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Is it time for MINUSTAH to leave Haiti?
Is it time for MINUSTAH to leave Haiti?
Handling the Aftermath of Haiti’s Presidential Assassination
Handling the Aftermath of Haiti’s Presidential Assassination

Is it time for MINUSTAH to leave Haiti?

Presentation by Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis Group on “Is it time for MINUSTAH to leave Haiti?” at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 25 July 2013.

In this presentation Crisis Group Senior Vice President Mark L. Schneider addresses the underlying causes of the current political crisis in Haiti and the ongoing challenges to the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH). The presentation summarises the still valid recommendations in Crisis Group’s two most recent reports on the island nation, “Governing Haiti: Time for National Consensus”, 4 February 2013, and “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition”, 2 August 2012. Schneider notes that the political polarisation within the country’s elites continues to stall long-delayed elections and much-needed reforms. In October 2013, the UN Security Council will consider the required extension of the MINUSTAH mandate and may question the lack of progress on establishing firm benchmarks for a transition targeted at the handover in 2016 from President Martelly to his successor.

I want to express my appreciation to Carl Meacham as director of the CSIS Americas Program for inviting me to discuss Haiti and the question “Is it time for MINUSTAH to leave Haiti”. I also want to commend Carl and CSIS for bringing security and stability issues in Haiti to the attention of Washington policymakers once again.

Polarisation, a generations-in-the-making deficit of confidence in government, exclusion from decision-making of the vast majority of the population and an absence of political consensus among elites continue to block institutional progress and to keep Haiti lurching from crisis to crisis.

The next crisis on the Haitian horizon has been visible for more a year. Ten of the country’s 30 Senators were to be elected in November 2011 but that election was never held. There also is a dispute as to whether the terms of another 10 are to end in January of 2014 or 2015. The Senate has passed a resolution saying the Constitutional mandate for six years means they stay in office till January 2015. A fair reading of the Constitution says the same. Others, apparently including some at the palace, argue that a 2008 law requires that their terms end this coming January.

President Martelly should not be tempted by those advisors to declare the Parliament not functioning in January in order to rule by decree. That is a red-line for donors and diplomats and they have told the President bluntly not to cross it. If he does, the result could be an instant suspension of bilateral and multilateral aid and a fiscal crisis to add to Haiti’s political crisis. If that occurs, no one may be able to stop Haiti’s descent once again toward permanent failed state status and Martelly will have condemned himself to a failed presidency.

The electoral dispute is compounded by the delay in elections for mayors and communal, municipal and departmental assemblies, leading to unconstitutional appointments of local officials by the President. And with the failure to name members of the Constitutional Court created a year ago in amendments to Haiti’s 1987 constitution, there is no arbiter for disputes between the executive and legislative branches of government.

President Martelly pledged a year ago to the international community to hold these long-delayed elections by the end of 2013. The polarised environment blocked the required Permanent Electoral Council.  Only the intervention of civil society in the form of a group of religious leaders achieved last year’s Christmas eve political agreement for a Transitional Electoral Council just for these partial legislative and local elections. That council finally sent its proposed electoral law to the palace on July 1 for formal submission to the Parliament. It is now July 25.

President Martelly still has not submitted that draft to the Parliament, a ministerial act which does not require his approval of the content of the draft. If there are questionable provisions—and some of the provisions clearly go well beyond what is required to hold these elections--he should send any recommendations for changes to the Parliament either with or after sending with the draft. But the delay is inexcusable.

To hold the first round of elections by the end of 2013, with the full support of MINUSTAH, will take a minimum of four to six months after the law is adopted.

One of the crucial elements in solving these disputes remains Haitians from across the political spectrum deciding that the country’s security, stability and prosperity is more important than their own narrow political or personal interests. Leaders in Haiti talk about dialogue—but they allow political disputes to be argued out emotionally in the press and thus close the doors to compromise before they are ever open.  For that reason, Crisis Group called earlier this year for the continued work of the “religions for peace” coalition to facilitate dialogue aimed at a national governability pact, similar to the consensus on key public policy issues that have recently been achieved in Mexico and earlier in Peru, Chile and Guatemala. And that coalition should be asked to rev up again to help Haiti’s political leaders act like leaders.

Not quite a year ago, Crisis Group published the report on the table “Toward a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition” and called on the UN to take three fundamental actions: develop with the Haitian government a fully transparent five year transition strategy defining a shift to Haitian responsibility for security and stability; second, adopt a narrower focus by MINUSTAH during this period focused on helping to strengthen institutions responsible for the rule of law and governance, including elections, and third; that MINUSTAH demonstrate its own commitment to international values by establishing a comprehensive human rights vetting and orientation for its peacekeepers and implement fully the recommendations of the UN own Independent Group of Experts on cholera.

Despite the criticisms that one hears in Haiti, we said then, and I would argue now as well, that MINUSTAH remains an essential contributor to security and stability in Haiti. The pace of the transition in downsizing its military component between now and the end of the Martelly presidency and the handoff to the next administration has to be conditioned by the realities on the ground.

So where are we with respect to MINUSTAH?

  • The Security Council did mandate the design of a transition plan linked to MINUSTAH’s own consolidation, but that process has only just now begun;
  • The resolution extending MINUSTAH also highlighted the crucial importance of security, the rule of law and governance. A working group between MINUSTAH and the Prime Minister’s office is supposed to establish transparent benchmarks in each of these areas. Regular and shared monitoring of progress toward those benchmarks also is essential.
  • Looking at the security challenge, major crime in Haiti—including homicide rates--are relatively low in contrast with those in some countries such as Honduras, or El Salvador, but the situation is far from satisfactory. Haiti has 6179 military troops and 2630 police in the UN MINUSTAH peacekeeping force. Yet, the Secretary General in March issued a report to the UN Security Council that said, the overall security situation (was) “relatively stable, although it was marked by an increase in civil unrest and major crimes.” His report went on to note an “upward trend in homicides” citing as a “major factor” the recurrence of gang clashes, and again, I want to quote “some of which appear to be instigated by political actors.”
  • For the first six months of the year, it appears that homicides are up significantly over the comparable period in 2012, kidnappings about on a par, and rapes also still at an unacceptably high level. All crimes, including robberies, etc., apparently show a slight decline.
  • MINUSTAH is most engaged in the development of the Haitian National police and here there is both good and bad news. The current 10,000 police have been vetted and slowly are improving their performance in corralling gangs, but much more is needed. To get to the goal of 15,000 trained and competent police by 2016 including filling the critical specialties from forensics to coast guard to border patrol, a much better job has to be done on recruiting for the police academy, and funding their salaries, equipment and infrastructure when they graduate. Last year only about 240 students graduated after the seven month course and more than 1000 have to graduate in each promotion to meet the 2016 goals. Recruiting has to be one year-round and one class should enter immediately after the previous has graduated.
  • MINUSTAH, other donors and the government need to quickly come together in a conclave to cope with the disappointing numbers from last year—where attrition actually was near equal to the academy graduates--take stock of the challenge and shake hands on an agreed roadmap going forward—including with enough money in Haiti’s own police budget line to cover its share of the costs—and donors need to do the same.
  • MINUSTAH also needs to be as active in helping Haiti rebuild its courts and justice system—including prisons—as it has been with the police. Anyone who has visited courts in Haiti often have difficulties in finding judges or prosecutors working—partly because many have their own private practices as well to which they give much more attention. The new High Judicial Council (CSPJ) finally is starting to set standards for judges and needs more help from MINUSTAH—coordinating other donors—in helping the CSPJ function. After a year, it has not yet earned professional or public credibility.
  • In the area of justice, one also hears about a proposal to raze the national penitentiary in downtown Port-au-Prince this year but with little visible planning about what to do with the 4000 current prisoners—some hard-core, some convicted, some neither of the above. However, unless there are other newly constructed jails, appropriate, staffed, and ready to accommodate those prisoners, tearing down the old prison needs to wait a while.
  • Finally, not enough has been done by MINUSTAH to respond to legitimate local anger at instances of egregious conduct by small numbers of MINUSTAH peacekeepers. As a result, the still irreplaceable role played by MINUSTAH tends to be overlooked in the heat of public anger. For instance, several key recommendations of the cholera Independent Panel of Experts submitted to the Secretary General have yet to be implemented and there still is an inadequate process for assuring human rights vetting of peacekeepers by troop contributing countries and when abuses occur, for communicating back to Haiti what kind of legal process has taken place.

Let me conclude by reminding all of us that Haiti is still coping with the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. We not only are talking about the 240,000 displaced still in camps around Port-au-Prince but also about the loss of lives of an even greater number of Haitians killed or severely injured in the disaster and the gutting of always weak national ministries, courts, and other institutions.

Haiti has the highest levels of infant (52/1000), child (70/1000) and maternal mortality (350/100,000 live births) in the Americas, the lowest levels of literacy and educational achievement, and a poster child for environmental exploitation. Next week Haitians will celebrate the “Carnival of Flowers” with the slogan, “One Haitian, one tree.” If they really want to see progress on the environment, health, education, jobs, and security, they should add, this year, “and one election.”

A police car filled with civilians and policemen drives up the Jalousie township where men accused of being involved in the assassination of President Jovenel Moise, have been arrested on July 8, 2021 at the Jalousie township in Haiti. Valerie Baeriswyl / AFP

Handling the Aftermath of Haiti’s Presidential Assassination

The killing of President Jovenel Moïse in murky circumstances has plunged the country into political turmoil. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Mariano de Alba explains the state of play and what outside actors should do as they seek to help Haiti achieve stability.

What’s the state of the investigation into President Moïse’s killing?

The circumstances behind President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination remain opaque, and conflicting theories as to the culprits abound. According to Haiti’s National Police, a squad of 28 mercenaries carried out the murder in the early hours of 7 July. The police have already killed three alleged suspects and arrested a further twenty, including eighteen Colombian former soldiers and two Haitian Americans. Five are missing. Authorities in Haiti proceeded to capture Christian Emmanuel Sanon, a Florida-based doctor, and accused him of plotting the killing through a security company headquartered in Miami. On 13 July, the police issued arrest warrants – listing charges of “murder and armed robbery” – for former Senator John Joël Joseph, an opponent of Moïse’s Tèt Kale Party, businessman Rodolphe Jaar and Joseph Félix Badio, an official who had worked for the country’s anti-corruption unit and was recently sacked. On 15 July, Haitian police took the head of the president’s security into custody. Authorities have also arrested three other local security officials and prohibited several others from leaving the country. Proceedings against the accused men are still ongoing.

All these actions, however, do not seem to have fully allayed the Haitian public’s mistrust of the official account of what happened on 7 July. Some observers wonder why there is no evidence that the security forces who were supposed to protect the president’s residence resisted the attack, in which only Moïse died while his wife was seriously wounded. Some also find it suspicious that the eighteen Colombians apprehended by Haitian authorities – several of whom claimed, according to family members, to have been hired to protect the president amid a wave of gang violence in Port-au-Prince – were so easily captured in the homes where they had been staying for the previous month, seemingly unprepared for the possibility they would be found.

As the U.S. and the Colombian governments sent law enforcement experts to Port-au-Prince to assist with the Haitian investigation, Colombian media and security officials offered speculation about the possible involvement of interim prime minister Claude Joseph, a version later denied by the head of Colombia’s police. The investigation is proceeding.

What was Moïse’s background and why was his presidency so controversial?

Prior to launching his political career, Jovenel Moïse was a banana exporter who became president of the Chamber of Commerce in Port-de-Paix, a city in north-western Haiti. He developed close ties with the former president, Michel Martelly, who was in power when Moïse appeared to win the first round of voting in the October 2015 presidential election. Turnout in the election was low, with only 1.5 million (of 5.8 million) registered voters going to the polls to choose from a field of 54 candidates – a manifestation of the country’s splintered politics. But although some international monitors, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), found that the first-round outcome was consistent with the voting that they observed, Moïse’s adversaries did not recognise the results, asserting that they were marred by ballot tampering and fraudulent tabulations. The dispute in turn led to violent unrest on the streets and repeated postponements of the second round of voting.

In May 2016, a commission formed by Jocelerme Privert, then interim president, to verify the 2015 results recommended that the election be restaged after finding evidence of “significant fraud”. In November of that year, Moïse won a fresh first round, in which only 1.12 million people, or 18 per cent of registered voters, turned out. He captured more than 50 per cent of the ballot, disposing of the need for a runoff, and assumed office in February 2017.

Haiti was in a bad state when Moïse took over ... by some measures the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere

Haiti was in a bad state when Moïse took over. It was by some measures the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, suffering extreme socio-economic inequality alongside flare-ups of political violence, and with weak institutions and high levels of impunity. It was also still enduring the effects of a devastating 2010 earthquake, estimated to have killed over 200,000 people. But during Moïse’s tenure, Haiti’s troubles went from bad to worse. On his watch, the country saw political and social unrest amid a deep economic crisis, worsening insecurity, corruption, poor handling of the pandemic and resurgent gang violence. Moïse was also implicated in a high-profile scandal. In May 2019, Haiti’s Superior Court of Auditors delivered a report to the Senate alleging that the president, among other political figures, was involved in the embezzlement of over $2 billion obtained through a financial agreement whereby Venezuela provided credit financing for Haiti and other countries to purchase crude oil on preferential terms. The profit from selling subsidised oil to private companies was supposed to fund investments in crucial infrastructure projects, but these never came to pass.

President Moïse’s opponents grew in number and strength as he sought to expand his presidential powers, which he did on several fronts. He began ruling by decree in January 2020, after his government decided not to hold parliamentary elections that had been scheduled for the previous October, citing “security concerns”. The decision effectively gutted the parliament. The terms of twenty senators expired, leaving the Senate with just ten elected members and unable to muster a quorum. In the lower house, all the deputies departed when their terms expired. Moïse also asserted control at the local level by handpicking mayors and local councillors in the absence of elections. On top of these moves, in February 2021, Moïse proposed a referendum (months later criticised by U.S. and EU officials) that would remove constitutional safeguards that had been introduced to curtail presidential power after dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier was toppled in the 1980s.

Still, Moïse faced further massive protests after parts of the opposition, civil society groups and Haiti’s Superior Council of the Judiciary determined that his five-year term in office had come to an end in early 2021. Moïse argued that he was due a one-year extension until 7 February 2022 given the delay before he took office. His position was backed by the UN Secretariat, the Secretary-General of the OAS and the U.S. government, but it encountered enormous pushback inside Haiti. On 7 February, the opposition tried to instal a parallel government, which led to the arrest of twenty people, including a Supreme Court judge. Moïse deemed the crisis an “attempted coup” and held onto power, despite recurrent mass demonstrations calling for his resignation.

Who is now in charge of the country?

In the wake of Moïse’s assassination, there was little clarity as to the legal order of succession. Claude Joseph, acting prime minister, proclaimed himself interim president and declared that the police were in control of the situation. According to the 1987 constitution, however, if the presidency becomes vacant, the head of the Supreme Court should take over (later revisions to that constitution altered the line of succession but their validity is disputed by critics). Yet after the head of the Supreme Court died of COVID-19 in June, there was no certainty as to who was the country’s most senior judge.

Complicating matters further, days before his death Moïse had appointed Ariel Henry as his new and seventh prime minister. Henry, a neurosurgeon who coordinated Haiti’s response to the cholera epidemic in 2010 and served as interior minister under President Michel Martelly in 2015, had nevertheless not been sworn in. On 7 July, he also declared himself acting president and asked Joseph to move to the post of foreign minister, while voicing his commitment to political dialogue and even joining Joseph’s meeting with a delegation from the U.S. government on 11 July.

On 17 July, the Core Group of states and organisations that has been discussing Haiti’s crisis in New York (comprising Brazil, Canada, the EU, France, Germany, the OAS, Spain, the UN Secretariat and the U.S.), called for formation of a “consensus and inclusive” government, and encouraged Henry to put it together. On 18 July, Joseph said to The Washington Post that he would step down and hand power over to Henry, which he did on 20 July.

What does the security picture look like in Haiti?

Security conditions are grim. There continues to be an immediate risk of escalating political instability and unmanageable street violence, particularly if powerful political figures are ultimately found to have been involved in the 7 July assassination.

Haiti’s violent and powerful gangs ... appear to be growing in strength and influence

But concerns about the country’s security extend far beyond Moïse’s murder and its aftershocks. Haiti’s violent and powerful gangs – often linked to political and business forces – appear to be growing in strength and influence, posing a major threat to overall security and the integrity of any elections. According to a recent UN report, in 2020 kidnappings increased by 200 per cent from the previous year, while murders rose 20 per cent and reported rapes 12 per cent. UNICEF stated in June that in Port-au-Prince “there are an estimated 95 armed gangs that control large territories” making up about one third of the capital, while a 1 July report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicated that gang violence has impeded the distribution of humanitarian assistance, including by forcing the cancellation of a program for distributing cash to more than 30,000 people. On 26 June, the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in the Martissant area of Port-au-Prince had to suspend operations because it was the target of an armed attack.

The development of effective state and security institutions to address these challenges is likely to remain an elusive goal so long as powerful elected politicians and their backers fund gangs, and the police force and courts remain too weak and compromised to enforce the law. In December 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department said “armed gangs in Haiti [are] bolstered by a judiciary that does not prosecute those responsible for attacks on civilians. These gangs, with the support of some Haitian politicians, repress political dissent in Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods known to participate in anti-government demonstrations”. Human rights abuses committed by the police are further cause for concern.

Will elections happen this year, and should they?

On 8 July, Joseph’s office announced that despite the assassination, elections will be held in September 2021, a date set by the Provisional Electoral Council that Moïse appointed by decree and that lacks broad political backing. Joseph promised talks with opposition leaders and other stakeholders to facilitate the electoral process. It is unclear, however, if Ariel Henry will stick to this plan now that he is in office. Encouragement to follow this course is likely to come from U.S. government officials and the UN special representative, who continue to say they expect Haiti to hold a presidential election in September.

Sceptics strongly question the wisdom of continuing down this path, arguing that the situation in Haiti is simply too insecure to hold credible elections. They also contend that the political establishment sorely lacks the legitimacy required to steer the country through the crises and challenges it is facing, including the growing links between politicians and gangs. To take on this task, some opposition parties and civil society groups have proposed handing the reins to a credible transitional government for a period of two years or more. Under this scenario, the transitional authorities would get started on needed reforms, such as enforcing vetting and accountability mechanisms for the police, creating a body to investigate and help try high-level corruption cases, and giving officers proper equipment. They would also lay the groundwork for elections and handle the most pressing issues affecting Haiti, such as fuel scarcity and the need to mount a COVID-19 vaccination campaign.

If the country takes this direction, it will be especially important that the transitional authorities stay within their emergency mandate and respect the integrity of Haiti’s institutions and its political diversity. Once in office, any transitional government, as well as its foreign backers, should also pay close heed to the views of Haitian civil society groups, many of which have been organised since the start of 2021 in a Commission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis in Haiti.

Are outside actors going to intervene militarily to stabilise Haiti?

Outside actors have made clear their desire to avoid any bold intervention in the country. U.S. officials rebuffed a request for military assistance from Joseph, their scepticism no doubt fuelled by the failure of previous military interventions to bring about lasting improvements in Haiti. The U.S. intervened in 1994 to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency and depose the military junta that had ousted him, only to return ten years later in the midst of a gang-led rebellion to escort Aristide into exile in highly controversial circumstances. On 15 July, President Joe Biden confirmed that “the idea of sending American forces to Haiti is not on the agenda at this moment”.

Nor does the UN Security Council seem likely to step up the UN’s presence in Haiti significantly. In 2017, the UN wound down a major stabilisation mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) that it stood up in 2004, soon after Aristide had taken flight, to address the country’s rampant insecurity and massive human rights violations. Relying on a significant Brazilian military contribution, MINUSTAH claimed early success in stabilising gang-affected areas and reforming the police. But the mission was also plagued by allegations that its troops used excessive force, committed sexual abuses and bore responsibility for the cholera epidemic that followed in the wake of the 2010 earthquake. In 2016, the office of the Secretary-General acknowledged the UN’s role in the cholera outbreak.

The Security Council discussed Haiti privately after Moïse’s killing, but there appears to be no consensus on enhancing the mission

MINUSTAH was eventually succeeded in 2019 by the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), a relatively low-key political mission, which focuses on advising and providing limited assistance to local authorities on how to achieve political stability and violence reduction. The Security Council discussed Haiti privately after Moïse’s killing, but there appears to be no consensus on enhancing the mission, including within the Core Group. Some Council members seem drawn to the idea of strengthening the mission’s ability to provide electoral support ahead of the planned September polls, which is part of its mandate – although given its limited capacity, others believe that BINUH would better attain its goals by supporting intensive diplomatic efforts to narrow the gulf between Haitian political and social forces.

Although international wariness about military intervention is well advised, outside assistance will nevertheless be key to helping Haiti overcome its daunting security challenges. Focused assistance to build up the police force is especially needed: experts estimate that the force suffers a deficit of at least 21,000 officers. Work to build up force numbers and territorial presence must be joined up with intensive efforts to mould a more professional, humane and reputable force.