Kurdên Sûrya: Pevçûnek di Nav Pevçûnekê da
Kurdên Sûrya: Pevçûnek di Nav Pevçûnekê da
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  1. Executive Summary
A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West
A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West
Report 136 / Middle East & North Africa

Kurdên Sûrya: Pevçûnek di Nav Pevçûnekê da

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Hember berfirehbûna pevçûna di nav Sûrîyê da bajarê kû piranîya xelkên wê Kurdin, di asayî yê da ma ne. Ji ber kû ev bajara ne gelek ber çav nînin, dûr ji êrişên dewletê ma ne. Bi derbas bûna demê, bo kû hêzên ewlehîyê Esed bikaribin di cihekê da kom bibin ji bajarên Kurda paşve kêşan. Komê Kurd hatin û şûna wan girt: kû bajarê xwe rizgar bikin û heremê xwe biparêzin û xizmetê pêdivî pêşkêşî xelkê xwe bikin û bo Sûrîya paş Esed rewşa civakê amade û bihêz bikin. Desthelatê mezintir ji dikarin bi dest bînin lê ne bi sanahî. Ji ber dijminîya navxwe, dijminî gel Ereba (hember pevçûnê wê dawîyê) û dijberîyê heremî li ser mijarek bi navê pirsgirêka kûrdistanê armançên Kurda niha ji bê çareser maye. Ji bo Kurdê Sûrî , ku bi sala hember zûlmê hatine û mafê wan yê serekî hatîye bin pê kirin, balkêş kû dijberîyê navxwe bi dawî bînin, daxwazê xwe zelal bikin – eger bi lihev kirinê sext jî bibe – û gel her sazîyê bihêzê di pêşeroja Sûrîyê lihev bike heta kû bikaribin mafê xwe zelal bikin û bidin misoger kirin. Û niha dema wê ye kû hevkûfê ne- Kurdên wan stratejîyek pêşkêş biken û giş Sûrîyan misoger bikin ku di dewleta nû da, mafê netewa, dad û lêpirsîn bi berfirehî bê qebûl kirin. 

Kurdên Sûriyeyê, komekin ku ji hêla neteweyî û zimanî gelk xelkê dî yên ev welatî ferq dikin, di erdê nêzî sînorê tirkîyê û Eraqê da dijîn, lê di gelek bajarê dî yên welat wek Şam û Helebê jî gelek kûrd dijîn, bi rastî eger em bixwazin bipeyivîn, dibî em bêjin ku bajarê wan di heremeke tenl da nînin, çi li hêla sîyasî – ewan wek wekhev xwe yê Eraqê di rejîma Bes da Serbixweyî bi dest neanî bûn – û çi ji hêla coqrafyayî jî, ji ber ku di heremê bakûrê rojhilatê ji ku xelkê wê bi gelenperî kurdin, netewê di wek Erebê Sûnî, Aşûrî, Ermenî, Tirkemen û Êzidî ji di hinek taxa da dimînin. Ji ber wê em nikarin ser heremek yekgirtî bipeyivîn. Zêdetir ji wê ev berevajîyê birayê xwe di Tirkîyê, Iranê û Eraqê ji qazanca jîyan di çîya da bêpişkin heta bikarin bi asayî dijberî dewleta navendî sazîyê çekdar saz bikin.

Rejîm behayek baş ji Kurdê Sûriyeyê re nadet û bi pejirandina hinek xebatê sîyasî û çekdarî (dema ku dij bi tirka dihatin bikar anîn) û xebatê tawanbar (zêdetir qaçax) ewan piştîvanîya hinek ji wan bi dest anî bûn, lê ewanê dî bi giştî di bin ferq û cudahîyê û zilma bi pergal bûn. Yek ji mînaka ev naberaberyê bê welat bûna û jîyan di valahîyê da û binpê bûna mafê bineyîyê nêzî 300,000 hizar kes ji kurda bo kû dibe ji sedî 15 ji du milyon Kurdên Sûriyeyê. Lê hinek caran serhildan çê dibin lê tên qir kirin li ber vê Kurdên Sûriyeyê bi giştî hêminin.

Ev rewşe diguhere. Her wek me di sala 1991 û disan di sala 2003 di Eraqê da dît, alozîyê tundê yê niha derfetek daye dest Kurda ji bo çak kirina – û yan herî kêm destpê kirina çak kirinê – tiştekê ku bi bawerîya Kurdan şaşîyek dîrokî bo, anku biryara dewletê Firansî û Inglîzî li ser pişk vekirina Rojhilata Navîn bi rewşek ku ev kirine gelê herî mezin yê bê dewlet. Wisa diyar dike ku ev li ser vê armancê micidin. Tevî ku hebûna nêrînê cûda li ser çavanîya bûne ev yekê, bûye sebeb ku hêdî hêdî pey vê armancê biçin.

Di sala 2011 da dema ku li sûriyeyî da sehilda çê bo, ciwanê kurd beşdarî serhildanê bûn, lê partîyê kêvneşopê kurda nêrînek cuda hebûn, ev ji vê yekê ditirsîan ku heke beşdarî mixalifan bibin li alîyê dewletê ve bi sebeba tolhildanê bên qir kirin, û serpêhatîyê wan, ji bê alîbûna Ereba di dema serhildana xwe ya sala 2004 an – û qir kirina paş vê – bîra wan dihat û gihiştine ev encamê ku pê tevlî nebûn xwe, berjewendî yê xwe bimeşînin, û li ser vê dilnigeran bûn ku têkoşerê ciwan rola wan rexne biken. Û herwisa rejîm jî bi hivîya pêşgirtin ji saz bûna cepeyek nû û pê misoger kirina dijberîya Kurd û Ereba, rewş zêdetir aloz kir, û xwe ji heremê kurda dûr xist, û li ser vê gelek partîyê Kurda biryar girtin ku zêdetir beşdarî pevcûna nebin, anku ne gel dewletê bi şar bên û ne piştevanîya biden vê, û hember dijbera ji pêvajoyek bi gûman û tirsê meşandin ji ber ku ev bi giştî Erebê netewperest û Islamî nas dikirin.

Di dema niha (û bi yeqîn di encama pevçûnê domdar) partîya herî bibandor PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) e, û her ev partîye kêmtirn daxwaza şer li gel rejîmê heye û bûye sebeba gûmana lihev kirina Kurda gel rejîmê. Partîyek ku bi xurtî hatîye birêxistin û perwerde kirin û çeke kirin, çiqa Kurdê sûriyeyî ya Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) ye ku xwe partîya şorreş ya herî balkeş di Tirkîyê daye. Demek kêm paş destpê kirina serhildana Sûriyeyê. PYD ku gel PKK ê di çîyayê bakura Eraqê da dima, vegerrrîya Sûriyeyê, û komek çekdar gel xwe anî nav welat. Ev partîye di sala 2012 ê paş derketina hêzên ewlehîyê rejîmê ji heremê kurda, derfet bikar anî û xwe ji alîyê siyasî û ewlehî xurt kir, û herî kêm di pênc bajara, mirovên dewletê ji navendê fermî xiste der û ala xwe bi şûna ala Sûrî danan. Û pê ev kiryare, ev partîye wek berpirsê sazîyê dewletê di bajarê Kurdan da, xwe da nas kirin.

Dijberê giring yê PYD çend komê cuda ji partîyê biçûk yê Kurdin ku gelek ji wan pêwendîyê nêz gel komê Eraqî hene. Di cotmeha 2011 da, bin sîya Mesûd Barzanî, serokê Hikometa Herema Kurdistan (KRG) di Eraqê û Serokê Partîya Demokrata Kurdistanê (KDP) di Encumana Niştîmanî ya Kurd (KNC) da kom bûn. Ev Encumene dijberê bibandor yê PYD ê ye, lê hebûna dijberîyê navxweyî û nebûna hêzek xebatkar di nav Sûriyeyê da, bandor vê wek hêzekê kêm kirîye. Wisa pecçûnê Sûriyeyî bi saz kirina valahîyek ewlehî û sîyasî di heremê Kurdan da, bûye sebeba zêde bûna dijberîyê ev du partîyê serekî.

Komê Kurd ne tenê li gel hev dijberîyê diken lê di heman demê da gel dijberê –ne-Kurd ji dijberin. Ev komene giş dixebitin bo bi dest anîna berjewendî yê xwe, dû şûnpê û zêde kirina heremê bindestê xwe dikin. Ji ber bi bandor bûna neteweperestîya Erebî û Islamxwazî di nava dijberê ne-Kurd da û herwisa pêwendîyê bercavê wan di gel dewleta Tirkîyê û piştivanên kevneşopê wan di nava welatê Kendavê, gelek Kurd, bi taybet lê ne tenê alîgirê PYD, ji wan biyanî ne. Hevdem gel zêde bûna pevçûna û metirsîya zivirana wan bo şerê giştî yê navxweyî, pevçûnê olî û netewî di rojevê dane, berî niha welat bûye şahidê pevçûnê navbera şervanê PYD ê û komê çekdarê dijber (ku gelek caran bi şaşî û nehêjayî Artêşa Azad a Sûriyê, FSA tê bang kirin). Heta ev demê pevçûn tenê li ser desthilatdarîyê bûye lê gengazê di pêşerojê da bibe pevçûnê mezintir ser rewşa pêşerojê ya Kurdan.

Di davîyê da pevçûnê Sûriyê, bûye sedema bi şidet bûna şerê na berçav li ser dil û rihê tevgera netewî ya Kurda di herçar welatê (Sûriye, Eraq, Iran û Tirkîyê) da ku ev tevgere di nava wan da bilav bûye. Piştîvanê heremî yê PYD û KNC anku PKK û KDPa Barzanî, du modelê serekî ji netewperestîya Kurdî û herwiha du mînakê dijber bû rûbirû bûn gel dewleta Tirka destnîşan diken, ji ber ku sînorê dewleta Tirk di nav pişkek mezin ji erdê ku Kurd welatê xwe yê dirokî dizanin da derbas dibe. PKK pê bikar anîna şerê çekdar hember Tirkîyê, xebitîye ku Enqerê neçar bike ku mafê çandî û sîyasîyê Kurdan zêdetir bike, di berevajî yê da, KDP, pê bikar anîna bandora xwe di Hikometa Herema Kurdistanê, di ev salê dawîyê da xebatê mezin kirine ku pê çê kirina pêwendîyê abûrî û sîyasî dewleta Tirka han bide bo kiryarek biqazanctir û hevdem kêm kêrina girêdayî bûna xwe gel dewleta Bexdayê. 

Tirka xwe jî di nava vê komê da cî digre. Girêdana PYD ê li gel PKK ê ne zelale, lê bi bawerîya Tirka bersiva ev pirsê di mêj da hatîye dayîn, di bawera Tirka da, tevgera Kurdê Sûriyeyê çiqek biçûk yan rûnivîsek biçûk ji PKK ê ye û xebatê wan ji bo bidest anîna desthilat di Sûriyeyê da metirsîya geş kirina hestê cudaxwazî di Tirkîyê da heye. Çeperê PYD yê bihêz di nêzî sinorê Tirkîyê ku gengaze di pevçûnê gel Tirkîyê ji alîyê PKK ê va bên bi kar anîn, ji alîyê Enqerê ve nayê pejirandin.

Hevdem gel kêm kirina dijberîyê navxweyî, misoger kirin Enqerê û berçav kirina hêza xwe, Barzanî dixebite ku bibe navbeynkerê lihev kirina navbera PYD ê û KNC ê. Herdu partî ji vê kiryarê mifa werdigrin: ji ber ku KNC yê hevalê navnetewî û meşrûtî heye, lê bi şidet dijberî navwxeyî hene û ser erê bê desthilate, berevajî yê vê, PYD ê piştivanîyê bihêz yê xwemalî hene û lê meşrûtîya navnetewî wek wê tuneye. Lê berhema navbeynkerîya Barzanî ku Desteya Kurdî ya Bilind (SKC) tê bang kirin, di rewşa herî baş da tenê ji bo berjewendîya ye, herdu alî ji yek re piştrast nînin, û herdu alîya gel pêwendîyê aloz gel mixalifê Sûriyeyî hene, di navbera wan da ser heremê balkêş pevçûn ketîye holê; û herdu çavrê ne ku rewşa welat bê zelal kirin. 

Herwisa, tevî ku di dema niha da, Tirkîye naxwaze yekser êriş li ser PYD ê bike – ji ber metirsîya ketina nava agir û herwisa nebûna hecetên şer gel PKK ê – û li gel vê hindê ku rolêk balkêş daye Barzanî ji ber ku ber ji PYD ê bigre. Lê gengaze ku ev rewşe nedûme. Pê derbas bûn demê, bi gengazîyek zêde dibe ku berjewendîyê Hewlêr û Enqerê li yek veqetin. Ji ber ku Hewlêr dixwaze herema desthilatdarîya kurda di sinore Eraq û Sûriyeyê da xurttir bike, lê Tirkîyê bi yeqin ji bandor vê yekê ser Kurdê welatê xwe, û bi taybet bandor vê li ser rewşa Pkk ê ya giştî ditirsît.

Kurdê Sûriyeyî dibe heri zêde bixebitin ku nakevine nava pevçûnê zêdetir yê heremî û herwisa ji bo serbixweyî ya zêdetir nexebitin. Pêşeroja wan niha di Sûriyeyê da tê bê zelal kirin, û dibe ev li ser rola xwe di pergala pêşerojê da gel hêzê Sûriyeyîya biaxivin û li rêzgirtina mafê xwe yê serekî di pêşerojê da misoger bibin.

Hewlêr/Şam/Birûksel, 22 yê kanûna duyem a 2013 a

As Syria’s conflict has expanded, the population in majority-Kurd areas has remained relatively insulated. Keeping a lower profile, it has been spared the brunt of regime attacks; over time, security forces withdrew to concentrate elsewhere. Kurdish groups stepped in to replace them: to stake out zones of influence, protect their respective areas, provide essential services and ensure an improved status for the community in a post-Assad Syria. Big gains could be reaped, yet cannot be taken for granted. Kurdish aspirations remain at the mercy of internal feuds, hostility with Arabs (evidenced by recent clashes) and regional rivalries over the Kurdish question. For Syria’s Kurds, long-suppressed and denied basic rights, prudence dictates overcoming internal divisions, clarifying their demands and – even at the cost of hard compromises – agreement with any successor Syrian power structure to define and enshrine their rights. And it is time for their non-Kurdish counterparts to devise a credible strategy to reassure all Syrians that the new-order vision of the state, minority rights, justice and accountability is both tolerant and inclusive.

Ethnically and linguistically a distinct group, Syria’s Kurds inhabit lands close to the Turkish and Iraqi borders, though several cities in other parts of the country, in particular Damascus and Aleppo, also have large Kurdish constituencies. Strictly speaking, theirs is not a region, whether politically – unlike their Iraqi counterparts, they have not gained autonomy under the Baathist regime – or geographically: even majority-Kurdish areas in the north east are interspersed with mixed areas also comprising Sunni Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkomans and Yazidis. As things stand, one cannot speak of a contiguous territory. Moreover, and unlike their brethren in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, they do not have the benefit of mountains in which to safely organise an armed insurgency against central rule. 

Partly co-opted by the regime, which developed its own Kurdish clients by tolerating some political and paramilitary activism (as long as it was directed against Turkey) and criminal activity (mostly smuggling), Syria’s Kurds also have seethed under systemic discrimination and repression. Among the more egregious forms of inequity, some 300,000 of them – roughly 15 per cent of the estimated two million total – remain stateless, living in a legal vacuum and deprived of fundamental rights. Although revolts occasionally erupted, these quickly were crushed. The result has been a largely quiescent population.

This is changing. As occurred in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003, the current acute crisis presents Kurds with an opportunity to rectify – or at least start rectifying – what they consider an historic wrong: the decision by the French and British Mandatory powers to divide the Near East in a way that left them as the largest non-state nation in the region. They appear determined to seize it, though hobbled by competing visions about how best to do so.

If, when Syrians rose up in 2011, many young Kurds joined in, echoing calls for the downfall of the regime, traditional Kurdish political parties took a somewhat different view. They feared fierce reprisal against their people if they decisively joined the opposition; nursed resentment at Arab indifference during their own protests – and subsequent regime crackdown – in 2004; saw more to gain by remaining on the sidelines; and worried that newly empowered activists would challenge their role. Meanwhile, hoping to avoid a new battlefront and banking on Arab-Kurdish divisions to further muddy the picture, the regime for the most part left Kurds alone. As a result, most Kurdish parties opted to remain in the shadows of Syria’s broader conflict, neither fighting nor supporting the regime, while assuming a sceptical approach toward the (non-Kurdish) opposition, viewed as overly Arab nationalist and Islamist. 

What is currently (and largely as a result of the ongoing conflict) the most influential of these parties, the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party, PYD), also has been the most reluctant to confront the regime, prompting charges of collusion. Well-organised, trained and armed, it is a Syrian Kurdish offshoot of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), the main Kurdish rebel group in Turkey. Shortly after the uprising broke out, the PYD, which had been encamped with the PKK in northern Iraq’s mountains, returned to Syria, bringing along a contingent of fighters. In July 2012, it took advantage of the regime security forces’ partial withdrawal from Kurdish areas to firmly establish its political and security presence, ousting government officials from municipal buildings in at least five of its strongholds and replacing Syrian flags with its own. In so doing, it openly asserted itself as the authority in charge of state institutions in most predominantly Kurdish towns.

The PYD’s main competitors are a motley group of small Kurdish parties, several of which have close ties with Iraqi Kurdish groups. Under the patronage of Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), over a dozen of these parties coalesced in the Kurdistan National Council (KNC) in October 2011. This alliance has been the only effective Kurdish political rival to the PYD, even as internal divisions and the absence of a fighting force inside Syria have reduced its potential as an effective counterweight. Still, by creating a security and political vacuum in Kurdish areas, Syria’s conflict has prompted intensifying competition between these two main trends.

Kurdish factions compete not only with each other but also with non-Kurdish opposition groups, all of which vie for space as they struggle to accrue resources and expand their areas of influence. Many Kurds, especially but not only PYD supporters, are alienated by the predominantly Arab nationalist and Islamist narratives put forth by the non-Kurdish opposition, as well as by its perceived dependence on Turkey and Gulf-based conservative sponsors. As the conflict endures and threatens to turn into an all-out civil war, sectarian as well as ethnic tensions are building up; already, the country has witnessed clashes between PYD fighters and opposition armed groups (often referred to under the loose and rather deceptive denomination of the Free Syrian Army, FSA). So far these essentially have been turf battles, but they could escalate into a broader conflict over the Kurds’ future status.

Finally, the Syrian conflict has exacerbated the undeclared fight for the heart and soul of the Kurdish national movement in the four countries (Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran) across which it is divided. The PYD’s and KNC’s respective regional patrons, the PKK and Barzani’s KDP, represent the two predominant models of Kurdish nationalism today as well as two competing paradigms for dealing with Turkey, whose territory encompasses much of what Kurds see as their historic homeland. The PKK has used an episodic armed struggle to try to force Ankara to extend greater cultural and political rights to Kurds in Turkey; in contrast, the KDP, using its dominance of the Kurdistan Regional Government, has laboured hard in recent years to develop economic interdependence and political ties to coax Turkey into a more constructive posture and simultaneously reduce the KRG’s dependence on Baghdad.

Turkey itself must be added to the mix. How much autonomy the PYD enjoys vis-à-vis the PKK is a matter of some controversy, though for Ankara the question has long been settled. In its view, the Syrian Kurdish movement is little more than a branch or carbon copy of the PKK, whose attempts to establish a foothold in Syria risk fuelling separatist sentiment in Turkey. A PYD stronghold at its doorstep, potentially exploited by the PKK as a springboard in its fight in Turkey, is something Ankara will not tolerate. 

Seeking simultaneously to contain internal rivalries, reassure Ankara and assert his own dominance, Barzani has tried to broker an agreement between the PYD and KNC. Both have something to gain: whereas the KNC enjoys international partners and legitimacy, it increasingly is divided internally and lacks a genuine presence on the ground; conversely, the PYD’s strong domestic support is not matched by its international standing. But this Barzani-brokered marriage, the Supreme Kurdish Committee (SKC), at best is one of convenience. Neither side trusts the other; the two maintain (strained) relations with conflicting Syrian opposition groups; skirmishes have occurred between them in sensitive areas; and both are biding their time until the situation in the country clarifies. 

Likewise, although for the time being Turkey has opted not to intervene directly against the PYD – for fear of being sucked into a quagmire and for lack of a clear casus belli involving the PKK – and although it has given Barzani a leading role in containing the PYD, this approach may not last. Over time, Erbil’s and Ankara’s interests are likely to diverge. Whereas the former aims to consolidate a broad, Kurdish-dominated area straddling the Iraqi-Syrian border, the latter almost certainly fears the implications of such an outcome on its own Kurdish population, and in particular its impact on the PKK’s overall posture.

Syria’s Kurds should do their best to avoid both over-entanglement in this broader regional battle and overreach in their quest for greater autonomy. Their fate at present rests in Syria, and thus it is with Syrians that they must negotiate their role in the coming order and ensure, at long last, respect for their basic rights.

Erbil/Damascus/Brussels, 22 January 2013

 

Workers carry boxes of humanitarian aid near Bab al-Hawa crossing at the Syrian-Turkish border, in Idlib governorate, Syria, June 30, 2021. Picture taken June 30, 2021. REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano

A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West

The UN Security Council is considering renewing an understanding whereby UN agencies transport aid to Idlib, an area held by Syrian rebels. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Richard Gowan, Dareen Khalifa and Ashish Pradhan explain why the arrangement remains essential.

What is at stake in the Security Council?

The UN Security Council is set to vote soon on the renewal of a mandate that allows UN agencies to deliver aid to rebel-held Idlib in north-western Syria via a border crossing with Türkiye without asking for approval from the government in Damascus. The UN calculates that nearly two and a half million people rely on this lifeline for food and other essential supplies. Yet the arrangement is contentious. Since 2019, Russia, the Syrian regime’s ally, has aimed to curtail the mandate, arguing that the UN should work with Damascus on aid deliveries out of respect for Syria’s sovereignty.

In 2021, the U.S. made a concerted effort to convince Moscow to help keep the mandate alive, but it has made no similar push in 2022, as the two powers’ relations have collapsed over Russia’s war in Ukraine. Senior UN officials worry that Russia may veto the mandate – which should be renewed by 10 July – causing a dramatic drop in humanitarian assistance to Idlib and potentially leading to an influx of refugees into Türkiye. What happens with the mandate is a concern for the UN and, more importantly, for the people in Idlib.

The Security Council first authorised the UN to deliver cross-border aid to opposition-controlled areas of Syria without Damascus’s approval in 2014. At first, this mandate covered four crossing points, giving UN agencies access to southern and north-eastern Syria as well as the north west. The Council members’ cooperation on humanitarian issues despite their broader rifts over the war in Syria was a rare bright spot in UN diplomacy. But in rancorous debates in late 2019 and mid-2020, during which Russia and China used their vetoes three times to block resolutions renewing the mandate, Moscow succeeded in limiting the UN’s cross-border operations to a single crossing, at Bab al-Hawa between Türkiye and Idlib. Russia also made clear that the mandate could not be renewed indefinitely.

In 2021, the Biden administration identified maintaining aid to Idlib as an area for better relations with Russia. U.S. officials negotiated over the mandate’s future bilaterally with their Russian counterparts in Vienna and Geneva. While the official U.S. position was that the Council should reauthorise opening all four original crossings – an outcome few UN officials and diplomats thought likely – Russia assented that July only to keeping Bab al-Hawa open. Moscow also demanded that the UN work harder on channelling aid into Idlib from government-held Syrian territory (which is referred to as “cross-line” aid, as opposed to cross-border from Türkiye) and called for greater international funding for “early recovery” projects in government-controlled parts of Syria. Finally, Russia insisted that the UN Secretary-General report on cross-line aid halfway through the mandate period in January 2022, indicating that it might try to block the mandate’s continuation at that point (though it did not act on this threat). Despite these caveats, the Biden administration presented the fact that Russia was willing to keep the mandate alive at all – and the absence of public rows and vetoes at the UN like those in 2019 and 2020 – as proof that the U.S. could do business with the Kremlin.

Security Council members [fret] that Russian and Western diplomats would fail to reach an agreement on the future of aid to Syria.

A year on, that optimism looks like a thing of the past. Since Russia’s assault on Ukraine in February and the sharp deterioration in Moscow’s relations with Western powers, Security Council members have fretted that Russian and Western diplomats would fail to reach an agreement on the future of aid to Syria. As things stand, the mandate’s fate remains unclear with less than a week to go before the deadline for its renewal.

Ireland and Norway, the Security Council’s two elected members acting as “penholders” (diplomatic leads) on the issue, introduced a draft resolution renewing the authorisation for aid deliveries through Bab al-Hawa for twelve months on 27 June. Russia has yet to make a definitive response, and Council members expect that there may be intense wrangling over the text before the vote. The outcome will have a major effect on the lives of civilians in Idlib. It is also a crucial test of how far Russia and the West can continue to work together at the Security Council – however grudgingly – as the war in Ukraine rages and their policies become ever more hostile to one another.

How important is the mandate for Idlib and are there alternatives?

Despite the high level of tension in the Security Council over cross-border aid, this mandate has given the UN essential political backing to guide humanitarian operations in Idlib. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in particular has played a pivotal role in cross-border aid delivery. The Council mandate allowed OCHA to coordinate donor response, lead negotiations with local authorities, and guarantee a significant degree of transparency for aid delivered into these rebel-held areas. OCHA has also helped NGOs involved in relief work navigate the legal and political hurdles of operating in an area under the control of Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militia running most of Idlib. HTS is UN-sanctioned and is listed by Russia, the U.S. and Türkiye as a terrorist organisation.

The UN has additionally led negotiations involving Damascus and the HTS-backed Salvation Government that administers Idlib over the balance between cross-border and cross-line aid operations. The Syrian government and Russia insist that the UN ramp up cross-line assistance as an alternative to channelling aid through Bab al-Hawa, as part of their effort to reinstate Damascus’s influence over aid delivery to all of Syria. UN officials and Western diplomats are sceptical that this proposal is realistic, especially given the Syrian regime’s track record of blocking aid to punish civilians in opposition-held areas and the hostility of its rhetoric toward Idlib and its residents. From a technical point of view, cross-border aid remains the cheapest, quickest and most reliable way to meet Idlib’s needs. A report from the UN Secretary-General in June stated that UN humanitarian monitors counted some 1,686 trucks carrying supplies (four fifths of them bearing food) from Türkiye into Idlib in April and May alone. By contrast, the report noted that the UN had overseen just five cross-line convoys between July 2021 and June 2022, and highlighted one in May that involved just fourteen trucks.

The U.S. and its allies have agreed that the UN should also experiment with cross-line aid ... into Idlib.

Nonetheless, the U.S. and its allies have agreed that the UN should also experiment with cross-line aid, mainly as a political concession to Russia and in hope of retaining Moscow’s acquiescence to cross-border operations. In 2021, the Security Council agreed to “encourage efforts to improve cross-line deliveries of humanitarian assistance” from government-controlled areas into Idlib. Moscow complains that the resolution has not been fully respected, as cross-line deliveries to Idlib have remained irregular, while HTS (and civil society groups in Idlib) as well as many humanitarian agency employees describe these efforts as a sop to the Kremlin rather than serious aid.

This debate has also become highly contentious for local forces in Idlib. HTS and the Salvation Government have reluctantly agreed to some of the cross-line aid deliveries, providing them with security and allowing for safe distribution. Yet HTS has come under fierce criticism from parts of the population and rivals in Syria’s opposition for thus “collaborating” with a regime that has killed thousands and displaced millions of Syrians. In private, HTS members express concern that the cross-line mechanism is a quandary for them: if they cooperate, they are criticised locally; if they don’t, they will be condemned internationally; and in neither situation can cross-line aid address even a fraction of humanitarian needs in Idlib. For the time being, HTS has found it prudent to facilitate the safe passage of several cross-line aid convoys to avoid giving Moscow a pretext to put a halt to the UN’s cross-border mandate and to strengthen Türkiye’s hand in negotiating with Russia. According to HTS, it would be much harder for them to cooperate on cross-line aid if Moscow were to veto the cross-border mandate’s renewal.

What would a Russian veto mean?

If Russia does veto renewal of the cross-border aid mandate, the immediate fallout could be chaotic. It is not clear whether OCHA would have to abruptly end its Syria operations in Türkiye or whether it could continue to play a minimal coordination function during a transitional phase. Regardless, the absence of OCHA’s irreplaceable aid infrastructure and cross-border mandate would significantly reduce the volume of aid and the efficiency of the donor response. It would also leave NGOs and donors struggling to manage aid coordination and oversight, while reducing their leverage in dealing with authorities in Türkiye and Idlib. UN officials estimate that NGOs could supply at best 30 to 40 per cent of the aid that the UN has been providing. In practice that means hunger will increase, medical cases will go untreated, and millions will be at risk of losing shelter and assistance.

Crisis Group’s interlocutors in Idlib agree that the aid flow’s disruption could lead many of the region’s inhabitants – many of whom fled other parts of Syria earlier in the war – to attempt to escape the area, mostly by trying to enter Türkiye. How Ankara would respond to chaos at the border remains unclear; already in Türkiye the presence of an estimated 3.7 million Syrian refugees is a source of socio-political tension, which is on the rise due to economic troubles and elections due in June 2023. Although living conditions in Idlib have improved considerably since Moscow and Ankara forged a de facto ceasefire in 2020, the population remains anxious about the precarious situation. “Our lives depend on the mood in the Kremlin every few months. This is inhuman and unsustainable”, an Idlib resident said.

What are the chances the mandate will survive?

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s assault on Ukraine, Security Council members generally seemed pessimistic about the chances of renewing the mandate for cross-border aid in conversations with Crisis Group. Now, however, some are guardedly optimistic that Moscow will let it survive. It is mostly a matter of speculation. The Russian mission in New York typically has to wait until late in negotiations on this file to get clear instructions from Moscow on how to act. In negotiations on the draft resolution tabled by Ireland and Norway on 27 June extending the mandate, neither Russian nor Chinese diplomats appeared to have definite guidance from their capitals. Western diplomats hope that Moscow will decide that it will retain greater leverage over events in Idlib by agreeing to renew the mandate – which gives it a platform for pushing the UN to work harder at cross-line aid – rather than forcing a crisis.

Western officials hope that Moscow will [refrain from using its veto] on this occasion.

Although Western and Russian diplomats have had toxic relations at the Security Council over Ukraine, Moscow has refrained from using its veto on other resolutions, such as a new mandate for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, that other countries feared it might block. Western officials hope that Moscow will show similar restraint on this occasion, especially as vetoing the resolution would intensify its tensions with Türkiye (Turkish sources, by contrast, insist that they cannot prevent Russia from using its veto, and argue that Ankara should not be expected to fix this problem on behalf of the U.S. and European nations). China may also help moderate Russia’s calculations. During the 2021 negotiations over the Syrian humanitarian mandate, Chinese diplomats told Western counterparts that they did not want a repeat of the public disputes of 2019 and 2020. In 2022, they have emphasised the need to avoid too many blow-ups in the Security Council while the Russian-Ukrainian war continues.

There are different views regarding what Council negotiations will bring. Some Council members speculate that Russia could make last-minute demands – most likely over cross-line aid and funding for recovery – in the coming days. While the Council is slated to vote on mandate renewal on 7 July, it could push the date back, with negotiations perhaps running past the current mandate’s expiry on 10 July. Equally some UN officials guess that Russia will not create this sort of disruption, meaning that the process may end with a quick vote.

What is the longer-term future of cross-border aid to Syria?

It is clear that the best outcome of current UN diplomacy over Syria would be for the Security Council to renew the mandate for cross-border aid for a year. No credible alternative set of arrangements exists for cross-border aid. If Russia does veto the mandate, the fallout would provoke enormous humanitarian suffering, additional displacement and, potentially, political turmoil in and around Idlib. While Moscow has shown scant regard for the disapproval of other Security Council members over its war on Ukraine, it might be wary of straining its relationship with Ankara – and of creating a new crisis for itself in Syria while it is focused on Ukraine.

Nonetheless, Western members of the Council and UN officials need to ready themselves for an end to the cross-border-mandate, either in July or at a later date. The original Council mandate for cross-border aid to Syria in 2014 was based on the assumption that rebel-controlled enclaves around the country were temporary phenomena, and the mandate as well. For now, it appears more likely that the Syrian conflict is moving into an extended stalemate with no clear military or political resolution on the horizon. Areas of northern Syria where millions of displaced Syrians live might remain outside government control – and in need of significant external aid – for some time to come. There is no guarantee that the Security Council will continue to renew the authorisation for cross-border aid indefinitely.

Donors, the UN and NGOs already have plans for the eventuality that the cross-border arrangements end. One option – even if the mandate is renewed – may be for OCHA to gradually wind down its delivery operations while continuing to play a smaller coordination role and helping build up the capacity of NGOs to supply aid to Idlib in place of UN agencies. In this case, a future Russian veto would do less damage to aid supplies than it would do today. For the time being, however, it is essential that the Security Council renew the mandate for cross-border aid to avoid a fresh humanitarian disaster in north-western Syria.

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