Myanmar: Post-Coup Crisis and a Flawed Election
Myanmar: Post-Coup Crisis and a Flawed Election
Commentary / Asia 9 minutes

Myanmar: Post-Coup Crisis and a Flawed Election

Myanmar’s military regime is planning elections despite facing widespread resistance. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2023, Crisis Group explains how the EU and its member states can help ease the country’s political and humanitarian crisis.

Two years after the 1 February 2021 coup d’état, Myanmar remains in deep crisis, with the economy moribund and millions in need of humanitarian assistance. Despite the security forces’ brutal repression of dissent, widespread popular resistance to the regime continues, by non-violent and violent means, across much of the country. Conflict has also escalated in several of the country’s ethnic areas where armed groups have confronted the security forces, and in the current environment there remains no realistic prospect of repatriating more than one million ethnic Rohingya who fled violence in Rakhine State and have taken refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh. 

While Crisis Group research and macro-economic indicators show the economy exhibiting signs of stabilisation, it remains some 20 per cent smaller than before the coup, and poverty rates have surged, compounding an already dire humanitarian situation. Health and education systems remain in disarray, and more than 1.5 million people are internally displaced, the vast majority due to post-coup conflict. Also contributing to the severe humanitarian crisis are new restrictions on non-governmental organisations that are likely to curtail even further their already very limited access to those most in need. Against this backdrop, the regime is gearing up to hold elections – likely in mid-2023 – that it presents as a return to civilian rule although its objective seems to be to consolidate its control by making a transition from emergency rule to a longer-term military-backed government. In the current circumstances, there is no prospect that these polls will be credible, and the risk that they will be marked by considerable violence is very high.

The European Union (EU) and its member states can help address the crisis in Myanmar by:

  • Making very clear that the junta has not created the conditions for credible elections in the coming year, and working with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other allies in the region to build an international consensus and common messaging in this regard;
  • Using all available channels to avert election-related violence, including by working through actors with greater capacity to influence the junta, such as the UN Security Council, ASEAN, India, Japan and China, and by pressing the National Unity Government to issue a set of principles – well ahead of the polls – opposing violence against electoral targets;
  • Maintaining and expanding targeted sanctions on the regime, the military and their business interests, while avoiding actions that would mainly affect ordinary people. In particular, Myanmar’s access to the Everything but Arms trade preferences scheme, which supports the jobs of hundreds of thousands of mainly female garment workers but provides little benefit to the regime, should not be revoked;
  • Continuing to engage closely with the National Unity Government as well as other key stakeholders, including ethnic armed groups and civil society, who will continue to shape the country’s internal dynamics;
  • Channelling aid to address both the current humanitarian emergencies and longer-term needs relating to health, education and livelihoods, through the mechanisms and partners that can most effectively reach those in need – including working more closely with local NGOs, providing cross-border assistance where appropriate, and potentially supporting the service delivery wings of the better established ethnic armed groups.
Anti-coup fighters escort protesters as they take part in a demonstration against the military coup in Sagaing, in the Sagaing Division of Myanmar on September 7, 2022. STR / AFP

No Likely Pathway Back to Civilian Rule

Myanmar’s post-coup crisis shows no sign of being resolved in the near term. The junta that seized power on 1 February 2021 continues to deploy extreme levels of political repression and violence to maintain its grip on power, while much of the country continues its determined resistance to military rule by both violent and non-violent means. With both sides intent on prevailing by force, there is so far no prospect of a negotiated settlement.

The regime has indicated that it will hold elections in 2023, likely before the 1 August deadline imposed by the constitution – which the military claims to be adhering to, despite the manifest unconstitutionality of the coup itself. The regime has presented the coming elections as a return to civilian rule and therefore a pathway out of the current crisis, but in reality, they appear intended to entrench a military-backed administration. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which won a landslide in the 2020 elections, only to be ousted from power months later, will not be willing (or even likely allowed) to participate and the military is reinvigorating the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) as its electoral vehicle. With the vast majority of the population unwilling to participate in these polls, and with opposition forces intent on disrupting them, the elections are becoming a flashpoint for further violence, while further entrenching older ex-military men in positions of power, at a time when broader social shifts triggered by the coup have opened space for younger leaders, especially women, to emerge.

The regime is likely to ratchet up repression ahead of the polls.

The regime is likely to ratchet up repression ahead of the polls, as it pressures parties, candidates and voters to participate in a fraudulent election, punishes those who refuse to do so, and deploys the military to try pacifying insecure areas so that polling can proceed there. The election will also be a target for resistance forces, some of which are already violently opposing it. Improvised explosive device attacks and assassinations of administrative officials and alleged regime informants have become common resistance tactics over the last two years, and some groups are likely to deploy them against candidates, polling stations, poll workers, political parties and voters, among other targets. There have already been deadly attacks on teams collecting civil data for voter lists. Schools could become a particular focus of violence if, as in previous elections, most polling stations are located in schools with schoolteachers serving as the majority of the poll workers.

Post-coup repression, violence and conflict, along with economic decline, have triggered a major humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. Some 1.1 million people have been displaced since the coup, bringing the country’s total internally displaced population to 1.5 million. Millions more have plunged into poverty. To make things worse, as it seeks to control civic space, the regime has increasingly restricted the activities of international and local humanitarian organisations, limiting their access to banking services, severely constraining their access to parts of the country affected by conflict and insecurity and, more recently, imposing onerous registration requirements that will make it even more difficult to operate. Meanwhile, the over one million Rohingya refugees who in 2017 and before fled waves of mass violence in Rakhine State and now live in Bangladesh – primarily in camps in the coastal district of Cox’s Bazar – continue to face an uncertain future. With the military now running Myanmar, and a fraught humanitarian and conflict situation in Rakhine State, there is no realistic prospect of mass returns in the foreseeable future. The prevailing sense of despair in the camps is prompting thousands to undertake dangerous sea journeys at the hands of human traffickers to try to reach South East Asia. Increasing numbers of Rohingya boys and young men are also joining armed groups running the illicit economy of the camps. Meantime, donor fatigue is making it increasingly difficult to raise the funds to provide for their essential needs (the UN humanitarian appeal was only 49 per cent funded in 2022, compared with 72 per cent the previous year), and Bangladeshi authorities are growing more and more impatient at the lack of any prospect of repatriation or other durable solutions.

Responding to the Crisis

With no sign of either an end to violence or a credible return to civilian rule, the EU and its member states can help address Myanmar’s political and humanitarian crisis through the following steps.

Firstly, the EU and its member states should take a very clear position that conditions are not in place for credible elections or a legitimate outcome given the extreme violence and climate of fear created by the regime; the fact that the polls are being organised by the same military that overturned the (broadly credible) 2020 election results in a coup; the fact that the regime has detained or killed many leaders, MPs-elect and members of the winning party; and the fact that it seems the vast majority of the public does not support these polls being held and has no interest in voting in them. The EU and its member states should encourage their international partners to speak with one voice in this regard, including by working with ASEAN and others in the region to build an international consensus, and coordinate common messaging. In the absence of a clear roadmap out of the crisis, there is indeed a very real risk that some governments, particularly in Asia, will be tempted to view the polls as an acceptable return to civilian rule, and push to resume normal ties with the new regime.

Secondly, the EU should throw its weight behind efforts to discourage election-related violence by both the regime and the resistance. While the EU and member states have limited leverage over the generals, they should work closely with other countries and groupings who may be better positioned to push the junta to desist from violence and repression. Among the actors with greater potential influence are the UN Security Council, ASEAN, India, Japan and China. The EU should also press the National Unity Government to issue at the earliest a clear statement of principles announcing its opposition to violence against electoral targets (including candidates, polling stations, poll workers, political parties and voters), and explaining the risk such attacks by its supporters would pose to the credibility and moral standing of the anti-regime resistance movement.

The EU should continue to develop its framework of sanctions focused on the military and its business interests.

Thirdly, the EU should continue to develop its framework of sanctions focused on the military and its business interests, and make clear that those who commit election-related abuses may also be designated. Specifically, Brussels should expand targeted sanctions on senior police and military officers most responsible for post-coup abuses and repression, including in relation to the elections, as well as military-owned or -linked companies. Such measures in this context send a useful signal about the EU’s values and principles, beyond whatever limited reputational or financial impact they may have. The EU should, however, refrain from revoking Myanmar’s access to the Everything but Arms trade scheme that gives developing country products tariff-free access to the EU single market, as the impact would fall on workers – mostly young women from poor families employed in the garment industry – while there is no indication that such a move would create leverage over the regime or meaningfully affect its finances.

Fourthly, the EU and its member states should avoid taking steps that would legitimise the regime, while maintaining ties with the actors who are playing key roles in shaping the country’s internal dynamics. Beyond staking out a clear position on the elections, they should maintain engagement with the National Unity Government and other key actors, including ethnic armed groups and civil society representatives. More broadly, it is important to continue supporting the roles of the ASEAN and UN special envoys, and to follow events on the ground closely as they evolve over the course of 2023, in order to be able to react quickly to emerging crises or situations that call for joint diplomatic initiatives.

Finally, the EU should continue to provide, and whenever possible, increase its assistance to address both the current humanitarian emergencies and longer-term needs of the Myanmar people relating to health, education and livelihoods. Given regime restrictions on NGOs and humanitarian access, aid delivery remains extremely challenging. It is important to provide aid through the mechanisms and partners that can most effectively reach those in need – including working more closely with local organisations, providing appropriate levels of cross-border assistance. While international donors have so far been hesitant to do so, it may also be time for them to consider supporting the service delivery wings of the better established ethnic armed groups, which have long experience in delivering assistance and services in the areas they control, as Crisis Group has outlined in more detail in a recent report. Given the shrinking humanitarian space, the EU and its member states should also prioritise the provision of cash assistance to those in need, which is often more logistically feasible than the delivery of in-kind support. It is also crucial to continue providing significant funding for Rohingya refugees in neighbouring Bangladesh, including greater support for the UN humanitarian appeal, given the signs that donor fatigue is setting in and resources increasingly difficult to mobilise.

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