The Syrian conflict since 2011 is a constellation of overlapping crises. Each of its global, regional and sub-national dimensions demands a tailored response set within an overarching framework. Instead, chronic violence and worsening suffering have killed more than 250,000 people, fueling radicalisation, refugee flight and a self-sustaining war economy. Outside stakeholders must learn from the way the Syrian conflict has repeatedly dashed unrealistic expectations on all sides. Crisis Group pursues a comprehensive approach for achieving a sustainable decline in violence and, ultimately, a political settlement. We also seek to correct dominant narratives that focus on jihadism and migrant flows, which are the symptoms, rather than the causes, of the problem.
Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, Ankara has been drawn ever deeper into the crisis. Its approach will likely hold steady for now. But the choices it makes next matter for the fate of millions of Syrians.
U.S. launched wave of retaliatory airstrikes against Iran-backed groups following killing of soldiers in Jan, Türkiye continued attacks on Kurdish targets, and clashes persisted between regime and rebels in north west.
In east, U.S. targeted Iran-backed groups, which continued attacks. In response to 28 Jan drone attack killing three U.S. soldiers in Jordan, U.S. 2 Feb launched most substantial retaliatory operation in Iraq and Syria since escalatory cycle began in Oct with strikes on more than 85 military targets, killing 29 Iran-backed militants in Syria; in show of restraint, U.S. allowed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers to evacuate beforehand. Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone 5 Feb killed six U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) at al-Omar base housing U.S. troops in Deir ez-Zor. Compounding risks of escalation, tribal militias backed by regime and IRGC 6 Feb targeted SDF. U.S.-led coalition 10 Feb intercepted six drone attacks targeting Conoco base, Deir ez-Zor. Meanwhile, Israel 2 Feb reportedly killed three Iran-backed militants in capital Damascus; 7 Feb struck Homs city, reportedly killing ten, including civilians; 21 Feb killed at least two in Damascus; IRGC reportedly scaled back deployment of senior officials and repositioned forces to western countryside.
In north east, Türkiye conducted repeated attacks on SDF. Notably, in Qamishli city, Hasaka province, Türkiye 11 Feb killed two SDF fighters and next day killed Kurdish administration official. With Türkiye seemingly taking advantage of U.S. preoccupation in east to destabilise Kurdish administration, SDF 12 Feb called on U.S. to strengthen its presence in region. Islamic State (ISIS) landmine 25 Feb killed fifteen civilians in Al-Raqqa’s eastern countryside.
In north west, regime forces and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) clashed. Regime forces, backed by Iranian proxies, targeted HTS with suicide drones in Idlib province: notably, 12 Feb killed two near Jisr al-Shughur city and 18 Feb killed and injured eight HTS fighters near Saraqib city.
Islamic State (ISIS) continued attacks; security forces killed protestor in south. ISIS 13 Feb reportedly killed nine soldiers near al-Sukhna town, Homs province. Security forces 28 Feb killed demonstrator at anti-govt protest in Suwayda city in first fatality since protests erupted in Aug.
Turkey is highly unlikely to compromise on troop withdrawal [from northern Syria].
It's important to remember that [Syrian president] Assad's return to the Arab League is a symbolic measure to begin the process of ending his regional isolation.
The U.S. and Europe have made it clear that they do not agree with Arab states normalizing with the Assad regime, but there doesn’t seem to be much they can do about it.
The UAE has, since 2021, embarked on a policy of diminishing tensions with other countries in the region, and normalizing with Assad is part of that.
If the UN fails to extend its operation [in Syria] via these [Turkish border] crossings, donor states should bypass the UN and do bilateral assistance themselves.
Whenever the American forces there [in Syria] are attacked, the question arises again: Why are they there?
The League of Arab States welcomed President Bashar al-Assad to its May summit, reinstating Syria’s membership, which it had suspended in 2011. The regime may look to have shrugged off the international opprobrium it earned for its brutality in repressing its opponents. But has it?
The rebels who control north-western Syria are dealing harshly with ISIS cells but have not yet crushed them entirely. The best way to stop jihadists from rebounding is to consolidate the area’s ceasefire. Outside powers can also help by sending more humanitarian aid.
Its self-declared caliphate is gone, but ISIS continues to stage attacks and intimidate the public in much of its former domain. The forces fighting the group need to hinder the militants’ movement between Syria’s regions – and, above all, to avoid debilitating conflicts with one another.
To prevent ISIS from resurging, forces fighting the group should stop it from moving across regions and avoid conflict with one another. This timeline catalogues some of the major ISIS attacks and counter-ISIS operations from 2017 to February 2022.
The UN Security Council is considering renewing an understanding whereby UN agencies transport aid to Idlib, an area held by Syrian rebels. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Richard Gowan, Dareen Khalifa and Ashish Pradhan explain why the arrangement remains essential.
This week on Hold Your Fire! Richard Atwood talks to experts Dareen Khalifa and Jerome Drevon about ISIS in Syria after the death of its leader Abdullah Qardash, the precarious calm that prevails across the country and the evolution of al-Qaeda’s former affiliate in the north west, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Aleppo was devastated by bombing and shelling during the Syrian war. It remains unsafe, with residents subject to shakedowns by the regime’s security forces and various militias. Damascus and its outside backers should curb this predation as a crucial first step toward the city’s recovery.
Turkey is increasingly relying on airpower in its fight against the PKK. New parties have been drawn into the conflict as it spreads to new theatres in Iraq and Syria, which, for now at least, complicates potential efforts to settle things down.
Receive the best source of conflict analysis right in your inbox.
This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Review our privacy policy for more details.