for La Jornada newspaper, in Huachines town, Nayarit state (west); unidentified armed group 15 July killed reporter Nelson Matus in Acapulco town, Guerrero. Meanwhile, civil society organisations from Caborca and Pitiquito municipalities reported 1-2 July clashes between Sinaloa Cartel and rival Caborca group resulted in at least 15 disappearances and three deaths; collective known as Madres Buscadoras, which searches for disappeared, 4 July said it had uncovered clandestine graves containing dozens of bodies in Tlajomulco de Zúñiga; another search collective 14-15 July found bodies in graves in Reynosa city, Tamaulipas; UN 27 July accused army of obstructing investigation into 2014 disappearance of students from Ayotzinapa teacher’s college.

López Obrador railed against key contender in 2024 presidential election. President López Obrador’s continued criticism of opposition candidate Xóchitl Gálvez in daily press conferences prompted National Electoral Institute 13 July to issue order prohibiting him from commenting on electoral matters. López Obrador next day accused electoral authorities of trying to “silence” him and reiterated claims he had gathered information about public contracts awarded to Gálvez, saying he would seek judicial investigation.

Nicaragua

Crackdown on Catholic Church continued, and opposition stepped up efforts to unify against Ortega regime.

Govt’s religious persecution persisted. Govt 4 July revoked legal status of Fundación Fraternidad Pobres de Jesucristo and expelled nuns in charge of convent from country. Authorities 10 July arrested Fernando Israel Zamora Silva, chancellor of Siuna diocese, in capital Managua. Govt 27 July revoked legal status of 18 organisations, including several religious groups. Meanwhile, Church officials 5 July said Bishop Rolando Álvarez, sentenced in Feb 2023 to 26 years in prison for treason, remained incarcerated despite reports of his release.

Opposition sought to unify. Following exiled opposition’s late June establishment of Monteverde Group, comprised of different opposition factions to consolidate united anti-Ortega front, group 9 July announced five official spokespersons including former presidential candidates Juan Sebastián Chamorro, Félix Maradiaga and Medardo Mairena.

In other important developments. UN human rights office 7 July condemned 2 and 5 July killings of two Indigenous people on Bosawas nature reserve along Atlantic coast; both victims were park wardens in protected area rife with settlers looking to clear land for farms and illegal mining and logging. International Court of Justice 13 July dismissed Nicaragua’s case in dispute with Colombia over maritime borders and economic rights over area of Caribbean Sea.

Haiti

Rival gangs struck fragile truce as violence expanded beyond capital, Kenya offered to lead multinational security force, and international actors urged compromise to resolve political crisis.

Rival gangs struck truce amid widespread violence. Leaders of rival G9 and G-pèp gang coalitions 1 July agreed truce in Cité Soleil commune of capital Port-au-Prince; local observers expressed doubts about pact’s durability as gangs did not commit to disarmament. UN 3 July said murders and abductions rose for fifth consecutive year, with homicides Jan-June 2023 up 67.5% on same period in 2022; report also said civilian self-defence groups, including Bwa Kale movement, killed at least 224 alleged gang members late April-late June (though movement’s strength has since waned). Armed assailants 23 July attacked Liancourt town (Artibonite), burning down houses and building of local broadcaster as gang violence continued to expand beyond capital.

Kenya offered to lead multinational force. Kenya 29 July said it would consider leading multinational force with contribution of 1,000 police officers to support Haitian National Police (HNP), pending UN approval. Offer came amid growing calls for such a force. Most notably, CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) heads of state 7 July stressed need to create a “humanitarian and security stabilization corridor under the mandate of a UN Security Council Resolution”; UN Security Council 14 July extended UN mission’s mandate for one year and encouraged countries to provide support to HNP, including through deployment of specialised force.

International actors continued pushing for dialogue to resolve political crisis. UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 1 July urged all actors involved in political negotiations to make the concessions “necessary for the restoration of democratic institutions” during visit to Haiti, while U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in 5 July meeting with acting PM Ariel Henry stressed urgency of achieving political consensus. CARICOM delegation 12-15 July convened Haitian politicians and civil society leaders for talks aimed at resolving crisis; meeting produced no agreement but delegation 18 July claimed progress toward reducing number of parties in dialogue and refining agenda for negotiations.

Humanitarian situation remained dire. World Food Programme 17 July said it was forced to cut number of people receiving emergency food aid in Haiti by 25% due to lack of funds.

Colombia

Govt’s “total peace” policy advanced as ceasefire with ELN gradually took hold and is due to take full effect in August, lasting 180 days in longest bilateral ceasefire ever concluded with guerrilla group.

Bilateral ceasefire with National Liberation Army (ELN) advanced. Govt and ELN 6 July ordered their forces to end offensive activities as sides gradually implemented June ceasefire agreement, set to take full effect 3 Aug and then last for 180 days; if successful, agreement will be longest bilateral ceasefire ever concluded with guerrilla group. Parties 14-15 July released two documents detailing protocols and monitoring mechanisms for full ceasefire, though civil society and grassroots groups criticised lack of explicit civilian protections. In lead up to cessation of offensive activities, ELN conducted several operations that raised concerns about its interpretation of agreement: group 3 July kidnapped soldier and her two children in Arauca department (north west), releasing them four days later; ELN’s Western Front 4-13 July held armed strike in Chocó department (Pacific coast), limiting citizens’ movements and prohibiting shops from opening.

Petro administration agreed to open talks with FARC dissident faction. Govt 8 July agreed to formal peace negotiations with dissident faction of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central. First stage of dialogue will aim to re-establish confidence after several months of communication breakdown, followed by official talks with 12 govt negotiators and six insurgents; attorney general 28 July lifted arrest warrants of militants who will form negotiating team. Govt did not renew ceasefires with several groups that ended 30 June, including Segunda Marquetalia dissident group and Sierra Nevada Self Defense Forces. Meanwhile, President Petro 23 July named former paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso, currently incarcerated in U.S., as a “gestor de paz”, a role that would allow him to serve as intermediary between govt and armed and criminal groups, notably Gulf Clan.

Oct local election cycle began. Individuals running for mayor, councillor or departmental legislator in Oct polls had to register candidacy by end of July. Official campaign begins in Aug amid concerns elections may escalate political tensions in conflict-affected regions as armed and criminal groups seek to assert influence, either by threatening or implicitly supporting candidates.

Guatemala

Judicial and other interference in presidential poll sparked political crisis and protests in capital, as external actors decried efforts to alter electoral process.

Electoral turmoil erupted following first round of presidential vote. After surprise June election result, in which voters selected Bernardo Arévalo of centre-left Movimiento Semilla to take on front runner Sandra Torres of right-wing Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza party in Aug runoff, Constitutional Court (CC) 1 July suspended release of official results after several political parties, including ruling Vamos, claimed vote count was fraudulent. Recount concluded 6 July with minimal variation and Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) 12 July confirmed candidacy of Torres and Arévalo in presidential runoff; Public Prosecutor’s Office (which is accused of corruption and acting in incumbent president’s interest) next day raided TSE’s Registry of Citizens office amid escalating tensions between the two.

Attempt to block Arévalo’s candidacy deepened crisis. Shortly before TSE certified results, a judge (at behest of Attorney General’s Office) 12 July suspended legal status of Movimiento Semilla over alleged irregularities in how party was created; legal experts claimed electoral law establishes that no party can be banned during electoral process. CC 13 July suspended decision to disqualify Movimiento Semilla, allowing Arévalo’s candidacy in runoff, but Public Prosecutor’s office continued investigations into party. Police 21 July raided Movimiento Semilla’s headquarters amid widespread domestic and international criticism. Arévalo 30 July denounced “campaign of fear”.

Efforts to reverse result sparked protests and international condemnation. Hundreds demonstrated throughout month, predominantly in capital, against efforts to change election results. External actors also criticised efforts to alter electoral process: notably, European Union 13 July said it was “deeply concerned by the continuing efforts to tamper with these election results”; Organization of American States’ observation mission 19 July said some parties and actors had abused “legal instruments” and put “country’s democratic stability” at risk; UN Sec-Gen 22 July urged authorities to “guarantee free expression of the will of electors”; and U.S. 24 July said “we are deeply concerned by ongoing efforts to interfere with the elections in Guatemala”.

Israel/Palestine

Israeli forces conducted largest raid on Jenin refugee camp since Second Intifada, parliament passed govt’s judicial overhaul despite massive protests, and tensions flared with Hizbollah.

Israeli forces killed a dozen Palestinians in Jenin raid amid West Bank volatility. Deadly violence continued across West Bank and Israel, killing at least 27 Palestinians and one Israeli during July. Notably, Israeli forces 3-5 July raided Jenin, claiming to target “terrorist infrastructure”, killing 12 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier (by friendly fire), injuring over 140, and displacing 500 families. In response, Gaza militants 5 July fired five rockets at Israel, prompting Israeli airstrikes in Gaza. Palestinian 4 July conducted car-ramming and stabbing attack in Tel Aviv, injuring at least seven before being killed. Hamas militant 6 July killed Israeli soldier near Kedumim settlement before being shot dead. Israeli forces 25 July killed three Palestinians in Nablus city and 27 July killed teenager during raid in Qalqilya. Israeli cabinet 9 July voted for economic measures to prevent Palestinian Authority’s (PA) collapse; Israeli forces 30 July again raided Jenin, arresting two Hamas members, indicating that Israel’s goal of having PA operate successfully there had so far failed.

Knesset passed bill limiting Supreme Court’s judicial authority. Knesset 24 July passed bill to remove Supreme Court’s ability to block govt decisions deemed “unreasonable”, while opposition boycotted vote and anti-govt protests and strikes against bill intensified, with thousands of military reservists threatening to boycott duty. Supreme Court 26 July said it would hear appeal against bill in Sept.

Israel and Hizbollah exchanged fire. After media late June reported Hizbollah had erected two tents housing armed militants in disputed Shebaa Farms area, Israel 6 July struck southern Lebanon with around 15 artillery shells in response to alleged rocket fire from Lebanon into northern Israel (see Lebanon). Adding to tensions, Israel early July began constructing fence around northern half of Ghajar town, located in occupied Lebanese territory, prompting Hizbollah’s condemnation.

In other important developments. Syrian state media 2, 19 July reported Israeli airstrikes on Homs and capital Damascus (see Syria). PM Netanyahu 17 July recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara (see Western Sahara).

Lebanon

Tensions picked up between Israel and Hizbollah as sides exchanged fire, economic crisis and presidential vacuum persisted, and deadly clashes erupted between militants in southern refugee camp. 

Mutual antagonism continued between Hizbollah and Israel. Following uptick in tensions late June when Israeli media reported Hizbollah had erected two tents housing armed militants in disputed Shebaa Farms area, Lebanese state media 5 July claimed that Israeli forces had breached border three separate times while carrying out construction work. Israel next day struck southern Lebanon with around 15 artillery shells in response to alleged rocket fire from Lebanon into northern Israel. Lebanese security source 12 July claimed that Israeli forces had lobbed three grenade-like explosives across border, wounding three Hizbollah operatives, while Israel said that it had used stun grenades. Meanwhile, Israel early July began constructing fence around northern half of Ghajar town, located in occupied Lebanese territory, prompting condemnation by Hizbollah as well as Lebanon’s caretaker govt. Tensions underscore risk that incident could trigger larger confrontation.

Economic crisis continued. Hardship remained severe despite period of relative stability for Lebanese Lira, due to continued intervention of Lebanese Central Bank and likely influx of hard currency during tourist season. Difficult economic conditions, however, continued to foment protest and public unrest. Several students 10 July reportedly attacked Education Minister’s convoy, blaming him for public-school year heavily disrupted by teacher strikes. Depositors on four occasions 10-20 July entered banks and forcibly withdrew their savings.

Presidential vacuum entered its ninth consecutive month. Parliament in July did not hold presidential election session, reflecting prevailing deadlock between various political factions. Concerns arose that vacuum could engulf Central Bank, given incumbent governor Riyadh Salameh’s term ended 31 July; several parties, including Christian Free Patriotic Movement, argue that caretaker cabinet cannot appoint new governor. Bank’s four deputy governors 6 July stated that they would collectively resign if govt failed to appoint Salameh’s replacement.

Militant factions clashed in southern refugee camp. Islamist militants 30 July shot dead Palestinian military general from Fatah and three escorts, sparking days of heavy clashes between factions in Ein el-Hilweh, country’s largest refugee camp near Sidon city, that killed at least eleven.

Syria

New insurgent group emerged in Idlib amid hostilities between regime and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Russia blocked cross-border aid, and clashes between Turkish-backed and Kurdish militants continued.

New militant faction emerged in Idlib as hostilities persisted. After “Revolutionary Shield Company” late June emerged in Idlib province, claiming to fight HTS “criminality”, group 14 July executed man accused of being HTS member outside Idlib city and 17 July searched vehicles on M4 highway; attacks come after nearly four years of relative stability in Idlib. Meanwhile, regime continued shelling throughout July, including civilian homes in Jisr al-Shoughur 9 July and “double-tap” attack killing rescue worker in Aleppo province 11 July. HTS 7 July conducted first raid since April, targeting regime position in Latakia, and 10 July shelled regime base in Jurin, Hama, killing one. Unknown group, likely HTS, 19 July conducted drone attack on Russian base in Hmemeim, Latakia.

Russian veto on cross-border aid compounded humanitarian crisis in north-west. Russia 11 July vetoed renewal of UN Security Council authorisation for cross-border aid in north-west, where 3mn have been without aid since 10 July. Govt 13 July said it would allow aid through Bab al-Hawa crossing providing UN does not communicate with “terrorist organisations”, referring to de-facto authorities in northwest.

Turkish-backed and Kurdish forces continued hostilities, particularly in northern Aleppo. In northern Aleppo, controlled by Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA), car bomb 9 July killed five civilians in Shawa village. Turkish IED 9 July killed three in Manbij city, including senior commander of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated Manbij Military Council. People’s Defence Units (YPG) forces 10 July raided TFSA position near Afrin city, killing at least five. SDF forces same day shelled Turkish base near Azaz, north Aleppo. Militants affiliated with YPG 29 July attacked TFSA positions in Afrin; Turkish drones next day struck YPG and regime positions nearby in response.

In other important developments. Alleged Israeli airstrikes 2 July targeted Homs city; 19 July struck near capital Damascus. U.S. airstrike 7 July killed alleged ISIS leader in al-Bab city, Aleppo governorate. Middle East Eye 12 July reported U.S. plans to assassinate leaders of Iran-linked resistance factions.

Iran

Purported diplomatic momentum toward U.S.-Iran de-escalatory understanding showed no sign of progress, while maritime tensions picked up.

Amid stalled diplomacy, U.S. criticised Iran’s weapons transfers to Russia. UN Security Council 6 July convened its semi-annual meeting on implementation of Resolution 2231 during which U.S. placed marked emphasis on Iran’s military cooperation with Russia, describing transfer of UAVs used in Ukraine as “a flagrant violation” of 2231’s restrictions, while UK, France and Germany underscored their joint concerns over continued expansion of Iranian nuclear activity. News late June reported U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley is on leave reportedly pending investigation into handling of classified information, which could deepen already-fraught political debate in Washington over diplomatic engagement of Iran.

Maritime incidents continued as U.S. bolstered regional military posture. U.S. military 5 July reported disrupting “two attempted commercial tanker seizures by the Iranian navy” in international waters, one of which involved “multiple, long bursts from both small arms and crew-served weapons” by Iranian ship against Bahamian-flagged Richmond Voyager. Iranian sources claimed that Richmond Voyager had struck Iranian ship, injuring five, and was subject to “a court order to seize it”; Chevron denied any such incident. U.S. Navy next day reported that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces had detained tanker, assessing that incident may have been smuggling-related. Indonesian authorities 11 July confirmed seizure of Iran-flagged tanker on suspicion of unauthorised ship-to-ship transfer in North Natuna Sea. U.S. defence official 14 July announced deployment of F-16 fighters as part of effort “to deter Iran from going after oil tankers”, while U.S. guided-missile destroyer and F-35 fighters entered region mid-July; Pentagon 20 July additionally announced deployment of Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit to region.

In other important developments. U.S. 18 July approved 120-day sanctions waiver allowing Iraq’s payments for Iranian electricity supplies to be carried out through third-party banks, with qualification that funds be used for humanitarian purposes (see Iraq).

Iraq

Tensions rose between Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement and rival Shiite Coordination Framework, protestors torched Swedish embassy over Quran burning, and pro-Iran groups demanded U.S. waivers.

Tensions between Sadrists and rivals mounted. Israel 5 July claimed Kataib Hezbollah (member of framework) in March kidnapped Russian-Israeli academic Elizabeth Tsurkov while conducting research partly on al-Sadr’s movement; Kataib Hezbollah denied allegation. Pro-Iran groups affiliated with framework interpreted Tsurkov’s meetings with Sadrists as Israeli attempt to infiltrate movement. Sadrist supporters 15-16 July attacked offices of Shia parties, including Dawa party, Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, in Basra, Najaf and capital Baghdad after alleged defamation of Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr.

Quran burnings sparked unrest, straining ties with Sweden and Denmark. Protestors, mostly from Sadrist movement, overnight 19-20 July ransacked Swedish embassy in capital Baghdad after Sweden permitted demonstrators to burn Quran in front of Iraqi embassy in Stockholm. Govt 20 July expelled Swedish ambassador, withdrew ambassador to Sweden and threatened to sever diplomatic ties. Hundreds 22 July attempted to storm Baghdad’s Green Zone to reach Danish embassy after Quran burning previous day in Danish capital Copenhagen; demonstrators same day set fire to Danish Refugee Council headquarters in Basra governorate.

Pro-Iran factions demanded U.S. waivers. PM al-Sudani 11 July announced deal to exchange Iraqi oil for Iranian gas. Group of pro-Iran “resistance factions” 14 July protested outside U.S. embassy to demand waivers, amid faltering support for unilateral moratorium on attacks on U.S. forces. U.S. 18 July signed 120-day waiver allowing Iraq to pay for Iranian electricity through non-Iraqi banks.

In other important developments. Türkiye continued targeting Kurdistan Workers’ Party in north (see Türkiye). President Rashid 3 July revoked special decree granted to head of Chaldean Church, provoking protests among Christian community. In first visit to Syrian capital Damascus since 2011, al-Sudani 16 July held talks on security cooperation with Syrian President Assad. In Kurdistan region, militant 7 July allegedly shot dead two members of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in Sulaymaniyah province; explosion 23 July killed former member of Kurdistan Democratic Party-linked intelligence agency in Dohuk city.

Saudi Arabia

Arabia Tensions with United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued to surface, while govt engaged Iran.

Rising tensions with UAE came to light. The Wall Street Journal 18 July reported that Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) during off-record press conference in Dec 2022 said UAE “stabbed us in the back” and that he would “take punitive steps” after sending list of demands to UAE; the news surfaced during period of rising Saudi-UAE economic competition and tensions over key issues, including Yemen and oil policy.

Riyadh continued diplomacy with Iran. Oil minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman 5 July reportedly discussed bilateral relations with Iranian counterpart on sidelines of OPEC conference in Austrian capital Vienna. State media 4 July cited foreign ministry affirming Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s exclusive claim to Durra gas field in Gulf maritime “Divided Area” and called on Iran to negotiate demarcation of area’s eastern border.

In other important developments. UN human rights experts 7 July called for release of two Saudi women jailed for critical tweets. Saudi Arabia 18 July agreed to purchase Turkish drones in biggest defence contract in Turkish history (see Türkiye).

Yemen

Negotiations between Huthis and Saudi Arabia remained stalled, Southern Transitional Council (STC) mobilised forces in Hadramawt amid mounting tensions, and economic crisis sparked protests.

Huthi-Saudi talks made no progress. Negotiations remained at impasse over use of oil revenues for civil and military salary payments and Riyadh’s insistence on its role as mediator in conflict. Huthi delegation 9 July completed Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia and reportedly met Saudi officials in Saudi capital Riyadh. Meanwhile, Huthis targeted forces in al-Dhale, southern al-Bayda, and Taiz governorates to pressure Riyadh. In UN Security Council briefing, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 10 July highlighted need for de-escalation of economic hostilities and concern over military posturing and parades; President of Huthi Revolutionary Committee Mohammed al-Huthi same day accused UN of perpetuating conflict and called for lifting of sanctions. Security Council 10 July renewed mandate for UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) until 14 July 2024.

STC mobilised supporters amid tensions with Saudi-aligned forces in Hadramawt. STC 7 July held annual rally in Hadramawt governorate, expressing discontent at newly-formed Saudi-led Hadramawt National Council (HNC); STC 7 July mobilised protests for Southern Homeland Day and reiterated calls to evict Islah-aligned First Military Region from Hadramawt. STC same day accused First Military Region of shooting protestors at tribal leader’s residence in Seiyun city. STC leader Ayderous al-Zubaidi 9 July threatened to “blow up the situation in Hadramawt”; Saudi-Emirati rivalry has intensified tensions, with Riyadh utilising HNC to diversify its influence in Hadramawt and weaken UAE-backed STC.

Economic hardship sparked protests. Protests 11-12 July erupted in Aden, Lahij, Taiz and Hadramawt governorates over electricity shortages and currency devaluation, as Riyal 11 July reached low of 1,500 to U.S. dollar for first time since April 2022; STC blamed govt ineptitude. Head of Presidential Leadership Council Rashad al-Alimi 12 July met Saudi officials in Riyadh to secure financial assistance and emphasised importance of resuming oil exports from Hadramawt and Shebwa governorates.

In other important developments. Replacement ship 16 July arrived in Yemen to begin unloading oil from stranded tanker FSO Safer. Unknown gunman 21 July killed World Food Programme worker in Turbah town, Taiz governorate.

Côte d’Ivoire

Political class continued to gear up for September 2023 regional and municipal elections.

Prominent opposition parties struggled to agree on joint candidacies. Electoral commission 19 July extended deadline to submit candidacies for regional and municipal elections until 23 July at request of Henri Konan Bédié’s Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and Laurent Gbagbo’s African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI). PPA-CI 18 July announced alliance with PDCI in 24 regions (out of around 30). Notably, VP of PPA-CI Stéphane Kipré 17 July joined list of PDCI official Alphonse Djédjé Mady in Haut-Sassandra region. Parties also filed joint candidacies in 158 out of 201 municipalities, but negotiations failed in key constituencies in economic capital Abidjan, including in Yopougon commune, where PDCI instead reached alliance with Simone Gbagbo’s party. Meanwhile, President Ouattara 13 July insisted that members of ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) who were not officially endorsed by party apparatus should not run as independents.

Hurdles persisted for heavyweights seeking political comeback. After electoral commission late June rejected Gbagbo’s request to be reinstated on electoral roll, PPA-CI did not appeal decision by 1 July deadline, meaning Gbagbo will remain unable to participate in September elections. Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique 4 July confirmed that exiled former PM Guillaume Soro is facing Paris-based judiciary investigation for alleged murder of ex-rebel leader Ibrahim Coulibaly in 2011; Soro, who remains under 2021 life sentence in Côte d’Ivoire for allegedly plotting coup against President Ouattara in 2019, unlikely to be allowed to return home in time to run for president in 2025.

Guinea

Tensions between transitional authorities and political parties remained elevated following failure of mediation process.

Truce between opposition and transitional authorities remained fragile. Dixinn court of first instance 3 July claimed to not have jurisdiction over slander and abuse of authority case brought against Justice Minister Charles Wright by National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC) protest movement leaders; latter same day brought case before Supreme Court. Meanwhile, authorities continued to harass opposition. Security forces 4 July prevented FNDC head of mobilisation, Billo Bah, from travelling abroad. Cellou Dalein Diallo’s Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) opposition party faced destabilisation attempt as Ousmane Gaoual Diallo, expelled from UFDG in June 2022 after joining Col. Doumbouya’s govt, geared up for UFDG presidency candidacy.

Tensions persisted between ECOWAS and transitional authorities. In interview with Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique published 7 July, outgoing chairman of West African regional body ECOWAS, Guinea-Bissau President Sissoco Embaló, said Guinean transition was taking too long. ECOWAS 9 July held summit in Guinea-Bissau, lamented transitional authorities in West Africa’s “very limited” collaboration with ECOWAS mediators, reaffirmed need to restore constitutional order; heads of state same day elected Nigerian President Tinubu, who has previously come out as strong opponent of military coups, as new ECOWAS chairman.

In other important developments. Trial of 28 September 2009 massacre, in which govt forces killed over 150 demonstrators and raped over 100 women while Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara was heading country, 10 July resumed after 6-week suspension. Junta 30 July expressed support for Niger coup leaders.

Nigeria

Jihadists and criminal groups killed dozens in North East and North West, herder-farmer violence flared in North Central states, while security forces fought separatists enforcing sit-at-home order in South East.

Jihadist violence persisted in Borno state, North East zone. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 25 July killed 32 civilians, including 25 herders, in two attacks in Gudumbali forest and Gubio area. Meanwhile, ISWAP 5 July killed scores of Boko Haram members in Sambisa Forest near Bama area. Counter-insurgency operations continued, with air force 5 July bombing ISWAP gathering near Marte town and 15 July launching airstrikes on ISWAP camps in southern islands of Lake Chad. Troops 20 July also repelled ISWAP attack on army post near Monguno town. Jihadist attacks continued, however.

Jihadist activity reported in North West zone amid persistent criminal violence. In Zamfara state, gunmen 10 July killed four police officers on Gusau-Sokoto road in Bungudu area, and 24 July killed at least 29 persons, including seven soldiers, in Maru area. Troops throughout month engaged suspected criminals at several locations, notably in Zamfara’s Maru area and Kaduna state’s Kagarko area. MP from Sokoto state, Sani Yakubu, 12 July said jihadists from Niger, Mali and Libya had joined forces with local criminals and taken over Tangaza area.

Herders-farmer violence continued in North Central zone. In Benue state, assailants 7-8 July killed 33 people in attacks on three villages in Ukum area; residents blamed Fulani herders, while Benue governor said some killings related to communal feuds and banditry. In Plateau state, gunmen 1-8 July killed at least 16 villagers of Mangu area; residents blamed attacks on Fulani armed groups hired by herders.

South East zone saw uptick in separatist violence. Gunmen 3-10 July enforced stay-at-home order in South East zone to press demands for release of outlawed separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leader Nnamdi Kanu, leading to shootings and confrontations with security forces. Notably, police 7 July killed four gunmen near Awkunanaw town, Enugu state, and gunmen next day killed two people in Owerri North area, Imo state.

Senegal

Political climate eased as President Sall decided not to stand for re-election, but detention of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko rekindled tensions.

Incumbent president renounced third candidacy. President Sall 3 July announced he will not run for third term in Feb 2024 election. International community immediately hailed decision, with U.S. Sec State Anthony Blinken welcoming “example for the region”, and UN Sec Gen António Guterres praising “demonstration of statesmanship and leadership”.

Authorities arrested opposition leader, sparking deadly protests. Opposition leader Ousmane Sonko 6 July denounced legal actions taken against him, including two-year prison sentence for “corrupting the youth”, as unjust, and warned of “indescribable chaos” if his presidential candidacy is prevented. Authorities 24 July lifted security detail set up around Sonko’s home in capital Dakar since late May, with govt next day saying risk to public order had faded. Police 28 July arrested Sonko on accusations of plotting an insurrection, and Sonko 30 July announced starting hunger strike. Authorities next day formally charged him with “fomenting an insurrection”, dissolved his party and restricted Internet access. Protests also 31 July broke out in Sonko’s southern city of Ziguinchor, with clashes between police and protesters leaving two people dead. Meanwhile, security forces 11 July arrested Sonko’s close ally, MP Birame Souleye Diop, on charges of “offenses against the head of state”; Diop released from police custody 19 July, but case ongoing.

Cameroon

Anglophone conflict continued to take high civilian toll, as human rights organisation denounced widespread human rights violations.

Tit-for-tat attacks by army and separatists continued in Anglophone regions. Armed Anglophone separatists 1 and 4 July killed three soldiers in Bamenda city and Belo town, both North West (NW) region. In response, govt forces launched spate of attacks, killing two women in Mejang village (NW) 5 July, three separatist combatants in Mbonge town (South West) 12 July, and at least five young men in Bamenda’s Nacho neighbourhood 14 July. Unidentified gunmen wearing military uniforms 16 July shot ten civilians dead in same neighbourhood; military and NW governor Adolphe Lele Lafrique next day blamed “terrorists”, while prominent separatist armed group, Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), denied responsibility.

ADF hardened their stance, threatening to target anyone working with govt. ADF leader Ayaba Cho Lucas 12 July vowed to seize, sell or destroy properties of “collaborators and enablers of Cameroon government’s activities in the Anglophone regions”, notably ruling party members and traditional rulers who cooperate with Yaoundé. Separatists 29 July declared ghost town in Bamenda city to disrupt funeral of opposition leader Ni John Fru Ndi for his stance in favour of united Cameroon.

Rights group denounced widespread human rights violations in North West. NGO Amnesty International 4 July published extensive report documenting human rights violations – killings, kidnappings and gender-based violence – committed by security forces, associated militias and armed separatists in North West region since 2020. Report also accuses govt of instrumentalising Fulani Mbororo community militias against Anglophone rebels, exposing community to reprisals by separatists, and of systematic crackdown on people denouncing violations.

In other important developments. Far North region in July recorded lull in jihadist violence after security forces in June reinforced their positions; lull also coincided with resumption of clashes between Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province in neighbouring Nigeria (see Nigeria). Anglophone cocoa producers in July staged street protests in Mamfe city (SW) to protest Nigeria exports ban imposed in June by Yaoundé in bid to curb smuggling.

Central African Republic

Central Africans voted on new constitution abolishing presidential term limits, while rebel groups stepped up attacks on govt forces in attempt to derail vote.

President Touadéra-sponsored constitutional referendum held 30 July. Touadéra 10 July unveiled proposed new constitution removing two-term limit for presidents, thus paving the way for his third-term bid; draft constitution also creates position of VP appointed by president and bars Central Africans of foreign origin or holding another citizenship from running for president. Opposition coalition Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC) voiced discontent but failed to mobilise large numbers, with less than 1,000 people protesting 14 July in capital Bangui. Opposition leader Anicet Georges Dologuélé late July criticised absence of level playing field, citing state control of key voting institutions, absence of electoral register and short campaign timeframe, and BRDC called for boycott of referendum. Vote 30 July proceeded without major incidents.

Armed groups intensified attacks in lead-up to referendum. Rebel Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) 3-4 July killed at least seven soldiers in ambush 25km from Abba town (Nana-Mambéré prefecture) and attack on checkpoint near Sam-Ouandja town (Haute-Kotto prefecture); 11 July launched another raid on checkpoint 30km from Nana-Bakassa town (Ouham prefecture), killing one soldier. In response, security forces 2-12 July arrested at least 70 people during search operations in Bambari city (Ouaka prefecture) and Bangui. UN peacekeeping force (MINUSCA) 10 July killed 15 suspected CPC fighters and lost one Rwandan peacekeeper during operation in Sam-Ouandja town.

Wagner’s mutiny fuelled speculations about paramilitary group’s future in CAR. Approximately 600 Russian paramilitary Wagner Group operatives 6 July left Bangui heading for Russia, fuelling speculations about group’s future in CAR following Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in Russia in June. Wagner spokesperson in CAR, Alexander Ivanov, 7 July said group will remain in country. CAR’s presidency next day confirmed “it is not a definitive departure but a rotation”, and hundreds of Wagner forces mid-July reportedly landed in Bangui. Meanwhile, UN Security Council 27 July relaxed arms embargo on CAR, lifting restrictions on supply, sale and transfer of arms to govt forces; Bangui criticised decision, demanding total lifting of embargo.

Chad

Interim President Déby moved to consolidate control over armed forces and authorities scheduled constitutional referendum for December, while communal violence persisted.

Déby appeared to set the stage for possible presidential candidacy. In apparent attempt to secure better control of armed forces, Interim President Gen. Déby throughout June and July retired at least 100 generals and promoted similar number of younger officers close to him to rank of general. In Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique, African Union Commission Chairperson (and former Chadian FM) Moussa Faki 17 July said military leaders of transition should not stand for election, reiterated need to hand over power to civilians. Authorities 17 July scheduled constitutional referendum for 17 December, while civil society continued to accused transitional govt of trying to impose unitary state.

Transitional authorities advanced reconciliation agenda. As part of transition’s national reconciliation agenda, govt late June-early July set up national commission in charge of disarming politico-military groups and reintegrating their personnel into national army, and another one tasked with national reconciliation and social cohesion. Déby 17 July pardoned 110 individuals sentenced to jail terms for alleged involvement in 20 October 2022 protests.

Intercommunal violence persisted. Clashes between Arab and Moubi communities 1-3 July left at least seven civilians dead in and around Kouka and Iregué localities in Mangalmé department, Guéra region.

Sudanese exodus continued to strain Chad’s humanitarian capacity. UN Deputy Sec Gen Amina Mohammed 18-19 July visited Chad, met with Déby and PM Saleh Kebzabo and reiterated call on international community to increase support for Sudanese refugees in Chad. World Food Programme 11 July announced scaling up its response on Chad-Sudan border to support surge of people fleeing from Sudan, as UN refugee agency 23 July counted over 329,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad.

Bosnia And Herzegovina

U.S. sanctioned four Bosnian Serb officials for undermining Dayton Peace Agreement.

U.S. 31 July sanctioned four Bosnian Serb officials for “encouraging” passage of law allowing self-governing entity Republika Srpska to ignore decisions made by country’s Constitutional Court. U.S. said in statement that “move threatens the stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, “the hard-won peace underpinned by the Dayton Peace Agreement” and “the country’s future trajectory”.

Kosovo

Pristina promised steps to reduce tensions in Serb-majority northern municipalities, and PM Kurti announced acquisition of Turkish combat drones.

Govt agreed to reduce police presence at northern municipal buildings and hold elections. Amid stepped-up pressure from European Union (EU) on Pristina to de-escalate tensions in Serb-majority northern municipalities, which soared after govt late May installed newly-elected ethnic Albanian mayors, EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčác 10 July met with Deputy PM Bislimi in Slovakian capital, Bratislava. Following meeting, Pristina 11 July announced reduction of police presence around municipal buildings in north by 25% and expressed support for “the holding of new elections”; EU High Representative Josep Borrell 12 July welcomed news but said EU expected further de-escalatory steps. In meeting with Serb President Alexsandar Vučić, NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg 19 July urged Belgrade and Pristina to “prevent escalation and engage in the EU-facilitated dialogue”; Vučić same day requested “a more significant role for [NATO-led force] Kosovo Force (KFOR) in easing tensions”. Chief negotiators for Kosovo and Serbia 19 July met separately in Brussels with Lajčác, who reportedly saw “need for additional coordination” before trilateral meeting occurs.

Serbia condemned Kosovo’s acquisition of Turkish drones. PM Kurti 16 July confirmed purchase of Turkish-made Bayraktar drones, saying security spending is making Kosovo safer; KFOR next day reiterated its “primary authority over the airspace above Kosovo”. Serbian Defence Minister Milos Vucevic 21 July accused Kosovo of acquiring “offensive weapons”, including drones, and warned that Belgrade is “carefully watching what is happening”.

Armenia

Yerevan and Baku continued to engage in high-level dialogue under U.S., EU and Russian auspices, as sides traded blame for border clashes.

International efforts to advance talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan persisted. Following June meeting in Washington, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders 15 July convened in Brussels for talks mediated by European Council President Charles Michel. Michel stated EU’s readiness to help finance railroad construction in region; he also reiterated need to unblock Lachin road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia amid deteriorating humanitarian situation and noted possibility of sending aid from Azerbaijan-controlled Agdam region into enclave, saying “both options [are] important … to ensure the needs of the population are met” (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 25 July held talks with Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs in Moscow, but meeting produced no tangible results.

Violent incidents occurred along border with Azerbaijan. Baku and Yerevan between 9 and 19 July reported multiple clashes along shared border, trading blame for incidents; clashes 11 July wounded one Azerbaijani soldier, 12 July injured two Armenian soldiers. Meanwhile, EU 18 July permitted third states to contribute to EU Civilian Mission along Armenian side of border with Azerbaijan; Canada 21 July announced plans to deploy two experts.

Border commissions reconvened after lengthy pause. Armenian and Azerbaijani border commissions 12 July convened at state border to resume delimitation and demarcation process following prolonged pause. Countries, however, continued to disagree on which maps to use for defining border and meeting concluded without breakthrough.

Azerbaijan

Baku and Yerevan continued to engage in high-level dialogue under U.S., EU and Russian auspices, as sides traded blame for border clashes.

International efforts to advance talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia persisted. Following June meeting in Washington, Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders 15 July convened in Brussels for talks mediated by European Council President Charles Michel. Michel stated EU’s readiness to help finance railroad construction in region; he also reiterated need to unblock Lachin road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia amid deteriorating humanitarian situation and noted possibility of sending aid from Azerbaijan-controlled Agdam region into enclave, saying “both options [are] important … to ensure the needs of the population are met” (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 25 July held talks with Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs in Moscow, but meeting produced no tangible results.

Violent incidents occurred along border with Armenia. Baku and Yerevan between 9 and 19 July reported multiple clashes along shared border, trading blame for incidents; clashes 11 July wounded one Azerbaijani soldier, 12 July injured two Armenian soldiers. Meanwhile, EU 18 July permitted third states to contribute to EU Civilian Mission along Armenian side of border with Azerbaijan; Canada 21 July announced plans to deploy two experts.

Border commissions reconvened after lengthy pause. Azerbaijani and Armenian border commissions 12 July convened at state border to resume delimitation and demarcation process following prolonged pause. Countries, however, continued to disagree on which maps to use for defining border and meeting concluded without breakthrough.

Authorities arrested prominent opposition politician. Turkish media 23 July reported arrest of opposition politician Gubad Ibadoglu and his wife Irada Bayramova in Baku for alleged links to Turkish group that Ankara calls the “Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation”. Court in Baku next day placed Ibadoglu in pre-trial detention for three months on charges of involvement in “preparation, acquisition or sale of counterfeit money or securities by an organised group”, same day released Bayramova.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Lachin blockade continued to aggravate humanitarian suffering, tensions between Baku and de facto authorities ran high, and Armenia-Azerbaijan talks continued amid international pressure.

Humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) deteriorated. NK residents continued to face severe shortages of food, electricity and medical supplies due to Azerbaijan’s blockade of Lachin corridor connecting NK with Armenia. Azerbaijan 11 July suspended International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) deliveries after contracted drivers attempted to smuggle cigarettes and mobile phones into enclave; ICRC same day acknowledged wrongdoing and humanitarian operations restarted 14 July. ICRC 25 July said it was again unable to deliver aid and warned of humanitarian consequences. Situation worsened after Azerbaijani forces 29 July arrested NK resident, Vagif Khachatryan, whom ICRC was evacuating for urgent medical treatment in Armenia; all medical evacuations were halted and had not resumed by end of month. Yerevan and Stepanakert 29 July said move violated international law but Baku justified arrest, accusing Khachatryan of genocide and ethnic cleansing during first NK war.

Baku and Stepanakert traded blame for multiple incidents throughout July. Baku and de facto authorities throughout month traded blame for clashes along line of contact, while Baku accused de facto forces of attempting to install fortifications. De facto authorities throughout month claimed Azerbaijani forces attacked farmers working near front. More clashes occurred between Armenia and Azerbaijan along border (see Armenia and Azerbaijan).

Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to engage in high-level dialogue. Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders 15 July convened in Brussels for talks mediated by European Council President Charles Michel (see Armenia and Azerbaijan). Michel reiterated need to unblock Lachin road and noted possibility of sending aid to enclave from Azerbaijan-controlled Agdam region, saying “both options [are] important … to ensure the needs of the population are met”; EU High Representative Joseph Borrell 26 July warned that Agdam route “should not be seen as an alternative to the reopening of Lachin” after Baku earlier that day began blocking humanitarian convoy from Yerevan on Lachin, arguing aid should be delivered via Agdam. Meanwhile, Russia 25 July held talks with Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs in Moscow; meeting produced no tangible results.

Georgia

Prospects for NATO and EU membership looked uncertain amid stagnant reforms, and 58th round of Geneva talks concluded without new agreements.

NATO summit yielded little for prospective Georgian membership. Leaders of NATO alliance 11-12 July met in Lithuanian capital Vilnius for second summit since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO 11 July reaffirmed Bucharest Agreement promising Georgia membership. Unlike Ukraine, however, which was offered post-war fast track to membership, Tbilisi walked away empty-handed, triggering frustration among opposition. Ruling Georgian Dream party’s pro-Russian rhetoric and failure to enact reforms may explain NATO’s changing position.

Violent disruption at LGBTQ+ event further jeopardised Georgia’s EU ambitions. Thousands of protesters, many with far-right ties, 8 July violently disrupted Tbilisi Pride festival. Organisers, who were forced to cancel event, accused govt of coordinating attack with far right. EU Delegation to Georgia same day expressed disappointment “that security and freedom of assembly could not be ensured” while Czech ambassador to Georgia said events indicated country was not doing enough to secure candidate status.

Protests broke out at Batumi port following arrival of Russian cruise ship. Cruise ship carrying some 800 mostly Russian tourists 27 July arrived in Black Sea port of Batumi from Russian port of Sochi. Protests same day erupted at port amid reports of passengers voicing support for 2008 Russo-Georgian War, forcing cruise to leave ahead of schedule; ship 31 July met fresh protests upon its return to Batumi.

Latest round of Geneva International Discussions took place. 58th round of Geneva International Discussions – multilateral forum to address security and humanitarian consequences of 2008 Russo-Georgian War – 11-12 July took place. Talks yielded no new announcements, though participants reaffirmed their commitment to process; next round scheduled for December.

Russia (Internal)

Kremlin clamped down on senior military officers following Wagner insurrection, Parliament passed raft of measures to strengthen mobilisation efforts, and Moscow withdrew from Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Authorities detained high-ranking officers in wake of Wagner mutiny. News outlet The Wall Street Journal 13 July reported that at least 13 high-ranking officers were detained following paramilitary Wagner Group’s short-lived mutiny in June, including Gen. Sergei Surovikin and Col. Gen. Mikhail Mizintsev. Paper also said Kremlin suspended or dismissed about 15 other officers. In further sign of cracks in security establishment, Maj. Gen. Ivan Popov 12 July announced he had been fired after criticising high command’s management of Ukraine war. Meanwhile, video published 19 July showed Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin addressing combatants in Belarus (see Belarus), saying mercenaries will remain in Belarus only temporarily before heading to Africa, though hinting they could eventually return to Ukraine.

Lawmakers extended eligibility for military service and approved creation of paramilitaries. State Duma 18 July approved bill raising age limit for reservists, 20 July increased fines for non-appearance at military enlistment office on demand and 25 July raised maximum age for military conscription from 27 to 30. Upper House of Parliament 28 July approved law allowing governors to create regional paramilitary units to assist security forces during mobilisation, wartime or periods of martial law; president will decide when to form or disband such units.

Fresh drones struck capital. Kremlin 24 July accused Kyiv of fresh drone attack on Moscow and promised retaliatory measures; two drones 30 July attacked govt complex, also in capital.

Moscow scuttled Black Sea grain deal. Russia 17 July withdrew from Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allowed safe passage for Ukrainian grain exports (see Ukraine). President Putin 19 July said Moscow could return to deal if Western states fulfil their obligations, including by unblocking Russian assets related to agriculture and reopening Togliatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline. During Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg 27-28 July, representatives from five African countries publicly called for resumption of agreement; Putin 29 July pledged to ship 25-50,000 tonnes of grain free of charge to poorest countries in Africa within 3-4 months, but stopped short of promising return to initiative.

Belarus

Wagner mercenaries travelled to Belarus following failed insurrection in Russia and conducted military exercises with army; crackdown on dissent continued.

Minsk conducted military exercises with Wagner mercenaries. Following Russian paramilitary Wagner Group’s short-lived mutiny in June and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s subsequent announcement that mercenaries could move to Belarus, State Border Guard Service of Ukraine 22 July claimed approximately 5,000 Wagner fighters were now in Belarus. Video published 19 July showed Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin addressing combatants, in which he announced Wagner would stay in Belarus only temporarily and promised to make Belarusian army “the second army of the world”. Defence ministry 20 July reported army was conducting exercises with Wagner at Brestski training range near Polish border. Polish interior minister 27 July said Poland, Latvia and Lithuania were prepared to close border with Belarus should they face “the threat of provocations” from Wagner; Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki 29 July expressed concern about movement of Wagner troops toward border.

Clampdown on dissent continued. President Lukashenka 1 July signed law allowing authorities to ban foreign media from Belarus in event of “unfriendly actions” by states. Minsk court 5 July sentenced Eduard Babaryka, son of former presidential hopeful Viktar Babaryka, to eight years in prison for “organising mass riots” and “inciting hatred.” Minsk court 19 July started trial of journalist Zmitser Bayarovich and his wife, Valeria, for protesting 2020 election results. Court 26 July sentenced journalist Pavel Mazheika to six years in prison for “extremist activity”.

In another important development. Russian news agency 25 July reported Belarus applied to join BRICS bloc of emerging economies, which includes Russia, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, in May.

Moldova

Murder of breakaway Transnistria’s most prominent opposition politician fuelled speculation, and Chişinău announced plans to expel 45 Russian diplomatic staff.

Prominent opposition politician in breakaway Transnistria region found dead. Leader of opposition Communist party Oleg Khorzhan was found dead 16 July at his home in de facto capital, Tiraspol. De facto authorities 17 July said they believed he was killed during a robbery as safe inside house was emptied, but activists and opposition politicians claimed his death was politically motivated – Khorzhan had been critical of Transnistria’s administration and served 4.5-year prison sentence for “inciting civil strife”. Moldovan national police 17 July opened investigation, saying it was taking “all appropriate investigative measures regarding the crime of murder”; Moldova’s Bureau for Reintegration, charged with govt policy on Transnistria, same day called on Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe to assist with investigation. Transnistria’s de facto interior ministry 24 July announced suspect in murder case, Andrei Duminica, who denied involvement.

Authorities announced expulsion of 45 Russian diplomatic staff. Amid growing fears of Russian destabilisation efforts in Moldova, Chişinău 26 July announced it will expel 45 Russian diplomats and embassy staff by 15 Aug due to “ongoing tensions and unfriendly actions”. Announcement followed media report published 24 July claiming spying technology had been installed on Russian embassy rooftop. Moscow 26 July said move “would not go unanswered”.

Ukraine

In major blow to Ukrainian economy and global food security, Moscow withdrew from Black Sea Grain Initiative before launching flurry of attacks on ports and grain facilities; Kyiv’s counteroffensive advanced slowly.

Russia scuttled Black Sea grain deal. Moscow, which had long threatened to quit Black Sea Grain Initiative ensuring safe passage for Ukrainian grain exports, 17 July accused West of failing to fulfil its obligations under deal (see Russia) and announced its withdrawal. Ukrainian aquatic drones earlier that day struck Kerch bridge connecting Moscow-annexed Crimea with Russia, but Kremlin stated there was no link between this attack and its decision to quit deal. Wheat prices subsequently spiked as Russia 18 July began targeting ports and grain facilities on Odesa region’s Black Sea coast and along Danube river in bid to throttle agricultural exports, which are pillar of Ukrainian economy. Speaking to UN Security Council, UN humanitarian chief Martin Griffiths 21 July said high grain prices threaten to push millions into hunger.

Ukrainian counteroffensive moved slowly as Russia mounted offensive in Kharkiv. Counteroffensive made incremental progress as Ukrainian forces struggled to break through complex Russian fortifications and large minefields. Troops focused their probing attacks on four sections of southern front that stretches across Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, making progress in Donetsk around Bakhmut city and 27 July recapturing Staromaiorske village on southern front. Meanwhile, Russian forces mid-July mounted ground offensive in north east of Kharkiv region, making small advances as Moscow sought to regain lost positions and divert Ukrainian forces from south and east.

Delivery of U.S. cluster munitions sparked controversy. First batch of cluster bombs 13 July arrived in Ukraine after Washington 7 July greenlighted delivery. Decision triggered fierce debate as cluster bombs’ indiscriminate nature and lingering danger from unexploded bomblets pose serious risk to civilians. Ukraine and U.S. defended decision, saying controversial weapon would compensate for lack of more precise ammunition.

NATO summit produced mixed results for Ukraine. During NATO summit in Lithuanian capital Vilnius 11-12 July, alliance pledged continued military aid to Ukraine but deferred membership prospects with carefully worded statement promising Kyiv an invitation “when allies agree and conditions are met”.

Kyrgyzstan

European Parliament condemned crackdown on media and freedom of expression, and U.S. imposed sanctions on several Kyrgyz firms for evading Russian sanctions.

European parliament spotlighted human rights breaches. European Parliament 13 July adopted resolution on rights situation in Kyrgyzstan amid “alarming deterioration in democratic standards and human rights”. Resolution urged authorities to “respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular those related to media and expression”.

U.S. sanctioned Kyrgyz firms for evading sanctions on Russia. U.S. Treasury 20 July imposed measures against four Kyrgyz firms, along with dozens of Russian companies, for circumventing sanctions on Russia. According to U.S., these Kyrgyz entities have exported “electronics components and other technology to Russia since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine”. Earlier that day, Bishkek denied helping Moscow evade sanctions but admitted to “possible involvement of private companies” and said it was investigating matter.

Tajikistan

Authorities declared two news websites extremist.

Prosecutor-General’s Office 19 July announced that Supreme Court mid-June had declared as extremist Pamir Daily News, an outlet covering developments in restive Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), and banned publication. Outlet same day published statement accusing authorities of “trying to completely drown out the news from GBAO”, while Reporters Without Borders 21 July said move was “designed to cut this troubled region off from the rest of the world”. Prosecutor-General’s Office 26 July announced Supreme Court had also labelled New Tajikistan 2 website – created by banned opposition movement Group 24 – “extremist”.

Uzbekistan

President Mirzioyev won landslide victory in snap election observers said “lacked genuine competition”.

President Mirziyoev 9 July won re-election in snap poll, securing over 87% of ballots in vote that saw almost 80% turnout. Mirziyoev ran against three largely unknown candidates, prompting criticism from observers. Notably, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 10 July released statement saying “election was technically well prepared but lacked genuine competition”. Poll followed number of constitutional amendments introduced by Mirziyoyev that, among other things, reset his presidential term count and extend term from five to seven years. NGO Human Rights Watch 7 July said election formed part of “a choreographed plan to consolidate power” and that govt had “gone into reverse with its reform agenda”.

Burundi

Main opposition party entered near-complete paralysis and Burundi delegation boycotted UN periodic review of country’s human rights record.

Main opposition party experienced split in leadership. National Congress for Freedom (CNL) President, Agathon Rwasa, 28 June dismissed 11 members of CNL’s political bureau, labelling them as “dissidents” and accusing them of insubordination and collusion with Interior Minister Martin Niteretse. In response, ten suspended members 4 July announced Rwasa’s suspension, accusing him of plotting against CNL, embezzlement and misappropriation of assets. Group thereafter named CNL Sec-Gen Simon Bizimungu as temporary party leader, who in turn urged CNL members to disregard announcement.

Burundi’s UN walkout deepened human rights concerns. Burundi delegation 3 July walked out of UN Human Rights Committee session in Geneva, Switzerland. Bujumbura cited presence at session of “criminals”, notably Armel Niyongere, one of 12 human rights activists and journalists convicted in Burundi for their alleged involvement in 2015 coup attempt. Committee same day expressed “deep regret” at move, said review of Burundi’s human rights record would continue without delegation. NGO Human Rights Watch 5 July said walkout was indicative of Burundian authorities’ “contempt for human rights”.

Imbonerakure violence continued. Two groups of ruling party youth militia Imbonerakure, including one returning from DR Congo, overnight 30 June-1 July engaged in violent clashes along Burundian bank of Rusizi River, reportedly leaving three dead. Imbonerakure 15 July allegedly beat 14-year-old to death in Ntega commune, Kirundo province, and around 17 July killed resident of Muhanga commune, Ngozi province.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Tensions escalated further ahead of general elections set for December, while civilians continued to bear the brunt of violence in eastern provinces.

Pre-electoral tensions turned violent. Unidentified gunman 13 July killed Chérubin Okende, MP and spokesman of Moïse Katumbi’s opposition party, Together for the Republic, in capital Kinshasa. Small anti-govt protests same day broke out and President Tshisekedi urged judiciary to “shed light on this case”. Adding to turmoil, electoral commission 10 July dismissed all opposition’s demands ahead of general elections set for December, including independent audit of electoral register. In response, opposition leader Martin Fayulu 12 July vowed to block “fraudulent” elections. Electoral commission 23 July closed registration of candidacies for legislative elections, with Fayulu and former President Joseph Kabila’s parties choosing to remain out of the race.

M23 ceasefire remained fragile in North Kivu province. Local sources said M23 armed group 5-16 July killed at least 11 civilians in Bukombo village and another eight in Bungushu village, both Rutshuru territory. Congolese military 27 July claimed to have pushed back incursion by Rwandan army north of North Kivu’s capital Goma. Rwandan army next day rejected accusations, accused Kinshasa of seeking pretext to launch attack on Rwandan territory. European Union 28 July sanctioned nine Congolese and Rwandan individuals responsible for serious human rights violations and/or for fuelling armed conflict in eastern DR Congo, including several armed group members and a Rwandan military officer.

Other armed groups continued to terrorise civilians in East. In Ituri province, association of various ethnic Lendu militias CODECO 3 July raided Pabon village, Mahagi territory, killing two; Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 12 July killed at least 16 people in Eloke-Nord and Apesiko villages, Mambasa territory. In North Kivu province, ADF next day killed two including one army officer in Mapobu village, Beni territory. Following 16 June school attack in Uganda, Ugandan and DR Congo forces stepped up operations against ADF cell in Mwalika Valley, Beni territory (North Kivu), reportedly killing 16 militants, including several leaders, by mid-July.

In other important developments. As conflict between Yaka and Teke communities persisted in western provinces, armed forces 3 July reportedly arrested 50 Yaka “Mobondo” militiamen.

Rwanda

Kinshasa accused Rwandan army of attacking Congolese border guards, and European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on Rwandan military officer for fuelling conflict in eastern DR Congo.

Congolese military 27 July claimed to have pushed back incursion by Rwandan army into North Kivu (see DR Congo). Rwandan army next day rejected accusations, accused Kinshasa of seeking pretext to launch attack on Rwandan territory. Meanwhile, European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell 7 July said EU “firmly condemns Rwanda’s support to M23 and Rwanda’s military presence in eastern DRC” and “reiterates its urgent demand that Rwanda withdraws its troops from eastern DRC, ceases immediately all support to M23”. EU 28 July sanctioned nine Congolese and Rwandan individuals responsible for serious human rights violations and/or for fuelling armed conflict in eastern DR Congo, including a Rwandan military officer and several armed group members.

Uganda

UK embassy issued terror alert as authorities tried to downplay security risks following major Islamist militia attack in June.

Govt sought to shape anti-terror narrative. Security agencies deployed heavily in and around capital Kampala after UK embassy in Uganda 2 July issued terror alert. Meanwhile, govt played down risk posed by Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) after group 16 June launched deadly attack in western Uganda. Notably, President Museveni 13 July referred to Uganda as “island of peace” where no terror group could survive, while acknowledging intelligence gathering failures; also accused former DR Congo President Kabila of having turned his country into ADF’s safe heaven, which Kabila’s spokesperson 18 July called “simply ridiculous”. Following 16 June attack, Ugandan and DR Congo militaries stepped up operations against ADF cell in Mwalika Valley, Beni territory (North Kivu), reportedly killing 16 militants, including several leaders by mid-July.

Museveni faced allegations of crimes against humanity. International media including The New York Times and The Guardian 11-12 July revealed accusations of crimes against humanity against 26 Ugandan officials, including President Museveni, his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba, and seven other high-level officials; testimonies of 215 people containing detailed allegations of torture were reportedly submitted in May to International Criminal Court (ICC) in support of opposition leader Bobi Wine’s complaint over troubled 2021 elections. Museveni’s entourage 12 July said accusers were “peddling wrong information” in order to tarnish his reputation.

In other important developments. In Karamoja sub-region, suspected ethnic Jie gunmen 3 July killed four, including two soldiers. Internal and state affairs minister 5 July said Museveni’s deadline for Kenyan Turkana herders to leave Uganda or face expulsion extended to September.