Nedovršena tranzicija Bosne: Između Dejtona i Europe
Nedovršena tranzicija Bosne: Između Dejtona i Europe
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans
Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans
Report 198 / Europe & Central Asia

Nedovršena tranzicija Bosne: Između Dejtona i Europe

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SAŽETAK

Iako se završava period Bosne i Hercegovine kao međunarodnog protektorata, što je samo po sebi dobrodošlo, trenutno nije vrijeme da se požuruje tranzicija. Država koja je formirana Dejtonskim mirovnim sporazumom iz 1995. godine nakon dugotrajnog rata nikada neće biti sigurna niti će moći zauzeti svoje mjesto u Europskoj uniji dok ne bude odgovorna za posljedice svojih sopstvenih odluka. Ali napetost je trenutno velika, a stabilnost se pogoršava, jer Bošnjaci i Srbi igraju igru u kojoj naizmjenično gube i dobijaju da bi tako poremetili Dejtonski dogovor. Napredak ka članstvu u EU je zaustavljen, a uslovi postavljeni 2008. godine za završetak protektorata nisu ispunjeni.

Međunarodna zajednica bi na važnom sastanku Vijeća za implementaciju mira, međunarodnog tijela za nadgledanje Dejtona, zakazanog za 26-27. mart trebala odlučiti da ne okonča mandat visokog predstavnika i njegovog ureda (OHR-a) do 30. juna 2009. godine, kako je to nagoviješteno. Ono bi, pak, trebalo imenovati novog visokog predstavnika i odlučiti da ostavi Ured dok se ne ispuni svih sedam uslova iz 2008. godine – pet “ciljeva” i dva “uslova”, da bi i zadržalo svoj kredibilitet i da bi sačuvalo ovlaštenja koja bi pomogla da se riješe gorući problemi. Kada se protektorat zaista završi, a očekuje se da će to biti do kraja 2009. godine, biće potrebna jedna jaka misija EU koja će nastaviti podsticati Bosnu na putu ka europskoj integraciji. Brisel i zemlje članice bi se sada trebale početi fokusirati na posebna ovlaštenja koja su potrebna njihovom specijalnom predstavniku i odlučiti da služe kao garanti Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma.

OHR više nije snaga koja Bosnu vodi naprijed, i za njega je prekasno da tu ulogu preuzme na bilo kakav način koji bi bio bez ograničenja. Vijeće za implementaciju mira je još 2006. godine objavilo da želi zatvoriti OHR i te se potom osloniti na EU. Vijeće za implementaciju mira se nadalo da će to potaknuti Bosnu da ispuni uslove kako bi brže došla do članstva u EU, ali se desilo upravo suprotno: prepušteni uglavnom sami sebi, bosanski lideri su postali blokirani u jednom zastoju, a neke su se reforme počele rješavati. Neki tvrde da bi šok terapija okončanja rada OHR-a imala spasonosan učinak na političare koji su se navikli da ih se štiti od najgorih posljedica njihovog neodgovornog ponašanja. Međutim, postoje četiri argumenta protiv trenutnog okončanja uloge OHR-a.

Prvo, međunarodni kredibilitet je narušen 2007. godine kada je EU sa Bosnom potpisala Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju – što je veliki korak u procesu pristupanja – iako nije usvojena posebna legislativa vezana za policiju na kojoj je EU tako energično insistirala kao na preduslovu, a visoki predstavnik je zbog toga došao u sukob sa liderom Republike Srpske, srpskog entiteta. Zatvaranjem OHR-a, uprkos tome što i dalje nisu ispunjena dva cilja (rješavanje statusa Brčko Distrikta i rješavanje pitanja državne imovine), te jedan uslov (potpuno poštivanje Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma) koji su kao uslovi utvrđeni 2008. godine, rizikovalo bi se da se naruši sposobnost EU da primjenjuje čvrstu politiku prema Bosni dugo nakon završetka samog protektorata. Time bi se takođe oslabio kredibilitet EU u cijelom regionu, posebno na Kosovu.

Drugo, postoje određeni pozitivni politički znaci čiji bi razvoj djelimično mogao ovisiti od ne preranog zatvaranja OHR-a. Od novembra 2008. godine, lideri zajednica Bošnjaka, Srba i Hrvata su pokušali učiniti napor kako bi postigli izvodljiv kompromis, uključujuči i uslove Vijeća za implementaciju mira i ustavnu reformu. Oni su izloženi napadu predstavnika tvrde struje iz njihovih redova, a najviše Bošnjaci. Srpske vođe su spremne na dogovor, jer žele da se OHR zatvori; Bošnjaci i Hrvati su više zainteresirani za ustavnu reformu i doprinose takvoj mogućnosti zatvaranja da bi prevazišli opiranje Srba. Eliminiranjem OHR-a bi se sada uništila inicijativa, jer bi se uklonio možda glavni poticaj za kompromis.

Treće, OHR može dati određeni kratkoročni doprinos razumnim korištenjem posebnih (bonskih) ovlasti visokog predstavnika. Bosanski lideri još uvijek strahuju od sankcija, uključujući i razrješenje sa dužnosti, koje se može nametnuti zbog flagrantnog kršenja Dejtona. OHR takođe može djelovati na manje štetne, ali jednako važne načine, kako se pokazalo nedavnim zamrzavanjem plata, što je potaknulo općinske vijećnike Brčkog na brzo djelovanje. Visoki predstavnik bi takođe trebao čuvati u rezervi svoje glavne ovlasti, ali djelovati kreativno radi deblokiranja namjernih obstrukcija.

Konačno, EU može i trebala bi iskoristiti kratko odgađanje zatvaranja OHR-a da bi se bolje pripremila za potpunije dužnosti koje će uskoro naslijediti. Uvećanje je tradicionalno sredstvo koje je, uglavnom sa izvrsnim učinkom, koristila u izgradnji mira i sigurnosti u istočnim područjima Europe, uključujući i Zapadni Balkan. Ali Bosna nije poput drugih zemalja za pridruživanje. Njen nedavno vođeni rat još uvijek ima političke, društvene i gospodarske posljedice. Ukoliko EU pristupi Bosni kao drugim zemljama za pridruživanje, doživjeće neuspjeh.

Lokalni političari koji donose odluke daju različit značaj europskim integracijama i koracima koje treba učiniti da bi se do toga došlo. Oni te razlike koriste jedni protiv drugih, blokirajući napredak ka konačnom cilju članstva u tom procesu. Predstavnici tvrdih struja na svim stranama priznaju da napredovanje ka Europi znači odustanje od njihovih idealnih rješenja: Srbi znaju da će im biti teže da se otrgnu kako se Bosna bude približavala Briselu; Bošnjaci strahuju da će smanjenje autonomije RS-a biti nemoguće. To je razlog i za jedne i za druge da koče, te se i jedni i drugi potajno nadaju da će pridobiti EU i SAD na njihovu stranu ukoliko ostanu nepopustljivi.

Brisel treba iznova procijeniti šta je to što je potrebno jednistvenom bosanskom okruženju, prvo dobiti konsenzus zemalja članica o sigurnosnim ulozima, te dati odgovarajuće političko obećanje da će zadatak izvršiti do kraja, uključujući i garantiranje Dejtona. Time će se pomoći da se osigura da njegova misija u Sarajevu poslije OHR ne bude osakaćena slabom političkom podrškom, što je često bio slučaj sa OHR-om. Svom specijalnom predstavniku bi trebao dati mandat da pomogne bosanskim akterima u naporima da postignu kompromis, ali i da kontrolira priliv pred-pristupnih financijskih sredstava; da nadgleda poštivanje Dejtona i napredak ka članstvu; da dâ čvrste preporuke o ciljanim diplomatskim, političkim i ekonomskim sankcijama, ukoliko je to potrebno; te da sve aktere, uključujući i Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a, redovno informira o razvoju situacije tako da oni mogu brzo reagirati na svaku opasnost. Obamina administracija bi trebala ponovo izraziti svoje opredjeljenje da pomogne Bosni u interesu šire stabilnost u povijesno eksplozivnom i još uvijek pomalo nestabilnom regionu koji je nekad činio Jugoslaviju. To može najboje uraditi zajedno sa EU i pružajući podršku EU, koja ima veće resurse da vodi ovaj posao.

Sarajevo/Brisel, 9. mart 2009. godine

Executive Summary

While Bosnia and Herzegovina’s time as an international protectorate is ending, which is in itself most welcome, now is the wrong time to rush the transition. The state put together by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement after a long war will never be secure and able to take its place in the European Union (EU) until it is responsible for the consequences of its own decisions. But tensions are currently high and stability is deteriorating, as Bosniaks and Serbs play a zero-sum game to upset the Dayton settlement. Progress toward EU membership is stalled, and requirements set in 2008 for ending the protectorate have not been not met.

The international community should decide, at the important meeting on 26-27 March of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international body that oversees Dayton, not to end the mandate of the High Representative and his office (OHR) by 30 June 2009, as has been foreshadowed. Rather, it should appoint a new High Representative and resolve to maintain the office until all seven of the 2008 requirements – five “objectives” and two “conditions” – are met, both to retain its own credibility and to keep in place powers that would help resolve immediate problems. Once the protectorate does end, hopefully by the end of 2009, a strong EU mission will be needed to continue encouraging Bosnia toward European integration. Brussels and member states should begin now to focus on the specific powers their Special Representative (EUSR) requires and resolve to serve as guarantors of the Dayton agreement.

The OHR is no longer the motor driving Bosnia forward, and it is too late for it to resume that role in any open-ended way. The PIC announced already in 2006 that it wanted to close the OHR and rely henceforth on the EU. The PIC hoped this would spur Bosnia to qualify faster for EU membership, but the opposite has happened: left largely to themselves, Bosnian leaders have become locked in a standstill, and some reforms have begun to unravel. Some argue that the shock therapy of an end to the OHR would have a salutary effect on politicians who have grown accustomed to being protected against the worst effects of their irresponsible behaviour. There are four arguments, however, against an immediate end to the OHR’s role.

First, international credibility took a big hit in 2007 when the EU signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia – a major step in the accession process – even though specific police legislation it had strenuously insisted was a precondition had not been adopted, and the High Representative was engaged in a related confrontation with the leader of the Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb entity. The closing of the OHR while two objectives (resolving the status of the Brčko District and dealing with state property) and one condition (full compliance with the Dayton agreement) identified by the PIC in 2008 as requirements remain unmet would risk crippling the EU’s ability to apply firm policies toward Bosnia long after the protectorate itself has ended. It would also weaken EU credibility throughout the region, notably in Kosovo.

Secondly, there are some positive political signs whose development may be partly dependent on not prematurely closing the OHR. Since November 2008, leaders of the Bosniak, Serb and Croat communities have been making tentative efforts toward a workable compromise, including on the PIC requirements and constitutional reform. They are under attack from their own hardliners, none more so than the Bosniaks. Serb leaders are being conciliatory because they want the OHR to close; the Bosniaks and Croats are more interested in constitutional reform and are leveraging the prospect of that closure to overcome Serb reluctance. Doing away with OHR now could kill the initiative by removing perhaps the main incentive for compromise.

Thirdly, OHR can make some short-term contributions by judicious use of the High Representative’s special (Bonn) powers. Bosnian leaders still fear sanctions, including dismissal from office, that can be imposed for egregious Dayton violations. OHR can also act in less disruptive but equally important ways, as shown by a recent salary freeze that spurred Brčko municipal councillors into rapid action. The High Representative should hold his or her major powers in reserve but act creatively to unblock deliberate obstruction.

Finally, the EU can and should take advantage of a brief OHR respite to prepare better for the fuller responsibilities it will soon inherit. Enlargement is the traditional tool it has been using, mostly to excellent effect, to build peace and security in Europe’s eastern reaches, including the Western Balkans. But Bosnia is unlike the other accession countries. Its recent war still has political, social and economic effects. Uniquely in Europe, its political system stems from a wartime compromise between hostile factions. If the EU approaches Bosnia like any other accession country, it will fail.

Local decision-makers place different values on European integration and the steps they must take to reach it. They deploy those differences against each other, blocking progress towards the ultimate membership goal in the process. Hardliners on all sides recognise that advancing toward Europe means giving up their ideal solutions: the Serbs know that as Bosnia draws closer to Brussels, it will be harder for them to break away; the Bosniaks fear that reducing RS autonomy will be impossible. This gives both a reason to hold back, and both secretly hope to win the EU and U.S. to their side by remaining intransigent.

Brussels needs to reassess what Bosnia’s unique environment requires, first formulating a member-state consensus on the security stakes and making a corresponding political commitment to see the task through, including by guaranteeing Dayton. This will help ensure that its post-OHR mission in Sarajevo is not hobbled by weak political support as the OHR itself too often has been. It should give its Special Representative a mandate to facilitate efforts by Bosnian actors to compromise, but also to control the flow of pre-accession funds; monitor Dayton compliance and progress toward membership; make tough recommendations on targeted diplomatic, political and economic sanctions, if necessary; and keep all actors, including the UN Security Council, abreast of developments so they can react quickly to any dangers. The Obama administration should recommit to helping Bosnia in the interest of wider stability in the historically explosive and still somewhat fragile region that was Yugoslavia. It can do that best by working with and supporting the EU, which has greater resources to lead on this job.

Sarajevo/Brussels, 9 March 2009

Changing Dynamics in the Western Balkans

This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker talks to Crisis Group expert Marko Prelec about the precarious situation in the Western Balkans, as Serb separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the frozen Kosovo-Serbia dispute continue to stoke regional instability.

The Western Balkans, a region defined in part by not being in the European Union, also contains several countries that were devastated by war in the 1990s. Now it faces new troubles, driven in part by the legacies of the old. Bosnia and Herzegovina is confronted with calls for secession in the autonomous Serb-dominated region, Republika Srpska, as well as the ongoing electoral grievances of its Croat minority. Meanwhile, efforts to resolve Kosovo’s dispute with Serbia over its independence have come to a standstill, leaving minority communities on both sides of the border vulnerable.

This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker talks to Marko Prelec, Crisis Group’s Consulting Senior Analyst for the Balkans, about why ethnic tensions persist in the region and whether there is any risk of a return to conflict. They discuss the prospects for European integration, asking whether the promise of EU membership remains an effective incentive for resolving these longstanding disputes. They also consider what impact Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had for stability in the Western Balkans, a region where painful memories of war are still very salient today.



Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.

For more of Crisis Group’s analysis, make sure to check out our Balkans regional page and keep an eye out for our upcoming report on the risk of instability in the Western Balkans.

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