Darfur: Die EU muss handeln
Darfur: Die EU muss handeln
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Op-Ed / Africa

Darfur: Die EU muss handeln

Die Darfur-Krise ist eine humanitäre Katastrophe. Über 200.000 Tote, tausende Vergewaltigte und Gefolterte und 2.6 Millionen Vertriebene sind die tragische Bilanz des Krieges der sudanesischen Regierung gegen die eigene Bevölkerung. Die Militäraktion, die als ein Schlag gegen lokale Rebellen begann, wurde schnell in eine höchst effektive Tötungs- und Vertreibungskampagne gegenüber der Zivilbevölkerung verwandelt.

Die Regierung des Sudan rekrutierte und bezahlte lokale Milizen - die Dschandschawid - die seitdem hunderte von Dörfern und Städten angegriffen haben, oft in Zusammenarbeit mit uniformierten sudanesischen Streitkräften. Nicht selten erleichtert die sudanesische Luftwaffe den Dschandschawid ihre Angriffe auf ohnehin wehrlose Dörfer.

Die Folgen dieser Angriffe waren und sind verheerend. Ein Drittel der Menschen in Darfur wurde gezwungen ihre Häuser zu verlassen. Sie leben entweder in Lagern im Inneren des Sudan, wo sie dem Terror der Dschandschawid weiterhin ausgeliefert sind, oder jenseits der Grenze im Tschad.

Bemühungen von Hilfsorganisationen, die Vertriebenen innerhalb des Sudan mit dem Nötigsten zu versorgen, scheitern häufig an genauso sinnlosen wie berechnenden Auflagen der Regierung in Khartum. Und selbst wenn die Hilfe ankommt, scheint es so, als ob die internationale Gemeinschaft, um es mit den Worten eines Mitarbeiters der Vereinten Nationen (UN) auszudrücken, "die Menschen mit humanitärer Hilfe am Leben erhält bis sie abgeschlachtet werden".

In einer solchen Situation reicht humanitäre Hilfe allein nicht. Der Fall Darfur verlangt nach konsequentem internationalem Handeln. Wir alle teilen die Verantwortung, das Töten zu stoppen und die Rückkehr der Menschen in ihre Dörfer zu ermöglichen. In den letzten drei Jahren hat der UN-Sicherheitsrat in sage und schreibe zehn Resolutionen die sudanesische Regierung aufgefordert, ihren Kurs zu ändern und ihrer Verpflichtung nachzukommen, die eigenen Bürger zu schützen. Unter anderem forderte der Rat die Entwaffnung der Dschandschawid durch Khartum. Alle Versprechen der Regierung, dies zu tun, blieben folgenlos.

Dabei schien im November 2004 eine friedliche Lösung fast greifbar, als Regierung und Rebellen sich in der nigerianischen Hauptstadt Abuja auf ein Waffenstillstands- und humanitäres Abkommen geeinigt hatten. Für einen kurzen Moment bestand die Hoffnung auf Versöhnung, zumal zur gleichen Zeit im kriegsgeplagten Süden des Landes ein großer Schritt in Richtung Frieden gemacht wurde. Eine UN-Sicherheitsratsresolution in Verbindung mit internationalen Vermittlungsbemühungen hatte den Weg für ein Ende des zwanzigjährigen Krieges im Südsudan geebnet - ein Durchbruch, den die Regierung und die Rebellen im Süden mit der Unterzeichnung einer Vereinbarung im Januar 2005 bekräftigt hatten. Ähnliches, so dachte man damals, würde nun auch im Westen des Landes folgen.

Aber Darfur hatte das Schlimmste noch längst nicht überstanden. Nach einer kurzen Unterbrechung des Flächenbombardements, kehrten die Kampfflugzeuge zurück, und die Dschandschawid setzten ihre Mord- und Vertreibungskampagne am Boden fort. Die neue Runde der Darfur-Friedensverhandlungen, die im Dezember 2004 begonnen hatte, wurde schnell eingestellt, weil die Regierung zeitgleich, und in eklatanter Missachtung des gerade unterschriebenen Waffenstillstandsabkommens, eine große Militäroffensive einleitete. Ein Verhalten, das symptomatisch blieb für den mangelnden Respekt der Regierung für eingegangene Verpflichtungen.

Letzten August, schließlich, entschied der UN-Sicherheitsrat, die bislang im Sudan stationierten und hoffnungslos überforderten Truppen der Afrikanischen Union (AU) durch eine 20 300 Mann starke UN-Friedenstruppe zu ersetzen. Khartum aber verweigerte, wenig überraschend, seine Zustimmung. Man einigte sich auf den Kompromiss einer gemeinsamen AU-UN-Truppe, die in drei Phasen aufgestellt werden sollte. Die sudanesische Regierung nutzte bis heute jedoch weiterhin jede Gelegenheit, die Stationierung zu verzögern und die Gespräche hinzuziehen. Ihr letzter Schachzug, Anfang März, war der Versuch, eine Reihe von neuen Auflagen für die zweite Aufstellungsphase durchzusetzen, mit dem Argument, dass die Truppe kein Mandat zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung haben sollte. Laut Khartum könne die sudanesische Polizei diese Aufgabe erfüllen. Dies ist blanker Zynismus!

Damit wird Kern des Problems sehr klar: Wir haben es in Khartum mit einer Regierung zu tun, die entweder nicht fähig oder nicht Willens ist, ihre eigenen Bürger vor Massengewalt und Gräueltaten zu schützen. Nach dem anerkannten Prinzip der "Verantwortung zu Schützen" ("Responsibility to protect"), das von den Staats- und Regierungschefs beim UN-Weltgipfel 2005 einstimmig verabschiedet wurde, geht die Verantwortung für den Schutz der Bevölkerung auf die internationale Gemeinschaft über, wenn ein Staat selbst diese Aufgabe nicht erfüllen kann oder will. Dieser Verantwortung kann und muss die internationale Gemeinschaft mit einer breiten Auswahl von Maßnahmen nachkommen - wenn nötig auch mit militärischer Gewalt.

Eine militärische Intervention in Darfur gegen den Willen Khartums steht heute jedoch außer Frage. Es fehlt nicht nur am nötigen politischen Willen für einen internationalen Kampfeinsatz, sondern es gibt auch berechtigte Zweifel an der Durchführbarkeit und Erfolgsaussicht einer solchen Operation.

Allerdings stehen der internationalen Gemeinschaft auch eine ganze Reihe anderer Möglichkeiten zur Verfügung. Obgleich diese vorzugsweise vom UN-Sicherheitsrat ausgehen sollten, so kann und muss die EU selbst dennoch die ihr möglichen Maßnahmen ergreifen. Solche Maßnahmen sollten darauf abzielen, den Preis erheblich zu erhöhen, den Khartum für seine Behinderung von Hilfslieferungen und seine politische Hinhaltetaktiken in Bezug auf internationale Truppen bezahlen muss.

Es ist daher wichtig, dass die EU-Außenminister dem Ruf des Europäischen Parlaments folgen und durchgreifende Sanktionen gegen die Regierung des Sudan verhängen. Die Schlüsselfiguren des Regimes wurden von einer UN-Untersuchungskommission und einem UN-Expertengremium längst klar identifiziert. Gegen diese Verantwortlichen müssen EU-weite Reiseverbote ausgesprochen und ihre Auslandskonten auf Eis gelegt werden.

Außerdem sollten gezielt Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, die da ansetzen wo es die sudanesische Regierung besonders schmerzt: bei den Einnahmen aus dem Ölverkauf. Das heißt auch, ein Augenmerk auf ausländische Investitionen und Lieferung von Gütern und Dienstleistungen zu richten. Die EU und ihre Mitgliedsstaaten müssen dringend Gesetze auf den Weg bringen, die den in ihren Ländern ansässigen Unternehmen eine direkte Beteiligung an Sudans Ölsektor und damit zusammenhängenden Industrien untersagen.

Außerdem sollte eine Untersuchung der Auslandskonten aller sudanesischer Unternehmen autorisiert werden, die mit der regierenden Nationalen Kongress Partei in Verbindung gebracht werden. Dies würde gewährleisten, dass vor allem jene Mitglieder und Sympathisanten des Regimes beeinträchtigt würden, die maßgeblich an der Finanzierung der Dschandschawid-Milizen beteiligt sind.

Solche gezielten Sanktionen würden auf die Schlüsselpersonen, ihre Macht und ihre Privilegien direkt zielen. Es ist höchste Zeit für Europa wirksame Massnahmen zu ergreifen, um das anhaltende Töten in Darfur zu beenden und den Menschen dort auch politisch zu helfen.

Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.

In a 1 February 2022 hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Crisis Group’s President & CEO Dr. Comfort Ero testified on the escalating situation in Sudan and outlined four main recommendations for the U.S. to help restore the civilian-led transition to democracy.

Good morning/afternoon, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Dr. Comfort Ero, and I am the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group. Previously I served as the organization’s Africa program director and I have spent my professional and academic career focusing on peace and security issues in Africa. The International Crisis Group is a global organisation committed to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of deadly conflict. We cover over 50 conflict situations around the world and our presence in Sudan dates back more than two decades.[fn]Crisis Group Africa Report N°281, Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution, 21 October 2019; Jonas Horner, “After the Coup, Restoring Sudan’s Transition”, Crisis Group Commentary, 5 November 2021; Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°168, The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement Sudan’s New Peace Agreement, 23 February 2021.Hide Footnote

I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about the deteriorating situation in Sudan today. The country is at a dangerous crossroads. Not for the first time in its history, the military has turned its back on the demands of the Sudanese people for more just and representative rule by violently seizing power. The coup on October 25 brought a sudden halt to a civilian-military coalition that since 2019 has been charged with steering Sudan toward elections and full civilian rule.[fn]Crisis Group Report, Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution, op. cit.; Horner, “After the Coup, Restoring Sudan’s Transition”, op.cit. It was a major reversal in a transition that had brought hope to so many in the Horn of Africa and beyond. I will share with you my analysis of the current situation in Sudan and recommendations for steps the United States might take to help guide it back on the path toward greater democracy and stability.

By way of background, the transition that was interrupted on October 25 followed 30 years of rule by the notorious strongman Omar al-Bashir.

  • After coming to office in a coup in June 1989, Bashir maintained his hold on power by repressing political opposition, fighting costly counter-insurgencies in the country’s peripheries and underwriting his factious security sector with patronage-driven expenditure that ate up, by some estimates, 70 per cent of the national budget.[fn]Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who was mandated to lead the civilian-military transition in August 2019, listed as an ambition driving down military expenditure to 20 per cent of the national budget. He said in some years, that budget line had stood at 80 per cent. “Sudan PM seeks to end the country’s pariah status”, AP, 25 August 2019.Hide Footnote
     
  • The patronage system that Bashir built eventually bankrupted the country and contributed to the strongman’s ouster. A small cabal of favoured cronies including Bashir’s Islamist allies from the National Congress Party, senior military officers (many of them drawn from the tiny riverine elite that has dominated Sudan’s military and politics for decades) and newly minted allies such as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was blamed for some of the worst violence in the western region of Darfur, benefited substantially from Sudan’s rigged, lopsided economy.[fn]“Who are Sudan’s RSF and their Commander Hemeti?”, Al Jazeera, 6 June 2019.Hide Footnote These same actors continue to try to preserve their privileges atop Sudan’s political, economic and security establishment.
     
  • Popular frustration over political repression, rising prices and a sclerotic economy that could not absorb Sudan’s ranks of unemployed youths helped trigger the protests that eventually drove Bashir from power. The uprising began in the south-eastern towns of Damazin and Sennar, where crowds took to the streets on 13 December 2018 in response to a tripling of bread prices. By the time the protests reached Atbara, the historic bastion of unionism in Sudan, demonstrators were demanding regime change. Against long odds and despite heavy repression, the protesters eventually overwhelmed the security forces, who staged a palace coup against Bashir on 11 April 2019.  
     
  • The military tried to maintain the upper hand but was forced under pressure both from the protest movement and external actors to compromise and accept to share power with civilians. International revulsion over a 3 June 2019 massacre of protesters encamped outside the military headquarters was particularly important in forcing the generals to cede to the will of the Sudanese people.[fn]“Sudan commemorates the June 3 Massacre”, Dabanga Sudan, 3 June 2021.Hide Footnote Under the terms of a 17 August Constitutional Declaration, the country would be governed by a hybrid civilian-military coalition for 39 months leading up to elections.
     
  • The task before that coalition was enormous. The new cabinet headed by the technocrat and diplomat Abdalla Hamdok was charged with breathing new life into Sudan’s anaemic economy, reforming political institutions to lay the ground for elections and delivering justice to the many Sudanese victims of atrocities during Bashir’s rule – and in the weeks following his fall. Despite the formidable obstacles the authorities faced, that coalition represented the country’s best hope for emerging into a stable, prosperous and democratic future and was a source of hope for those supporting democratic renewal in other countries in the region.
     
  • Always reluctant participants in the alliance, the generals barely disguised their opposition to the Hamdok administration’s reforms and were particularly opposed to efforts to deliver justice and to reshape the country’s economy. In defiance of the United States government and others who warned them against doing so, they seized power and ousted the civilians.

Today, unfortunately, the picture looks grim. The military violently applied the brakes on the transition in the early hours of October 25 when they placed Hamdok under house arrest, rounded up numerous other civilian officials in the administration, declared a state of emergency and dissolved key institutions including the cabinet. Since then, Sudan’s military chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken a series of steps to reverse the reforms the civilian-led administration had rolled out, including by disbanding a committee charged with reclaiming public assets, by packing the Sovereign Council, which serves as the country’s executive, with his allies and by appointing Bashir-era figures into key posts including in the judiciary and security forces.[fn]Crisis Group EU Watch List 2022, 27 January 2022.Hide Footnote The military attempted some window dressing when it reinstated Hamdok on 21 November, a move Sudanese protesters rightly dismissed as an effort to legitimise their power grab. Some efforts to stimulate talks among Sudanese actors to find a way out of the crisis continue although the prospects of a resolution appear dim.

[Sudan] has been on a downhill trajectory since the coup.

Overall, the country has been on a downhill trajectory since the coup. On 2 January, Hamdok resigned in frustration after failing to persuade the generals to stick to their commitments under the August 2019 constitutional charter, and in particular to give him a free hand to appoint a new cabinet. In the meantime, the public’s frustration has been growing. For the past few weeks, Sudanese people across the country have taken to the streets to signal their revulsion at the military’s power grab. The general’s response to the protests has come right out of the Bashir playbook. The security forces have repeatedly fired into crowds, killing dozens, according to human rights groups and the UN.[fn]“Bachelet condemns killings of peaceful protesters in Sudan”, UN, 18 November 2021.Hide Footnote A late December decree by military chief Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan gave the police effective immunity for their actions. Still, the Sudanese people continue to risk their lives by staging protests, work boycotts and other strike actions.

While it is not yet clear who will come out on top in this contest between the security forces and the street, there is evidence to suggest that the generals have gravely miscalculated the strength of their hand. This is a different Sudan from the one in which the army captured control of the state at least five times in the past, including in 1989 when Bashir took office.[fn]"A history of Sudan coups”, Statista, 25 October 2021.Hide Footnote Sudan has one of the youngest populations in the world.[fn]“After the Uprising: Including Sudanese Youth”, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2020.Hide Footnote Six in ten Sudanese are aged between fifteen and 30 – and the current generation rejects the notion that the country should go back to being governed by an unaccountable, out-of-touch elite.[fn]Sudan’s Political Impasse”, The Horn (Crisis Group podcast), 26 January 2022.Hide Footnote This mobilised, youthful population showed its power at the end of 2018 when it rose up in protest at Bashir’s repressive, kleptocratic rule. The protest movement captured the imagination of pro-democracy campaigners well beyond Sudan with its diversity, with the prominent role that women played – sometimes outnumbering men in demonstrations – with its tenacity, and ultimately with its success. Against what many viewed as tall odds, it brought a halt to Bashir’s rule. Since the coup, this movement has again shown its strength by mobilising millions of Sudanese to take to the streets and send a clear signal to the generals that they will not, as past generations of officers did, get away with imposing their will on the Sudanese people.[fn]“Deaths Reported in Sudan as ‘March of Millions’ Demands Restoration of Civilian Rule”, Voice of America, 30 October 2021.Hide Footnote

Getting the transition back on track would serve both the people of Sudan’s democratic aspirations and the interests of the United States.

Getting the transition back on track would serve both the people of Sudan’s democratic aspirations and the interests of the United States and other regional and international actors in the strategically important Horn of Africa – where Sudan sits between major regional powers Ethiopia and Egypt and shares a border with seven countries, several in the throes of conflict themselves. Support for Sudan’s transition would comport with the U.S. government’s stated commitment to champion democratic values and to “demonstrate that democracies can deliver by improving the lives of their own people”[fn]“President Biden to Convene Leaders’ Summit for Democracy”, White House, 11 August 2021.Hide Footnote . It would also be the surest pathway to medium- and long-term stability in the country.

The United States is one of Sudan’s most important external partners. It provides about half a billion dollars in assistance annually and was a champion of efforts to reconnect Sudan’s economy with international financial institutions. Given these ties and the United States government’s relations with all the main regional actors, the U.S. is well positioned to support efforts to reverse the military’s power grab and set Sudan back on a path toward elections and representative government. Specifically, it could:

  • Press the generals to immediately halt violence against protesters and coordinate targeted sanctions to hold them to account: As outlined, Sudan’s security forces have responded to peaceful protests by indiscriminately shooting into crowds and sometimes reportedly even pursuing fleeing and wounded demonstrators into hospitals.[fn]“Sudanese security forces ‘hunt down’ injured protesters in hospital”, France 24, 25 January 2022.Hide Footnote This pattern of behaviour, on top of its grave human cost, threatens to poison relations between the parties and render a resolution even further beyond reach. In coordination with partners including the African Union (AU) and the European Union, the United States should make clear that the generals will face consequences including asset freezes and travel bans if they continue to kill unarmed demonstrators. The White House should simultaneously convene an interagency process to design a targeted sanctions programs aimed at key figures in the military and outline that it is willing to deploy these against individuals that continue to sanction the killing of protesters or obstruct progress toward elections more broadly.
     
  • Support Sudanese-led efforts to rerail the transition: The United States has already signalled its backing for efforts to stimulate negotiations among the generals and civilian groups including the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the coalition that spearheaded the protest movement and neighbourhood resistance committees, which play an integral role in the day-to-day organisation of protests and have proved a particularly effective channel of resistance to the military coup. The United States should warn the generals against taking precipitous measures that could derail these potential talks, including refraining from unilaterally appointing a new prime minister. It should further insist that these talks are maximally inclusive and in particular that they should take on board the views of the resistance committees. The 2019 power-sharing agreement should be the blueprint for a compromise that could restore civilian-military governance and lead to elections.
     
  • Withhold financial assistance until the military reverses its coup: In the immediate aftermath of the military takeover, the United states suspended $700 million in assistance to Sudan. This was the right step given the generals’ brazen decision to terminate the power-sharing agreement. The United States should make clear to the generals that this support will not resume unless they accept to return to the path toward elections laid out in the 2019 power-sharing agreement. In the meantime, the United States should advance with efforts to repurpose some of its support to civil society groups and also to work with partners including the UN to offer direct assistance to Sudan’s long-suffering people.
     
  • Urge all regional actors to back a return to a civilian-led dispensation: Many on the Sudanese street perceive some external actors, namely Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, as tacitly backing military rule.[fn]Sudan’s Political Impasse”, op. cit.Hide Footnote Such perceptions will ultimately be damaging to those countries’ standing in Sudan if it is able to reinvigorate its transitional process. But it is still possible for these key regional actors to play an important role in helping Sudan return to a civilian-led transitional process, thereby protecting their relations with the Sudanese people. Given his strong background in regional diplomacy, Special Envoy Satterfield should be well positioned to engage these actors and urge them to use their privileged relations with Sudan’s generals to convey to them that the power-sharing agreement they torpedoed remains Sudan’s best and perhaps only chance for stability, a goal they all profess to share. With the welcome appointment of a new ambassador to Khartoum, the United States could play a key role in marshalling a coalition of actors within and outside Sudan that can help steer the country back toward the path to elections.


Sudan is at a historic hinge-point. The military’s power grab has derailed a transition that was an inspiration well beyond Sudan, and still could be, if the generals step back and allow Sudan’s civilians to steer the country to elections. With a piling set of challenges – not least an economy in deep distress, resurging violence in Darfur and elsewhere, and a tottering peace deal with armed groups – the generals can hardly afford to stonewall the Sudanese people’s demands for change. The world – and the United States – should stand with Sudan’s people in their quest for a more democratic and accountable government, an outcome that represents the country’s best hope for achieving long-run political, social and economic stability.

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