Shooting incident revived longstanding tensions with Morocco, while UN redoubled efforts to strengthen Western Sahara peace process.

Security forces shot at individuals straying past Morocco’s maritime border. Algerian coastguards late Aug fired on group of individuals after they crossed into Algerian waters from Morocco, leaving two dead; Algerian defence ministry 3 Sept said individuals, who were riding jet skis, had ignored warning shots. Morocco’s National Council for Human Rights 4 Sept strongly condemned use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians, decrying incident as “severe violation of international standards and human rights laws”. Several dozen Moroccan human rights activists same day gathered outside country’s parliament in capital Rabat, denouncing “Algerian military regime” and demanding accountability.

U.S. stepped up diplomacy with Algeria, Morocco over Western Sahara. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Africa, Joshua Harris, late Aug-early Sept travelled to Algeria and Morocco ahead of UN envoy Staffan de Mistura’s first visit to Morocco-controlled Western Sahara since his 2021 appointment (see Western Sahara); Harris reaffirmed U.S. support for UN-led political process, and announced strengthening of “strategic dialogue” with Algeria in likely attempt to encourage Algiers to distance itself from Russia.

UN expert visited Algeria to assess assembly rights after years-long delays. UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, 16-26 Sept conducted first visit of UN special rapporteur to Algeria since 2016; in preliminary remarks, Voule urged govt to pardon people convicted for their involvement in 2019 Hirak protest movement and “loosen up current tight restrictions on associations”.

In other important developments. At UN General Assembly, heated exchange 26 Sept took place between Algerian and Moroccan representatives over Western Sahara.

Amid mounting economic hardship, authorities announced bringing presidential election forward to December.

Authorities set presidential vote for December. National Election Authority 25 Sept scheduled presidential election initially expected in 2024 for 10-12 December, with possible runoff to be held on 8-10 Jan 2024; move comes as Cairo faces mounting pressure from International Monetary Fund (IMF) to switch to flexible exchange rate and take other steps which could escalate tensions.

IMF once again delayed disbursement of loan funds. Amid Cairo’s lack of progress in meeting IMF’s terms for $3bn loan, IMF 17 Sept confirmed further postponement of first review of Egypt’s economic reform program and disbursement of second tranche of funds, originally scheduled for March 2023. Meanwhile, statistics agency 10 Sept said annual inflation rate hit new record high of 39.7% in Aug, with food and drinks prices rising by 71.9% over one year.

Repression of opposition continued unabated ahead of presidential election. NGO Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 26 Sept said security forces in recent weeks arrested around 73 campaign volunteers for opposition presidential candidate Ahmed Tantawi. Court 16 Sept sentenced opposition figure Hisham Kassem to six months in prison for slander, defamation and verbal assault on police officer; his political coalition, Free Current, next day announced boycotting presidential ballot in protest.

In other important developments. Explosion at air defence base in North Sinai 17 Sept killed seven soldiers; cause of blast – whether attack by Islamic State-affiliated militants or technical malfunction – remained unclear. U.S. administration mid-Sept reduced impact of human rights-related conditions on its military assistance to Egypt, withholding $85mn of $320mn conditioned on human rights; Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman 30 Sept threatened to place hold on remaining $235mn.

Floods devastated eastern city of Derna after Storm Daniel caused dam collapse, leaving thousands dead; UN envoy for Libya reiterated support for unified govt before elections.

Up to 20,000 people feared dead after devastating floods. As Storm Daniel 11 Sept hit eastern Libya, two dams located upstream from coastal city of Derna collapsed; water swiped away entire neighbourhoods, resulting in an estimated 20,000 deaths. In rare sign of unity, aid in following days poured from across country. Various state agencies affiliated with Tripoli-based govt sent in aid and some military commanders from western Libya arrived in Derna. East-based authorities however denied entry to Derna to Tripoli-based govt ministers in likely attempt to prevent Tripoli from taking credit for rescue efforts. International support effort also defied traditional geopolitical divides. Traditional allies of general commander of Libyan National Army, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, including United Arab Emirates and Egypt, immediately stepped in to help, but historical allies of Tripoli-based authorities, Qatar and Türkiye, also sent search and rescue teams and specialized equipment to help locate survivors. Debate erupted over human responsibility for tragedy. Hundreds of protesters 18 Sept rallied in Derna, blaming long-term neglect for dam collapse and chanting slogans against eastern parliament, House of Representatives (HoR), and its speaker Aguila Saleh. Country’s top prosecutor 25 Sept announced detention of eight current and former officials pending investigation into collapse of dams; several others reportedly detained in following days.

UN envoy for Libya reiterated support for unified govt before elections. UN special envoy to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, early Sept met with several Libyan officials, including Aguila Saleh and Khalifa Haftar, and Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba. In meeting with latter, Bathily 5 Sept reiterated elections should take place under supervision of unified govt. Bathily in aftermath of Derna flood continued to urge Libyan stakeholders to step up efforts toward holding elections and unifying national institutions.

Controversy over former FM’s meeting with Israeli counterpart persisted. After revelation that Tripoli-based FM Najla al-Mangoush held talks with her Israeli counterpart, Eli Cohen, in Aug sparked widespread protests, leading to her dismissal, prosecutor’s office 2-3 Sept launched investigation into bilateral meeting.

Authorities continued to silence govt critics, controversy over EU-Tunisia migration deal persisted, and President Saïed kept hard stance against austerity despite risk of economic collapse.

Judicial harassment of An-Nahda officials continued. Authorities 5 Sept arrested Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party’s interim president Mondher Ounissi and senior official Abdel Karim Harouni as part of investigation into alleged illegal financing from abroad. Security forces same day also arrested former PM and An-Nahda leader Hamadi Jebali at his home in city of Sousse, released him after 7-hour interrogation by judicial unit responsible for financial corruption cases.

EU-Tunisia migration control deal continued to face pushback. In heated debate at EU parliament, EU lawmakers 12 Sept discussed EU-Tunisia migration control deal signed in July; several MEPs accused EU Commission of failing to recognise mounting evidence of Tunisian authorities’ abusive treatment of sub-Saharan migrants, while others denounced deal’s failure to reduce migration flows. European Ombudsman 15 Sept announced asking EU Commission to clarify how it plans to ensure respect for human rights in migration-related actions resulting from agreement. Meanwhile, Tunis mid-Sept denied entry to EU parliament’s foreign affairs committee delegation; committee later “condemned” decision and demanded “detailed explanation”.

In other important developments. Amid persistent risk of economic collapse, Saïed 8 Sept called on Central Bank to purchase treasury bonds to help finance budget directly, in spite of Central Bank Governor Marouane Abassi’s previous warning that move could lead to higher inflation and greater pressure on banks’ liquidity. Saïed 15 Sept also pressed PM Ahmed Hanachi, who took office 1 Aug, to set up commissions in every ministry to review public sector hiring processes, in likely attempt to break political parties’ patronage networks.

UN envoy Staffan de Mistura visited Morocco-controlled Western Sahara for first time since appointment two years ago in bid to revive stalled political process on disputed territory.

UN envoy visited Morocco-controlled Western Sahara for first time. Ahead of UN Security Council meeting on Western Sahara in October, UN envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, 4 Sept began first visit to Morocco-controlled Western Sahara since 2021 appointment; de Mistura had renounced previous trips due to Rabat-imposed restrictions on meeting list.

U.S. redoubled engagement to advance UN-led political process. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Africa, Joshua Harris, 31 Aug-4 Sept visited Algeria and Morocco to support UN efforts to revive peace process; Harris notably met with Polisario Front independence movement leader, Brahim Ghali, in Sahrawi refugee camps of Tindouf (Algeria).

In other important developments. At UN General Assembly, heated exchange 26 Sept took place between Algerian and Moroccan representatives over Western Sahara.

Lethal Israeli raids and settler violence continued unabated across West Bank amid Palestinian attacks, Israel launched strikes in Gaza and Saudi Arabia signalled possible normalisation deal.

Israeli forces killed over dozen Palestinians. Israeli forces continued arrest raids across West Bank and killed at least 14 Palestinians. Notably, Israeli forces 19 Sept killed four Palestinians and injured 30 in Jenin, and 24 Sept killed two Palestinians in raid on Tulkarem city. Israeli soldier stationed on watchtower overlooking Al-‘Arroub refugee camp in Hebron 9 Sept opened fire on three children, killing one. Daily Israeli settler violence continued: notably, settlers 9 Sept assaulted shepherd in Jordan Valley and 16 Sept stabbed Palestinian in Hebron. Meanwhile, Palestinians continued attacks: 6 Sept injured one Israeli in stabbing in Jerusalem and shooting attack 13 Sept injured two Israelis in Huwara. Israel advanced home demolitions, mainly in East Jerusalem, bringing total to 261 in 2023.

Israeli forces staged attacks in Gaza. Israeli soldiers 13 Sept opened fire at Palestinians protesting at Gaza border in solidarity with prisoners in Israeli jails and marking eighteenth anniversary of Israel’s withdrawal from strip, killing seven and injuring over 25. Israeli forces 19 Sept killed Palestinian in Gaza and 15, 22, 23 Sept launched air attacks at alleged Hamas targets, while protestors continued activities until late month.

Saudi Arabia signalled progress on possible normalisation deal. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 20 Sept said normalisation with Israel was getting closer “every day” (see Saudi Arabia); Kingdom during Sept hosted first official Israeli delegation at UNESCO meeting and Israeli tourism minister, while Palestinian delegation also visited seeking measures on Palestinian statehood in any deal. First Saudi ambassador to Palestine 26 Sept presented credentials to PA President Abbas.

Regional tensions remained high with Syria and Iran. Syrian state media reported Israeli airstrike on Tartous city 13 Sept killed two soldiers. Israel 20 Sept struck two Syrian structures in Golan Heights; alleged Israeli drone next reportedly killed two near Syrian town Beit Jinn (see Syria). Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 11 Sept accused Iran of building airport in southern Lebanon as launchpad for attacks.

Fighting resurged between Palestinian factions in southern refugee camp, economic crisis and presidential vacuum persisted, and army raised alarm over uptick in irregular Syrian migrants.

Violent clashes continued inside southern Palestinian refugee camp. After period of uneasy calm following clashes in Aug, triggered by late July assassination of Fatah general and three of his bodyguards, intense fighting between Palestinian armed militants 7 Sept resurged in Ein el-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in south; combatants 12 Sept agreed to ceasefire, which collapsed next day before new ceasefire was announced 14 Sept that held thereafter. Fighting killed at least 18 during month, displaced hundreds of camp residents, and forced UN refugee agency UNRWA to suspend all services in camp.

Economic crisis remained severe. Interim Central Bank governor 4 Sept announced replacement of much-criticised Sayrafa platform – used by bank to inject U.S. dollars into market – with alternative system likely using “managed float” of Lebanese Lira; International Monetary Fund 15 Sept praised decision but nonetheless criticised “lack of action” on “urgently needed economic reforms”. Over 100 judges 1 Sept began open-ended strike, protesting devalued salaries. Human Rights Watch 13 Sept reported children in public schools had fallen between one and two years behind their curricula due to school closures. Households in capital Beirut and Mount Lebanon faced recurrent water shortages, as state could not pay for diesel needed to run pumping facilities.

Presidential vacuum entered eleventh consecutive month. French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian 11 Sept conducted three-day visit to try and break prevailing deadlock over election of new president, as parliament had not convened for presidential election session since June, but mission apparently failed to deliver tangible progress.

Concerns rose over irregular Syrian migration. Army 4 Sept claimed that it had stopped more than 1,000 Syrians trying to enter Lebanon over previous week. Caretaker FM Abdallah Bou Habib 6 Sept exhorted international community to provide aid to Syria, arguing deteriorating economic conditions there had sparked recent migration wave. Tensions could rise between host communities and Syrian refugees amid hostile rhetoric from political elites.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reasserted control in north east amid tensions with Arab leaders, clashes continued between rebels and regime in north west and anti-govt protests persisted in south.

In north east, tensions simmered between SDF and Arab tribes. Following anti-SDF uprising in Deir ez-Zor province late Aug that saw clashes as Arab tribes effectively abandoned posts and called for unified opposition against group, U.S. officials 3 Sept met Arab tribal leaders and SDF commanders to diffuse tensions. SDF early Sept bolstered forces to regain control of towns and 6 Sept declared end of military operations but near-daily insurgent attacks continued. Renewed clashes 25 Sept erupted in Ziban town, as various actors late month attacked SDF positions across eastern Deir Ez Zor.

In north west, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and regime battled. Hostilities raged in southern Idlib during early Sept amid spate of Russian bombings as regime forces sought to regain strategic hills. HTS raid 1 Sept killed at least 16 soldiers in Latakia province and 2 Sept destroyed regime position in western Aleppo. HTS attack 15 Sept killed five soldiers in Latakia. UN 19 Sept commenced aid deliveries to Idlib for first time since July.

Turkish-Kurdish clashes persisted, Israel conducted airstrikes. Turkish drone 7 Sept killed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) commander in Hasakah province and drone strikes 17 Sept killed five Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) members in Hasakah; 19 Sept killed high-ranking People’s Protection Units (YPG) member in Manbij. SDF 18 Sept reportedly attacked Turkish-backed fighters, killing at least 13 in Tal Battal, Aleppo province. Meanwhile, Syrian state media reported Israeli airstrike 13 Sept targeted Tartous city, killing two soldiers and injuring six, and missile factory in Hama province. Israel 20 Sept struck two Syrian structures in Golan Heights; alleged Israeli drone next reportedly killed two near Beit Jinn (see Israel-Palestine).

Anti-govt protests continued in south. Protests in Suwayda and Deraa provinces, sparked by currency crisis in Aug, took on more overtly anti-Assad tones as thousands marched calling for regime’s downfall. Aside from Baath Party guards 13 Sept firing at protestors in Suwayda, injuring three, regime response centred on negotiations with Druze leaders.

Ties soured between Iran and nuclear watchdog amid safeguards concerns; govt implemented humanitarian deal with U.S., potentially clearing atmosphere for engagement on regional and nuclear files.

In “unprecedented” move, govt scaled back cooperation with nuclear inspectors. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi 11 Sept opened Board of Governors meeting by noting “no further progress” in resolving outstanding safeguards concerns and voiced worry over “decrease in interest” among IAEA members; while confirmed decrease in Iran’s rate of stockpiling uranium at highest end of enrichment likely forestalled formal censure resolution, 63 countries – including U.S. and E3 (France, Germany and UK) – urged Iran to “immediately” resolve safeguards concerns. U.S. and E3 13 Sept warned of possible censure resolution without Iran’s “urgent actions”. In move he described as “disproportionate and unprecedented”, Grossi 16 Sept announced Iran had “effectively removed about one third of the core group of the Agency's most experienced inspectors”; U.S. and E3 18 Sept demanded Tehran “immediately reverse” decision.

In positive step toward de-escalation, U.S. and Iran concluded humanitarian deal. Five U.S. nationals detained in Iran, along with two family members, 18 Sept departed for Qatar en route to U.S.; Washington in turn released five imprisoned Iranian nationals and, in parallel, approximately $6bn in Iranian assets held in South Korea were transferred to Qatari banks to be accessible for humanitarian purposes. Deal could serve as platform for more concerted diplomatic efforts to contain nuclear concerns and maintain momentum on regional engagement.

West continued sanctions. Citing Iran’s non-compliance with 2015 nuclear deal, E3 14 Sept announced intent “to maintain nuclear proliferation-related measures and arms and missile embargoes” due to expire in Oct; Iran pledged to respond. To mark anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death on 15 Sept, U.S. blacklisted 29 Iranian persons and entities and imposed visa restrictions on thirteen individuals, while UK, Canada and EU issued designations. U.S. 18 Sept sanctioned Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security as well as former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, citing their role in hostage-taking and human rights violations. U.S. 19 and 27 Sep sanctioned total of eighteen entities and individuals linked to Iran’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program.

Protests turned deadly in Kirkuk city, govt relocated Iranian Kurdish groups away from Iranian border under pressure from Tehran, and Türkiye struck Kurdish militants in north.

Clashes over Kurdish Democratic Party’s (KDP) presence in Kirkuk killed four. Following protests by Arab and Turkmen residents of Kirkuk city late Aug over govt decree to hand building used by Iraqi army back to KDP in line with deal between Baghdad and Erbil, KDP supporters 2 Sept held counterprotest demanding demonstrators unblock Kirkuk-Erbil highway, creating standoff with police acting as buffer. As clashes between sides erupted, security forces opened fire and killed four Kurds and injured over dozen; security forces next day deployed to city. Supreme Court 3 Sept issued temporary ruling delaying handover of building; absent lasting solution, violence could flare up again in run up to Dec provincial polls.

Govt began relocating Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Ahead of 19 Sept deadline set by Iran for Iraq to disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition parties based in Kurdistan region, FM Fuad Hussein 12 Sept said Iraq had started relocating groups from Iranian border to undisclosed camps; Hussein next day visited Iranian capital Tehran to urge Iran not to resort to military action amid concern Iranian forces may stage operation to create buffer zone on Iraqi territory. Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and Komala parties reportedly vacated bases in Erbil governorate, while Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) – affiliated to Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – refused to hand over weapons; deployment of Iraqi border guards reportedly caused tensions with PKK, raising prospect of violent escalation between pair.

Türkiye continued strikes on PKK targets. In north, clashes 6 Sept killed Turkish soldier. Authorities from Iraq’s Kurdistan region 17 Sept reported Turkish drone strikes killed four PKK members, including one senior member, near Sinjar mountains; drone strike next day killed three members of Peshmerga in Arbat airfield near Sulaymaniyah city. Reportedly, Turkish security forces 27 Sept targeted another seasoned PKK member near Sulaymaniyah. Maritime dispute with Kuwait surfaced. Supreme Court 4 Sept nullified ratification of 2013 Iraq-Kuwait treaty regulating maritime navigation in Khor Abdullah channel.

Maritime dispute with Kuwait surfaced. Supreme Court 4 Sept nullified ratification of 2013 Iraq-Kuwait treaty regulating maritime navigation in Khor Abdullah channel.

Govt and Israel reportedly inched toward normalisation deal, ambassador to Iran commenced diplomatic duties, and officials hosted Houthi delegation for first time.

Saudi Arabia and Israel signalled progress on possible normalisation deal. First official Israeli delegation 10 Sept arrived in capital Riyadh for UNESCO World Heritage Committee meeting. In first public visit by Israeli cabinet minister, tourism minister 26 Sept arrived in Riyadh to attend UN World Tourism Organization event. In interview with U.S. broadcaster, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 20 Sept said normalisation with Israel was getting closer “every day”. Israeli FM next day said normalisation deal could be in place “in first quarter of 2024” but U.S. officials cautioned that “there’s some way to travel” before reaching agreement. Amid reported progress, Palestinian delegation 6 and 14 Sept visited Saudi Arabia, requesting measures on Palestinian statehood be included in any deal with Israel. Saudi delegation 26-27 Sept visited occupied West Bank for first time in three decades; first Saudi ambassador to Palestine 26 Sept presented credentials to PA President Abbas (see Israel-Palestine).

Tehran and Riyadh exchanged ambassadors; officials held talks with Houthis. Fulfilling terms of reconciliation deal in March, albeit three months later than planned, Saudi ambassador to Iran and Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia 5 Sept commenced official duties in respective capitals. Riyadh 14-19 Sept hosted Houthi delegation and Omani mediators for political talks in first visit by rebels since outbreak of war (see Yemen).

Houthi delegation visited Saudi Arabia for first time in nine years, sporadic clashes surged between Houthis and govt forces, and Southern Transitional Council (STC) called for separate state.

Houthi representatives travelled to Saudi Arabia for dialogue. In first official visit since outbreak of war in 2014, Houthi delegation and Omani mediators 14-19 Sept held talks with Saudi officials in Saudi capital Riyadh; talks reportedly included reopening of Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa airport and Hodeida port, reopening roads in Taiz, Al-Dhale, Marib and Hodeida governorates, prisoner exchange, roadmap for permanent ceasefire, ending airstrikes and cross-border attacks, establishing timeline for foreign troops to leave Yemen, and payment of public salaries from oil and gas revenues, possibly by directing revenue to neutral country’s bank; talks did not include representatives from Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Meanwhile, Houthis 2 Sept announced that Yemenia airlines would increase flights between Sanaa and Jordanian capital Amman to six per week from 5 Sept.

Houthis and govt forces clashed sporadically. After hostilities broke out along several frontlines in Marib governorate in Aug, clashes 16 Sept erupted between govt forces and Houthis near Al-Mutoon district and 20 Sept reportedly in Taiz governorate. Bahrain late month claimed Houthi drone strike killed four Bahraini soldiers on Saudi Arabia’s border; Saudi-led coalition said it “reserves the right to respond”. In Houthi-controlled Sanaa, Houthis 21 Sept held military parade. Teachers in Houthi-controlled areas, including Sanaa, entered second month of strikes demanding unpaid salaries; in response, after announcing transportation allowance for teachers in late Aug, Houthis 8 Sept arrested representative of Yemeni Teachers Club in Mahwit.

STC leader renewed call for southern state. Following uptick in fighting between Houthis and STC-affiliated brigades in Aug in region straddling Al-Bayda governorate’s Al-Zahir district and Lahj governorates’s Al-Hadd and Yafea districts, resulting in dozens of casualties on both sides, head of STC and member of PLC Ayderous al-Zubaidi 22 Sept called for creation of separate southern state. Clashes between STC-affiliated group and suspected al-Qaeda militants 27 Sept reportedly killed at least five STC-affiliated fighters in Abyan governorate.

Fragile calm in north shattered as group of heavily armed Serbs clashed with Kosovo police, leaving one officer and three Serbs dead; coming weeks could see more violence.

Heavily armed Serbs clashed with Kosovo police. Kosovo Police officers 24 Sept arrived at Serb-majority Banjska village in northern Kosovo after receiving reports that two trucks without license plates had blocked bridge. Around 30 heavily armed Serbs ambushed patrol upon arrival, killing one police officer before forcing their way into nearby monastery; shootouts ensued as police mounted “clearance operation”, leaving three Kosovo Serbs dead. Minister of Internal Affairs Xhelal Svecla same day said police had “regained control” of area, made several arrests and seized large amounts of military-grade weaponry including mortars, grenade launchers and anti-tank rockets; weapons indicate Serbs in north are preparing for a fight, raising risk of further escalation in Oct.

U.S. warned of Serbian military build-up along border amid rising tensions. PM Kurti 24 Sept blamed “Serbian-state supported troops” for attacks; Serb President Aleksandar Vučić denied accusation and condemned killing of police officer, but added that gunmen were local Kosovo Serbs who “do not want to suffer under Kurti’s terror anymore”. Former VP of Serbian List – largest Serb political party in Kosovo – Milan Radoičić 29 Sept assumed responsibility for attack, claiming he acted alone without informing Belgrade. U.S. 26 Sept said attack “was coordinated and sophisticated” and that “the quantity of weapons suggests this was serious, with a plan to destabilise security in the region”. U.S. 29 Sept accused Serbia of military build-up along border while NATO allies authorised additional forces, warning of “increasing tensions”. 

EU-mediated Kosovo-Serbia dialogue failed to yield progress. Ahead of escalation, EU High Representative Josep Borrell 14 Sept mediated talks in Brussels, Belgium’s capital, between PM Kurti and Serb President Aleksandar Vučić to advance normalisation process, afterward saying “it was not possible to bridge the differences”; he noted Vučić’s acceptance of EU’s compromise proposal but said “Kurti was not ready” to move forward on establishing Association/Community of Serb municipalities in north, key provision of 2013 and 2015 Brussels agreements. Kurti same day claimed his sequencing plan was “the only proposal on the table”.

Azerbaijan amassed troops at border with Armenia ahead of its lightening offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK); EU held talks with envoys from Yerevan and Baku.

Armenia reported troop build-up along Azerbaijan border before NK offensive. Azerbaijan 19 Sept launched military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, 20 Sept declaring victory after 24 hours of fighting that reportedly left hundreds dead (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Before offensive, Yerevan early Sept had begun reporting military build-up along Armenia-Azerbaijan border in south close to Iran, and between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region – deadliest front in periodic skirmishes since 2020 war; EU civilian monitoring mission along Armenian side of border 7 Sept echoed concerns. Yet despite rising tensions along border and Azerbaijan’s offensive in NK, sides appeared at pains to avoid escalation, with Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan 19 Sept saying Armenia would not be dragged into fight.

EU held talks with envoys from Baku and Yerevan. Envoys from Baku and Yerevan 26 Sept met with EU, German and French officials in Brussels to prepare for potential meeting between President Aliyev and Pashinyan early Oct; meeting followed televised address by Pashinyan 21 Sept, in which he justified talks with Baku “for the sake of independence”. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 25 Sept met with Aliyev in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave for talks; Erdoğan later said Zangezur road, which would link Azerbaijan proper to Nakhchivan via Armenia, should be completed.

Govt arrested several individuals critical of offensive. Authorities 19-21 detained at least five individuals for anti-war posts online and four others for political activism. One detainee, journalist Nurlan Gahramanly, 21 Sept claimed he had been subjected to violence while in detention.

Azerbaijan launched military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, claiming victory after 24 hours and ending three decades of de-facto self-governance; mass exodus followed.

Azerbaijan’s 24-hour offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh ended de facto self-rule. Baku 19 Sept launched “anti-terrorist” campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), attacking territory with heavy bombardment and ground offensive. 24 hours later, Azerbaijani forces had advanced to outskirts of Stepanakert city, forcing de facto authorities 20 Sept to surrender in Russian-brokered ceasefire. Fighting reportedly left hundreds dead and many more wounded. Baku and Stepanakert held follow up talks and on 28 Sept, de facto leaders announced their self-declared govt would “cease to exist” by Jan 2024.

Military offensive followed escalating tensions and intense diplomacy. Initial signs early Sept raised fears of new war. Officials in Yerevan start of Sept reported military build-up in several areas along Armenia-Azerbaijan border (see Armenia, Azerbaijan), while de facto authorities in NK 5 Sept released video showing movement of Azerbaijani armoured vehicles near frontline; EU civilian monitoring mission 7 Sept echoed concerns about stepped-up tensions. Despite intensive EU and U.S. diplomacy to avert conflict, including agreement that led to humanitarian deliveries 18 Sept into NK, Azerbaijan launched offensive.

Humanitarian crisis exploded. Humanitarian crisis, already fraught due to Baku’s blockade of Lachin corridor connecting Armenia with NK, escalated. Stepanakert flooded with ethnic Armenians from villages seized by Azerbaijani forces amid scarce supplies of food, medicine and electricity. Azerbaijan 26 Sept announced measures to respond to needs but failed to appease locals, whose fears for their future under Baku’s rule mounted after its forces 26 Sept detained former de facto senior official Ruben Vardanyan as he tried to leave. Beginning 24 Sept, locals streamed out of enclave and as of 30 Sept, over 100,000 had crossed into Armenia; many more expected in coming weeks (see Armenia).

Baku’s actions drew mixed responses from international community. EU and U.S. condemned offensive; Turkish President Erdoğan 20 Sept expressed his support for Azerbaijan before 25 Sept meeting with Azerbaijani President Aliyev in Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave; and Moscow refrained from criticising Baku, 25 Sept criticised Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan’s “reckless approach” toward NK.

President Zourabichvili faced impeachment, and PM Garibashvili underscored commitment to EU integration during UN General Assembly address.

Ruling party moved to impeach president over Europe tour. Ruling Georgian Dream party 1 Sept launched impeachment proceedings against President Zourabichvili, who days prior began touring EU countries to drum up support for Georgia’s EU candidate status, for which decision will be announced in Oct. Ruling party chairman Irakli Kobakhidze accused Zourabichvili of violating constitution by visiting EU member states without govt approval and claimed trip “directly opposes the efforts of the Georgian government to receive the said [candidate] status”. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 8 Sept said impeachment was “counterproductive polarisation” and urged Tbilisi to work on “depolarisation”, “de-oligarchisation” and reforms.

PM’s speech at UN focused on breakaway regions and EU integration. Speaking to UN General Assembly 22 Sept, PM Garibashvili emphasized Georgia’s desire to reunite with breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and urged Russia to engage in Geneva International Discussions – multilateral forum to address security and humanitarian consequences of 2008 Russo-Georgian War; Garibashvili further underscored govt’s commitment to EU integration. De facto foreign ministry of breakaway South Ossetia 24 Sept urged Georgia to “accept geopolitical realities” established in 2008.

Ruling party claimed sweeping victory in local elections held across Russia and in occupied Ukrainian territory, drone attacks continued, and North Korea’s leader made surprise visit.

Ruling party won big in regional and municipal elections. Russians 8-10 Sept cast their ballots for regional governors, regional legislatures, and city and municipal councils. President Putin’s United Russia party won 15 out of 16 elections for regional legislative assemblies and every provincial governor’s race aside from Republic of Khakassia, which re-elected Communist party governor Valentin Konovalov. Russia also held elections in four partially occupied regions of Ukraine, announcing ruling party victory and prompting outrage from Kyiv and its allies. Meanwhile, crackdown on dissent persisted; notably, Justice Ministry 1 Sept added Novaya Gazeta editor-in-chief and Nobel Prize winner Dmitry Muratov to its list of foreign agents.

Ukraine’s campaign of aerial strikes continued. Ukrainian drone attack 7 Sept caused explosion near military headquarters in Rostov region’s Rostov-on-Don city; Kursk region witnessed multiple drone attacks. Notably regional governor 16 Sept announced that strike on Plekhovo village killed one; drone 20 Sept hit oil depot in Sochi city’s Adler district, 25km from Putin’s Sochi residence; and drone attack 25 Sept destroyed several buildings. Meanwhile, reports 4 Sept surfaced claiming authorities had released General Surovikin, detained after Wagner mutiny in June; two days later, Commonwealth of Independent States reportedly appointed Surovikin head of air defence committee.

President Putin held summit with North Korea’s leader. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un 12-18 Sept made surprise trip to Russia and 13 Sept met with Putin at Cosmodrome Vostochny space launch centre for talks. Sides did not provide details on concrete agreements, but Putin later confirmed readiness to assist North Korea with its satellite program; in exchange, Russia is likely to receive ammunition for Ukraine war. Kim also visited Gagarin Aircraft Manufacturing Association, Sukhoi fighter jet production facility in Komsomolsk-on-Amur city and Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok city.

Several EU countries banned entry of Russian-registered cars. Poland 17 Sept joined Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland in banning entry of Russian-registered cars; Norway’s Foreign Ministry 19 Sept announced plans to introduce similar restrictions.

48 children removed from occupied Ukrainian territories arrived in Belarus, EU labelled Minsk “an accomplice” of Russian war crimes, and tensions with western neighbours remained elevated.

Dozens of children from occupied Ukrainian regions arrived in Belarus. State news agency Belta 19 Sept reported arrival of 48 children from Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia (which Russia partly occupies and claims to have annexed) in Belarus. Head of charity organising removals said move sought to help “children from dilapidated cities and towns in the new territories of Russia”. Speaking on sidelines of UN General Assembly, Ukraine’s first lady Olena Zelenska 20 Sept called on international partners to help ensure return of Ukrainian children forcibly taken by Russia.

Russia and Belarus continued to deepen ties. Russian President Vladimir Putin 15 Sept hosted President Lukashenko in Black Sea resort of Sochi, days after Putin held summit with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un; during talks, Lukashenko said Moscow and Pyonguang should consider “three-way cooperation” but did not elaborate. Talks follow European Parliament resolution 13 Sept condemning Minsk’s role in Ukraine war and calling govt “an accomplice in the crimes committed by Russia”. Meanwhile, Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation 1-6 Sept held military exercises in Belarus, with troops from Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan participating.

Tensions with Poland and Latvia persisted. State Border Committee 1 Sept claimed Polish helicopter had violated Belarusian airspace, 28 Sept blamed Poland for another airspace violation; Warsaw denied allegations. Belarus 11 Sept accused Poland of using tear gas and physical force to push back migrants trying to cross border. Meanwhile, Latvia 19 Sept announced closure of one of two border crossing points with Belarus, citing “increasing number of illegal travellers”.

Ukrainian forces stepped up attacks in Russian-annexed Crimea amid slow-paced counteroffensive, several vessels arrived in Odesa ports to export grain, and tensions with Poland sharpened.

Ukraine’s southern counteroffensive made modest gains. Counteroffensive continued at slow pace along southern front, which stretches across Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions. General Oleksandr Taranavsky 22 Sept announced his forces had broken through defensive lines near Verbove settlement (Zaporizhzhia) and said next goal is Tokmak city. Ukrainian forces 16, 18 Sept recaptured Andriivka and Klishchiivka villages (Donetsk) near Bakhmut city after number of Russian forces redeployed south. Also near Bakhmut, missile 6 Sept struck market in Kostiantynivka town, killing 16; news outlet The New York Times 18 Sept suggested Ukrainian air defence missile malfunctioning may have caused strike. Ukraine escalated attacks on Russian-annexed Crimea having weakened Russia’s air defence. Notably, cruise missile 13 Sept struck naval infrastructure in port city of Sevastopol; pair of cruise missiles 22 Sept struck Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters. Meanwhile, senior official 27 Sept claimed remnants from Russian paramilitary Wagner Group had returned to frontline.

Several ships reached Odesa ports to load grain. Following Russia’s withdrawal from Black Sea grain deal and subsequent attacks on ports and grain facilities, Ukraine mid Aug established temporary shipping corridor from Odesa ports to evacuate civilian ships stuck in Ukraine. Yet infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov 22 Sept announced arrival of two ships in Odesa ports using corridor to load grain bound for ports in Middle East and Africa. Meanwhile, Romania bolstered air defence systems along Danube amid heightened security concerns.

Kyiv-Warsaw tensions rose over ban on agricultural imports. After temporary EU ban on Ukrainian agricultural imports into Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 15 Sept lapsed, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia same day announced unilateral restrictions to protect farmers from cheaper Ukrainian competition. Kyiv 18 Sept filed World Trade Organization lawsuit, claiming bans violate international trade rules. Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki 20 Sept said Poland would cease military aid to Ukraine.

Govt signaled tougher stance on corruption. Parliament 6 Sept appointed Rustem Umerov as defence minister following series of recent corruption scandals. Umerov 18 Sept fired seven top officials from Defence Ministry.

Tensions with Kyrgyzstan increased over top Kyrgyz official’s border dispute comments; U.S. president met with Central Asian leaders amid growing engagement in region.

Tajikistan summoned Kyrgyz ambassador following remarks on border dispute. One year on from deadly clashes along disputed part of Kyrgyz-Tajik border, Kyrgyz National Security Committee head Kamchybek Tashiev 15 Sept urged Tajikistan to renounce its territorial claims to Kyrgyzstan; Foreign Ministry 16 Sept summoned Kyrgyz ambassador and 18 Sept warned that “such comments could seriously damage the ongoing negotiation process on delimitation and demarcation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border”.

Central Asian leaders pledged greater regional cooperation. Tajikistan 14-15 Sept hosted leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in capital Dushanbe, as well as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev who attended as “honoured guest”. Leaders discussed ways to promote trade, tackle insecurity and better manage energy resources amid water shortages across region.

U.S. president held summit with Central Asian leaders in New York. U.S. President Joe Biden 19 September met with Central Asian leaders on sidelines of 78th UN General Assembly in New York amid stepped-up efforts to bolster ties in region. Biden hailed “historic” meeting and pledged greater cooperation in number of areas, including security, trade and investment, and regional connectivity. NGO Human Rights Watch day prior issued statement noting “renewed focus” on region following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and warning Biden not to “allow this to eclipse urgent human rights concerns”. Meanwhile, Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation 1-6 Sept held military exercises in Belarus, with troops from Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan participating.

U.S. president met with Central Asian leaders amid growing engagement in region.

Central Asian leaders pledged greater regional cooperation. Tajikistan 14-15 Sept hosted leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in capital Dushanbe, as well as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev who attended as “honoured guest”. Leaders discussed ways to promote trade, tackle insecurity and better manage energy resources amid water shortages across region.

U.S. president held summit with Central Asian leaders in New York. U.S. President Joe Biden 19 September met with Central Asian leaders on sidelines of 78th UN General Assembly in New York amid stepped-up efforts to bolster ties in region. Biden hailed “historic” meeting and pledged greater cooperation in number of areas, including security, trade and investment, and regional connectivity. NGO Human Rights Watch day prior issued statement noting “renewed focus” on region following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and warning Biden not to “allow this to eclipse urgent human rights concerns”.

Tensions with Tajikistan increased over top Kyrgyz official’s border dispute comments; U.S. president met with Central Asian leaders amid growing engagement in region.

Tajikistan summoned Kyrgyz ambassador following remarks on border dispute. One year on from deadly clashes along disputed part of Kyrgyz-Tajik border, National Security Committee head Kamchybek Tashiev 15 Sept urged Tajikistan to renounce its territorial claims to Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan’s foreign ministry 16 Sept summoned Kyrgyz ambassador and 18 Sept warned that “such comments could seriously damage the ongoing negotiation process on delimitation and demarcation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border”.

Central Asian leaders pledged greater regional cooperation. Tajikistan 14-15 Sept hosted leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in capital Dushanbe, as well as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev who attended as “honoured guest”. Leaders discussed ways to promote trade, tackle insecurity and better manage energy resources amid water shortages across region.

U.S. president held summit with Central Asian leaders in New York. U.S. President Joe Biden 19 September met with Central Asian leaders on sidelines of 78th UN General Assembly in New York amid stepped-up efforts to bolster ties in region. Biden hailed “historic” meeting and pledged greater cooperation in number of areas, including security, trade and investment, and regional connectivity. NGO Human Rights Watch day prior issued statement noting “renewed focus” on region following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and warning Biden not to “allow this to eclipse urgent human rights concerns”. Meanwhile, Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation 1-6 Sept held military exercises in Belarus, with troops from Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan participating.

Niger ended bilateral military cooperation with Benin, weakening country’s counter-insurgency capabilities amid persistent jihadist violence in northern departments.

Niamey denounced military accord with Porto-Novo. Amid threat of military intervention by West African regional bloc ECOWAS to restore constitutional order in Niger, ruling junta in Niamey 12 Sept cancelled military cooperation agreement with Benin, accusing country of hosting “mercenaries and military supplies” intended to support war “wanted by France”; end of security cooperation with Niger could significantly affect Benin’s counter-insurgency capabilities as jihadist militants use cross-border Park W as launching pad for attacks in coastal country. Meanwhile, govt late Sept denied rumours that French military base was being built in Alibori department to house troops exiting Niger.

Northern departments remained under jihadist threat. In Alibori department’s Karimama commune, suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) fighters 6 Sept killed three civilians in Karimama commune, and kidnapped local chief and his advisor from Kangara Peulh village. In Atakora department, suspected JNIM militants 15 Sept killed two soldiers and injured another two in Materi commune near Pendjari National Park.

Ruling party won sweeping victory in local elections, confirming overwhelming dominance over political scene two years before presidential election.

Ruling party consolidated power in local elections. Regional and municipal elections 2 Sept proceeded peacefully, featuring candidacies from across political landscape. Electoral commission 5 Sept announced President Ouattara’s party, Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), won 123 out of 201 municipalities (61%) and 25 out of 31 regions (81%); despite their alliance, main opposition parties Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire and African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire secured only 34 municipalities and four regions. RHDP’s sweeping victory, even in traditional opposition strongholds, inched country closer to return to de facto one-party rule ahead of presidential election due in 2025. RHDP 16 Sept also won 56 of 64 seats in senatorial elections, reinforcing its grip on parliament’s upper chamber.

In other important developments. Ouattara 28 Sept announced plan to reshuffle govt in October. Burkina Faso authorities 19 Sept arrested two Ivorian police officers who had crossed into Burkina chasing illicit gold miners; Ivorian govt 28 Sept said it was negotiating for their release.

Repression of opposition protest left several dead, while transitional authorities reportedly detained military officers amid unconfirmed rumours of coup attempt.

Security forces cracked down on protesters on coup anniversary. On two-year anniversary of military coup, coalition of political parties and civil society organisations, Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG), 4-5 Sept held demonstrations in capital Conakry to voice discontent at military junta’s perceived backsliding on transition commitments. Clashes broke out between demonstrators and security forces attempting to enforce ban on protests; FVG 6 Sept reported four protesters dead. Renewed clashes 8 Sept erupted during protesters’ funerals in Conakry, leaving 12 civilians injured.

Authorities allegedly detained military personnel amid rumours of coup attempt. Civil society activist Sékou Koundouno 4 Sept claimed around 100 military officers were detained following exchange of fire between junta forces and National Guard. French media outlet Jeune Afrique 5 Sept also reported transitional authorities late Aug-early Sept carried out series of arrests of military personnel following unconfirmed rumours of possible coup attempt on 26-27 Aug.

Junta leader Doumbouya struck defiant tone at UN. At UN General Assembly, interim President Col. Doumbouya 21 Sept admonished Western countries for “lecturing” African countries following recent coup wave, labelling Western democracy as “imposed” on Africa and “difficult to adapt to our realities”. FVG next day denounced Doumbouya’s remarks as signalling “an emerging dictatorship”.

Court dismissed opposition’s challenge to Bola Tinubu’s presidential election win, while jihadist, criminal and separatist groups continued to fuel insecurity across country.

Election tribunal upheld Tinubu’s presidential win. Presidential Elections Petitions Tribunal 6 Sept rejected opposition parties’ challenges to Bola Tinubu’s win in February presidential election. Main opposition presidential candidates in following days appealed against judgement at Supreme Court.

In North East zone, Bauchi state reported mounting insecurity. As part of military operations against jihadist groups in Borno state, air force 12 Sept announced bombing Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) combatants in Kala/Balge area. Meanwhile in neighbouring Bauchi state, authorities 13 Sept reported increasing attacks by armed groups fleeing military operations in neighbouring states, while security operatives 16 Sept rescued over 30 abductees in Alkaleri area.

Armed group violence continued in North West and North Central zones. In Kaduna state, gunmen 1 Sept killed at least seven people in mosque at Saya-Saya village, Ikara area. In Zamfara state, armed groups 9 Sept reportedly abducted over 50 people near Anka town, and 22 Sept abducted about 24 mainly female students in Sabon-Gida village. Abuja-based Daily Trust newspaper 19 Sept reported armed groups in recent days attacked seven villages at border between Kebbi and Sokoto states, killing unconfirmed number and forcing hundreds to flee. In Plateau state, armed group 10 Sept attacked Kulben village in Mangu area, killing ten people; residents blamed attack on “armed Fulani militia”.

Kidnappings-for-ransom continued in South East amid persistent Biafra agitation. Security personnel continued to battle faction of outlawed separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) enforcing lockdown across South East zone. Notably, suspected IPOB members 19 Sept killed eight security forces in ambush in Ehime Mbano area of Imo state. Air force 26 Sept bombed two locations identified as IPOB training camps and armouries in Nnewi North area, Anambra state, and Okigwe area, Imo state. Meanwhile in Enugu state, police 3 Sept clashed with gunmen allegedly attempting to abduct travellers in Enugu East area, with two assailants and one policeman dead; gunmen 17 Sept abducted Catholic priest and six others in Udi area, demanded ransom for their release.

President Gnassingbé named new security minister in likely attempt to coup-proof govt following recent coups in West Africa and Gabon.

Gnassingbé reshuffled govt ahead of legislative and regional elections. Gnassingbe 8 Sept reshuffled cabinet ahead of legislative and regional elections expected for December, with changes affecting eight ministries. Most notably, long-time ambassador to France, Col. Calixte Batossie Madjoulba, was appointed as security and civil protection minister; change at powerful ministry may come as attempt to prevent military seizure of power after August coup in Gabon, where dynastic Bongo regime shared many similarities with Gnassingbé family’s hegemony over Togo.

Scattered violence from jihadist groups continued in northern region. In Savanes region, explosive device likely planted by al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 11 Sept injured farmer in Djabdjoare village, Kpendjal prefecture.

Jihadists escalated attacks on military after a months-long lull, leaving over 50 security forces dead, and transitional authorities announced foiling coup attempt.

Jihadist attacks inflicted heavy losses on govt forces and auxiliaries. After taking over two military bases in East region in late August, presumed al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) combatants 4 Sept killed at least 17 soldiers and 36 civilian auxiliaries in attack on military position in Koumbri town, Yatenga province (North region). In response, govt launched series of airstrikes, with at least 30 JNIM fighters killed 11-14 Sept in Sahel, Centre-East and Centre-North regions. Civilians remained caught between jihadists on one side and state forces on the other. Suspected JNIM fighters 7 and 12 Sept killed eight civilians in Ouaboadi village and near Namagdou town, both Gnagna province (East region). Suspected Islamic State Sahel Province 12 Sept killed eight people in Wendou camp for displaced persons in Seno province (Sahel region).

Transitional authorities announced thwarting coup attempt. Military prosecutor 8 Sept announced arrest of three low-ranking officers, accusing them of plotting to “destabilize the conduct of the transition”. Transitional president, Capt. Traoré, 13 Sept appointed new heads of security services including at National Intelligence Agency, indicating concern about vulnerability to counter-coup. Thousands 26 Sept demonstrated in support of military rulers in capital Ouagadougou as new rumours of mutiny circulated on social media. Transitional authorities next day announced thwarting coup attempt by group of military officers and others, saying plotters planned to seize power and plunge country into “chaos”, and later arrested at least four military officers for alleged involvement.

Ouagadougou cultivated ties with military govts in Niamey and Bamako. As West African regional bloc ECOWAS continued to threaten use of force in Niger to restore constitutional order, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 16 Sept signed charter creating Alliance of Sahel States in bid to establish framework for collective defence and mutual assistance. Transitional legislature 19 Sept approved govt’s proposal to deploy soldiers to Niger to defend against possible military intervention by ECOWAS. Meanwhile, Ouagadougou 14 Sept expelled French defence attaché, accusing him of “subversive activities”, and same day closed military mission in Paris.

Ruling junta postponed presidential election due in February, further pushing back timeline for return to constitutional order; violence escalated between 2015 peace deal signatories, while jihadists stepped up deadly attacks in north.

Military junta extended transition period. Transition authorities 25 Sept announced delaying February 2024 presidential election without setting new date, citing “technical issues” related to adoption of new constitution in June referendum and review of electoral lists. Move sparked outrage from political and civil society groups. Notably, M5-RFP opposition coalition 27 Sept denounced “unilateral” decision, said it is “imperative” that junta “respects its commitments”.

Parties to 2015 peace agreement engaged in intense fighting in northern regions. As UN mission 1 Sept started second phase of withdrawal, alliance of predominantly Tuareg rebel groups, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), 11 Sept said it considered itself “at war” with Bamako, and in following days claimed several gains. CMA 12 Sept claimed seizing control of military camp and posts near Bourem town (Gao region) from army and Russian Wagner Group paramilitaries; 17 Sept said they temporarily seized two army bases near Léré town (Timbuktu region); and 28 Sept announced capturing Dioura military camp (Mopti region in centre) before withdrawing.

Jihadist violence escalated in northern regions, persisted in centre. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) maintained blockade on Timbuktu city in protest at army deployment in region, creating food and aid shortages. Elsewhere in north, JNIM militants 7 Sept attacked river boat near Abakoira village, Timbuktu region, as well as Bamba military camp, Gao region, killing at least 64 people including 49 civilians and 15 soldiers. JNIM next day launched complex attack targeting Malian army and Wagner base near Gao airport, reportedly killing up to 37 Malian soldiers. Islamic State Sahel Province militants 13 Sept attacked Tannal village, Ménaka region, killing 20 people. Fighting also continued in central regions. Notably, JNIM 6 Sept killed a dozen Wagner elements in ambush near Pogo town, Ségou region.

In other important developments. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger 16 Sept signed charter creating Alliance of Sahel States.

Junta signed mutual defence pact with Mali and Burkina Faso, bolstering united putschist front in central Sahel; uptick in jihadist violence continued in south west as attention of top military brass remained focused on Niamey.

Niamey drew closer to other military-led neighbours. As West African regional bloc ECOWAS continued to threaten force to restore constitutional order, Niamey 12 Sept denounced military cooperation agreement with Cotonou, accusing Benin of “planning an aggression” against Niger. Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso 16 Sept signed charter creating Alliance of Sahel States in bid to establish framework for collective defence and mutual assistance.

Junta continued rupture with former colonial power. Junta 1 Sept accused French President Macron of instrumentalizing ECOWAS for “neo-colonial project”, and tens of thousands 2 Sept rallied in capital Niamey and south-western Ouallam town to demand departure of French forces. Paris 24 Sept announced end of military cooperation with Niger and departure of French soldiers by year’s end. France’s ambassador to Niger 27 Sept returned to Paris, one month after junta ordered him to leave. Meanwhile, U.S. military 14 Sept resumed flying drones and aircraft out of its bases in Niger following negotiations with junta.

Uptick in violence continued in south-western Tillabery region. Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) 1 Sept killed three people in Doukou Tegui village, Tillabery department. Govt forces 4 Sept reported thwarting al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) ambush near Ouro Gueladjo, Say department, killing around ten suspected fighters. IS Sahel fighters 13 Sept killed community leader in Garin Wadey town, Abala department. Suspected jihadist militants 28 Sept killed at least a dozen soldiers in Kandadji town, Tillabery department.

In other important developments. Transitional govt 14 Sept announced opening of consultations at local level as prelude to national dialogue, thereby following in footsteps of Mali and Burkina Faso, where national dialogues held shortly after coups helped legitimise military rule; Niamey however did not set date for dialogue. Meanwhile, former PM and prominent opponent to deposed President Bazoum, Hama Amadou, 11 Sept returned to Niger after two-year exile in France.

Govt and opposition made progress toward resolving differences, Al-Shabaab continued deadly attacks, while cattle and banditry-related violence persisted.

Bipartisan talks between govt and opposition inched forward. After signing framework agreement defining dialogue’s agenda in late Aug, National Dialogue Committee led by Kalonzo Musyoka, representing opposition Azimio la Umoja coalition, and Kimani Ichung’wah, National Assembly Majority Leader representing ruling Kenya Kwanza coalition, from 11 Sept onward received submissions from civil society groups and political parties on agenda. Meanwhile, cost of living continued to cause discontent; notably, opposition leader Raila Odinga around 15 Sept criticized govt policies following new increase in fuel price.

Al-Shabaab attacks continued along Somali border. Explosive devices allegedly planted by Al-Shabaab 3 Sept killed two policemen and injured others in Arabia area of Mandera county, 10 Sept injured several soldiers in Boni Forest, Lamu county, and 16 Sept killed four civilian and injured others along Mandera-Elwak road in Mandera county. Security forces 13 Sept reported killing five al-Shabaab combatants in Garissa county. Meanwhile, Kenya and U.S. 25 Sept signed defence cooperation agreement to counter Al-Shabaab and collaborate on domestic and international security efforts.

Western county reported rise in cattle rustling and banditry incidents. Governor of Elgeyo-Marakwet county early Sept reported increase in armed attacks after several months of relative calm amid joint military-police operation in Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, and West Pokot counties. Notably, unidentified armed men 3 Sept killed two people in border area between Elgeyo-Marakwet and West Pokot counties. Meanwhile, West Pokot Senator, Julius Murgor, 11 Sept announced Pokot community leaders will travel to Uganda to negotiate grazing access for Pokot herdsmen and release of 4,000 cattle seized early Sept by Ugandan authorities.

Opposition accused President Rajoelina of “institutional coup” in run-up to November presidential election.

Rajoelina 6 Sept announced he will run for re-election in presidential election scheduled for 9 Nov. Opposition parties 8 Sept filed three constitutional challenges to Rajoelina’s candidacy, relating to controversy over his citizenship status. High Constitutional Court (HCC) 9 Sept rejected appeals, confirmed Rajoelina and 12 others as presidential candidates. Rajoelina same day resigned to contest presidential election, as required by constitution. HCC in following days said presidential powers would now be exercised by govt collectively with PM Christian Ntsay as head, after Senate president, Herimanana Razafimahefa (intended interim head of state by law) declined to assume presidential powers citing “personal reasons”. In joint letter to electoral commission, 10 presidential candidates 12 Sept denounced move as “institutional coup” intended to give Rajoelina undue advantages in Nov election; all 10 candidates 22 Sept met with HCC magistrates to discuss matter. Meanwhile, in joint communique, eight countries and international organisations, including EU and U.S., 19 Sept vowed “greatest vigilance” during electoral preparations.

Insurgent activity decreased in northern Cabo Delgado province following August killing of militant leader; political tensions persisted ahead of October municipal elections.

Militant activity slowed after death of group leader. After security forces 22 Aug killed Ibn Omar, reported leader of Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP), insurgent activity relatively decreased; death yet to be confirmed from non-govt sources. Despite ISMP cells reportedly pursuing hearts and minds strategy in some coastal areas, group of militants 14 Sept attacked Naquitengue village, Mocímboa da Praia district, killing 11 civilians. Hundreds of civilians 20 Sept also fled Pangane village, Macomia district, after militants launched forced recruitment drive.

Build-up to October municipal elections continued amid concerns of violence. Main opposition party RENAMO leader, Ossufo Momade, late Aug accused ruling FRELIMO party of using police for partisan purposes. Police chief 18 Sept denied his force’s involvement in attempts to assassinate political leaders after reported attacks on Nampula mayor in Aug and Quelimane mayor 11 Sept, both from RENAMO. President Nyusi 25 Sept called on candidates to avoid “incendiary and intimidating speeches” during campaign for 11 Oct municipal elections, which formally began 26 Sept. Opposition party Democratic Movement of Mozambique 28 Sept accused police of illegally detaining its members in Sofala and Cabo Delgado provinces.

Border with Tanzania re-opened. Namoto border crossing between Cabo Delgado and Tanzania’s Mtwara province 11 Sept reopened after two-year closure due to insecurity; move should help boost cross-border trade (see Tanzania).

Fallout from contested August elections continued as opposition called for election re-run and tensions ran high with Southern Africa’s regional body.

Opposition called for rerun of controversial general elections. Main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) 1 Sept called for re-run of general elections held 23 August and nationwide protests, reiterating process was marred by irregularities and uneven playing field. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition of local civil society groups throughout month called for Southern African Development Community (SADC)-led dialogue to end crisis. Meanwhile, repression of opposition continued after vote. Unidentified assailants 2 Sept abducted and beat CCC elected official in capital Harare. Police 12 Sept briefly detained two CCC elected officials over alleged assassination attempt and malicious damage to property that occurred on election day, and 23 Sept arrested CCC mayor of Bindura town on fraud charges.

President Mnangagwa inaugurated amid persistent tensions with SADC. Mnangagwa sworn in for second presidential term 4 Sept in ceremony attended by South African President Ramaphosa, Mozambique President Nyusi and other leaders; Southern African Development Community (SADC) chair, Angolan President Lourenço, and Zambian President Hichilema, who heads SADC Organ Troika, however did not attend. In inaugural address, Mnangagwa accused foreigners of trying to “sponsor mayhem”. Govt 11 Sept accused Zambia of “treacherous lobbying” over Lusaka’s efforts to convene extraordinary SADC summit on Zimbabwe’s elections. SADC Organ Troika 27 Sept held meeting to discuss elections and criticised govt’s attempts to undermine SADC mission’s credibility; govt minister next day portrayed Hichilema as West’s “puppet”.

Police briefly detained opposition leader Tundu Lissu for alleged unlawful assembly.

Police 10 Sept arrested opposition leader and chairman of opposition party Chadema, Tundu Lissu, and three others for allegedly holding illegal gathering and obstructing police work in Arusha region; police later same day released Lissu on bail. Meanwhile, Namoto border crossing between Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province and Tanzania’s Mtwara region 11 Sept reopened after two-year closure due to insecurity; move should help boost cross-border trade (see Mozambique).

Offensive against Al-Shabaab in central regions saw both setbacks and progress, while regional tensions over elections persisted.

Fallout from Aug collapse of frontline hindered anti-militant efforts in centre. After army retreat in southern Galgaduud region of Galmudug state resulted in Al-Shabaab takeover of area, govt redoubled efforts to secure additional support from local clans with a view to reversing losses before rainy season begins in October. Offensive however progressed in other parts of Galgaduud, as govt forces 11 Sept recovered Labidulle, Ceel Garas and Ceel Lahaley villages, south west of state capital Dhusamareb, and 15 Sept withstood major Al-Shabaab attack on positions in Ceel Lahaley. Govt forces 15-17 Sept also recovered Xinlabi, Qod Qod, Qeycad, Bacadweyne, Shebellow and Camaara villages in southern Mudug region (also Galmudug), amid heavy fighting.

Al-Shabaab militants continued to pose major threat, particularly in south. In Lower Shabelle region (South West state), Al-Shabaab 10 Sept attacked army position in Awdheegle town, resulting in significant losses on both sides. Al-Shabaab 17 Sept also caused heavy casualties in attack on convoy of Ethiopian forces in Bakool region (also South West). Targeted attacks continued, including Al-Shabaab suicide bomber 15 Sept targeting Galmudug president Ahmed Kariye ‘Qoor Qoor’ in Las Gacamey village; Qoor Qoor escaped unharmed, but two soldiers killed. In Hirshabelle state’s Hiraan region, bomb attacks 23 Sept killed over 20 in Beledweyne city, and 28 Sept killed at least six in Buloburde city.

Political disputes remained latent in several regions. Puntland President Said Deni made no effort to engage opposition, who continued to accuse him of seeking to use transition to universal suffrage to extend term or set rules in his favour. In South West and Jubaland states, groups of local politicians remained at odds with state leaders over timing of future elections; South West politicians 24 Sept met in Mogadishu, announced they would travel to state capital Baidoa in Oct to push for elections.

In other important developments. In letter to UN Security Council, govt 19 Sept requested three-month pause in drawdown of AU mission (ATMIS) personnel; AU 27 Sept announced withdrawal would continue but troop contributing countries backed request in letter to Security Council.

New front line between Dhulbahante clan militias and govt forces stabilised, while election-related tensions dissipated after President Bihi accepted compromise with opposition.

Front line shifted away from Sool region’s capital Las Anod. Following Dhulbahante militiamen’s major victory with Aug capture of Goojacade army base near Las Anod, new front line emerged between Oog and Guumays villages in western Sool. New division corresponds roughly to boundaries between Isaaq and Dhulbahante clans, with Isaaq being dominant grouping in Somaliland. Both sides in Sept sent reinforcements to area, raising fears of further clashes, but new front line remained quiet. Meanwhile, SSC-Khatumo State (self-declared govt of Dhulbahante separatists) 14 Sept hosted large delegation of MPs from Somalia as it strives to become Somali member state.

President Bihi accepted compromise on longstanding electoral dispute. Weakened by army’s retreat from Sool, Bihi 30 Aug accepted recommendations from elders of Haber Jeclo, sub-clan of Isaaq, who had been mediating between govt and opposition on electoral dispute; agreement will see combined political party and presidential election on 13 November 2024. As Gacaan Libaah militia opposed deal, Bihi 6 Sept offered to pardon group in exchange for their demobilisation, and militia late Sept accepted to disband. Political association headed by prominent figure from Western Somaliland also criticised agreement as Isaaq-mediated deal that leaves out non-Isaaq communities such as Gadabursi, tapping into latent grievances in Awdal region.

“Total peace” policy advanced further as govt concluded fourth round of talks with ELN and announced expected start of formal dialogue with FARC dissidents.

Govt-ELN dialogue continued. 180-day ceasefire between National Liberation Army (ELN) and state security forces remained in place, as negotiators from group and govt 4 Sept concluded fourth round of talks in Venezuelan capital Caracas. Sides agreed to proceed with 25 regional consultations, though precise format remained unclear, and govt said it would improve conditions for ELN prisoners. Parties also agreed to undertake “dynamic humanitarian actions” in several areas of Chocó, Antioquia and Bolívar departments to improve conditions for conflict-affected communities.

FARC dissident faction agreed to formal dialogue with govt amid ongoing violence. Petro administration and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) 19 Sept announced formal negotiations and 10-month bilateral ceasefire starting 8 Oct. FARC-EMC violence continued, however; notably, dissidents 14 Sept attacked military patrol in La Argentina municipality, Huila department (south west), wounding four soldiers; 16 Sept killed four soldiers during clashes in Cumbitara municipality, Nariño department (Pacific coast); and 29 Sept killed another soldier in El Plateado town, Cauca department (south west). In first two weeks of Sept, violence between ELN and FARC-EMC in Puerto Rondón town, Arauca department (north west), forcibly confined hundreds of families.

Authorities released long-awaited drug policy. Justice Ministry 10 Sept announced new drug policy, promising to help small-hold coca farmers transition to alternative livelihoods, improve public health responses to drug consumption, and target senior traffickers and money launderers. Some aspects of document, such as authorisation to eradicate crops planted after signing of policy, raised concerns among some that, in practice, current approach won’t change. Meanwhile, Petro 9 Sept proposed Latin American alliance to fight drug trafficking.

Campaigning for Oct elections continued. Campaigning for local elections in Oct continued amid concerns poll may escalate political tensions in conflict-affected regions as armed and criminal groups seek to assert influence. Unknown assailants, for example, 28 Sept assassinated former mayor of Caloto town, Cauca; his son is currently candidate for same position.

Unknown assailants killed municipal councillor amid spate of attacks on political figures throughout electoral period.

One day after being reported missing, authorities 8 Sept found body of Bolivar Vera, municipal councillor from crime-ridden Durán city, in Guayas province. His death, which occurred one month ahead of presidential run-off on 15 Oct, marked latest in string of political assassinations during electoral period and triggered anger toward govt. Notably, Vera’s political party Partido Social Cristiano 8 Sept criticised President Lasso’s administration for failing to adequately protect civilians, while Durán city mayor denounced Lasso for not providing security for officials despite “countless” requests; Organization of American States Electoral Observation Mission 8 Sept said it “firmly repudiates any act of political violence that endangers the security of citizens and the ongoing electoral process”.

Govt-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) offered support for upcoming primary, sharpening disagreements among opposition parties; govt, opposition and U.S held closed-door talks aimed at improving electoral conditions.

CNE offer to provide support for primary sowed confusion within opposition. Process for opposition primary, due to be held on 22 Oct to select single nominee for 2024 presidential election, continued to face challenges. Notably, opposition parties disagreed on how to proceed if banned candidate, such as Frontrunner María Corina Machado, wins primary; Machado continued to insist that she will not cede candidacy if victorious, raising prospect of intra-opposition squabbling over result. Former vice-president of primary commission María Carolina Uzcátegui 7 Sept said conditions were not in place for successful election and urged opposition to consider accepting CNE involvement. Adding to confusion around process, CNE 22 Sept offered to provide technical/logistical support; primary organisers 25 Sept said they would consider accepting. CNE 28 Sept proposed postponement of vote to 19 Nov. Machado and others continued to oppose idea of CNE involvement, saying it favours President Maduro; Machado also rejected delay to vote. Meanwhile, govt continued to attack primary, 7 Sept launching investigation into its financing.

Efforts to push through deal on electoral conditions continued. Amid growing concern about competitiveness of 2024 elections, several closed-door meetings between govt and opposition, closely monitored by Washington, took place during month, aimed at reaching deal on sanctions relief in exchange for improved electoral conditions. Details unclear but bans on leading opposition politicians reportedly remained key stumbling block: U.S. argues that Maduro cannot choose his electoral opponent by eliminating other candidates, while govt insists Machado’s support for U.S. intervention in Venezuela precludes her from being allowed to run.

Govt deepened ties with China. Maduro 8 Sept arrived in China for official visit; President Maduro and Chinese President Xi Jinping 13 Sept signed bilateral cooperation agreements in areas including economy, trade and tourism.

Govt introduced initiative to combat poverty, while officials defended President Bukele’s re-election bid.

Bukele launched phase six of his security plan amid ongoing anti-gang efforts. Legislative Assembly 12 Sept extended state of exception for 18th time upon Defence Minister Monroy’s request. Bukele 15 Sept announced phase six of his anti-gang Territorial Control Plan, dubbed “integration”; under this phase, authorities will create Directorate for National Integration to combat poverty with budget of $30mn; several other bodies, including Salvadoran Institute of Professional Formation and National Youth Institute, will now fall under Directorate for National Integration. Bukele 19 Sept defended anti-gang efforts at UN, saying security “results” were “irrefutable”. Several media sources late Sept reported confidential police document from 1 Sept showed nearly 43,000 people allegedly connected to gangs yet to be detained.

Govt defended Bukele’s re-election bid. As Feb 2024 polls drew closer, ruling party Nuevas Ideas’ continued to face accusations that its nomination of Bukele and VP Félix Ulloa as presidential and vice-presidential candidates violates constitutional ban on consecutive presidential re-election. Ulloa continued to describe re-election attempt as “second mandate” rather than re-election. Electoral authorities appear set on allowing Bukele’s re-run after Supreme Electoral Tribunal Magistrate Noel Orellana 31 Aug said only four of five magistrate votes are required to allow Bukele’s re-run; just one magistrate has said he will vote “in accordance with the constitution”.

Judicial efforts to hinder transition process after Bernardo Arévalo’s surprise electoral victory continued, eliciting domestic and international condemnation.

Judicial attacks on Arévalo, his party and electoral authorities persisted. Following electoral victory of Bernardo Arévalo and his centre-left Semilla Movement in Aug, judicial efforts to derail transition continued, led by Attorney General Consuelo Porras, head of Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity Rafael Curruchiche, and Judge Fredy Orellana. Notably, Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), who late Aug confirmed Arévalo’s victory and has since sought to advance transition, 1 Sept said Public Prosecutor’s Office had opened four different investigations against them. TSE 3 Sept announced it had temporarily revoked suspension order issued by Judge Orellana late Aug against Semilla. Judicial authorities 12-13 Sept and 29 Sept raided electoral centre. Video 13 Sept surfaced showing prosecutors opening boxes containing votes and counting ballots during raids; Arévalo accused Attorney General’s office of plotting against him, while Curruchiche claimed boxes were opened as part of investigation into accusation Semilla falsified signatures for legal status.

Civil society denounced judicial persecution. Amid widely held assumption that judiciary is working with powerful political and business figures to prevent Arévalo from taking power, Guatemalans 2 Sept protested in Constitutional Plaza of capital Guatemala City to demand Porras’ and Curruchiche’s resignation. Indigenous groups 18-19 Sept blocked roads and streets in capital, demanding removal of Porras, Curruchiche and Orellana.

International community stepped up pressure to preserve election result. European parliament 14 Sept denounced “repeated attempts to suspend the Semilla movement”, while some deputies proposed provisional suspension of commerce with Guatemala. U.S. official same day said Washington could impose sanctions and reduce aid to country unless election result is respected.

Country faced institutional crisis over vacant Attorney General role, and govt defended tough security measures.

Constitutional and political crisis continued over vote for new Attorney General. Ruling Libre Party and opposition National Party failed to agree on candidate to replace Attorney General Oscar Chinchilla, whose mandate ended 31 Aug. Opposition have blocked Libre’s choice in response to passing of controversial amnesty law that they claim benefits members of ruling party and persecutes opposition; govt, meanwhile, accuses National Party of preventing appointment to protect themselves from possible future criminal charges. Libre 7 Sept appointed Secretary of Parliament Carlos Zelaya to lead negotiations with opposition, who announced Congress would convene only after agreement on issue; some opposition congress members 27 Sept warned legislative paralysis could continue into 2024. Meanwhile, Chinchilla 1 Sept left Honduras for Nicaragua amid corruption allegations.

Stringent security measures remained in place. Amid ongoing state of exception, authorities 6 Sept claimed period June-Sept saw 40% reduction of homicides compared to same period in 2022; police data, however, showed multiple-homicides (where at least 3 people are killed in one incident) increased by 34% compared with same period in 2022. Meanwhile, military police commander Ramiro Fernando Muñoz 10 Sept declared civil society would soon be able to verify human rights situation inside prisons, which have been under military control since June, and acknowledged allegations of abuses levelled against his agents; Muñoz also warned that there are no effective rehabilitation programs in place as prisons are under reconstruction.

Criminal violence remained rampant, political parties announced presidential candidates in upcoming election, and authorities spotlighted uptick in migration.

Violence continued at high levels. In Guerrero state (south), armed men purportedly belonging to La Familia Michoacana criminal group 9 Sept shot dead state attorney Víctor Manuel Salas Cuadra in Coyuca de Catalán city; unknown assailants 12 Sept shot dead federal attorney’s office representative Fernando García Fernández in state capital Chilpancingo. In Tamaulipas state (centre), navy troops 4 Sept killed four alleged aggressors in Matamoros city; four civilians also injured. In Sinaloa state (centre), clashes 8 Sep between criminal groups killed five in El Rosario town. Govt 25 Sept sent 1,500 troops to Frontera Comalapa region of Chiapas state (south) following media reports of fighting between Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels. Meanwhile, govt 15 Sept extradited Ovidio Guzmán, son and principal heir of former Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín Guzmán, to U.S. on organised crime and fentanyl trafficking charges.

Parties selected female candidates for 2024 presidential election. Ruling MORENA party 6 Sept announced former Mexico City mayor Claudia Sheinbaum as party’s candidate for poll. Former FM Ebrard, who came second in internal vote, raised concerns over irregularities and asked for re-run; President López Obrador next day backed Sheinbaum’s candidacy. With opposition block Frente Amplio por México late Aug announcing Xochitl Galvez as its candidate, 2024 race will mark first time two women compete for Mexico’s highest office.

Migration flows increased. Migratory authority 14 Sept said it expected to receive record 150,000 asylum claims during 2023, noting uptick in arrivals during Aug and Sept, particularly from Cuba, Haiti and Honduras. Authorities same day found 350 Central American migrants in trailer suffering from oxygen shortage in Veracruz state (east). International Organization of Migration 12 Sept announced 686 deaths in 2022 by persons trying to cross Mexico-U.S. border, making it most lethal land migration route worldwide.

Govt continued to stifle dissent and bolster ties with Russia and China amid worsening economic situation.

Repression of opposition, Catholic church and others continued. NGO Mechanism for the Recognition of Political Prisoners 9 Sept identified 89 political prisoners in country. Police 8 Sept arrested priest Osman José Amador Guillén after he expressed support for political prisoner Bishop Rolando Álvarez. Govt 19 Sept announced it had access to all student data from defunct Jesuit-run Central American University, raising concerns about potential harassment of student activists. Fears about treatment of media also increased after army chief 4 Sept labelled all journalists “mercenaries”; according to civil society report 11 Sept, 1,329 violations of press freedom were recorded in Nicaragua over past five years. Meanwhile, UN 11 Sept denounced increased violence against indigenous people in Nicaragua; unidentified settlers next day killed indigenous person in Mayangna Sauni As indigenous area on northern Caribbean coast; authorities 29 Sept arrested Brooklyn Rivera, only indigenous parliament representative, at his home in Bilwi city, Puerto Cabezas (north) on unknown charges.

Managua bolstered ties with China and Russia amid deteriorating economy. Report published by UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 8 Sept highlighted 6% decrease in exports in first six months of 2023, leading to thousands of job losses. Govt continued to strengthen ties with China and Russia in its search for economic lifeline. Notably, parliament 1 Sept ratified free trade agreement with China; Ortega 12 Sept acknowledged Russian military base in Nicaragua is training security forces to fight opposition.

Dominican Republic closed its border with Haiti over canal dispute, which risks aggravating ever-worsening humanitarian crisis; gang violence in capital forced thousands to flee.

Dominican Republic closed border with Haiti. Dominican Republic 15 Sept shut all land, air and sea borders with Haiti over dispute about construction of canal by farmers on Haitian side of Massacre River; decision risks harming both countries’ economies when living conditions in Haiti have already deteriorated; UN Haiti expert William O’Neill 18 Sept warned closure would have “dire” humanitarian consequences. Tensions had been escalating in weeks prior to decision. Notably, Dominican govt late Aug raised concerns about potential negative effects of canal on environment and agricultural producers in both countries.

Gang assaults in capital Port-au-Prince triggered mass displacement. Gangs in G-pèp coalition continued offensives in various parts of Port-au-Prince in attempt to expand foothold toward centre. Armed assailants allegedly led by gang leader alias Kempès 6 Sept attempted to invade Solino neighbourhood in downtown Port-au- Prince, prompting civilians to set up roadblocks. Gang violence fuelled new waves of displacement. Notably, International Organisation for Migration 5 Sept reported that gang operations in capital had displaced over 20,000 since mid Aug; alleged members of Canaan gang 22 Sept staged attacks in Saut d’Eau commune and 25 Sept assaulted Mirebalais commune, both near capital, displacing over 10,000 people. Meanwhile, leader of G9 gang coalition Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier 18, 19 Sept organised demonstrations, pledging to overthrow acting PM Henry.

Dialogue to resolve political crisis stalled. CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) experts 4-10 Sept visited Haiti in third attempt to progress govt-opposition negotiations. Civil society platform Montana Accord 5 Sept called for Henry’s resignation, however; Henry dismissed calls and continued attending CARICOM- facilitated discussions. CARICOM mediators 11 Sept said tone of negotiations had hardened. Engagés pour le Développement party led by former PM Joseph organised demonstration in Port-au-Prince 17 Sept, during which Joseph announced party was leaving dialogue to join social movements calling for Henry's resignation.

In another important development. UN Security Council members early Sept received first draft of resolution authorising multilateral security mission for Haiti, 2 Oct approved force (await next month’s edition for full coverage).

Tensions diminished in buffer zone following violent skirmishes in Aug, while rhetoric from Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leadership signalled wide gulf between sides.

After tensions in UN buffer zone subsided following violent skirmishes between Turkish Cypriots and UN personnel in Aug, parties during Sept traded criticism and rhetorical barbs over different visions to resolve Cyprus question. In fiery speech, “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) leader Ersin Tatar 13 Sept asserted that Cyprus is Turkish island and accused those supporting federative formula of aligning with “game” played against Turkish Cypriots. Addressing UN General Assembly, Republic of Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides 20 Sept said “just like in Ukraine, in Cyprus the UN Charter and international law continue to be violated” and asserted “there is not, and never will be, another basis for settlement of the Cyprus question to that dictated by the United Nations Security Council resolutions”, requesting UN to appoint envoy to prepare for resumption of talks. In response, Tatar 21 Sept called remarks “shallow and insincere”, saying that Greek Cypriot administration could not represent Turkish Cypriots. After rejecting calls for unification on 20 Sept, Tatar 23 Sept reiterated “TRNC” “will not compromise on the principle of sovereignty” after meeting UN Sec Gen Antonio Guterres. Ankara and Turkish Cypriot leadership on various occasions during Sept pressed for recognition of de facto Turkish Cypriot administration in north.

Military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in southeast, northern Syria and northern Iraq, while ties with Greece continued positive trajectory and govt engaged EU and Russia.

Military continued operations against PKK. In rural Diyarbakir province, security forces 18 Sept reportedly killed four high-ranking PKK members. In Iraq, clashes 6 Sept killed Turkish soldier; authorities from Iraq’s Kurdistan region 17 Sept reported Turkish drone strikes killed four PKK members near Sinjar mountains (see Iraq). In northern Syria, drone strikes 17 Sept killed five Syrian Democratic Forces members in Hasakah and 19 Sept killed high-ranking People’s Protection Units (YPG) member in Manbij (see Syria). In first attack in Ankara since 2016, PKK militants 1 Oct conducted suicide bombing in front of interior ministry and opened fire on guards, injuring two; in retaliation, military launched airstrikes in northern Syria and northern Iraq and staged wave of raids across Turkish provinces (await next month’s edition for full coverage).

Relations with Greece remained on course to improve. Greek FM Giorgos Gerapetritis 5 Sept met Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan in Ankara, where pair agreed to seek “new approaches” to resolving issues in Aegean. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 17 Sept reiterated importance of dialogue for maritime delimitation, adding that issues of sovereignty will not be negotiated. Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan 20 Sept met on sidelines of UN General Assembly, agreeing to resume 2022 confidence building talks. Mitsotakis next day said geopolitical tensions remain but there has been “good progress” in normalisation.

Govt continued engagement with EU and Russia. EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi 5 Sept visited Ankara and announced several financial aid packages. Responding to European Parliament’s report on 14 Sept that criticised govt’s democracy record, Erdoğan 16 Sept said Türkiye could “part ways” with the EU if necessary but backtracked on 18 Sept, noting “window of opportunity” for revitalising ties. Meanwhile, talks with Russia to reinvigorate Black Sea Grain Deal continued but meeting between Erdoğan and Russian President Putin 4 Sept ended without breakthrough.

Crackdown on Islamic State-linked individuals continued. Security forces during Sept detained at least 125 individuals with alleged links to ISIS.

Azerbaijan amassed troops at border with Armenia ahead of its lightening offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), which triggered mass exodus into Armenia and anti-govt protests; EU held talks with envoys from Yerevan and Baku.

Armenia reported troop build-up along Azerbaijan border before NK offensive. Azerbaijan 19 Sept launched military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, 20 Sept declaring victory after 24 hours of fighting that left hundreds dead (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Before offensive, Yerevan early Sept had begun reporting military build-up along Armenia-Azerbaijan border in south close to Iran, and between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region – deadliest front in periodic skirmishes since 2020 war; EU civilian monitoring mission along Armenian side of border 7 Sept echoed concerns. Yet despite rising tensions along border and Azerbaijan’s offensive in NK, sides appeared at pains to avoid escalation, with PM Pashinyan 19 Sept saying Armenia would not be dragged into fight.

Refugees poured into Armenia as anti-govt protests rocked capital. After Baku’s victory in NK, Yerevan 21 Sept announced plans to host up to 40,000 families from enclave amid humanitarian crisis and fears of ethnic cleansing. By 30 Sept, authorities reported over 100,000 arrivals, with more expected in coming weeks. U.S. and EU 26 Sept pledged millions to support displaced. Meanwhile, outrage over Armenia’s inaction in NK spurred thousands into streets of capital, demanding Pashinyan’s resignation. Police 25 Sept confirmed 142 people had been arrested, though opposition groups put number at around 300.

EU held talks with envoys from Yerevan and Baku. Envoys from Baku and Yerevan 26 Sept met with EU, German and French officials in Brussels to prepare for potential meeting between Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev early Oct; meeting followed televised address by Pashinyan 21 Sept, in which he justified talks with Baku “for the sake of independence”. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 25 Sept met with Aliyev in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave for talks; Erdoğan later said Zangezur road, which would link Azerbaijan proper to Nakhchivan via Armenia, should be completed.

Unidentified assailants conducted deadly attack in north east, while cost-of-living crisis triggered protests in capital Accra.

Unidentified assailants launched roadside ambush in north east, killing nine. Gunmen 21 Sept attacked police convoy escorting traders from Bawku town (Upper East region) to Cinkassé town (Togo), killing nine people and injuring 15 others. Bawku MP Mahama Ayariga and reports by local media in following days suggested incident was related to chieftaincy conflict in Bawku district, which borders Burkina Faso.

Protests over economic crisis gripped capital Accra. Civil society organisation Democracy Hub 21 Sept organised protest against economic crisis and rising cost of living in Accra; police arrested 49 protesters for unlawful assembly. Independent govt agency National Commission for Civic Education 25 Sept reported police violence against protesters and journalists. Protests continued peacefully over next two days without further arrests.

Suspected RED-Tabara rebels launched deadly attack along border with DR Congo for first time since 2021; President Ndayishimiye dismissed allegations of coup plot.

DR Congo-based rebels launched attack in Burundi after years-long lull. Gunmen 2 Sept ambushed civilian vehicles in Buringa area of Bubanza province, near economic capital Bujumbura, reportedly killing two and injuring one. As security forces deployed to area and subsequently claimed to have repelled assailants, local sources suggested up to 60 govt and allied forces dead, particularly among ruling party youth militia Imbonerakure. In Twitter statement, DR Congo-based rebel group RED-Tabara – which Burundi has been fighting in DR Congo’s South Kivu province since August 2022 – 3 Sept claimed to have “attacked and destroyed a guidance station for aircraft approaching Bujumbura Airport”, in first such claim since Sept 2021.

Tensions ran high in Gitega amid clampdown on judiciary, allegations of coup plot. After authorities in Aug imprisoned at least ten judges on charges of “undermining the security of the state” and “corruption”, Ndayishimiye 1 Sept urged judges to abandon “corrupt” practices, accusing them of sabotaging country’s justice system. Ndayishimiye 25 Sept dismissed allegations of coup plot circulating on social media as rumours spread by “individuals intent on tarnishing Burundi’s international reputation”.

In other important developments. Ndayishimiye 5 Sept presided over Extraordinary Summit of East African Community in Kenya; heads of state extended mandate East African Force in eastern DRC by three months.

Civic space restrictions and armed group violence in eastern and western provinces continued to bode ill for general election due in December.

Political climate remained tense ahead of December general elections. Authorities 8 Sept arrested journalist Stanis Bujakera, later charged him with “forgery” and “spreading falsehoods”, prompting condemnation from Committee to Protect Journalists. Court of Cassation 13 Sept sentenced President Tshisekedi’s former ally, Jean-Marc Kabund, to seven years in prison for “insulting the Head of State and the institutions of the Republic” and “propagation of false rumours”. Opposition heavyweight Martin Fayulu 30 Sept confirmed presidential candidacy.

Fallout of Goma massacre loomed large. Authorities 5 Sept put on trial six soldiers, for “crimes against humanity” in relation to 30 August killing of over 50 people protesting foreign forces’ perceived inaction in North Kivu province’s capital Goma. Tshisekedi 18 Sept replaced North Kivu military governor with another army general, de facto extending unpopular state of siege. At UN general assembly, Tshisekedi 20 Sept advocated starting withdrawal of UN mission (MONUSCO) in December instead of next year.

M23 returned to prominence in North Kivu province. Marking shift from recent low-profile strategy, M23 18 Sept proclaimed takeover of Kiwanja town (Rutshuru territory), nominally controlled by East African Community (EAC) troops, and 22 Sept organised large rally in strategic Kibumba town (Nyiragongo territory), from which they supposedly withdrew last Jan. M23 around 20 Sept also clashed with pro-govt armed groups between Kitshanga and Mweso villages in Masisi territory. Meanwhile, EAC 5 Sept extended mandate of regional force in eastern DR Congo by three months.

Other violence continued in eastern provinces. Maï-Maï militia group 7 Sept attacked Balingina village in Ituri province, killing 18 civilians. Also in Ituri, suspected CODECO militia, which gathers various ethnic Lendu armed groups, 31 Aug-8 Sept killed at least 15 civilians in Mahagi and Djugu territories. Congolese and Ugandan forces throughout month reported gains against Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Ituri (see Uganda).

Mobondo militia continued to extend attacks in western provinces. Govt reported Mobondo rebels 11 Sept killed 19 people in village raid in Kongo Central province. Fighting between Mobondo militia and army 17 Sept left 15 soldiers and three Mobondo fighters dead in Kwango province.

Relations with DR Congo remained tense amid hostile rhetoric, President Kagame announced candidacy for 2024 election, and Washington scaled back military cooperation.

Kinshasa and Kigali continued to trade blame for M23-related instability. After Congolese President Tshisekedi at UN general assembly 20 Sept once again said M23 armed group was Kigali’s auxiliary, President Kagame same day refuted allegation and blamed DR Congo-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda for instability in Great Lakes region. Kagame 27 Sept appointed Gen James Kabarebe, recently retired from army and regularly questioned for his involvement in M23-related conflict, as minister for regional integration.

In other important developments. Kagame 19 Sept announced he would run for fourth term in 2024 election. French media outlet RFI 21 Sept reported U.S. restricted military cooperation with Rwanda under Child Status Protection Act due to Kigali’s support for M23 rebel group, which recruits child soldiers.

Govt claimed significant gains against Islamic State-affiliated ADF rebels; Kampala faced further backlash to anti-homosexuality law, and crackdown on opposition persisted.

Military reported successes in battle against ADF. Authorities said police 3-5 Sept foiled bombing plots by Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), notably on church in capital Kampala. Ugandan and DR Congo govts 15 Sept publicised agreement on expansion of joint anti-ADF offensive further into Ituri province, eastern DR Congo, and joint operation same day reportedly freed 115 hostages from ADF captivity in Ituri’s Irumu territory. President Museveni 23 Sept said Ugandan army airstrike on ADF base in DR Congo 16 Sept killed “a lot” of militants, including group’s second-in-command Meddie Nkalubo.

International backlash to Anti-Homosexuality Act persisted. European Union 6 Sept announced it would not cut funding to Kampala over anti-gay law enacted in May; local NGO Convening for Equality coalition 8 Sept criticised decision. Museveni 10 Sept denounced several U.S. companies’ decision to stop importing textiles from Uganda because of discriminatory law, vowed not to back down. Deputy Treasury Secretary Patrick Ocailap 26 Sept confirmed govt is negotiating with World Bank for vital funding resumption, said Kampala expects financial institution to rescind funding freeze before Uganda in Feb concludes budgeting for next fiscal year.

Police restricted opposition gatherings. After opposition National Unity Party (NUP) 2 Sept launched nationwide campaign tour, NUP leader Robert Kyagulanyi, known as Bobi Wine, 8 Sept called on Baganda ethnic group to oppose govt. Police in following days opened sectarianism criminal inquiry, and 13 Sept announced banning NUP’s mobilisation activities, claiming they breached safety guidelines. NUP same day vowed to defy ban.

UN report warned of ongoing Eritrean violations in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, President Isaias met with Sudan’s army chief, and several Eritrean diaspora events descended into violence.

UN accused Eritrean forces of ongoing violations in Tigray. UN rights commission report published 18 Sept warned of “ongoing atrocities” in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, confirming that Eritrean troops, alongside militia members from Ethiopia’s Amhara region, “continue to commit grave violations”, including “systematic rape and sexual violence of women and girls”.

Asmara continued work to bolster regional standing. President Isaias 11 Sept met with Sudan’s army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in capital Asmara; according to state media, Isaias reiterated Eritrea’s pre-war plan for political stability and security in Sudan, dubbed “Transition to Safety”, and underscored need to harmonise various external peace initiatives instigated after outbreak of hostilities (see Sudan). Meanwhile, African Development Bank President Akinwumi Adesina 1 Sept met with Isaias, praising govt and pledging more support for country’s economic development.

Violence broke out at Eritrean cultural festivals in Israel and Germany. Supporters and opponents of Isaias’ govt 2 Sept clashed during Eritrean cultural festival in Israel’s capital Tel Aviv, leaving around 150 people injured; violence 16 Sept broke out between opposing sides during another cultural festival in German city of Stuttgart. Asmara 9 Sept accused “Eritrea’s detractors” of fomenting unrest among diaspora communities.

Violence in Amhara exacted heavy toll on civilians, Tigray’s interim administration faced opposition amid rising crime levels, and govt-insurgent fighting continued in Oromia.

Civilians bore brunt of ongoing hostilities in Amhara region. Fighting primarily between federal forces and nationalist militia known as Fano continued, with latter’s scattered presence and lack of cohesion rendering rebellion difficult to combat. Though most clashes occurred in rural areas, Fano militants 24 Sept managed to enter Gondar city, leading to deadly skirmishes with federal forces. Fano militants same day attacked Debre Markos city (East Gojjam), killing mayor. Conflict exacted heavy toll on civilians. Notably, federal forces late Aug-early Sept reportedly killed at least 70 in northeast Majete town for alleged ties to Fano; drone strikes early Sept in East Gojam, West Gojam and North Shewa zones reportedly killed at least 50; and strike in West Gojjam’s Dembecha and Quarit districts 17 Sept killed at least 48. Fano militants also crossed into Oromia region, 9 Sept attacking civilians in West Shewa and North Shewa zones; alleged Fano militants 15-16 Sept killed around 30 in East Wollega Zone.

Tigray peace process faced new challenges. Tigray region’s interim president Getachew Reda 6 Sept claimed federal govt had agreed to dismantle Amhara’s “illegal administration” in disputed Western and Southern Tigray, though Amhara unrest, in part driven by fears govt will return disputed territories to Tigray, risks complicating issue. Getachew also warned of mounting crime and rising political tensions; opposition-led protesters next day gathered in regional capital Mekelle to denounce administration’s failure to improve security; authorities violently dispersed protesters and arrested scores, including opposition leaders. Meanwhile, UN rights commission 18 Sept warned of “ongoing atrocities” in Tigray, perpetrated by “Eritrean troops and Amhara militia members” (see Eritrea).

Fighting in Oromia region persisted. Hostilities between Oromo Liberation Army and federal forces continued, notably in East Wollega, Horo Guduru Wollega and North Shewa zones. Oromia President Shimelis Abdissa 11 Sept said govt was committed to “silencing guns… through peaceful means”, though no talks have occurred since first round of negotiations ended early May.

In another important development. Final filling of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam completed 10 Sept (see Nile Waters).

Ethiopia announced completion of fourth filling of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) ahead of fresh talks with Sudan and Egypt.

Two weeks after Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan resumed talks on GERD, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed 10 Sept declared Ethiopia had completed “fourth and final filling” of dam; Egypt’s foreign ministry 11 Sept condemned “unilateral, illegal” move, while Sudan did not comment. Sides 23-24 Sept met in Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa for fresh negotiations; Ethiopia 24 Sept said parties exchanged “constructive ideas” on disputes and reiterated “its commitment to continue negotiating in good faith”; in sharp contrast, Egypt said talks did not make “any worthwhile progress” and accused Ethiopia of backtracking on previous agreements.

Opposition denounced controversial election bill amid ongoing disagreements about South Sudan’s readiness for 2024 poll; insecurity escalated in several states.

Opposition decried controversial election bill. Parliament 18 Sept hastily passed National Election Act amid pressure from President Kiir. VP Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) boycotted vote and staged walkout over last-minute amendment giving president-elect right to appoint additional 5% of legislators, saying bill went against peace agreement and would lead to “undemocratic” poll; stance raises possibility of SPLA-IO boycotting 2024 vote as disagreement on prerequisites for credible election persisted. Other aspects of bill, such as increase in number of MPs from 250 to 332, dashed hopes for simplified and cheaper govt; Kiir 26 Sept signed bill into law. Kiir same day appointed Angelina Teny, former Defence Minister and Machar’s wife, as new Interior Minister; Teny’s sacking from Defence Minister position in March had caused controversy for violating peace agreement.

Insecurity, including abuses by govt forces, intensified. Unknown assailants 16 Sept killed four in ambush on Akobo-Bor road (Jonglei state). Unknown assailants 23 Sept attacked UN children fund (UNICEF) convoy that had been delivering aid in Central Equatoria State, killing two aid workers and destroying humanitarian supplies; UNICEF subsequently paused deliveries to area. Month saw President Kiir’s South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), disgruntled by low wages, step up abuses. Notably, SSPDF soldiers 7 Sept extrajudicially executed civilian in Bor town (Jonglei). SSPDF commander 17 Sept reportedly executed former commander of Pochalla area (Greater Pibor Administrative Area) who had allegedly begun mobilising Anyuak youth after army sacked him; ensuing fighting between SSPDF and Anyuak youth 17-18 Sept killed at least ten, with SSPDF using helicopter gunships against Pochalla town’s population.

President Kiir engaged in flurry of diplomatic activity. President Kiir 4 Sept hosted Sudanese army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Juba, 17 Sept welcomed Sudanese delegation led by Darfur governor Minni Minawi. Kiir 14 Sept visited Ugandan President Museveni in Ugandan capital Kampala, 18 Sept met UN Sec-Gen António Guterres in New York, and 28 Sept met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russian capital Moscow. President’s frequent foreign trips indicated confidence in measures undertaken to coup-proof regime.

Fighting between army and paramilitary forces continued in Khartoum and Darfur, killing highest number of civilians in one month since fighting erupted; army leader conducted regional tour.

RSF battled for control of Khartoum. Fighting in Khartoum and sister city Omdurman continued as paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sought to fully conquer capital, 16-18 Sept launching well-coordinated attacks on remaining army bases. Army responded with intensified airstrikes, resulting in high civilian casualties; notably, shelling 5 Sept killed over 30 in Omdurman and alleged army drone 10 Sept killed around 50 in Khartoum. After Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Burhan’s escape from capital late Aug, army announced plans to form emergency govt in Port Sudan; army walked back plans following wide opposition from various actors including civilians and instead late Sept announced reshuffle to various ministries.

RSF-army clashes raged in Darfur, rebel group expanded foothold further east. Having captured most of West Darfur, RSF concentrated its assault on army in North and South Darfur, with latter’s state capital Nyala witnessing most intense fighting outside Khartoum. Army’s indiscriminate airstrikes caused scores of civilian casualties in mostly Arab-populated areas, with shelling 13 Sept killing at least 40. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North continued to expand its foothold, emerging as third major force in conflict. Meanwhile, army and tribal militia known as Forces of the Eastern Sudan Parties and Movements Alliance 18 Sept clashed in Port Sudan over control of security checkpoints.

Burhan met with number of regional leaders. Burhan continued regional tour among countries seen to support army before 21 Sept addressing UN General Assembly in New York. Efforts to restart talks faced more setbacks. Notably, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 8 Sept reiterated rejection of Kenyan-led Intergovernmental Authority on Development mediation, while Burhan 9 Sept rejected African Union’s (AU) mediation after AU Commission Chairperson Musa Faki 3 Sept met RSF special envoy Yousif Izzat. Meanwhile, U.S. 6 Sept sanctioned prominent RSF leaders, which could dissuade group from mediation process involving U.S., 28 Sept levied additional sanctions against prominent pro-Bashir politician and two companies supporting RSF.

China continued its maritime presence in waters surrounding Japan, while Tokyo rejected Beijing’s claim over disputed islands and voiced concern over its military build-up.

China continued regional maritime presence. As of 28 Sept, Japan spotted 92 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone during month and detected eight vessels within Japan’s territorial sea. China 11-15 Sept conducted five-day military exercise in West Pacific during which its Shandong carrier strike group was spotted entering waters southeast of Taiwan and Bashi Channel, while eight additional Chinese navy warships passed through Miyako straits in East China Sea; during drill, Shandong launched around 40 fighter jet missions and 20 helicopter sorties.

Japan rejected China’s claim over disputed islands. Japan 5 Sept protested new standard map published by China in late Aug, which depicted disputed Senkaku islands – known as Diaoyu islands to China – as part of China’s territory. Japan 20 Sept asked China to remove buoy found by Japan’s Coast Guard near Senkaku/Diaoyu islands believed to be collecting data related to weather and sea conditions.

Tokyo acknowledged strained ties and China’s military development. After Japanese PM Fumio Kishida 13 Sept reshuffled cabinet, newly-appointed FM Yoko Kamikawa next day asserted it is important for Japan to maintain frank dialogue with China to improve strained ties, while newly-appointed Defence Minister Minoru Kihara 17 Sept expressed concern over China’s rapid military build-up in East China Sea and South China Sea; Kihara also said Tokyo and U.S. will step up joint exercises as pair 14 Sept began Orient Shield 23 drills in Hokkaido prefecture.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia in quest for closer military cooperation, while Pyongyang directed harsh rhetoric at U.S. and expelled detained U.S. soldier held since July.

Kim Jong Un’s trip to Russia signalled potential for deeper military cooperation. In first overseas trip since 2019, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un – accompanied by coterie of military and diplomatic officials – 10 Sept crossed border into Russia’s Far East and 13 Sept met Russian President Putin; meeting came amid speculation over potential deal between pair on provision of North Korean munitions to Russia’s war in Ukraine, as Russia strongly implied it would assist North Korea with its faltering satellite launch program. Pyongyang tried and failed on two occasions this year to launch satellites and vowed third attempt in Oct, which may be timed to coincide with 10 Oct anniversary of founding of Korean Workers’ Party. South Korean President Yoon 21 Sept declared any deal in which Russia assists Pyongyang’s weapons development will be “direct provocation”. U.S., Japan and South Korea 22 Sept called any cooperation “serious concern”.

South Korea held military parade, Pyongyang slammed U.S. during UN address. After one of two regular large-scale U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises ended on 31 Aug, South Korea 26 Sept held major military parade on streets of Seoul for first time in decade. In address to UN General Assembly, North Korean ambassador Kim Song 26 Sept accused U.S. and allies of “reckless and continued hysteria of nuclear showdown” that made 2023 “extremely dangerous year” and accused U.S. of “a sinister intention to provoke a nuclear war.”

North Korea expelled Private Travis King. U.S. soldier who fled across border into North Korea during tour of Panmunjom in July was transferred to American custody in China on 27 Sept; U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan thanked Sweden – U.S. protecting power in North Korea – and China for their roles. According to North Korean state media, King confessed that “he harbored ill feeling against inhuman maltreatment and racial discrimination within the U.S. army and was disillusioned about the unequal U.S. society”.

Taiwan voiced concern over “abnormal” Chinese aerial and maritime presence around island, while U.S. maintained strong military and diplomatic support for Taiwan.

Chinese aircraft around Taiwan set new daily record. As of 28 Sept, Taiwan spotted 512 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which at least 216 either crossed unofficial demarcation median line or were detected in Taiwan’s Southwest air defence identification zone; Taiwan sighted 187 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Notably, 103 Chinese planes 18 Sept were detected around island – marking highest total for incursions in single day – with 40 crossing median line. After Taiwan’s defence ministry 24 Sept announced it observed Chinese activities near Dacheng Bay in China’s southern Fuijan province, Taiwan’s Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng next day said China’s drills and heightened activity are “quite abnormal”; Kuo-cheng 23 Sept said China’s activity risk “getting out of hand” and expressed concern about accidental clash sparking wider conflict. U.S. guided missile destroyer Ralph Johnson and Canadian navy frigate HMAS Ottawa 9 Sept sailed through Taiwan Strait.

U.S. maintained military and diplomatic support for Taiwan. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan 16 Sept met Chinese FM Wang Yi, raising cross-strait issues. U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken and Chinese Vice Premier Han Zheng 18 Sept met in New York on sidelines of UN General Assembly, during which Blinken stressed importance of stability in Taiwan Strait. After U.S. late Aug approved $80mn military package for Taiwan under program typically reserved for sovereign nations, Taiwan and U.S. 20 Sept announced new cooperation deal to build joint cybersecurity supply chain under U.S.-Taiwan Technology Trade and Investment Collaboration framework.

In other important developments. China’s state council 12 Sept announced measures to encourage Taiwanese citizens to visit, study, work and do business in Fujian province to deepen cross-strait development. Kuomintang party presidential candidate Hou You-ih 15 Sept kicked off eight-day visit to U.S., advocating “3D strategy” for managing cross straits relations that includes deterrence, dialogue and de-escalation. Taiwan 28 Sept launched its first indigenous defense submarine “Narwhal”.

Tensions mounted between Taliban and Pakistan over Pakistani Taliban attacks and deadly border clashes, while de facto authorities tightened harsh governance policies.

Taliban and Pakistan traded barbs and clashed at border. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 6 Sept launched major offensive in Chitral district in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, leaving four soldiers and dozen militants dead (see Pakistan); Islamabad issued demarche to Taliban authorities, claiming militants directed operation from Afghan soil and demanded Kabul stop the attacks. Pakistani and Taliban border forces same day clashed at Torkham border crossing, killing at least two Taliban soldiers, wounding several others and forcing crossing’s closure for nine days. Reports 18 Sept emerged Afghan authorities were constructing over 100 new border posts in Kunar, Nuristan and Nangarhar provinces purportedly aimed at preventing TTP cross-border movement.

Humanitarian appeal faced chronic under-funding. Ongoing humanitarian crisis continued to suffer funding shortages, prompting further cuts in humanitarian programs and external interventions. Notably, World Food Programme 5 Sept announced it cut rations to two million Afghans due to funding shortages; to plug gaps, Asian Development Bank 21 Sept announced $400mn grant and EU 20 Sept announced €140mn. Afghanistan’s economy continued to remain vulnerable and aid-dependent, albeit there are signs it might be faring slightly better than in past.

Taliban continued to restrict women’s rights and political space. Authorities late Aug prohibited women from visiting Band-e-Amir national park – well-frequented tourist spot – marking latest restriction on women’s social rights. De facto authorities in Sept continued to restrict political and civil space: by mid-Sept, reports emerged that Ministry of Justice had closed provincial offices of Hizb-e-Islami party and were taking similar actions against other political parties, including Hizb-ul-Tahrir. UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 20 Sept published report outlining human rights abuses against detainees, including excessive force and mistreatment during and after arrests.

In other important developments. Newly-appointed Chinese ambassador in Kabul 13 Sept presented credentials to de facto govt, signalling Beijing’s intent to explore avenues for normalisation with Kabul that might prompt regional countries to follow suit. Indications mid-Sept surfaced that security forces arrested major ISKP cell in Badakhshan province (northeast).

Opposition continued campaign to force PM’s resignation, govt’s human rights record fuelled international criticism and insecurity persisted in Rohingya refugee camps.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) mobilised against ruling Awami League. Ahead of elections in Jan 2024, BNP continued to organise mainly peaceful rallies, marches and sit-ins to demand PM Sheikh Hasina’s resignation, albeit at slower pace and with no sign of demonstrations reaching tipping point to bring country to standstill and dislodge govt; worsening economic crisis, resurgence of Islamist group Jamaat-e-Islami or death of detained BNP leader Khaleda Zia, however, could escalate tensions, or BNP could resort to violent tactics in coming months. Notably, rival supporters and police 1 Sept clashed in at least four districts, injuring more than 120, while attacks by Awami League supporters in Natore district 19 Sept injured 30 BNP members. Court 26 Sept ordered arrest of senior BNP member Ruhul Quddus Talukder Dulu and his wife.

Concerns persisted over govt’s human rights record. Govt 8 Sept fired Deputy Attorney General Imran Ahmed Bhuiyan after he told reporters that Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus – who faces almost 200 charges in case widely seen as govt retribution – is subject to judicial harassment. Court 14 Sept sentenced two members of human rights group Odhikar to two years imprisonment for report published ten years ago on alleged police massacre of members of Islamic organisation Hefazat-e-Islam; European Parliament same day expressed concern over deterioration of human rights, referencing sentencing.

Violence in Rohingya camps continued as govt sought repatriation. Gunmen 11 Sept shot dead man in camp 2. Clashes between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation in camp 7 killed two on 14 Sept. Armed Police Battalion 17 Sept engaged in gunfight with criminal gang. Meanwhile, govt 4 Sept sent delegation to Myanmar’s capital Naypyitaw for talks with regime on “technical issues” related to Rohingya repatriation; while both sides agreed to start repatriation by Dec, few are expected to return absent guarantees for citizenship. UK 12 Sept announced £3mn in aid for refugee response, while U.S. 21 Sept announced $116mn in aid to support Rohingya in Myanmar, Bangladesh and region.

Ethnic conflict in Manipur state showed no signs of ebbing, while major diplomatic row erupted with Canada after govt hosted G20 summit in boost for PM Modi ahead of 2024 elections.

Instability and attacks plagued Manipur state in north east. Meiteis continued to demand withdrawal of paramilitary forces Assam Rifles, as hundreds of protestors 10 Sept sought to storm chief minister’s secretariat; Chief Minister assured forces will be replaced this month. Heavy exchange of fire along border of Kuki-dominated Churachandpur and Meitei-dominated Bishnupur districts late Aug killed six. Suspected sniper 13 Sept shot dead Kuki policeman beyond buffer zone in Churachandpur district. Photos of two murdered Meitei students, missing since July, 25 Sept went viral; protesters angry with govt for slow pace of investigation tried to attack houses of Manipur’s Chief Minister and State President.

Modi govt faced its biggest international crisis to date. Canadian PM Justin Trudeau 18 Sept announced “credible allegations” that India was involved in killing of Sikh independence leader and Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh Najjar in June in Canada. India furiously rejected allegations and 21 Sept suspended visas for Canadian nationals. Allegations pose challenge for India to navigate international opprobrium and risk giving Sikh separatist Khalistan movement in Punjab state new lease of life.

India exhibited diplomatic skill while hosting G-20 summit. At G20 gathering in New Delhi, PM Modi 9 Sept welcomed African Union as group’s latest member and claimed central role in delivering joint declaration amid fraught international environment. Although Indian analysts noted absence of Chinese leader Xi Jinping may reflect sour bilateral relations, summit was seen as political triumph for Modi who seeks third term next year.

Govt sought airfield near disputed China boundary, Maoist violence continued. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh 12 Sept announced construction of Nyoma airfield, located 23km from Line of Actual Control (LAC), calling it “game changer”; airfield could become new friction point with China. Meanwhile, Maoists mid-Sept issued death threats against Maharashtra state minister for supporting six new mining projects and steel plant. Security forces 19 Sept killed two female Maoists in Dantewada district in Chhattisgarh state (centre).

Security operation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) highlighted threat of underground militancy, authorities clamped down on media and Supreme Court concluded hearing on region’s status.

Security forces continued operations against militants. Security forces 13 Sept started six-day major operation with heavy weapons against militants of The Resistance Force – affiliated to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba – in forested areas of Anantnag district, leaving four security personnel and two militants dead; operation underscored new militant strategy utilised since 2021 to lure security personnel to dense forests to inflict maximum damage and countered New Delhi’s narrative of normalcy in Kashmir. Militant strikes could pick up before onset of winter weather. Elsewhere in J&K, security forces 4-5 Sept killed militant in Jammu’s Reasi district; security forces 6 Sept killed two militants from Pakistan infiltrating Jammu’s Poonch district; clashes in Jammu’s Rajouri district between security forces and militants 12-13 Sept killed two militants and security member; security forces 16 Sept killed three militants during alleged infiltration attempt in Baramulla district along Line of Control. Security forces 18 Sept thwarted attack by militant with pistol in Srinagar.

Authorities continued crackdown on press. Police 1 Sept issued statement threatening legal action against BBC for publishing story on India’s crackdown on Kashmiri journalism. Police 14 Sept arrested journalist Majid Hyderi under stringent Public Safety Act; though seen as pro-govt, Hyderi was likely arrested for raising sensitive questions on social media regarding corruption allegations against Lieutenant Governor and another top official. Former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti 15 Sept said “This is how journalists who expose scams are accused of intimidation and defamation”.

Supreme Court concluded hearings on J&K’s status. Supreme Court 5 Sept reserved judgment, opting to give decision at later date, in petitions challenging constitutionality of govt’s decision in 2019 to revoke Article 370 (which offered J&K semi-autonomous status); Court appeared to urge govt to restore statehood and hold elections but hearings are seen in Kashmir as mere formality.

Twin suicide bombings in provinces bordering Afghanistan killed scores amid spate of militant assaults, while Pakistani and Taliban forces clashed on border.

Suicide attacks killed dozens in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Two suicide bombers targeting Islamic procession in Baluchistan province’s Mastung district and Mosque in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s Hangu city 29 Sept killed at least 59 people and injured dozens; Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) reportedly denied responsibility, as suspicions centred on local Islamic State affiliates. Earlier in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, TTP 6 Sept launched major offensive on two checkpoints in Chitral district that killed four soldiers and dozen militants; army alleged attack was coordinated from Afghan soil, leading Islamabad to issue demarche to Afghan Taliban authorities (see Afghanistan). Security forces 9 Sept clashed with militants in Chitral, killing seven and injuring six. Security forces 26 Sept arrested four alleged Islamic State-affiliated militants in provincial capital Peshawar. In Baluchistan province, bomb attack 14 Sept injured at least eleven in Mastung district; police suspected Islamic State of targeting Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) leader, Hafiz Hamdullah.

Hostilities flared between Islamabad and Taliban. Pakistani and Taliban forces 6 Sept clashed at Torkham border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan, killing at least two Taliban militants and forcing crossing’s closure for nine days.

Election Commission continued preparations for polls. Amid talks with political parties on timing of election – which according to constitution must be held by 9 Nov – Election Commission 1 Sept announced that it aims to complete process of delimiting new constituency boundaries, following census conducted this year, by 30 Nov; Commission 21 Sept announced elections will be held in last week of Jan 2024. Reuters 14 Sept reported that Election Commission had privately written to caretaker PM Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar expressing concerns about “a general perception that the caretaker government is a continuation of the previous government”. Meanwhile, former PM Imran Khan’s lawyer 13 Sept revealed court had extended Khan’s judicial custody related to charges of publicising state secrets until 26 Sept; Court 26 Sept extended Khan’s custody until 10 Oct.

New allegations of govt involvement in 2019 Easter bombings took centre stage, UN Human Rights chief lamented country’s poor accountability and ethnic tensions grew more severe.

New claims surfaced alleging govt involvement in 2019 attacks. UK news outlet Channel 4 on 5 Sept broadcast documentary with eyewitnesses alleging military intelligence officials were involved in organising 2019 Easter Sunday suicide bombings and obstructed police investigations before and after attacks, accusing current head of State Intelligence Service Suresh Salley of meeting directly with bombers. In response, Catholic Church reiterated calls for international investigation, while main opposition party called for international support to domestic probe; Salley, former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Defence Ministry rejected accusations, while President Wickremesinghe 10 Sept announced two separate committees to investigate claims.

Ethnic tensions escalated. Tamil district judge T. Saravanarajah 23 Sept resigned his position in northern district of Mullaitivu and fled country, after receiving threats apparently linked to recent rulings that had angered prominent Sinhala nationalist monks and govt parliamentarians. Stick-wielding Sinhala nationalists 17 Sept attacked Tamil parliamentarian Selvarajah Kanjendran in Trincomalee, Eastern Province, during march commemorating death of Tamil nationalist hunger striker; organisers cancelled another commemoration event in capital Colombo amid threats.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) criticized “accountability deficit”. UN Human Rights Council 11 Sept commenced session following High Commissioner’s 6 Sept report that found “lack of accountability at all levels remains the fundamental main human rights problem”; report urged international community “to play an important complementary role”. Govt reiterated its rejection of resolutions that set up OHCHR “accountability project” and criticised OHCHR’s “increasing mandate”. Govt 15 Sept published revised draft of Anti-Terrorism Act, followed on 19 Sept by release of draft Online Safety Act; activists and opposition politicians expressed strong criticism of both, arguing they posed major threats to democratic rights.

In another important development. International Monetary Fund officials 27 Sept announced they had failed to reach agreement with govt to unlock next $330mn tranche of funding; officials expressed concern at lower-than-projected govt revenue and announced completion of first six-month review also depends on foreign debt restructuring.

Regime and resistance forces battled in several regions as tensions rose with Arakan Army in Rakhine state; junta confirmed election delay and regional bloc ASEAN condemned regime’s inaction.

Regime and resistance forces continued hostilities across multiple parts of country. In Kachin state (north), clashes continued between Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and military: fierce fighting 6 Sept erupted south of Namsan Yang village and KIA 9-12 Sept assaulted military convoy seeking to reinforce positions by road from state capital, forcing convoy’s retreat. In northern Shan State (east), hostilities intensified between Ta’ang National Liberation Army and military, notably around Sei Lant village on border with China and between Kuktai town and Namhpatkar village on Mandalay-Muse highway. In Rakhine state (west), tensions rose between Arakan Army and military as both sides staged tit-for-tat arrests of other’s members. In Kayah state (centre-east), regime forces made slow progress towards rebel-held southern areas amid fierce opposition after resistance forces in June seized large parts of Mese township on Thai border. In Kayin state (centre-east), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and allied forces waged attacks on isolated regime outposts: notably, KNLA 1 Sept seized post in Kyaukkyi township, sparking fierce fighting, and allied forces 3 Sept launched drone strike on administrative office in Myawaddy border town, killing five.

Regime signalled election delays and signed confidential agreement with minor groups. Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing 1 Sept reiterated that election will be held only after Oct 2024 national census; data of census is unlikely to be finalised before mid-2025 and conducting count is likely to trigger violence. Meanwhile, regime delegation and five signatories of 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 31 Aug signed “final comprehensive peace agreement”, although terms were not revealed; groups are relatively minor players in country’s conflicts.

ASEAN adopted new response mechanism. ASEAN leaders 5 Sept revealed formation of “troika” comprising former, current and upcoming bloc chairs to manage response to crisis; in group’s strongest condemnation to date, leaders said they “were gravely concerned by the lack of substantial progress”; bloc decided Myanmar will not take up rotating chair in 2026.

Political and criminal violence persisted in south, while security forces continued to battle Communist insurgents.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In Maguindanao del Sur province, unidentified individuals 4 Sept fired two M-79 grenades in residential areas of Buluan town, injuring one. Gunfight 12 Sept erupted between Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) militants and members of Islamic State-inspired Dawlah Islamiyah in Datu Hoffer Ampatuan town, killing three Dawlah Islamiyah members and displacing 70 families of local indigenous community. Clashes between army and Dawlah Islamiyah 23 Sept killed one militant and injured three others in Ampatuan town, Maguindanao. Rival members of MILF’s 106 Base Command 19 Sept clashed in Datu Abdullah Sangki town, killing one civilian. In Maguindanao del Norte province, assailant 18 Sept killed local candidate for village polls in South Upi municipality. Sulu province’s local govt 11 Sept declared Sulu free of Abu Sayyef Group.

Hostilities persisted between security forces and Communist militants. Clashes between security forces and Communist rebels in Luzon island (Quezon province) in north, Mindanao Island (Surigao and Bukidnon) in south, and Visayas Islands (Negros and Panay) in centre killed at least 23 combatants and civilians.

Standoff continued between China and Philippines over disputed Scarborough Shoal, while regional countries conducted naval drills across South China Sea (SCS).

Dispute continued between Beijing and Manila over shoal. After escalation in tensions in Aug, China and Philippines 8 Sept were embroiled in another standoff over Second Thomas Shoal as Chinese Coast Guard attempted to block entry of Philippine vessels on resupply mission to grounded BRB Sierra Madre; Philippine Defence Secretary Gilbert Teodoro 13 Sept said resupply missions would continue despite “harassment” and called for forging new alliances. Philippines 26 Sept removed 300-metre “floating barrier” erected by Beijing in part of Scarborough Shoal that blocked its fishermen’s activities, calling it “clear violation of international law” and asserting “Filipino people will not back down”. Philippine President Marcos Jr. 29 Sept said “We are staying away from fiery words, but our resolve to defend Philippine territory is strong”.

Military activity in region remained high. Philippines and U.S. 4 Sept conducted joint sail in waters west of Palawan Island; Philippines and Canada 25 Sept conducted joint sail in same area. China’s aircraft carrier Shandong 15 Sept returned to SCS, along with five navy surface ships. Regional bloc ASEAN 19 Sept held its first joint military drill involving ten member states plus Timor-Leste near Indonesia’s Batam Island. Chinese state media 20 Sept reported China had built two ground stations for its BeiDou satellite system on two disputed reefs in Paracel Islands, which are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. China 28 Sept issued navigation warning for planned exercises in SCS.

U.S. and Vietnam boosted ties. During President Biden’s historic visit to Vietnam, pair 10 Sept called for peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law without threat or use of force; Vietnam and U.S. upgraded their diplomatic ties to Comprehensive Strategic partnership, a special category that Vietnam hitherto reserved for Laos and Cambodia. During visit to China, Malaysia’s PM Anwar Ibrahim 17 Sept said Malaysia and China agreed to have continuous and open communication over SCS to ensure situation remains peaceful.

New cabinet entered office focused on economic improvement, while peace dialogue in deep south awaited new govt delegation amid ongoing insurgent attacks.

King approved new cabinet. After Pheu Thai Party nominee Srettha Thavisin, a real-estate mogul and political novice, was elected Thailand’s 30th prime minister in late Aug, King Vajiralongkorn 2 Sept endorsed new cabinet that is intended to focus on economy; its policy statement issued 11 Sept included controversial 10,000 baht ($280) digital wallet scheme, energy costs and amending constitution to make it more democratic. Supreme Court 20 Sept issued lifetime ban on holding public office for Pannika Wanich, former MP and founding member of Future Forward Party, after National Anti-Corruption Commission accused Pannika of breaching ethical standards for Facebook posts in 2010 deemed disrespectful to monarchy. Court 26 Sept convicted human rights lawyer and activist Anon Nampa of lèse-majesté for Oct 2020 speech, sentencing to four years in prison.

Deep south dialogue remained in abeyance while insurgent attacks continued. Dialogue between govt and main separatist armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) awaited appointment of new delegation by incoming govt. Meanwhile, in major attack late Aug, militants ambushed police patrol in Yarang district, Pattani province, with small arms and improvised grenades, killing four police officers and two defence volunteers; militants simultaneously bombed five power poles at three nearby locations, hampering response of security forces. Elsewhere in Pattani, assailant 1 Sept threw pipe bomb into army base in Thung Yang Daeng district. Motorcycle-borne militants 12 Sept shot and wounded defence volunteer in Saiburi district. In Narathiwat province’s Sungai Padi district, roadside IED 4 Sept injured two military personnel and IED 7 Sept killed ranger at shooting range. Militants 30 Sept-1 Oct staged shooting and grenade attacks on 11 security outposts across three provinces, wounding one ranger and one civilian.

President Biya conducted minor military reshuffle; separatists enforced lockdown as school year started in Anglophone regions.

President Biya made changes in armed forces. Amid series of coups in West Africa and neighbouring Gabon, Biya 30 Aug replaced some colonel rank officers holding technical positions, and 4 Sept signed decree creating specialised military school in distant Motcheboum town, East region, to train soldiers for peace missions.

Separatists launched several attacks amid lockdown in Anglophone regions. As new school year started, Anglophone separatists 4-18 Sept violently enforced lockdown in North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions; lockdown served as show of force and protest at unresolved conflict. Notably, armed separatists 2 Sept killed two head teachers in Belo town, Boyo division (NW); 5 Sept attacked military truck with explosive device in Lebialem division (SW), killing at least one civilian and wounding others; and 7 Sept stopped cars and shot at passengers to block access to Muea neighbourhood of SW regional capital Buea, leaving three civilians killed. Suspected separatist fighters 29 Sept also killed gendarme in Awing locality, Mezam division (NW).

Military stepped up monitoring operations in Far North after spate of jihadist attacks. After Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga divisions in Aug experienced surge in violence, soldiers 9 Sept thwarted Boko Haram (BH) raids on Limani and Djakana villages (Mayo-Sava division), killing two militants. Army 21 Sept ambushed BH fighters in Galdala village (Mayo-Tsanaga), killing three. Islamic State West Africa Province militants 21 Sept reportedly killed one gendarme in Darak, Logone-et-Chari division.

In other important developments. Cameroon and Nigeria early Sept launched joint operation against Biafra separatist group Black Marine in Bakassi Peninsula (SW), reportedly dislodging militants from Abana town, Idabato subdivision, by 10 Sept.

Presidential Guard detained army officers, reflecting widening rifts within army amid series of coups in West and Central Africa; armed group violence continued unabated in hinterland.

Coup in Gabon sparked tensions in Bangui. Amid rumours of imminent coup in Bangui in wake of military overthrow of President Bongo in Gabon, Presidential Guard 10 Sept arrested unknown number of army officers, including Capt. Kamezo-Laï Gilbert and Chief Warrant Officer Kohoté Fabia, both close relatives of diaspora opposition activist Regis Sikangba. Armed forces in following days started identity checks by night on roads of capital Bangui.

President Touadéra proceeded to arrest former rebel leader turned ally. Authorities 4 Sept detained former rebel leader Abdoulaye Hissène, and UN-backed Special Criminal Court 7 Sept charged him with crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 2017 as one of main leaders of Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic. NGO Human Rights Watch next day welcomed move as step toward ending impunity. Many in govt circles however perceived Hissène’s arrest as disloyal move from Touadéra, as Hissène had become govt’s ally since 2019 peace agreement.

Armed groups continued to increase presence in hinterland following referendum. In Nana-Mambéré prefecture (west), govt forces and Russian Wagner Group paramilitaries 2 Sept killed eight 3R rebels in operation 70km from Baoro town; Wagner and 3R elements 10 Sept clashed in Baboua sub-prefecture, leaving one Wagner dead. Attacks by unidentified armed men continued in Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture (north), including ambushes on army checkpoints in Djamassinda and Miaméré villages on 7 and 11 Sept. Rwandan peacekeepers from 26 Aug onward intensified patrols in villages between Mbrès and Koukourou, Nana-Gribizi prefecture (centre), after locals reported increased armed group presence. Meanwhile, UN mission (MINUSCA) 27 Sept announced deployment of peacekeepers in Mboki city, Haut-Mbomou prefecture (east), after Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militia 31 Aug attacked regional peace committee delegation.

In other important developments. As part of unprecedented tour of African countries collaborating with Wagner, Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Col-Gen Yanous Bek Evrourov, 2 Sept met with Touadéra in Bangui. Pursuing diplomatic appeasement initiated since early 2023, French President Macron and Touadéra 13 Sept met in France’s capital Paris.

Deadly incident at military base run by French forces sparked calls for departure of French troops; influx of Sudanese refugees continued to strain eastern provinces.

Constitutional referendum remained controversial. Opposition coalition led by Republican Platform leader, former minister Sidick Abdelkerim Haggar, 13 Sept called for boycott of constitutional referendum scheduled for 17 December. Another gathering of 15 major opposition parties 13 Sept denounced “violation of the principle of equality and uniqueness of place and time” as authorities 28 Aug-16 Sept conducted electoral census in country’s central and northern provinces after having covered southern provinces between 24 July and 6 Aug.

Killing of Chadian soldier sparked calls for French troops’ departure. French soldier 5 Sept shot and killed Chadian soldier in French military base in Faya city, Borkou province, allegedly in self-defence. Angry residents 5-6 Sept took to the streets in protest and tried to make their way into French base, prompting Chadian security forces to use live ammunition to disperse gathering. Chadian and French armies 6 Sept announced joint investigation into incident. Coalition of opposition parties and civil society organisations Wakit Tama 7 Sept denounced “murder” and called for withdrawal of French troops.

Eastern provinces continued to face humanitarian fallout of Sudan war. International Organisation for Migration 11 Sept said 400,000 people had crossed border into Chad since beginning of war in Sudan, including at least 62,300 Chadian returnees. UN humanitarian agency 12 Sept published revised Humanitarian Response Plan for Chad, with required funds increasing from $674.9mn to $920.6mn. World Bank same day announced new funding of $340mn to help Chad cope with influx of Sudanese refugees and support host communities.

In other important developments. Opposition figure Succès Masra, head of Les Transformateurs political party, late Sept said he would return to Chad no later than 20 October one-year anniversary of crackdown on protests.

Ruling junta appeared set to strike a balance between cementing power grip and promoting inclusive transition back to constitutional order.

Under pressure from Central African regional bloc (ECCAS) to return power to civilians, coup leader, Gen Brice Oligui Nguema, 1 Sept said he will not rush to elections that “repeat past mistakes”. Junta next day adopted transitional charter providing for new constitution to be adopted by referendum, and prohibiting members of provisional govt from standing in next elections, but not explicitly excluding Oligui Nguema, who was sworn in 4 Sept as transitional president. Junta 6 Sept said deposed President Bongo has been released from house arrest and is free to leave country for medical treatment. ECCAS 7 Sept suspended Gabon’s membership. Oligui Nguema same day appointed Raymond Ndong Sima, one-time PM under Bongo and subsequent opposition leader, as PM. Ndong Sima 9 Sept unveiled cabinet composed of military officers, Bongo-era officials and civil society activists, and next day hinted at two-year transition period before elections. Nguema 11 Sept appointed mixture of army officers, civil society activists, Bongo regime and opposition politicians to lead transition parliament, notably prominent opposition figure Paulette Missambo as Senate head. Civil society activist and new Senate VP Marc Ona 16 Sept stated civil society’s proposed transition period is six months to one year. Authorities 19 Sept detained Bongo’s eldest son, Noureddin Bongo Valentin, and several members Bongo’s cabinet on charges of “high treason” and “corruption”. Nong Sima 22 Sept addressed UN General Assembly, defended military takeover as “lesser evil” that prevented bloodshed following Bongo’s disputed re-election, and 27 Sept outlined plans for “national dialogue” to be held in 2024 to pave the way for drawing up new constitution.