Indonesia: Industri Penerbitan Jemaah Islamiyah
Indonesia: Industri Penerbitan Jemaah Islamiyah
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 147 / Asia

Indonesia: Industri Penerbitan Jemaah Islamiyah

Ringkasan ikhtisar

Sejumlah anggota dan orang dekat Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), organisasi ekstrimis yang paling menonjol di Indonesia, telah mengembangkan sebuah konsorsium usaha penerbitan yang menguntungkan di dan sekitar pesantren yang didirikan oleh Abu Bakar Ba’asyir dan Abdullah Sungkar di Solo, Jawa Tengah. Konsorsium tersebut telah menjadi sebuah kendaraan penting bagi penyebaran ajaran jihad, dengan cara menyalurkan buku-buku cetak dengan tampilan yang menarik ke mesjid-mesjid, toko-toko buku dan kelompok-kelompok diskusi. Usaha penerbitan ini memperlihatkan ketahanan JI dan sejauh mana idiologi radikal telah menanamkan akarnya di Indonesia. Pemerintah Indonesia perlu mengawasi perusahaan-perusahaan penerbitan ini dengan lebih dekat, tetapi mereka mungkin juga memainkan peran yang positif dengan mengalihkan energi JI untuk berjihad ke halaman-halaman cetak atau buku-buku daripada ke aksi kekerasan.

Dengan mempelajari judul-judul yang dicetak memungkinkan untuk mengikuti debat yang berlangsung di dalam lingkungan JI mengenai minat mereka terhadap taktik al Qaeda. Debat itu kelihatannya terjadi dengan sendirinya, tanpa dibantu oleh program “deradikalisasi” pemerintah, dan adalah penting hal ini terus terjadi. Melarang penerbitnya atau buku-buku mereka akan menjadi hal yang kontraproduktif. Namun penelitian yang lebih dalam terhadap kegiatan-kegiatan penerbitan ini diharapkan karena beberapa alasan:

  • Usaha penerbitan telah meningkat seiring dengan melemahnya JI, kemungkinan hal ini mencerminkan keputusan dari atas untuk fokus pada dakwah agama dan kegiatan perekrutan sebagai salah satu cara untuk membangun kembali organisasi mereka. Buku-buku yang diterbitkan mungkin adalah bagian dari upaya tersebut.
     
  • Dari penterjemah sampai distributor, jaringan usaha penerbitan merupakan sebuah contoh dari jaringan sosial yang mempersatukan JI, terutama ketika dalam kondisi lemah. JI telah terbukti sangat mampu untuk bangkit lagi dari kemunduran, dan jaringan yang menjadi tiang pondasi JI mungkin dapat membantu menjelaskan alasannya.
     
  • Meskipun perusahaan-perusahaan penerbitan tersebut dimiliki oleh individu, bukan JI sebagai organisasi, sejumlah pendapatan yang diterima sudah hampir pasti dialirkan kembali untuk kegiatan-kegiatan JI.
     
  • Anggota yang dekat dengan Noordin Mohammed Top (yang bisa dibilang merupakan buronan teroris yang paling berbahaya di Asia Tenggara), mungkin bekerja sebagai penterjemah untuk rumah-rumah penerbitan JI, meskipun ada jurang ideologi antara Noordin dan mainstream JI.

Cara terbaik untuk memastikan pengawasan yang memadai yaitu bagi pemerintah Indonesia untuk menegakkan hukum dan peraturan yang terkait dengan penerbitan, pencatatan/pendaftaran perusahaan dan pajak. Penegakan hukum semacam itu bukan saja dapat menjadi cara untuk mengawasi usaha-usaha ini, tapi juga bisa memberi informasi yang berharga mengenai besarnya dan status organisasi JI.

Jakarta/Brussels, 28 Februari 2008

Executive Summary

A handful of members and persons close to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s most prominent extremist organisation, have developed a profitable publishing consortium in and around the pesantren (religious school) founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in Solo, Central Java. The consortium has become an important vehicle for the dissemination of jihadi thought, getting cheap and attractively printed books into mosques, bookstores and discussion groups. The publishing venture demonstrates JI’s resilience and the extent to which radical ideology has developed roots in Indonesia. The Indonesian government should monitor these enterprises more closely, but they may be playing a useful role by channelling JI energies into waging jihad through the printed page rather than acts of violence.

Examining the titles printed permits tracking of a lively internal debate within JI over the desirability of al-Qaeda tactics. That debate seems to be taking place spontaneously, without any assistance from the government “deradicalisation” program, and it is important that it continue. Banning the publishers or their books would be counterproductive. But more scrutiny of the publishing activities would be desirable for several reasons:

  • Publishing has increased as JI has weakened, likely reflecting a decision from the top to focus on religious outreach and recruitment as a way of rebuilding the organisation. The books produced may be part of that effort.
     
  • From translator to distributor, the publishing web is an example of the social network that holds JI together, particularly at a time of weakness. JI has proven itself extraordinarily able to rebound from setbacks, and the networks underpinning it may help explain why.
     
  • Although the publishing houses are owned by individuals, not JI per se, some revenues are almost certainly being ploughed back into JI activities.
     
  • Individual members close to Noordin Mohammed Top, perhaps the region’s most dangerous at-large terrorist, may be working as translators for JI publishers, despite the ideological gulf between Noordin and the JI mainstream.

The best way to ensure adequate scrutiny would be for the Indonesian government to enforce its own laws with respect to publishing, labour, corporate registration and taxation. Such enforcement would not only offer a means of monitoring these enterprises, but it could also yield valuable information about the size and status of the JI organisation.

Jakarta/Brussels, 28 February 2008

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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