Syari’at Islam dan Peradilan Pidana di Aceh
Syari’at Islam dan Peradilan Pidana di Aceh
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 117 / Asia

Syari’at Islam dan Peradilan Pidana di Aceh

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Ringkasan Ikhtisar

Aceh adalah satu-satunya propinsi di Indonesia yang memiliki hak untuk menerapkan Syari’at Islam secara penuh. Sejak tahun 1999, Aceh secara perlahan-lahan telah mulai meletakkan sebuah kerangka kelembagaan untuk menegakkan Syari’at Islam. Dalam proses peletakan kerangka kelembagaan tersebut, mereka menemui pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang sulit dijawab: Aspek apa yang harus ditegakkan pertama kali? Apakah sebaiknya menggunakan aparat kepolisian, kejaksaan dan pengadilan yang sudah ada atau membentuk lembaga baru? Bagaimana sebaiknya menjatuhkan hukuman kepada para pelanggar hukum? Upaya mereka untuk menemukan jawaban bagi pertanyaan ini diperhatikan dengan seksama oleh pemerintah daerah yang lain, dan beberapa diantaranya telah membuat peraturan-peraturan daerah (perda) yang terinspirasi oleh atau diambil dari Syari’at Islam. Langkah ini pada gilirannya telah memicu perdebatan hangat di Indonesia mengenai apa peran pemerintah di tingkat pusat, propinsi dan kabupaten  dalam mendorong ketaatan terhadap Syari’at Islam dan sejauh mana gerakan Islamisasi akan dan sebaiknya diperbolehkan untuk berkembang.

Laporan ini menganalisis alasan-alasan yang mengemuka atas pertanyaan mengapa Aceh mendapatkan hak untuk menerapkan syari’at Islam, sementara propinsi yang lain tidak. Alasan alasan itu antara lain: bahwa Islam adalah identitas utama masyarakat Aceh.; bahwa ada preseden masa lalu penerapan syari’at Islam di Aceh; bahwa memberikan hak menerapkan Syari’at Islam akan membujuk Aceh menjauh dari separatisme dan membantu memulihkan kepercayaan kepada pemerintah pusat. Ketiga asumsi ini, namun khususnya yang terakhir, ikut menjadi alasan ketika pada tahun 1998 pemerintah pasca- Soeharto yang pertama mulai memikirkan tentang solusi politik atas konflik di Aceh.

Pengadilan Islam di Aceh telah lama menangani kasus- kasus mengenai perkawinan, perceraian dan warisan. Sebuah terobosan yang berkenaan dengan penerapan hukum Islam yang lebih luas terjadi setelah undang- undang Otonomi Khusus disahkan pada tahun 2001, yang memberikan lampu hijau kepada pengadilan Islam untuk melebarkan jangkauan mereka hingga ke peradilan pidana.   Pada   titik   inilah   persoalan   serius  mengenai

dualisme hukum muncul, tanpa adanya batasan yang jelas mengenai pembagian tugas antara pengadilan negeri biasa dan pengadilan Syari’at. Pertanyaan mengenai masalah penegakan hukum bahkan lebih suram: laporan ini mengamati peran wilayatul hisbah, yaitu “polisi syariat” yang telah dibentuk oleh pemerintah setempat dan bagaimana perannya semakin lama semakin luas  – dengan cara yang membuat polisi tidak senang.

Crisis Group mengkaji persoalan-persoalan praktis yang telah muncul pada saat Aceh mencoba untuk menegakkan tiga aturan Syari’at Islam yang pertama, yang telah disahkan oleh pemerintah propinsi. Aturan-aturan itu adalah: larangan minuman keras; berjudi; dan khalwat. Laporan ini melihat bagaimana dan mengapa pemerintah memilih hukum cambuk sebagai sanksi bagi yang melanggar ketiga aturan ini, meskipun hukuman ini belum pernah ada sebelumnya di Aceh.. Laporan ini juga melihat rencana-rencana untuk memperluas penerapan hukum Islam.

Crisis Group menyimpulkan bahwa meskipun para pejabat Syari’at di Aceh benar-benar yakin bahwa penerapan hukum Islam yang ketat akan ikut memfasilitasi tujuan yang lebih luas seperti upaya perdamaian, rekonsiliasi, dan rekonstruksi, tapi ada dinamika lain yang juga terjadi. Fokus perbaikan moralitas tak lagi jadi sarana tapi sudah jadi tujuan itu sendiri. Birokrasi Syari’at memiliki kepentingan untuk memperluas kekuasaannya. Semangat yang ditunjukkan oleh polisi syariat dalam menerapkan peraturan ini telah mendorong sebuah proses dimana penduduk saling melaporkan tentang tetangganya dan main hakim sendiri. Ada persepsi bahwa perempuan dan kaum miskin telah menjadi target utama dari penegakan hukum Islam ini. Belum ada indikasi bahwa penerapan Syari’at Islam bisa meningkatkan keadilan  bagi sebagian besar rakyat Aceh. Namun, bagi mereka yang mendukung perluasan penegakan syari’at Islam, hal itu mungkin tidak relevan. Masalah sebenarnya adalah apakah hukum buatan manusia atau Tuhan akan berlaku.

Jakarta/Brussels, 31 Juli 2006

Executive Summary

Aceh is the only part of Indonesia that has the legal right to apply Islamic law (Shari’a) in full. Since 1999, it has begun slowly to put in place an institutional framework for Shari’a enforcement. In the process, it is addressing hard questions: What aspects should be enforced first? Should existing police, prosecutors and courts be used or new entities created? How should violations be punished? Its efforts to find the answers are being watched closely by other local governments, some of which have enacted regulations inspired by or derived from Shari’a. These moves in turn are sparking a raging debate in Indonesia about what role government at any level should play in encouraging adherence to Islamic law and how far the Islamisation drive will or should be allowed to spread.

This report analyses the reasons usually put forward for why Aceh has been granted the right to apply Shari’a when many other regions have not: that Islam is central to Acehnese identity; that there is a historical precedent there; and that granting Shari’a would help woo an area wracked by insurgency away from separatism and restore trust in the central government. All three assumptions, but particularly the last, came into play when the first post-Soeharto government in 1998 began thinking about a political solution to the Aceh conflict.

Islamic courts in Aceh had long handled cases of marriage, divorce and inheritance. The breakthrough in terms of greater application came after special autonomy legislation was passed in 2001, which gave the courts a green light to extend their reach into criminal justice. It was at this point that serious issues of legal dualism emerged, with no clear line between what the division of labour would be between the regular state courts and Shari’a courts. The question of law enforcement was even murkier: this report looks at the role of the wilayatul hisbah, the “vice and virtue patrol” that Aceh has set up and how its role is gradually expanding much to the unhappiness of the police.

Crisis Group examines the practical problems that have emerged as Aceh tries to enforce the first three Shari’a regulations passed by the district government: criminalising consumption and sale of alcoholic beverages; gambling; and illicit relations between men and women. It looks at how and why the government instituted caning as a punishment for all three, even though there was no precedent for it in Aceh, and the plans for expanding the application of Islamic law.

The report concludes that while the Shari’a officials in Aceh deeply believe that strict enforcement will facilitate broader goals like peace, reconstruction and reconciliation, there are other dynamics at work. The focus on morality seems to have become an end in itself. The religious bureaucracy has a vested interest in its own expansion. The zeal shown by the vice and virtue patrol in enforcing the regulations has encouraged a report-on-your-neighbour process and a kind of moral vigilantism. Women and the poor have become the primary targets of enforcement. There is no indication that implementation of Shari’a is advancing justice for most Acehnese. But for many of its advocates, that may be beside the point. The real issue is whether man’s law or God’s will prevails.

Jakarta/Brussels, 31 July 2006

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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