Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause?
Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause?
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Lebanon’s Elections Portend Protracted Political Vacuum
Lebanon’s Elections Portend Protracted Political Vacuum

Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause?

Few political actors in the Middle East have seen their environment as thoroughly affected by recent events in the region as Hizbollah, the Lebanese political-military organisation that first came on the scene in the mid-1980s.

I. Overview

Few political actors in the Middle East have seen their environment as thoroughly affected by recent events in the region as Hizbollah, the Lebanese political-military organisation that first came on the scene in the mid-1980s. In U.S. political circles, calls for action against Hizbollah, which is accused of global terrorist activity, are heard increasingly. With the ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the U.S. has upped its pressure on Syria and Iran – Hizbollah’s two most powerful patrons. Meanwhile, Israel has made clear it will not tolerate indefinitely the organisation’s armed presence on its northern border. Within Lebanon itself, weariness with Hizbollah and questions about its future role are being raised with surprising candour.

One after another, its local and regional cards appear to have been lost: Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon deprived Hizbollah of its principal raison d’être; America’s swift military success reduced the immediate prospect of it being drawn into a costly confrontation in Iraq; and renewed international efforts to restore calm in the Israeli-Palestinian theatre combined with intense pressure on radical Palestinian Islamist groups have diminished its ability to invoke the Palestinian struggle as a justification for armed action. Today perhaps more than ever since its establishment in 1984, the organisation’s purpose and fate hang in the balance.

Hizbollah is engaged in its own soul-searching. Pressured to undertake a strategic shift, it faces the decision whether its future is one among many Lebanese political parties or whether it will maintain the hybrid nature, half political party and half armed militia, part local organisation and part internationalist movement that has defined it from the outset.

Fully penetrating Hizbollah’s decision-making process is almost impossible. The movement enjoys a highly effective regime of internal discipline and concealment. External influence, whether emanating from Iran or Syria, is extremely difficult to assess. Nevertheless, various sources – including ICG interviews with Hizbollah members and with informed Lebanese political observers as well as Hizbollah’s own public statements and commentaries in its weekly al-Intiqad (critique) – offer important insights into its dilemma and the directions in which its thinking is leading.

The picture pieced together by ICG on the basis of fieldwork between April and July 2003 is that of a movement perplexed by recent developments and still struggling to find its footing. Outward self-confidence conceals deeper doubt and uncertainty about its role and possible theatres of action. Uncomfortable in its current pose yet unwilling to change in fundamental ways, it has opted for a posture of wait-and-see, maintaining the rhetoric and armed capability of a militant organisation but few of its concrete manifestations.

In so doing, it is postponing an inevitably wrenching internal debate and banking on future developments in Iraq and on the Israeli-Palestinian front that, by radicalising the region, might renew either Hizbollah's purpose or its patrons’ strength. The U.S. could fail to establish a political authority viewed as legitimate by the Iraqi people, Iranian or Syrian influence might grow there, and that country might yet turn into a deadly quagmire for the occupying forces; violence between Israelis and Palestinians could rekindle. Under either of these scenarios – even more so under a combination of them – pressure on Hizbollah to disarm and normalise its status, it believes, would fade.

There is little doubt that international and principally U.S. pressure in the Middle East has helped lead Hizbollah to its present stance of relative passivity. But pressure alone – and, to date, it has essentially been pressure alone – can only move it so far. Indeed, Hizbollah believes that the strong U.S. rhetoric and aggressive approach toward Syria and Iran may already be producing a backlash. A highly tense and polarised atmosphere in which Washington appears to be asking regional players to choose sides is one in which even Lebanese actors inherently hostile to Hizbollah are reluctant to be seen as backing the U.S. Lebanese who in recent months had become more assertive in their denigration of both Hizbollah and Syrian policies toward and presence in their country have felt compelled to mute their criticism since Damascus has become an overt U.S. target.

Being tough-minded need not mean being single-minded. To be effective, a policy that pressures countries and organisations that sponsor or engage in armed attacks ought also to offer the prospect of genuine gain if they cease to do so. The U.S. should be much clearer in presenting these potential gains and in putting forward an overall, positive vision of the region's future. Members who aspire to see Hizbollah play a more restrained role ought to be encouraged. The U.S. ought to refrain from references to forcible regime change in Syria or Iran. It should put before Damascus its conception of a fair and lasting Israeli-Syrian peace, even if its implementation cannot be immediate and its realisation will depend on clear-cut Syrian steps designed to boost Israel’s confidence – particularly concerning support for radical, militant groups. And Iran ought to hear some acknowledgment of its security concerns and of the trade-offs that Washington is prepared to undertake.

Putting and maintaining pressure on Hizbollah, Syria and Iran undoubtedly will play an important part in determining the future of the region. But for the United States and its vision for the region, getting things right in Iraq and moving forcefully toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, seriously engaging Syria and Iran and encouraging Hizbollah's conversion into a purely civilian political actor are likely to have the greatest and most sustainable impact.

Amman/Brussels, 30 July 2003

Election officials carry ballot boxes and election material to be distributed to polling centres, ahead of the parliamentary election, in Beirut, Lebanon. REUTERS / Mohamed Azakir

Lebanon’s Elections Portend Protracted Political Vacuum

On 15 May, amid a continuing economic meltdown, Lebanese voters chose a new parliament. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert David Wood parses the results and assesses the implications for efforts to resolve the country’s deepening crisis.

What happened in the parliamentary elections?

Lebanon’s national elections on 15 May saw the Shiite Islamist movement Hizbollah and its allies lose their parliamentary majority. New parties drawn from civil society and the 2019 protest movement made significant inroads. But, in the end, the established political forces – encompassing both Hizbollah’s bloc and its long-time foes – remained in control of 90 per cent of the legislative seats.

The balance of power in parliament has nonetheless shifted, with no clear majority coalition or easy path to forming a government. Hizbollah and its partner Amal – the “Shiite duo” – won all the seats reserved for Shiite MPs. Their Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), held seventeen of the eighteen seats it won in the 2018 polls, after which it was the party with the largest share. It was the nominal independents once aligned with Hizbollah, Amal and the FPM, who cost the bloc its majority. All were either voted out or quit the coalition before the polls. Women candidates secured eight seats – the highest number to date in Lebanese electoral history – with affiliations ranging from traditional political parties without progressive agendas to civil society groups.

The biggest surprise was the performance of the civil society and protest movement activists.

The biggest surprise was the performance of the civil society and protest movement activists, most of whom are fresh faces in formal politics. They scored thirteen seats, some of them representing districts far beyond Beirut, the capital city. In several instances, their gains came at the expense of high-profile establishment politicians associated with Hizbollah’s bloc, such as Faisal Karami, scion of a major family in the northern city of Tripoli, prominent Druze leader Talal Arslan in the Mount Lebanon town of Aley, and Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party head Assaad Hardan in the south. These new forces oppose Lebanon’s sectarian or “confessional” system, which parcels out parliamentary seats (and some other positions) among the Catholic, Sunni, Shiite, Orthodox, Druze, Alawite and Evangelical communities.

Yet the candidates with non-traditional affiliations were not the only net winners. The Lebanese Forces, a Christian party led by Samir Geagea, also achieved substantial gains, becoming the largest party in parliament. The party now has nineteen MPs and has pulled ahead of its main Christian rival, the FPM. It is deeply opposed to Hizbollah, whose forces under arms it views as undermining Lebanon’s national security, sovereignty and economic development. This issue divides Lebanon’s two main establishment blocs, with the parties that demand Hizbollah’s disarmament opposing those that do not. All these results make for a murky overall picture, though competition between the two main blocs – that led by Hizbollah and that comprising its adversaries – will continue to be a major dynamic.

Do the electoral gains for alternative political forces usher in a new era for Lebanese politics?

Not right now and not any time soon. To be sure, the new political forces’ showing reflects the growing rejection of Lebanon’s ruling elite since the 2018 elections. In October 2019, when large protests erupted across Lebanon, demonstrators blamed the country’s leaders for decades of neglect and corruption. These long-term failures of governance had culminated in a crushing economic crisis, which the World Bank considers one of the world’s biggest financial collapses since the 1850s, and which continues to worsen. At the outset, the protest movement stayed largely free of the country’s notorious sectarian and political fault lines, which the established parties habitually use to divide and rule the population. The protesters forged a broad alliance around the demand to eject the political class wholesale – irrespective of sectarian or political identity – under the rallying cry “all of them means all of them” (must go).

The 15 May polls seem to have revived something of this unifying spirit, which until then appeared to have disintegrated. Mass demonstrations became rare after October 2019, with the notable exception of protests concerning the disastrous Beirut port explosion in August 2020. In the election campaign, parties claiming the 2019 movement’s mantle often competed against one another rather than presenting unified lists. It seemed that the competition among different opposition lists might weaken their chances, but this turned out not to be the case. In most districts, voters rooting for change converged on a single party slate, producing results that exceeded most observers’ expectations for electoral success.

Yet that success needs to be viewed in context. Despite their dismal record in public office, Lebanon’s established political forces still control 90 per cent of the parliament. This enduring popularity suggests that when it comes to elections, time-tested mobilising methods, such as leveraging patronage and instigating sectarian fears, still have traction.

Patronage is arguably a more useful political tool than ever.

Patronage is arguably a more useful political tool than ever. The economic collapse’s sheer depth has made many Lebanese even more dependent than before on the various material favours, from jobs to cash handouts, that the established political leaders have been doling out for decades. Living standards have deteriorated dramatically across the country since October 2019. Heavily dependent on imports, Lebanon burned through the dwindling foreign currency reserves needed to buy essential goods. Lack of foreign exchange means that the state is no longer able to cover the cost of fuel and other subsidies. The electricity grid provides just two hours of power per day and many households can no longer afford skyrocketing bills for backup diesel generators.

The Lebanese lira’s massive devaluation has pushed up the price of imported goods, triggering runaway inflation, at a rate of 84.9 per cent in 2020 and 145 per cent in 2021. While 150,000 Lebanese lira bought $100 in early 2019, the same amount is worth around $5 today. The currency collapse has disproportionately affected low-income Lebanese, who struggle to pay for food, medication and other necessities. The UN Economic and Social Council for Western Asia estimates that over 80 per cent of the population now lives in multidimensional poverty.

Amid this chaos, Lebanon’s political elites are well positioned to purchase the support of desperate constituents. Ahead of the elections, reports abounded of parties offering citizens money and other material incentives in exchange for their support at the ballot box. In Lebanon’s most impoverished regions, some parties allegedly offered voters up-front cash payments of just one million lira – less than $35 – for their vote. In other cases, candidates allegedly promised to reward voters with improved individual access to basic services, like electricity, fuel and health care. In the coming years, unless the gloomy economic outlook brightens, needy constituents will be even more tempted to avail themselves of the patronage networks that the established leaders control.

Fear of violence also helped the ruling elites deter voters from straying toward recently formed opposition groups. In October 2021, violent conflict broke out between rival groups in Tayyouneh, a residential suburb of Beirut. Rhetoric from the parties linked to the incident – including Hizbollah and Amal, as well as their opponents, the Lebanese Forces – emphasised their capacity to protect the communities they represent, even as the country disintegrated. These appeals carry special weight in Lebanon, where memories of the nation’s brutal civil war (1975-1990) are still fresh. With the state’s security forces struggling to pay and feed soldiers and policemen, many Lebanese feel that, in such perilous times, it is a bad idea to upend the political status quo. This apprehension, which future violent incidents would likely deepen, could continue to limit the new opposition’s political reach.

Runaway inflation has left many Lebanese struggling to pay for food, medication and other necessities. CRISIS GROUP / Michelle Malaney

How long will it take for a new government to be formed?

Government formation is likely to be complicated and time-consuming. Clear procedures apply under the constitution. The president appoints the new prime minister in consultation with parliament. The prime minister then selects the new council of ministers or cabinet. The present government led by Najib Mikati will continue in caretaker mode until the country’s political forces agree on their replacements.

In recent years, making these appointments has been arduous, with political players vetoing candidates to maximise their share of executive authority. Past governments have taken shape only after the country’s establishment leaders – each claiming to speak for a particular confessional group – agreed on a specified balance of power, which divided influence among the various competing factions. The leaders have justified these tactics with rhetoric about securing the interests of the group they purport to represent. Crisis-hit Lebanon would benefit from speedy government formation this time around. Yet it appears more likely that the bargaining will be lengthy, as parties jostle to adjust the balance of power in their favour after the election results.

The stakes are high for the forthcoming negotiations. First, established political leaders face looming decisions about far-reaching reforms, which could fundamentally transform the economy. In April, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced a staff-level agreement with the Lebanese government, by which it promised to supply Lebanon with $3 billion in stabilisation support over four years. The IMF conditioned this pledge on legislative and fiscal reforms, which need to be under way before the IMF’s management and executive board can approve the package. The agreement’s conditions – such as restructuring the financial sector, lifting banking secrecy laws and reforming state-owned enterprises – could have serious repercussions for Lebanon’s political and financial elites. Established political leaders will want to secure direct influence over the new government to make sure that any reforms will not affect their interests.

The wrangling could be all the more intense because the new government may have a full four-year parliamentary mandate to carry out the reforms. In September 2021, established leaders consented to the Mikati government’s formation, in part because it would serve only until the next May’s parliamentary elections – a mere nine months. During this period, Mikati’s administration could do little harm to vested interests – especially since everyone knew the big reform issues would be faced after the election. Lebanon’s political elites will be invested in enshrining a new balance of power that will safeguard their commercial interests and patronage networks vis-à-vis other communities.

A further complicating factor is the need for political elites to agree on a new president by 31 October.

A further complicating factor is the need for political elites to agree on a new president by 31 October, when the six-year term of the incumbent, Michel Aoun, expires. The most powerful role reserved for Maronite Christians, the president signs all legislation and, at least nominally, serves as the Lebanese army’s commander-in-chief. Aoun has been angling to anoint his son-in-law Gebran Bassil as his successor. Bassil is chair of the FPM, which Aoun founded. Yet Bassil faces stiff and potentially insurmountable opposition to his presidential candidacy. He has alienated key figures across Lebanon’s political spectrum and in November 2020 became subject to U.S. sanctions on corruption allegations. Should he feel compelled to abandon Bassil’s candidacy, Aoun may well demand political concessions – such as a certain level of FPM representation in the new cabinet – in return. Since the president must sign off on any new government, Aoun can block cabinet formation until his demands are met.

The presidential appointment process presents other issues as well. Parliament elects the president – who requires the support of at least two thirds of sitting legislators. Following the recent election results, it is highly unlikely that any political camp will be able to muster this number without the consent of its main rivals. For this reason, there is a strong chance that politicians will not compromise on a presidential candidate without a larger agreement about the country’s overall balance of power for the coming years.

In the likely event that no new president has been chosen by 1 November, the constitution delegates the president’s powers to the council of ministers. The parties are aware that the new government they are trying to form may, within less than six months, be arrogated all executive power, which further raises the stakes. Should cabinet formation remain stalled until that point, the Mikati cabinet will still be in place. But it remains unclear if, constitutionally, a caretaker government can assume these additional executive powers, which would inevitably prompt further political bickering. If the answer is no, the country could be staring at a political vacuum. The absence of leadership would place reforms, and the arrival of substantial external support, even farther out of reach.

Given the election outcome, protracted negotiations over the new balance of power appear all but inevitable. The FPM in particular will fight hard to retain as much as possible of the leverage it obtained in 2018. The Lebanese Forces, for their part, have made clear that, as the new largest party in parliament, they intend to take an assertive stand. On election night, party leader Geagea wasted no time in intimating the Lebanese Forces’ opposition to re-electing powerful Amal leader Nabih Berri, a staunch Hizbollah ally, as house speaker – a position echoed by other key anti-Hizbollah parliamentarians. Returning fire, the head of Hizbollah’s parliamentary group, Mohammad Raad, evoked the spectre of “civil war” if opposing political forces fail to approve a consensus government. Such bombast aside, both main establishment blocs have indicated that they will not accept just any power redistribution, making the prospect of timely government formation even more remote.

What would an extended political vacuum mean for Lebanon?

In short, nothing good.

A political vacuum in the form of protracted negotiations and an extended stalemate over who governs the country will mean that Lebanon’s economic meltdown continues and perhaps accelerates. Before the elections, Lebanon’s leaders expended considerable resources on maintaining a semblance of financial stability, notably by releasing hundreds of millions in U.S. dollars to arrest the lira’s freefall. With foreign exchange reserves now reportedly below $10 billion, this policy is unsustainable. The currency is liable to crash again.

If the economic decline picks up pace, security risks will almost surely continue to mount. State security agencies have prevented large-scale conflict to date, but these underfunded institutions are now approaching their breaking point. Clashes between rival armed groups – like the tussle in Tayyouneh – may become more regular. A political vacuum could also stoke these dangerous tensions, as sectarian leaders use political polarisation among communities to incite violence. Meanwhile, overstretched soldiers and police will increasingly struggle to contain crime; robberies and kidnappings for ransom are already on the rise across Lebanon.

As Lebanon's economic crisis worsens, underfunded state security agencies are approaching their breaking point. CRISIS GROUP / Michelle Malaney

So, what now?

Ideally, Lebanon’s establishment leaders would form a new government quickly so that it could immediately start working on urgently needed legislation. Heading the list of priorities would be complying with all the conditions necessary to unlock IMF funding, as outlined in the April agreement, which Lebanese politicians hope will encourage other donors to make their own contributions. In this highly optimistic scenario, the leaders would also hold an efficient presidential election during the allotted window, from 1 September to 21 November, rather than allowing it to slip because of a failure to reach agreement. Even if they do pull off these tasks, it is still unlikely that Lebanon would receive significant financial aid before early 2023 – such is the wholesale nature of reforms required. But even though the need for progress is urgent, the reality is that political leaders will probably drag their heels on difficult decisions in the post-election period and forward movement will be sluggish.

On a parallel track, in parliament, Lebanon’s thirteen civil society MPs could form a new opposition bloc capable of disrupting the country’s usual legislative workings in the service of reform. This alliance could help defeat draft laws it deems unacceptable, such as a capital control law that would unfairly favour Lebanon’s banking elites. It could drive the adoption of required legislation, both on economic and social issues, and critically review establishment politicians’ performance. But there are practical impediments to keeping such a bloc together. While the civil society MPs appear united in their disdain for Lebanon’s ruling class, ideological differences may emerge. For instance, they have varying opinions on how to resolve the economic crisis. Another issue concerns each politician’s willingness to cooperate with groups like Kataib – which campaigned with opposition groups but has a history as a civil war militia – and independent MPs who worked with establishment parties until recently. What position to take toward a government that may include representatives or supporters of Hizbollah will likely be another point of controversy among new opposition MPs.

Still, it appears possible that political actors could overcome such divisions by organising the bloc of civil society MPs around a set of guiding principles that allows for a margin of internal differences on some issues and unity on others. For instance, coalition members might agree to oppose the introduction of new regressive taxes, while leaving more divisive matters – like Hizbollah’s weapons – to one side.

In the meantime, Lebanon needs urgent, targeted humanitarian aid – independent of the long-term assistance pledged by the IMF – to stave off total social collapse. Donors should contribute to maintaining essential services, including hospitals, schools and infrastructure for safe drinking water. Where possible, they should provide funding to tamp down the rise in food prices, lest widespread hunger emerge. At the same time, they should keep making any large-scale development aid packages contingent on significant legislative reforms. If donors were to give such funding with no strings attached, they would risk entrenching Lebanon’s political class and rewarding their inaction with yet another get-out-of-jail-free card.