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Turkey’s PKK Conflict Kills almost 3,000 in Two Years
Turkey’s PKK Conflict Kills almost 3,000 in Two Years
How Turkey’s Ties to the West May Survive the Syrian War
How Turkey’s Ties to the West May Survive the Syrian War
A man walks among the wreckage of vehicles as Turkish rescue workers and police inspect the blast scene following a car bomb attack on a police station in the eastern Turkish city of Elazig, on August 18 2016. Ilyas Akengin / AFP

Turkey’s PKK Conflict Kills almost 3,000 in Two Years

20 July 2017 marks the two-year anniversary of a collapsed ceasefire that previously held for two-and-a-half-years between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Crisis Group's new analysis of open-source data reveals that the ongoing cycle of violence has now killed three times as many as the 2011-12 escalation.

On 20 July 2015, an Islamic State (ISIS) suicide bomb attack killed 33 and injured more than 100 mostly pro-Kurdish young activists in the majority Kurdish town of Suruç in south-eastern Turkey. That same day in nearby Adıyaman province, an alleged attack by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) killed a Turkish corporal. This marked the breakdown of a two-and-a-half-year ceasefire between the PKK – listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU – and the Turkish state. It was also the start of a violent cycle that has taken at least 2,981 lives, about three times more than during the July 2011-December 2012 escalation, when Crisis Group confirmed almost 1,000 deaths.

Among the deaths confirmed through Crisis Group’s open-source data collection, nearly half were PKK militants (1,378), followed by state security force members (976) and civilians (408). The remainder (219) were “youths of unknown affiliation”, a category created to account for confirmed urban deaths, aged 16-35, who cannot be positively identified as civilians or members of the PKK or its urban youth wing.

Since [June 2016], around 90 per cent of all deaths, as tracked by Crisis Group, occurred in rural south-eastern districts.

Violence peaked between February and May 2016 when fighting erupted in some urban districts of south-eastern Turkey for the first time in the conflict’s 33-year history. The PKK had built up an armed presence in the region during the 2012-2015 peace process. Around one third of all deaths occurred in Hakkari province’s Yüksekova district, Şırnak province’s Cizre and Silopi districts, Şırnak’s provincial centre, Mardin province’s Nusaybin district and Diyarbakır province’s Sur district. In June 2016, the conflict moved back to its traditional rural arena. Since then, around 90 per cent of all deaths, as tracked by Crisis Group, occurred in rural south-eastern districts.

The PKK or its affiliates have not carried out any major attack in the country’s urban centres and the west of Turkey since December. U.S. pressure, intense operations by the Turkish military and PKK’s strategic considerations appear to have contained its attacks. Nonetheless, Ankara is alarmed by the boost of PKK’s self-confidence especially following the U.S. decision to arm the YPG, the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, for the Raqqa offensive. Once the Raqqa offensive ends, the likelihood of military confrontation may increase if U.S. engagement wanes or if Turkey decides to strike the YPG in north-west Syria. Moreover, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) – a PKK offshoot widely believed to maintain links to the organisation – threatened new attacks on Turkish cities and tourist sites in a statement issued 6 June. These dynamics could herald an increase in violence in the coming months.

What follows are five main conclusions derived from the data collected over the last two years by Crisis Group. The analysis focuses on the last eight months of the conflict (December 2016-July 2017), but also looks at broader trends.

1. PKK attacks on local ruling party officials have intensified Turkish nationalist feelings

The recent killing of Justice and Development Party (AKP) political figures and civilians in the south east has heightened nationalist feelings in Turkish society. Since March 2017, when the Turkish military intensified its operations against the PKK, there have been seven attacks on political figures and civilians in the region. All are widely assumed to have been carried out by the PKK, though so far it has only taken responsibility for three of them.

Attacks claimed by the PKK:

  • On 9 June, a group of militants attacked the official car of Kozluk mayor (Batman province) Veysi Işık, killing 22-year-old music teacher Aybüke Şenay Yalçın, who was walking by.
     
  • On 16 June, Necmettin Yılmaz, a primary school teacher, was abducted while driving his car which was found burned in Tunceli province. The PKK announced that Yılmaz was “penalised” for collaborating with Turkish security forces. His body was found in a nearby river on 12 July.
     
  • On 1 July, AKP deputy head of Diyarbakır’s Lice district Orhan Mercan was shot dead in front of his house. The women’s branch of PKK’s urban youth wing, YPS-Jin (Civil Protection Units-Women), claimed responsibility, alleging Mercan was spying for the state and trying to recruit Kurdish youths as spies.

Attacks attributed to the PKK:

  • On 9 March, gunmen wounded Tayfun Ayhan, AKP head of Esendere town in Hakkari province’s Yüksekova district, and killed his brother, Murat Ayhan, while they were carrying out campaign activities for the presidential system referendum.
     
  • On 15 April, the motorcade of AKP Muradiye district head Ibrahim Vanlı was attacked in Van province. Vanlı’s nephew Adnan Vanlı, himself a village guard, was killed.
     
  • On 1 July, AKP deputy head of Van province’s Özalp district Aydın Ahi was shot dead.
     
  • On 8 July, two lorries and two cars were attacked in Hakkari’s Yüksekova district. Four civilians, Harun İbişoğlu, Dursun Doğan, Sadık Aktaş, and Hüseyin Kartal, were killed.

The PKK’s targeting of AKP political figures is probably an attempt to show the state, the AKP and its local supporters that it can still carry out dramatic attacks, despite an intense military crackdown. But this could backfire: instead of weakening the government and the president, these attacks are strengthening AKP support. Reports of slain security officials, political figures and civilians dominates the national media, justifying, in the eyes of many, harsh anti-PKK operations. Fuelling nationalist fervour over the past two years has allowed Ankara’s political leadership to consolidate support for its agenda, strengthening its alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which helped it win the April 2017 presidential system referendum. Meanwhile, PKK attacks also allow Ankara to justify the prosecution of some opponents by labelling them “terrorists” or “collaborators”.

As the AKP continues mobilising nationalist segments of society and banks on its alliance with the MHP, it is unlikely that the political leadership will return to a more constructive agenda addressing Kurdish demands or resuming peace talks in the medium term for two reasons:

  • Following the April referendum, the AKP still relies on its alliance with the MHP – which opposes concessions to address Kurdish aspirations – to pass new internal parliamentary regulations and other adjustment laws.
     
  • Two significant elections are scheduled for 2019: local and presidential. The AKP and the president will continue to rally nationalist constituencies to mobilise support.

2. An escalatory cycle of increased IEDs against security forces and intense Turkish military operations

Around 60 per cent of all security force fatalities since July 2015 were caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). During June and July of 2017, the number of IED attacks in rural areas increased, mostly along roads leading to military bases, including an attack on 17 July in Hakkari’s Yüksekova district that injured seventeen soldiers.

There are several reasons why militants use these devices:

  • IEDs are relatively cheap and easy to employ;
     
  • They can inflect greater casualties by targeting a group of security personnel with a single explosive;
     
  • Since IEDs can be detonated from a distance, militants can avoid direct armed confrontation, limiting their own risks.

This occurred amid intense military operations against the PKK in rural south-eastern districts which most recently focused on Lice district in Diyarbakır, Çukurca district in Hakkari and Başkale and Çaldıran districts in Van. The objective is both to target militants and destroy PKK ammunition depots.

Beginning in March 2017, the Turkish military carried out what it described as its most intense operations in years, deploying about 7,000 soldiers, special forces, police officers and village guards. In March, at least 79 PKK militants were killed, up from 23 in February, thirteen in January and six in December that Crisis Group could confirm.

3. Fewer PKK attacks prior to the April referendum

The number of security force members killed was relatively low in the run-up to the April referendum. While seventeen security force members were killed in PKK attacks in the two-and-a-half-month period prior to the referendum, this number almost quadrupled with 67 security force fatalities in the two-and-a-half-months after the referendum. There were no such fatalities in February 2017, the first month without security force being killed since July 2015. Aside from two urban IED attacks in Diyarbakır in January and April, the PKK or its affiliates did not carry out major, dramatic attacks in urban centres in Turkey and in the west of the country in the months prior to the referendum.

Sources close to the PKK told Crisis Group that they made the strategic decision to hold back in order to avoid generating further nationalist support for the “Yes” vote. As noted above, increased military operations by Ankara and U.S. pressure likely also played a role in curbing attacks. Regardless of the reason, this suggests the PKK has the ability to determine the timing and intensity of its attacks as well as to control its militants on the ground.

In the run-up to the referendum both the PKK and the government used the threat of violence to rally their supporters.

In the run-up to the referendum both the PKK and the government used the threat of violence to rally their supporters. Cemil Bayık, a PKK leader, warned on 9 April that if the “Yes” camp won, “the war” would intensify. AKP officials raised the spectre of PKK terrorism in their campaign for a “Yes” vote. President Erdoğan on 2 March equated voting “No” with supporting Qandil (a reference to the PKK’s headquarters in northern Iraq). Other officials said a “Yes” vote would put an end to all terrorist activity in the country whether carried out by the PKK or by what the government calls the Fetullahist Terrorist Organisation (FETÖ), allegedly led by Fethullah Gülen, an exiled cleric living in the U.S. who the government blames for masterminding the 15 July coup attempt.

Ankara saw the referendum results as vindication of its hard-line approach: it interpreted the fact that the “Yes” camp received 10 per cent more votes in the south east than the AKP got in the 2015 elections as demonstrating support for its strategy to “eradicate” the PKK. In turn, a strengthened president mobilising nationalist support made it easier for the PKK to legitimise in the eyes of its supporters resort to violence.

4. Violence more dispersed in the south east

Although security force and PKK militant deaths have remained largely concentrated in the south-eastern provinces of Hakkari, Şırnak, Mardin and Diyarbakır, violence was more dispersed in the south east over the past eight months. From December 2016 to July 2017, around 50 per cent of all confirmed fatalities occurred in these four provinces, compared to around 70 per cent in the previous sixteen months (July 2015-November 2016). Fatalities resulting from military operations rose in other south-eastern provinces, in particular Tunceli (28 confirmed militant deaths in February) and Bitlis (38 confirmed militant fatalities in May and June). Crisis Group also confirmed 29 militant fatalities in northern Iraq in March and April as a result of cross-border airstrikes by the Turkish military.

Confirmed fatalities in Tunceli, Bitlis and northern Iraq resulted from the military’s decision last spring to intensify its efforts to track down militants in mountainous areas and conduct cross-border operations in northern Iraq. At the same time, the military has been winding down operations in urban districts (such as Cizre, Sur, Silopi, Nusaybin, Yüksekova) located mostly in the provinces of Hakkari, Şırnak, Mardin and Diyarbakır, another factor possibly explaining the extension of deaths to other provinces.

5. Kurdish village guard deaths have increased since April 2017

Fifteen members of the state-funded Kurdish Village Guard were killed between April and July 2017, a slight increase compared to the first four months of the year. Ankara has ramped up recruitment for these paramilitary forces since January 2017 when it retired 18,000 guards over the age of 45 in a force that totals about 50,000. It plans to recruit 25,000 new paid guards, between 22 and 30 years old. Turkish media outlets reported that the newly-hired guards would be equipped with heavy weapons and take part in operations against the PKK.

Civilians interviewed by Crisis Group in Nusaybin in early 2017 confirmed that Kurdish-speaking security personnel – most likely village guards – participated in anti-PKK operations. Guards receive two weeks of basic military training immediately after joining plus supplementary training once a month.

Fifteen members of the state-funded Kurdish Village Guard were killed between April and July 2017

The government recently revitalised its system of “neighbourhood guards” in urban areas, probably in response to the PKK's urban tactic last year. The government plans to place neighbourhood guards in urban stations around the country to assist police and the military in maintaining “public order”. The nationwide recruitment process continues: about 280 guards were recruited in January 2017 to operate in several majority-Kurdish urban neighbourhoods (69 in Diyarbakır, 40 in Hakkari, 49 in Mardin, one in Şanlıurfa, 121 in Şırnak). As Crisis Group previously warned, these urban and rural guards sometimes use their state-backed authority to advance personal interests. The system could thus ignite tensions and clashes between Kurdish clans and large families in the south east, a situation that the PKK could easily exploit.

Looking Ahead: A Grim Picture

Violence is unlikely to diminish in the near future. Instead, there is a risk of greater conflict as Ankara steps up military efforts to eradicate the PKK (including through cross-border military actions), limit YPG gains in northern Syria and marginalise the domestic, legal Kurdish movement. As for the PKK, it remains focused on gains in northern Syria and may be further emboldened by the direct military support its affiliate, the YPG, now receives from the U.S. for the Raqqa offensive. The U.S. appears to temporarily have helped curb risks of escalation by pressuring the PKK to rein-in attacks in Turkey’s densely-populated urban centres including in the west of the country and by remaining closely engaged with the YPG (including in some instances by co-locating its special forces). However, violence could escalate once the Raqqa offensive ends, if US engagement falters, or if Ankara further intensifies military operations against the YPG around Afrin, in north-western Syria.

There is a risk of greater conflict as Ankara steps up military efforts to eradicate the PKK

Domestically, the government’s crackdown on the Kurdish political movement continues. Avenues for constructive engagement and political channels remain closed. As Crisis Group argued in its latest report, the marginalisation of the legal Kurdish political movement could have long-term consequences, legitimising resort to violent means and driving up PKK recruitment. A resumption of talks appears unlikely in the foreseeable future but remains the only viable path to resolving this deadly conflict.

How Turkey’s Ties to the West May Survive the Syrian War

Crisis Group's Middle East & North Africa Program Director Joost Hiltermann participated in the 2018 Körber Policy Game, designed to explore possible outcomes in the event of a crisis between Turkey and the West in Syria. While the exercise underscored many of the Syrian conflict's complexities, it also revealed that a strong desire by stakeholders to find common ground can help overcome them.

You can listen to an interview with Joost Hiltermann about his experiences at the event here.

If it were up to regional experts advising their governments, things in the Middle East needn’t look so bad: the Syrian conflict could be contained; a war between Israel and Iran could be avoided, and so, too – and more importantly – a war between Russia and the United States; and Turkey would return to providing regional stability, anchored firmly in the West through its NATO membership.

At least, such can be concluded from a one-day “policy game” in Berlin on July 2 that focused on crisis management in Turkey’s neighbourhood. Brought together by the Körber-Stiftung in a so-called scenario exercise, participants from Russia, the U.S., Turkey and Europe – some of them government officials, others with more informal advisory roles at home – tried to navigate a path toward the best possible outcomes for their countries in response to imagined future developments involving Syria and Turkey. The questions guiding the exercise were: What are Turkey’s foreign policy options in case of a crisis situation in Syria, in particular toward its relations with the West and Russia? What are the interests and preferences of Russia and the U.S. in such a case? And what role would Europe play?

There is a certain artificiality to such an exercise. The scenarios, which project twelve months into the future based on current realities, are plausible but not probable; any unanticipated incident could dramatically alter the trajectory of events, rendering the best possible policy advice instantly obsolete. Once you get one move wrong (in this case, there were three), any subsequent move, which derives from your decisions taken in the previous ones, unavoidably goes wrong as well, carrying you ever further from the core of the problem, and your ability to effectively tackle it.

What I discovered is that this sort of exercise is potent not for its predictive powers – which are feeble – but for the discussion it triggers and the channels it opens. On this score, it is priceless. It helps clarify perceptions, policy priorities and positions, preoccupations, fears and red lines, as well as areas of divergence and convergence. And it creates bonds of trust that could translate into honest communication, if not cooperation, between the participants in addressing future crises involving their governments. Call me a convert.

Still, there is reason to be sceptical. The selection of participants was, by the nature of the beast, selective, even if carried out in good faith and with the intent to attract a range of political opinion. Nuance in policy positions was likely lost. As anyone who has been part of a bureaucracy will readily acknowledge, opinions on any emotive issue are as many as there are people in the room, and battles are fiercely fought, in most cases forcing a difficult compromise that threads the policy needle. Instead, in a scenario exercise such as this one, we were working with what amounted to types: views that were only broadly representative of different policy lines.

What I discovered is that this sort of exercise is potent not for its predictive powers – which are feeble – but for the discussion it triggers and the channels it opens.

This, too, was useful in stirring discussion, but I could not help but notice that there appeared to be a salutary and shared sentiment in the room toward wanting to resolve conflict, and that this derived from the participation of policy experts who were principally inclined to accept the invitation to join such an exercise in the first place. What about those who seek war to advance their national interests? Would they have readily agreed to participate as well? This, one must doubt.

This inherent self-selecting bias produced an admirable convergence on conflict resolution in Syria, which found its expression in the notion that no one present sought a prolongation of the war; instead, everyone worked hard to devise ways to prevent its inadvertent escalation through misread signals or “black swans” – abrupt game-changing events to which no one is quite prepared to respond, because no plans for such eventualities exist. I can only wish that in any future real policy debate back home, these advisers prevail for the sensibility and humanity they exhibited in Berlin.

What emerged was that all participants, unanimously, deemed the Syrian crisis extremely dangerous not just for the harm it has done to Syrians, but also for its potential to bleed across borders and ignite secondary, possibly more deadly conflicts in the region. The scenario design contributed to what appeared like a mounting concern across the teams, as each move introduced new volatile elements in an already unstable situation. It climaxed in the question not just how to end the Syrian war but how to preserve the regional and international order. In other words, the exercise was not so much about Syria and Turkey, as its title indicated, but about the overall regional equation involving Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Gulf states, and ultimately about the tense relationship between the United States and Russia, and how to avert a death spiral toward a third world war.

Based on this shared perception, everyone started looking for ways to defuse the crisis. In our individual team discussions (whose conclusions we would communicate to the plenary following each move) we emphasised what we saw as our nations’ bottom-line concerns, shedding our preferred outcomes in the Syrian war in favour of a flexibility that focussed on possible areas of common interest as a basis for at least limited or tactical cooperation.

As a participant noted, the Europeans are vegetarians in Syria compared to the other powers, who are carnivores

For example, while the European team expressed deep scepticism about dealing with a Turkey ruled by an autocrat, they identified protecting Europe’s unity and cohesion as their overriding goal. To this they subordinated Europe’s approach not only toward Turkey (keeping it in the Western alliance), but also toward the Syrian regime (no reconstruction funding without a meaningful political transition), Russia (encouraging it to back the Geneva process and a political transition), the United States (strengthening its commitment to the Geneva process and keeping U.S. troops in Syria), and issues such as the migrant/refugee crisis (maintaining the deal with Turkey) and fighting the Islamic State as part of the U.S.-led coalition. The team assigned particular importance to the need for Russia and the U.S. to preserve their de-confliction mechanism in Syria.

As the crisis worsened with the game’s third move, the European team found itself clutching at straws, recognising they had a particularly poor hand compared to the two super powers and Turkey, all with assets on the ground in Syria. The result was an almost desultory resort to declaratory responses: urging the parties to de-escalate, and offering no more than diplomatic support. Thus it became clear that while such an approach did not endanger unity, it also exposed the fact that Europe’s main foreign policy strength – its soft power – has turned it into a bystander to the growing Syrian crisis from whose fallout it suffers, while its strategic ally, the U.S., has been reluctant to use its matching hard power to jointly effect a diplomatic end to the war. As a participant noted, the Europeans are vegetarians in Syria compared to the other powers, who are carnivores; as long as Europe lacks its own hard power, it won’t play a role until there is a political process that might give it limited leverage through its hands on the reconstruction purse.

The other teams likewise ordered their countries’ policy priorities. The Turkish team proposed Ankara’s to be as follows: a quick end to the Syrian war; every effort to avoid confrontation with the U.S. over the YPG (the Syrian affiliate of the PKK, which both Turkey and the U.S. label a terrorist organisation); fighting the PKK with vigour, but not at the risk of straining Turkey’s relationship with NATO (indeed emphasising the importance Ankara continues to attach to NATO membership); a continued U.S. military presence in north-eastern Syria, despite U.S. support for the YPG, but only if a U.S. withdrawal would mean a resurgence of the Syrian regime there and increased Iranian influence; encouraging Europe to provide reconstruction funds even with Assad still in place (a marked departure from standing Turkish policy); and fighting the perception that Turkey is in Syria to stay, even if it finds it cannot afford to withdraw its forces for now.

With the third move, which suggested a major escalation between Turkey and the Syrian regime, the Turkish team counselled moderation. They proposed that Ankara open a communication channel with the Syrian regime and ask for international (especially Russian) mediation, efforts to stem the renewed flow of refugees and increased humanitarian assistance (at the threat of reopening its borders to Europe for refugees). This approach bespoke an acknowledgment of Turkey’s relative weakness in the face of a possible escalation in Syria directly affecting its military presence and the stability of its borders. Turkey’s fate in Syria, like that of other regional players (not present in the policy game), is ultimately at least partly dependent on actions by the two superpowers.

The Russian team acknowledged that the Syrian crisis was Russia’s to manage, but seemed eager to spread the responsibility to others with skin in the game. They therefore sounded a strikingly conciliatory tone, at least initially. They defined Russia’s main policy priority in Syria to be continued cooperation with the U.S., including in the fight against the Islamic State, despite deep scepticism concerning the reliability of the current White House tenant. They said Russia was committed to the Geneva process, but only if Assad’s ultimate departure would not be a condition. They pointed at Europe’s marginal role in Syria, while expressing hopes for European reconstruction funds, if only of a symbolic nature (likely to legitimise a resurrected Assad).

Most importantly, to preserve the Syrian regime and Russia’s other gains in Syria, they proposed that Moscow continue to play its precarious regional balancing act: cooperating with Iran without thereby provoking Israel, including by keeping Iranian proxies at some distance from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights; and cooperating with Turkey while protecting the Kurds, and encouraging a rapprochement between Damascus and the YPG that would see a degree of Kurdish autonomy and a sharing arrangement for the Deir al-Zour oil fields (without which, they claimed, the central government would be unable to function).

With the third move, the Russian tone became more strident. The team exhibited a distinct hardening in its attitude toward Turkey, suggesting that any attempt by Turkey to change the status quo in Syria would justify a military response by the Syrian regime. The team opposed any move that would threaten Syria’s territorial integrity; suggested that the Syrian regime has every right to retake Syrian territory, especially if the area is controlled by jihadists (excluded under the Astana agreement); mooted the possibility of arming the YPG; and advocated closer cooperation with Iran. At this point in the discussion, not a word was said about the U.S., indicating there was no desire in Moscow to even tweak the Syrian conflict’s overall direction.

There can be no doubt, however, that the Syrian crisis brooks no partial solutions; the interests of all stakeholders will need to find reflection in a final settlement, if we are to reach one.

The U.S. team started out assertively, almost as if on the premise that the United States has a finger in every Syrian pie. It does, of course, but the team’s aspirations intimated a capability Washington may not possess, except as spoiler. They started with the presupposition that there should be no early withdrawal of U.S. troops and proceeded to posit the need to counter the influence of both Russia and Iran (which happen to be the two predominant powers in Syria); to continue fighting the Islamic State, while balancing relations between the Kurdish and Arab partners in the local alliance Washington backs (the YPG-led Syrian Defence Forces); and to keep Turkey in NATO, while persuading it to accept pluralistic and multi-ethnic arrangements for governance in northeast Syria on terms that promote stability in the way the Kurdish region in northern Iraq has.

The dearth of workable policy responses to a rapidly evolving situation – as the plot thickened with moves two and three – suggested a certain powerlessness. This may have sprung from the Trump administration’s evident lack of interest in investing in a Syrian endgame. Its priority seems to be to substitute Iran for the Islamic State as its main regional adversary – to be confronted in the smoking wreckage that is Syria.

I should also note who and what were missing from the policy game. There were no country teams for Iran or Israel, two key players. This was understandable, given the game’s focus on the Syrian war in relation to Turkey. There can be no doubt, however, that the Syrian crisis brooks no partial solutions; the interests of all stakeholders will need to find reflection in a final settlement, if we are to reach one. Missing also were European states other than Germany and France, and also no real sense of European commonality; The Europe team just paid lip-service to that fragile notion. Some issues one would expect to come up didn’t: no explicit mention by the Russian team of its country’s troop presence in Syria (only of the need for military-to-military cooperation and for all foreign forces to leave the country eventually), or the UN’s role and the Geneva process (except to say that Assad is reluctant to go down that path). No mention by the Turkish team of jihadists, whom they may be seeing as a lesser evil compared with the PKK/YPG. And no mention by the U.S. team of the European Union – an apparent irrelevancy – except as a supplier of humanitarian aid. Most sobering was the omission of any reference by anyone to the need to reassert values in international politics; the discussion strictly concerned interest-based trade-offs.

What emerged clearly from this policy game was that the main stakeholders in the Syrian conflict may be able to sign off in principle on a process to end it, as laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (December 2015), but only as long as the end point remains undefined and they think they can still shape this process in order to yield the outcome they desire. In the end, Russia sees the Syrian uprising as what caused the war, and thus wants to revert to the stable status quo ante, with the Assad regime still in place. By contrast, the U.S. and its allies see the regime’s violent response to the uprising as having sparked the war, and therefore want to see Assad gone. (Interestingly, the U.S. team didn’t even mention the regime’s departure as a U.S. policy goal.) Yet Russia, which has been pursuing the Astana process with Iran and Turkey precisely to get what it wants, holds the better cards. As one of the participants noted, we are living in a multi-axial work, with no single superpower or organising principle. In the Syrian crisis, it is Russia, not the U.S., that has the initiative and holds escalation dominance; with advantage comes responsibility: Moscow now must navigate a way out without making things worse for itself and everyone else.

From Ankara’s perspective, Russia may have things to offer, but these do not outweigh the benefits of Turkey staying in the Western alliance.

As for Turkey’s foreign policy direction, which was a main focus of this exercise: Despite initial concerns that Turkey would drift away from the Western alliance because of U.S./EU dissatisfaction with Turkey’s internal problems and Ankara’s anger at lack of NATO/U.S./EU support in its campaign to suppress the PKK in both Turkey and Syria, both sides strongly reaffirmed Turkey’s belonging to the Western family as the crisis in Syria escalated. Strains in the relationship will doubtless remain, but in the final analysis, Europe needs Turkey to manage the refugee crisis and keep jihadists in check, and Turkey needs European help in weakening the PKK. Likewise, the U.S. needs Turkey as a bulwark against Iran, Russia and jihadists; inversely, Turkey needs the U.S. as protector of last resort against Russia and Iran – especially if they support Kurdish irredentism – and it needs NATO’s support in countering the PKK/YPG when these groups threaten its borders. From Ankara’s perspective, Russia may have things to offer, but these do not outweigh the benefits of Turkey staying in the Western alliance. Russia must be engaged but not actively courted as a strategic alternative.

At the end of the day, I should have felt drained. Instead I was filled with a sense of exhilaration. I had been part of a tremendously stimulating set of conversations within and between four country teams about three successive scenarios that left me alarmed, as anyone covering the Syrian war should be, but not panicked. The war has taken a horrific toll on Syrian society, which will need generations to recover. But the conflict’s regional metrics do not (yet) give cause for despair. Sufficient common ground remains (for now) to prevent things from spinning out of control. The Körber Policy Game both led to that finding and helped contribute to it.