Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Report 76 / Africa

Darfour: la nouvelle crise du Soudan

Le Soudan, où les perspectives de paix semblaient pourtant si prometteuses en 2003, est en passe d'offrir en 2004 un scénario d'horreur. Le démarrage rapide de la guerre dans la région ouest du Darfour a engendré l'une des pires crises humanitaires au monde, avec des milliers de personnes tuées et quelques 830 000 déracinées de chez elles.

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Synthèse

Le Soudan, où les perspectives de paix semblaient pourtant si prometteuses en 2003, est en passe d'offrir en 2004 un scénario d'horreur. Le démarrage rapide de la guerre dans la région ouest du Darfour a engendré l'une des pires crises humanitaires au monde, avec des milliers de personnes tuées et quelques 830 000 déracinées de chez elles. Pendant ce temps, les pourparlers de paix menés par l'IGAD (Autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement) à Naivasha au Kenya entre le gouvernement et les rebelles de l'Armée/Mouvement Populaire de Libération du Soudan (APLS) menacent de conduire à une impasse. Il est impératif que ces négociations réussissent et que, simultanément, s'engage un processus parallèle pour traiter les aspects humanitaires et politiques de la crise du Darfour.

Les développements négatifs ne sont pas sans rapport les uns les autres. Ne participant pas aux pourparlers de l'IGAD, les rebelles du Darfour ont décidé de frapper craignant que des décisions concernant l'ensemble du pays en matière de partage du pouvoir et des richesses ne soient prises sans eux. Jugeant correctement que la communauté internationale ne le critiquerait pas à un moment aussi crucial du processus de paix, le régime de Khartoum a ralenti le processus de Naivasha pour se donner le temps d'une offensive majeure au Darfour.

La réaction initiale a été en effet timide et inefficace. La priorité des principaux acteurs extérieurs (pays voisins et leurs sponsors à Washington, Londres, Oslo et Rome) était la conclusion d'un accord final par Khartoum et la SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army). La ligne adoptée était celle d'un engagement constructif, servie par une diplomatie non-agressive et le souci de maintenir un accès à l'aile dure du gouvernement. Au lieu de pressions, des incitations diplomatiques et économiques ont été adressées aux deux parties, or c'était essentiellement l'exercice de pressions qui avait contribué à amener le gouvernement et la SPLA à portée de la paix. C'est seulement en mars 2004 qu'a été amorcée une diplomatie plus musclée à l'égard du processus de l'IGAD et en vue d'établir une réelle négociation sur le Darfour.

Au début de l'année 2003, une guerre ouverte éclata au Darfour lorsque deux groupes rebelles alliés de circonstance, l'Armée/Mouvement de Libération du Soudan (ALS) et le Mouvement pour l'Egalité et la Justice (MEJ) attaquèrent des installations militaires. Les rebelles qui cherchent à mettre fin à la marginalisation économique et politique permanente de la région, prirent également les armes pour défendre leurs communautés face aux milices soutenues par le gouvernement depuis vingt ans et recrutées parmi les groupes d'Arabes du Darfour ainsi qu'au Tchad. Ces milices appelées "Janjaweed" ont reçu du gouvernement un appui qui s'est nettement accru l'an passé pour chasser les civils des zones considérées comme déloyales. Les attaques des milices et l'offensive gouvernementale de terre-brûlée ont entraîné des déplacements massifs de population, des attaques meurtrières aveugles, des pillages et viols collectifs, tout cela en infraction avec l'Article 3 commun des Conventions de Genève de 1949 qui interdit l'attaque de civils.

La guerre civile, qui risque d'infliger des dommages irréparables au fragile équilibre ethnique qui repose sur sept millions de personnes uniformément musulmanes, est en fait un entrelacement de plusieurs conflits: le premier se situe entre les forces pro-gouvernementales et les rebelles; un second consiste en des raids de miliciens agissant à la solde du gouvernement sur les civils; et un troisième voit s'affronter les communautés du Darfour entre elles. Ses conséquences dépassent largement les frontières du Darfour. La guerre menace indirectement les régimes en place au Soudan ainsi qu'au Tchad et pourrait inspirer des insurrections dans d'autres parties du pays. Le parti Beja de l'Est soudanais s'est déjà allié à l'ALS, d'autres groupes pourraient émerger tant à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest et se fondre dans une coalition antigouvernementale. Certains éléments de la SPLA des Monts Nouba et de la région méridionale du Nil Bleu pourraient même être tentés de regagner le champ de bataille si les pourparlers de l'IGAD venaient à les décevoir.

Khartoum cherche à éviter d'aborder les problèmes politiques qui alimentent le conflit. Accés uniquement sur l'humanitaire, les accords ne seraient pas viables, et cela nuirait autant au processus mené par l'IGAD qu'à son application. A l'instar des pourparlers censés se tenir au Tchad en avril 2004, toute démarche entreprise parallèlement à celle de l'IGAD en vue de régler la crise humanitaire du Darfour par le biais d'un cessez-le-feu, doit aussi prendre en compte les motifs politiques qui inspirent la rébellion.

Le rôle du Tchad dans les négociations en 2003 était faussé et contreproductif. La facilitation des nouveaux pourparlers doit être ouverte à un cercle beaucoup plus large d'acteurs extérieurs tels que l'UE, les Etats-Unis et les Nations Unies. Cela demandera un effort de coordination internationale sur le Darfour supérieur à celui entrepris jusqu'à maintenant, une diplomatie publique accrue pour appuyer le processus et dénoncer les abus ininterrompus en matière de Droits de l'Homme, ainsi que l'imposition de pénalités claires à toutes les parties soudanaises qui mettraient en danger la résolution du conflit.

En attendant, à Naivasha, quelle que soit la partie intransigeante et le moment, celle-ci devrait faire l'objet de pressions plus ciblées. Les chefs d'Etat de l'IGAD et les autres pays observateurs devraient se rallier derrière la récente proposition américaine concernant Abyei qui est en soi un juste milieu pour résoudre le problème clé en suspens, et l'appréhender comme un catalyseur dans les négociations ultimes sur un accord final. Si elle est disposée à actionner ses moyens de levier et entreprendre une diplomatie habile, la communauté internationale peut aider le gouvernement et la SPLA à conclure au plus vite un accord de paix.

Nairobi / Bruxelles, le 25 Mars 2004

Executive Summary

The international community can no longer ignore the escalating war in Sudan's western region of Darfur, which threatens international peace and security because of its cross-border nature, including refugee spill-over. It is described by UN officials as the worst humanitarian crisis in Africa.[fn]"U.N. Slams Sudan War, Says Killings Recall Rwanda", Reuters, 19 March 2004.Hide Footnote Diplomatic attention has been understandably centred on the IGAD peace process between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA), but the scope and intensity of the Darfur conflict also demands immediate, focused action.

The UN estimates that in the past year the conflict has led to the killing of thousands of civilians, the forcible internal displacement of 700,000 and the flight to neighbouring Chad of another 130,000, figures the government does not dispute.[fn]Figures as of 26 February 2004 according to UN sources. ICG interview, 26 February 2004. More recent assessments by the UN of up to one million displaced are contested by Khartoum. See "U.N. Slams Sudan War, Says Killings Recall Rwanda", Reuters, 19 March 2004.Hide Footnote  Testimony of displaced people and refugees depict a consistent pattern of attacks by a government-aligned militia, the Janjaweed, whose horse- and camel-mounted fighters use scorched-earth tactics, backed by government air and land strikes.

Survivors tell of Janjaweed assaults in which villagers are indiscriminately killed, whipped, and raped. Hundreds of villages have been burned to the ground after looting. Grain in storage or about to be harvested is destroyed. These tactics have led to the depopulation of entire areas inhabited by the Fur, Zaghawa, Massaleit, and other smaller groups of black African origin and are grave violations of the laws of war that govern internal armed conflicts, namely Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.[fn]Sudan acceded to the four Geneva Conventions on 23 September 1957. Fighting between army and security forces and SLA and JEM rebels, as well as between the rebel groups and the Janjaweed militia, qualifies as internal armed conflict. However, much violence involves militia attacks on civilians suspected of supporting the rebels. Parties to internal armed conflicts are obliged to uphold Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which prohibits attacks on civilians, including violence to life and person, cruel treatment and torture, taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, sentencing and the carrying out of executions without judgment by a regular court. The government of Sudan is responsible for prosecuting under national law abuses committed by all parties to the conflict.Hide Footnote

The situation in Darfur poses a direct threat to the IGAD peace talks aimed at ending two decades of civil war between the SPLA and the government. As ICG has argued, it is in part because that peace process was structured around the north/south axis -- rather than recognising the fact that the war is a national one, with grievances not limited to the South -- that other marginalised peoples of Sudan felt compelled to fight to make their grievances heard.[fn]See ICG Africa Report N°39, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, 10 January 2002, and subsequent ICG reporting.Hide Footnote Darfur is a stark reminder that Sudan's crisis has more to do with the structural imbalances of governance and economic development that characterise the relations of the centre with peripheral regions than with the north/south divide. Fighting in Darfur is not the only sign that Sudan's conflicts cannot be dealt with definitively within such a restricted geographic framework. For example, in mid-January the SLA, the larger of the two rebel groups in Darfur, reached an alliance with the Beja Congress, an ethnically-based armed group operating in Sudan's underdeveloped eastern states, and on 13 February 2004, it joined the umbrella opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA).[fn]The SLA decision to join the NDA was also a sign of internal divisions with the insurgency. There is unease inside the SLA about the true ambitions of the JEM leadership. "One reason why we joined the NDA was to differentiate ourselves from the JEM", an SLA activist told ICG in March 2004. For more on these internal divisions, see below.Hide Footnote

The fate of the IGAD peace process remains linked to Darfur developments. Until recently, the government has essentially had a free hand in Darfur, able to support attacks against civilians suspected of backing the rebellion while calculating correctly that the international focus would remain on the incomplete IGAD process. The international community is only slowly realising that the crisis in Darfur can no longer be ignored.

The IGAD peace talks moved closer to success when the parties signed a framework agreement on wealth sharing in January 2004. They continued for another two weeks -- without result despite heavy outside encouragement -- on the three contested areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile until the key figure on the government side, Vice President Taha, abruptly left Naivasha for a pilgrimage to Mecca.

The government used the three-week break until talks resumed on 17 February to launch a massive military offensive in Darfur it hoped would remove any reason to negotiate further with the SLA/JEM rebels. It has consistently denied that substantial political issues are at the core of the rebellion, which it dismisses as "tribal warfare" or "banditry". It periodically also tries to tie the insurgency to the agenda of domestic or foreign foes, including the SPLA, Eritrea, Chad, Israel, and Hassan el-Turabi's Popular Congress (PC) party.

In fact, the alleged link between JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) and the PC is the most worrisome for it, since it fears Turabi is using Darfur as a tool for returning to power in Khartoum at the expense of his former partners in the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). This concern, and exaggeration of the potential repercussions, lies behind its hesitancy to talk to the rebels, particularly JEM.[fn]ICG interview, 2 March 2004.Hide Footnote

The Darfur conflict has potential to destabilise the regimes in both Sudan and Chad. The situation in the region, including ethnic overlaps, has helped determine power struggles in Ndjamena for decades. The linkages -- and the Chad government's aid to both sides in the present struggle -- have made Chad's mediation efforts (the Abéché process) ineffective. A ceasefire signed by Khartoum and the SLA in September 2003 was rendered irrelevant by Khartoum's escalated support for the Janjaweed. In December, Chad's president called rebel terms for substantive negotiations "unacceptable" and unilaterally broke off the process. The government never kept the ceasefire, increasingly targeted civilians through the Janjaweed and escalated fighting with its own offensive in late December.

On 9 February 2004, President al-Bashir announced an end to military operations in Darfur, claiming that the government had recaptured all rebel territory and had full control over the region. His statement also included for the first time a formal conflict resolution package. In an apparent bid to pre-empt any push for a wider mediation process, the government said it would guarantee unimpeded humanitarian access and safe return of the internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees, a pledge it has not fulfilled. It called for a conference within Sudan -- to which the "citizens" who rebelled would be invited -- in order to "comprehensively redress all grievances in the region", and pledged to implement its decisions. It also offered a one-month amnesty for rebel fighters to hand over weapons, and established a National Committee to focus on reconciliation, peaceful coexistence and the restoration of the "social fabric" in Darfur.[fn]"Statement by His Excellency Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir, President of the Republic of Sudan, on the situation in Darfur States", Sudan News Service, Sudan Embassy, Nairobi, 9 February 2004.Hide Footnote

Immediately following this declaration, the government announced that it would not attend a humanitarian dialogue with the SLA, JEM and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA), on the pretexts that it had not been invited and that the talks, organised by the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, had become too politicised.[fn]"Sudan: Government will not attend Darfur Humanitarian Access talks", IRIN, 9 February 2004. The talks, planning for which had taken months, had appeared certain just a few days earlier.Hide Footnote  It also launched a diplomatic offensive to persuade interested international parties that while a limited outside role might be acceptable, Darfur issues could be best handled through a domestic political process.[fn]ICG interview, Brussels, 11 February 2004. The government also re-affirmed its commitment to the Abéché process. See: "Press Release", Press Office, Sudan Embassy, Nairobi, 11 February 2004.
 Hide Footnote

The government promised to open humanitarian corridors by 16 February. Initial reports from the UN and humanitarian agencies on the ground indicate that humanitarian access has improved slightly in certain areas but the majority of the population remains out of reach of relief. The UN estimates that it now has access to 25 to 30 per cent of persons in need, as opposed to roughly 15 per cent prior to the government declaration.[fn]ICG interview with a UN official, Nairobi, 25 February 2004.Hide Footnote However, relief recipients are increasingly targeted by the Janjaweed. Some IDPs, fearing such attacks, have requested humanitarian agencies not to distribute aid under current conditions.[fn]ICG correspondences, 29 February 2004, and 2 March 2004. See also "Darfur Crisis, Sudan. U.N. Weekly Humanitarian Roundup, 22-29 February 2004", Available at www.unsudanig.org.Hide Footnote

The al-Bashir announcement of victory motivated the rebels to disprove Khartoum's claims. An SLA activist said, "The government has forced us to resume activities by their rejection of the Geneva talks. They don't want to negotiate because they think they have crushed the rebellion. But we are still intact..."[fn]ICG interview, 10 February 2004.Hide Footnote

The rebels announced they had attacked the road network in Darfur on 11 February.[fn]ICG interview, 11 February 2004. See also "SLA and JEM impose total curfew on Darfur region", JEM press release, 12 February 2004, posted at: http://www.sudaneseonline.com/ anews/feb12-55747.html.Hide Footnote Although reports indicate that they did sustain heavy losses in the government offensive, they retain enough strength to launch counter-attacks, and fighting has been consistent since al-Bashir's announcement.[fn]ICG correspondence and interviews, February and March 2004.Hide Footnote

The international community has responded to the Darfur crisis largely with quiet diplomacy, fearing too much pressure on Khartoum would endanger the IGAD peace talks. It is clearer by the day, however, that the conflict there must be resolved if there is to be overall peace in Sudan. The issues behind it need to be recognised as inherently political. The international community should push for a separate, internationally facilitated, political process for Darfur. There are indications that a process focused on humanitarian access will soon begin in Ndjamena, with U.S. and EU (led by the UK and France) observation. Without the commitment to political talks, any ceasefire or humanitarian access agreements will be jeopardised, as will ongoing IGAD efforts. Reliance on Chad to lead such a process without the active involvement of the EU, U.S. and UN would doom it to failure, given the record of its past efforts and its deeply compromised role in officially or unofficially providing support to both sides.

International partners will need to remain involved in ensuring that a neutral process emerges for inter-tribal reconciliation. Initially, this will require making certain that refugees and IDPs can return to their home towns and villages. The government should be required to compel the Janjaweed to withdraw from areas it seized by evicting the original inhabitants. Once these conditions have been met, donors and the government will need to support development programs that counteract the deteriorating ecological situation, such as by increasing water sources for agriculture and human and livestock consumption.

Complicating the picture, fighting between the government and the SPLA has resumed in several areas since the end of January 2004 despite the cessation of hostilities agreement. In the Western Upper Nile oilfields, the trigger was defection to the SPLA of two commanders of the pro-government South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), Tito Biel and James Lieh Diu.[fn]ICG interviews, February 2004. The SSDF is the umbrella organisation for government-aligned southern armed groups.Hide Footnote  Reports from the area are somewhat contradictory but this is indicative of trends that could threaten any peace agreement. SPLA Chairman John Garang's insistence on negotiating one-on-one with individual SSDF commanders means the government can promote new commanders from within the same movement, while feeding internal divisions with money and arms.[fn]Khartoum apparently named Peter Dor to command Diu and Biel's SSIM (South Sudan Independence Movement – a faction of the SSDF) forces who stayed loyal. ICG interview, 23 February 2004.Hide Footnote  Combat likewise flared between government-aligned militias and the SPLA in Shilluk Kingdom in the south east where Dr Lam Akol's former government-aligned SPLM/United had merged with the SPLA in November 2003.[fn]For more on the fighting in Shilluk Kingdom, see the press statement of the Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association, 18 March 2004 and "Sudan: Fighting escalating in Shilluk Kingdom", IRIN, 19 March 2004.Hide Footnote Khartoum has also begun a concerted effort to reassert control over its southern allies, including by promoting 58 southern militia leaders to high ranking positions in the national army (six as major-generals) in 2004 and imposing travel restrictions over those suspected of talking with the SPLA.[fn]ICG interviews, February 2004. The government's strategy also includes continuing support to the Lord's Resistance Army from Uganda. These issues will be further addressed in forthcoming ICG reports on northern Uganda and Sudan.Hide Footnote

Nairobi/Brussels, 25 March 2004

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