Des violences intercommunautaires opposant principalement des communautés arabes et non arabes ont ravagé l’Est du Tchad en 2019, et pourraient menacer la stabilité du pays. Le gouvernement devrait ouvrir un large débat sur la gestion des mobilités pastorales et soutenir l’organisation d’une conférence inclusive à l’Est.
Libya-based Chadian rebel group Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) attacked army in north, while Boko Haram (BH) scaled down activity in west, and electoral commission scheduled long overdue legislative elections for Dec. In Tibesti region in north, CCMSR 10 Feb said it had taken control of Kouri Bougoudi town after clash with army. Govt dismissed claim. Army 19 Feb repelled CCMSR attack on military camp near Kouri Bougoudi; dozens of rebels reportedly killed. In Lake Chad province in west, army 1 Feb captured two suspected BH militants near Baga Sola town. In Ouaddaï province in east, security forces 29 Feb forcefully took control of residence of former traditional leader Sultan of Ouaddaï, reportedly leaving several injured. President Déby early Feb continued to restructure security apparatus including by appointing relatives and members of his ethnic group to leading roles in army and police. In capital N’Djamena, police 10 Feb used tear gas to disperse students protesting against poor study conditions at university and arrested eight. Electoral commission 14 Feb scheduled legislative elections postponed since 2015 for 13 Dec. Several opposition parties raised concerns over political climate including harassment of opposition and civil society activists. African Union (AU) 7 Feb elected Chad as member of AU Peace and Security Council for two-year mandate.
Les tensions croissantes entre le gouvernement, les chercheurs d’or et la population teda du Tibesti font craindre une escalade sécuritaire au Nord du Tchad, dans un contexte régional fragile. Les autorités devraient desserrer l’étau autour de la localité de Miski, éviter les discours réducteurs et rechercher le dialogue.
Les relations entre une frange de la jeunesse sahélienne et le gouvernement tchadien se détériorent, ce qui risque de nourrir les insurrections tchadiennes hors des frontières. Pour y remédier, les autorités devraient lutter contre l’impunité, y compris s’agissant des proches du pouvoir, et éviter les amalgames entre émigration et rébellion.
Créée en février 2017, la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel est une force de nouvelle génération dans un espace sahélien où se bousculent des initiatives militaires et diplomatiques parfois concurrentes. Il ne suffira pas de fournir des armes et de l’argent pour résoudre les crises sahéliennes. Pour atteindre ses objectifs, la force doit gagner la confiance des populations et des puissances régionales et obtenir leur soutien.
Since 2015, the conflict between Chad’s armed forces and Boko Haram has destabilised the Lake Chad region in the west of the country. Defeating this resilient insurgency requires the state to go beyond a purely military campaign and relaunch trade, improve public services and reintegrate demobilised militants.
Regional armies in the Lake Chad basin deploy vigilantes to sharpen campaigns against Boko Haram insurgents. But using these militias creates risks as combatants turn to communal violence and organised crime. Over the long term they must be disbanded or regulated.
[There are no] significant indications of other violent extremist activity [in Chad aside from Boko Haram], so in that respect, [the decision to include Chad in the U.S. travel ban] is completely baffling.
Rural insurgencies across the Sahel are destabilising the region and undermining local security and governance. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to continue support for the Alliance for the Sahel and promote local dialogue to buttress law and order.
The West sees Chad as a reliable ally in the fight against extremists in the African Sahel. But it needs to take more care. Chad is breaking prior agreements by spending much of its oil revenue on the military, while social services and good governance have suffered.
The Boko Haram insurgency is weakening in the Lake Chad basin, but its underlying socio-economic drivers remain to be addressed. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2017, we urge the EU and its member states to support regional governments with winding down vigilante groups, funding youth employment projects, rebuilding agriculture and trade, and restoring public services.