Indonesia: Harapan Dan Kenyataan di Papua
Indonesia: Harapan Dan Kenyataan di Papua
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Briefing 126 / Asia

Indonesia: Harapan Dan Kenyataan di Papua

Ringkasan Ikhtisar

Meskipun konflik Papua belakangan ini makin sulit dicari jalan keluarnya, tapi beberapa ide solusi saat ini sedang dibahas. Kekerasan yang meningkat di bulan Juli dan Agustus menegaskan kebutuhan yang mendesak untuk menjajaki ide-ide solusi tersebut. Pemerintah Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sebaiknya segera bertindak untuk mengesahkan pembentukan sebuah badan baru bernama Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Di Papua Dan Papua Barat (UP4B) yang sudah lama ditunda dengan mandat yang mencakup masalah politik. Unit ini harus memperhatikan serangkaian indikator politik, sosial, ekonomi, hukum dan keamanan yang dihasilkan oleh sebuah Konferensi Perdamaian Papua pada Juli lalu yang bisa menjadi kerangka kerja bagi kebijakan-kebijakan yang lebih tercerahkan. Bersama-sama, mereka melambangkan sebuah visi akan seperti apa Papua yang damai nantinya. Para peserta yang merancang ide-ide solusi bagi persoalan di Papua ini hampir semuanya dari masyarakat sipil Papua. Agar perubahan nyata bisa terjadi, perlu ada dukungan tidak saja dari Jakarta tapi juga dari para pejabat setempat asli Papua – yang sekarang ini jumlahnya semakin banyak – yang punya pengaruh dan sumber daya di tingkat lokal.

Aspirasi yang disuarakan selama konferensi sangat kontras dengan kenyataan meningkatnya konflik di kabupaten pegunungan Puncak Jaya, sebuah wilayah terpencil yang didera oleh pemberontakan, korupsi dan kemiskinan. Puncak Jaya merupakan rumah bagi Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (TPN), sayap militer dari organisi pro-kemerdekaan Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). Sejumlah faktor yang kompleks mendorong timbulnya gerakan pemberontakan, termasuk ketidakadilan sejarah, tindakan kekerasan dari TNI dan Polri, maupun persaingan dan perpecahan, kadang berbasis klan, diantara para pemberontak sendiri. Kekerasan di Papua membantu memicu aktivisme lokal dan sebuah gerakan solidaritas internasional, yang pada gilirannya memicu rasa antipati di Jakarta terhadap langkah apapun ke arah resolusi konflik yang mencakup pembahasan ketidakpuasan politik. Hal ini juga menyebabkan pembatasan akses bagi organisasi-organisasi asing kemanusiaan dan pembangunan.

Konferensi pada 5 hingga 7 Juli itu bermaksud untuk merubah pola ini. Buah dari upaya-upaya di belakang layar selama dua tahun oleh sebuah kelompok bernama Papua Peace Network (Jaringan Damai Papua), konferensi ini adalah sebuah latihan dalam memformulasikan isu-isu yang kemudian bisa didiskusikan dengan pemerintah di Jakarta dengan cara yang dipikir oleh beberapa orang bisa menjauhkan kata “M” (merdeka). Tapi hal ini tidak berjalan seperti yang direncanakan oleh panitia. Pejabat senior pemerintah menawarkan “komunikasi konstruktif” informal tanpa menjelaskan secara rinci apa yang mereka maksud. Para aktivis merespon dengan sebuah tuntutan bagi dialog yang jauh lebih formal, dengan pemerintah Indonesia dan para negosiator pro-kemerdekaan Papua duduk berhadap-hadapan di meja negosiasi, dan dimediasi oleh pihak ketiga yang netral dari dunia internasional. Dan bukannya menjembatani, konferensi ini malah menegaskan dalamnya jurang perbedaan persepsi antara para pejabat pusat dan masyarakat sipil Papua mengenai sifat konflik yang terjadi di Papua.

Pemerintah SBY, sejauh ini amat lambat untuk mengembangkan sebuah kebijakan yang tepat. Selama setahun terakhir, muncul gagasan untuk membentuk sebuah unit khusus yang berbasis di kantor wakil presiden untuk menangani masalah Papua yang disebut Unit Percepatan Pembangunan di Papua dan Papua Barat atau UP4B. Pada awalnya unit ini dibentuk sebagai sebuah badan untuk mengimplementasikan proyek-proyek pembangunan “quick win”, dan kelihatannya pada awal tahun 2011 UP4B mulai memperoleh mandat yang lebih luas, sehingga bisa menangani isu-isu yang lebih sensitif seperti masalah-masalah terkait tanah, sejarah, konflik dan HAM. Tapi sebuah rancangan Peraturan Presiden (PP) untuk mengesahkan pembentukan UP4B masih tersangkut di meja Sekretaris Kabinet sejak bulan Mei, dan tidak ada indikasi kapan akan diserahkan ke presiden untuk ditandatangani. Tanpa UP4B, kesempatan akan adanya perubahan positif di dalam kebijakan pemerintah menjadi sangat berkurang, membuat perkembangan yang terjadi di Puncak Jaya menjadi simbol bagi aktivis di dalam dan luar Indonesia atas segala sesuatu yang salah di Papua.

Jakarta/Brussels, 22 Agustus 2011

I. Overview

The conflict in Indonesian Papua continues to defy solution, but some new ideas are on the table. A spike in violence in July and August 2011 underscores the urgency of exploring them. The government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should move quickly to set up a long-delayed new Papua unit with a mandate that includes political issues. That unit should look at a set of political, social, economic, legal and security indicators produced in July by a Papua Peace Conference that could become a framework for more enlightened policies. Taken together, they represent a vision of what a peaceful Papua would look like. The conference participants who drafted them, however, were almost all from Papuan civil society. For any real change to take place, there needs to be buy-in not just from Jakarta but from the increasingly large constituency of Papuan elected officials who have influence and resources at a local level.

The aspirations voiced during the conference contrast sharply with the reality of escalating conflict in the highland district of Puncak Jaya, a remote region wracked by insurgency, corruption and some of the worst poverty in Indonesia. It is home to one of the most active units of the pro-independence National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN) of the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM). A complex set of factors feeds the insurgency, including a sense of historical injustice, harsh actions by security forces, and competition and factionalism, sometimes clan-based, among the fighters themselves. Violence there helps fuel local political activism and an international solidarity movement, which in turn fuels antipathy in Jakarta to any steps toward conflict resolution that involve discussion of political grievances. It also leads to restrictions on access by foreign humanitarian and development organisations.

The conference on 5-7 July was meant to break that pattern. The fruit of two years of behind-the-scenes labour by a group called the Papua Peace Network, it was to be an exercise in formulating issues that could then be discussed with the government in Jakarta in a way that some thought might keep the “M” word – merdeka (independence) – at bay. It did not work out quite as the organisers had planned. Top government officials offered informal “constructive communication”, without specifying what they had in mind; activists responded with a demand for a much more formal dialogue, with the Indonesian government sitting across the table from Papuan pro-independence negotiators, mediated by a neutral international third party. Instead of building bridges, the conference underscored the depth of the gulf in perceptions between Jakarta-based officials and Papuan civil society about the nature of the conflict.

The government of President Yudhoyono, on Papua as on everything else, has been glacially slow to develop a policy that would be different from the default response of throwing cash at the problem and hoping it will go away. In mid-2010 the idea emerged of a special unit on Papua to be based in the vice-president’s office called the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (Unit Percepatan Pembangunan di Papua dan Papua Barat, UP4B). Initially conceived as an agency to implement “quick win” development projects, it seemed by early 2011 to be gaining a wider mandate that could also allow it to address more sensitive issues related to land, conflict and human rights. A draft decree setting up UP4B has been on the Cabinet Secretary’s desk, however, since May and there is no indication when it will be sent to the president for signing. Without the new unit, the chance of any positive change in policy is much diminished, allowing developments in Puncak Jaya to stand as a symbol for activists inside and outside Indonesia of everything that is wrong in Papua.

Jakarta/Brussels, 22 August 2011

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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