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Report 147 / Asia

Indonesia: Industri Penerbitan Jemaah Islamiyah

Ringkasan ikhtisar

Sejumlah anggota dan orang dekat Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), organisasi ekstrimis yang paling menonjol di Indonesia, telah mengembangkan sebuah konsorsium usaha penerbitan yang menguntungkan di dan sekitar pesantren yang didirikan oleh Abu Bakar Ba’asyir dan Abdullah Sungkar di Solo, Jawa Tengah. Konsorsium tersebut telah menjadi sebuah kendaraan penting bagi penyebaran ajaran jihad, dengan cara menyalurkan buku-buku cetak dengan tampilan yang menarik ke mesjid-mesjid, toko-toko buku dan kelompok-kelompok diskusi. Usaha penerbitan ini memperlihatkan ketahanan JI dan sejauh mana idiologi radikal telah menanamkan akarnya di Indonesia. Pemerintah Indonesia perlu mengawasi perusahaan-perusahaan penerbitan ini dengan lebih dekat, tetapi mereka mungkin juga memainkan peran yang positif dengan mengalihkan energi JI untuk berjihad ke halaman-halaman cetak atau buku-buku daripada ke aksi kekerasan.

Dengan mempelajari judul-judul yang dicetak memungkinkan untuk mengikuti debat yang berlangsung di dalam lingkungan JI mengenai minat mereka terhadap taktik al Qaeda. Debat itu kelihatannya terjadi dengan sendirinya, tanpa dibantu oleh program “deradikalisasi” pemerintah, dan adalah penting hal ini terus terjadi. Melarang penerbitnya atau buku-buku mereka akan menjadi hal yang kontraproduktif. Namun penelitian yang lebih dalam terhadap kegiatan-kegiatan penerbitan ini diharapkan karena beberapa alasan:

  • Usaha penerbitan telah meningkat seiring dengan melemahnya JI, kemungkinan hal ini mencerminkan keputusan dari atas untuk fokus pada dakwah agama dan kegiatan perekrutan sebagai salah satu cara untuk membangun kembali organisasi mereka. Buku-buku yang diterbitkan mungkin adalah bagian dari upaya tersebut.
     
  • Dari penterjemah sampai distributor, jaringan usaha penerbitan merupakan sebuah contoh dari jaringan sosial yang mempersatukan JI, terutama ketika dalam kondisi lemah. JI telah terbukti sangat mampu untuk bangkit lagi dari kemunduran, dan jaringan yang menjadi tiang pondasi JI mungkin dapat membantu menjelaskan alasannya.
     
  • Meskipun perusahaan-perusahaan penerbitan tersebut dimiliki oleh individu, bukan JI sebagai organisasi, sejumlah pendapatan yang diterima sudah hampir pasti dialirkan kembali untuk kegiatan-kegiatan JI.
     
  • Anggota yang dekat dengan Noordin Mohammed Top (yang bisa dibilang merupakan buronan teroris yang paling berbahaya di Asia Tenggara), mungkin bekerja sebagai penterjemah untuk rumah-rumah penerbitan JI, meskipun ada jurang ideologi antara Noordin dan mainstream JI.

Cara terbaik untuk memastikan pengawasan yang memadai yaitu bagi pemerintah Indonesia untuk menegakkan hukum dan peraturan yang terkait dengan penerbitan, pencatatan/pendaftaran perusahaan dan pajak. Penegakan hukum semacam itu bukan saja dapat menjadi cara untuk mengawasi usaha-usaha ini, tapi juga bisa memberi informasi yang berharga mengenai besarnya dan status organisasi JI.

Jakarta/Brussels, 28 Februari 2008

Briefing 139 / Asia

Indonesia: Ketegangan Seputar Bendera Aceh

A dispute over a flag in Aceh is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Indonesia’s central government, heightening ethnic tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of the province and raising fears of violence as the 2014 national elections approach.
 

I. Overview

The decision of the Aceh provincial government to adopt the banner of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) as its official provincial flag is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Jakarta, heightening ethnic and political tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of Aceh and raising fears of violence as a national election approaches in 2014.

On 25 March 2013, the provincial legislature adopted a regulation (qanun) making the GAM’s old banner the provincial flag. It was immediately signed by Governor Zaini Abdullah. The governor and deputy governor are members of Partai Aceh, the political party set up by former rebel leaders in 2008 that also controls the legislature.

The central government, seeing the flag as a separatist symbol and thus in violation of national law, immediately raised objections and asked for changes. Partai Aceh leaders, seeing the flag as a potent tool for mass mobilisation in 2014, have refused, arguing that it cannot be a separatist symbol if GAM explicitly recognised Indonesian sovereignty as part of the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 that ended a nearly 30-year insurgency. Partai Aceh believes that if it remains firm, Jakarta will eventually concede, as it did in 2012 over an election dispute.

Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s government is torn. On the one hand, it does not want a fight with the GAM leaders; the 2005 peace agreement is the most important achievement of a president who, in his final term, is very much concerned about his legacy. It also is unwilling to provoke GAM too far, fearful that it will return to conflict, a fear many in Aceh discount as unwarranted but one that Partai Aceh has exploited with relish. On the other hand, it does not want to be branded as anti-nationalist as the 2014 election looms, especially as some in the security forces remain convinced that GAM has not given up the goal of independence and is using democratic means to pursue it. The president and his advisers also know that if they allow the GAM flag to fly, it will have repercussions in Papua, where dozens of pro-independence activists remain jailed for flying the “Morning Star” flag of the independence movement.

GAM leaders see little to lose by standing their ground. The flag is a hugely emotive symbol, and defying Jakarta is generally a winning stance locally. Some individual members of parliament see it as a way of regaining waning popularity for failing to deliver anything substantive to their constituencies. Also, Partai Aceh took a controversial decision to partner with Gerindra, the party of former army General Prabowo Subianto, for the 2014 election. Leaders like Muzakir Manaf, deputy governor and former commander of GAM’s armed wing, may want to use the flag issue to show they have not compromised their principles by allying with a man whose human rights record is often questioned.

Within Aceh, adoption of the GAM flag has sparked protests from non-Acehnese ethnic groups in the central highlands and south west. The GAM heartland has always been along the east coast; to highlanders like the Gayo, the flag thus represents the domination of the coastal Acehnese at their expense. The issue has revived a dormant campaign for the division of Aceh into three by the creation of two new provinces, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) for the central highlands and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS) for the south west. If GAM does not back down on the flag, support for that campaign by the intelligence services is likely to rise, and with it, the probability of increased ethnic tensions.

The options for breaking the stalemate seem to be as follows: the government concedes; GAM concedes, making slight changes to the flag by adding or removing an element; GAM agrees to limits on how or where the flag can be displayed; or the dispute is taken to the Supreme Court, thereby delaying any resolution.

In the meantime, the power of the GAM machinery in Aceh continues to grow.

Jakarta /Brussels, 7 May 2013