The number of Salafi-jihadists in action around the world has risen markedly since 2001. But this is no homogenous army, and the key point is that most are fighting locally. Understanding how different jihadist groups operate in varying contexts is essential for an effective policy response.
The fact that some of the recent attacks [in Nigeria] specifically targeted military bases shows they were deliberate, not opportunistic.
Given the [Nigerian] government’s continuing inability to impose its own solution to the conflict [with Boko Haram] ... the government’s exploration of dialogue [with] the insurgents is understandable.
The U.S. is worried that a [French] Security Council resolution [on an African counter-terror force in the Sahel] might open the door to funding at a time when cutting back their UN funding is a priority.
There is a strong sense [in Burkina Faso] that the state has never really done much for the north. [...] Strengthening its military presence isn’t enough – they need to establish trust.
We don’t know whether the former commanders [of Hezb-i-Islami in Afghanistan] will unite around [Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar or work against him. This is his last attempt to reach power.
Are we building any kind of sustainable peace [in Mali] through this kind of process that gives the most resources to the guys with guns?
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