Despite considerable progress since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in November 1995 in consolidating the peace and rebuilding normal life in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), international efforts do not appear to be achieving the goal of establishing Bosnia as a stable, functioning state, able at some point to run its own affairs without the need for continued international help. Peace, in the narrow sense of an absence of war, has been maintained; progress has been made in establishing freedom of movement throughout the country; joint institutions, including the state presidency, parliamentary assemblies and ministries, as well as a joint command for the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation), have been established.

However, the return of refugees and displaced persons (DPs), one of the key planks of the DPA, has been disappointingly slow, despite considerable international attention to this issue and the application of considerable resources. While joint institutions have been set up, at the state level they barely function, if at all, with the international high representative, Carlos Westendorp, having to intervene and impose decisions in a number of key areas. Institutions in the Federation frequently do not function properly. Bosniac and Croat parallel institutions continue, de facto, to operate, while in cases where joint institutions have begun to function, Bosniac and Croat officials often behave more as representatives of their ethnic groups and political parties than as professional public servants. And while a joint command for the Federation Army notionally exists, in practice separate Bosniac and Croat military formations remain, so that Bosnia still effectively has three military forces representing the three recent wartime protagonists.

In general, mutually-suspicious ethnic parties representing the three principal ethnic groups are dominant. They hold very different perspectives about how the country should look. If they do co-operate at all in implementing the DPA it is usually only grudgingly and under intense international pressure. The political system, which requires consensus among ethnic representatives, does not function effectively. In a system infused with corruption and cronyism, the one major respect in which many in power share a united purpose across the ethnic divide is in their determination to take advantage of the numerous opportunities for personal enrichment. In this situation economic reforms, such as privatisation, which numerous western advisers and consultants have tried to steer towards a western-style market orientation, are more likely further to entrench cronyism.

This paper weighs up the chances of current efforts to rebuild Bosnia ever producing a stable, functioning Bosnian state. It considers the outlook for Bosnia in present circumstances, and it considers whether there is any alternative to the present pattern of antagonistic ethnic parties failing to govern effectively and depending upon international pressure and intervention for decisions to be taken.

Sarajevo, 9 September 1998