Daur Ulang Militan Indonesia: Darul Islam Dan Bom Kedutaan Australia
Daur Ulang Militan Indonesia: Darul Islam Dan Bom Kedutaan Australia
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 92 / Asia

Daur Ulang Militan Indonesia: Darul Islam Dan Bom Kedutaan Australia

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RANGKUMAN IKHTISA

Tidak mungkin memahami konsep jihad di Indonesia tanpa mengerti gerakan Darul Islam (DI) serta upayanya membentuk Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). Selama 55 tahun terakhir, gerakan tersebut telah menghasilkan berbagai pecahan dan sempalan, mulai dari Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) hingga kelompok agamis yang menolak kekerasan. Setiap kali generasi lama akan sirna, munculah generasi baru yang militan yang mendapat ilham dari sejarah DI maupun pesona negara Islam, untuk membaharui keberlanjutan gerakan tersebut. Sepanjang pola yang diurai didalam laporan ini tetap berjalan, maka Indonesia tak akan pernah bisa memberantas JI maupun mitra-mitranya dalam berjihad, sekalipun setiap anggota dari komando pusat berhasil ditangkap, akan tetapi dengan memperhatikan beberapa upaya kunci, kiranya mereka dapat terkendali.

Gerakan DI, yang bermula dari pemberontakan-pemberontakan di Jawa Barat, Sulawesi Selatan dan Aceh pada tahun 1950an, kini merupakan jaringan yang bersifat fleksibel namun langgeng, terdiri dari hubungan-hubungan pribadi yang terjalin pada hampir semua pulau-pulau besar di nusantara. Peristiwa bom pada bulan September 2004 didepan kedutaan Australia menunjukkan betapa hubungan-hubungan tersebut memainkan perannya.

Beberapa hari saja pasca bom tersebut, polisi telah menetapkan keterlibatan Azhari Husin dan Noordin Mohammed Top, dua anggota JI dari Malaysia. Tapi, belakangan terungkap keduanya bekerjasama dengan beberapa anggota DI dari kelompok yang terkenal dengan sebutan Ring Banten, yang beroperasi di basis-basis lama DI di Jawa Barat. Tiga pemuda Ring Banten yang direkrut menjadi pelaku bom bunuh diri, yang salah satunya ikut tewas pada peristiwa bulan September, masing-masing diketahui ayahnya adalah anggota DI.

Dengan mencermati sejarah DI, kiranya dapat lebih mudah memahami JI:

  • Cara Darul Islam bertahan serta melakukan adaptasi setelah mengalami kekalahan ditangan TNI pada tahun 1960an dan tertangkapnya hampir seluruh pimpinannya pada 1977-1982, mengisyaratkan bahwa JI pun mungkin bisa bertahan walaupun banyak diantara pemimpin tertinggi telah ditangkap.
     
  • Seringkali dengan dipenjara, pamor anggota DI justru naik; bahkan setelah dipenjara untuk waktu cukup lama mereka kerap keluar dengan semangat baru dan bisa direkrut untuk operasi baru.
     
  • Perpecahan maupun perebutan kekuasaan yang terjadi di tingkat atas sering berdampak kecil terhadap kerjasama di tingkat bawah.
     
  • Kecilnya kemungkinan keberhasilan suatu operasi tertentu tidak banyak mematahkan semangat mereka yang bertekad melancarkan serangan. Dengan semboyan operasi “Menang atau mati syahid”, maka berjihad dihadapan tantangan yang sangat besar justru memiliki daya tarik tersendiri.
     
  • Kegagalan pimpinan senior untuk merespon kejadian-kejadian politik tertentu dapat membuka jalan bagi timbulnya gerakan-gerakan militan baru dibawah pimpinan anggota-anggota muda yang merasa kesal terhadap sikap pasif para senior mereka.
     
  • Ikatan-ikatan baru dan persahabatan yang langgeng terjalin ketika menjalankan program pelatihan militer.

Semua ini tentu saja mengkhawatiran, namun ada juga berita yang menggembirakan. Terjadinya daur ulang anggota DI lama yang masuk kedalam JI atau yang membentuk kerjasama dengan JI mengisyaratkan bahwa basis perekrut pelaku jihad tidak berkembang secara signifikan, selain itu tampaknya mereka menemukan kesulitan untuk bergerak jauh diluar lingkungan DI lama maupun lingkungan JI yang ada. Bahkan didalam basis-basis DI sendiri, yang merupakan tempat merekrut pelaku lapangan untuk pengeboman kedutaan Australia, ternyata sulit menemukan pemuda yang bersedia menjalankan paduan antara praktek agama yang sangat ketat dengan penafsiran jihad yang sangat ekstrim. Tak ada alasan menduga, misalnya, bahwa perang Irak bakal meningkatkan jumlah anggota JI baru secara mendadak, kendati perang tersebut sangat tidak populer dan telah mengobarkan sentimen anti-Amerika, yang akan tetap mempersulit upaya melawan terror yang dilakukan didalam negeri

Variabel yang terpenting didalam menentukan apakah jihadisme dapat dikendalikan termasuk:

  • penanganan yang tepat terhadap ketegangan antar agama yang terjadi didalam negeri;
     
  • kapasitas penegakan hukum ditingkatkan;
     
  • perhatian yang lebih serius dari pemerintah Indonesia terhadap dampak memenjarakan pelaku jihad, dan tindak lanjut setelah mereka dibebaskan; dan,
     
  • pengendalian yang lebih cermat atas penjualan dan access kepada senapan, amunisi dan bahan peledak;

Semua hal tersebut sesungguhnya berada didalam kendali pemerintah Indonesia. Ada lagi variabel keempat, yaitu apakah akan lahir sebuah pusat utama pelatihan jihad internasional seperti yang pernah ada di Afghanistan. Sudah barang tentu hal itu tergantung tidak saja pada tindakan pemerintah Indonesia, melainkan juga atas kebijakan lebih luas dari komunitas internasional.

Singapura/Brussels, 22 Februari 2005

Executive Summary

No understanding of jihadism in Indonesia is possible without understanding the Darul Islam movement (DI) and its efforts to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia (NII)). Over the last 55 years, that movement has produced splinters and offshoots that range from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to non-violent religious groups. Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by DI's history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life. If the pattern outlined in this report holds, Indonesia will not be able to eradicate JI or its jihadist partners, even if it arrests every member of the central command but, with more attention to a few key measures, it ought to be able to contain them.

The DI movement, that began as separate rebellions in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh in the 1950s, is now one very loose but enduring web of personal contacts that extends to most of the major islands in Indonesia. The September 2004 bombing in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta shows how some of those contacts can be brought into play.

Within days of the explosion, Indonesian police determined that two known Malaysian JI members, Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top, were involved. But it became apparent that they were working in partnership with an offshoot of DI called the Banten Ring, operating in old DI strongholds in western Java. Three of the young men recruited as suicide bombers from the Banten Ring, including one who died in the September bombing, had fathers in DI.

Examining DI's history may give us clues to understanding JI:

  • The way Darul Islam survived and adapted after its defeat by the Indonesian army in the 1960s and the arrest of virtually its entire leadership in 1977-1982 suggests JI may also be able to survive the arrests and imprisonment of many of its top leaders.
     
  • Imprisonment often enhances the credentials of DI members and rarely serves to weaken their commitment to the cause; they often emerge even from long imprisonment as energized as when they went in and recruitable for new operations.
     
  • Rifts and power struggles at the top often have little impact on cooperation at lower levels.
     
  • The odds against a particular operation succeeding are little deterrent to those committed to planning attacks. With "Victory or martyrdom" as the operative slogan, waging jihad against insuperable odds has its own attraction.
     
  • Failure of older leaders to respond to particular political events may lead to the emergence of new, militant movements led by younger members angered by the inaction of their elders.
     
  • New bonds are forged and lasting friendships made during military training programs.

All this is worrying but there is also good news. The recycling of old DI members into JI or into partnerships with JI suggests that the recruiting base for jihadists may not be expanding significantly, and that it is difficult for them to move very far beyond old DI or existing JI constituencies. Even in the DI stronghold where the foot soldiers for the Australian embassy bombing were recruited, it was difficult to find youths willing to sign up for the combination of very strict religious practice and extreme interpretation of jihad. There is no reason to think that the war in Iraq, for example, will produce a sudden spurt of new JI members, even though the unpopularity of that war and the anti-American sentiment it has fuelled will continue to complicate domestic counter-terror initiatives.

The most important variables that will determine whether jihadism is contained include whether:

  • communal tensions inside Indonesia are properly managed;
     
  • law enforcement capacity is improved;
     
  • the Indonesian government gives more serious thought to the impact of prison on the jihadists in custody and what happens to them on release; and
     
  • better control is exerted over the sale and transfer of arms, ammunition and explosives.

All these are within the control of the Indonesian government. A fourth variable is whether a new major centre of international jihadist training, such as Afghanistan once was, emerges. That depends, of course, not only, or even primarily upon the Indonesian government's actions but upon policies of the wider international community.

Singapore/Brussels, 22 February 2005

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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