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Iran and the P5+1: Getting to “Yes”
Iran and the P5+1: Getting to “Yes”
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
How Biden Can Score a Diplomatic Win in the Gulf, With an Assist From Europe
How Biden Can Score a Diplomatic Win in the Gulf, With an Assist From Europe

Iran and the P5+1: Getting to “Yes”

November’s deadline could be the last chance to avoid a breakdown in the Iran and the P5+1 nuclear talks. Compromise on Iran’s enrichment capacity is key to ending the impasse, requiring both sides to walk back from maximalist positions and focus on realistic solutions.

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I. Overview

That nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, U.S. and Germany) were extended beyond the 20 July 2014 deadline was neither unexpected nor unwelcome. The parties had made enough headway to justify the extension, which was envisioned in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) that was signed in November 2013 and came into force in January, but given the political and technical complexity, they remain far apart on fundamental issues. Unless they learn the lessons of the last six months and change their approach for the next four, they will lose the opportunity for a resolution not just by the new 24 November deadline but for the foreseeable future. Both sides need to retreat from maximalist positions, particularly on Iran’s enrichment program. Tehran should postpone plans for industrial-scale enrichment and accept greater constraints on the number of its centrifuges in return for P5+1 flexibility on the qualitative growth of its enrichment capacity through research and development.

Crisis Group proposed in May a comprehensive 40-point plan, comprised of three stages lasting over fourteen to nineteen years, for a nuclear accord. It was guided by four objectives: building a firewall between Iran’s civilian and potential military nuclear capabilities by constraining the most proliferation-prone aspects of its nuclear program; enhancing transparency by establishing rigorous monitoring and verification mechanisms; ensuring implementation and deterring non-compliance by establishing objective and compulsory monitoring and arbitration mechanisms, as well as by devising, in advance, potential responses to breaches by either party; and bolstering the parties’ incentives to remain faithful to the agreement by introducing positive inducements rather than purely negative ones. That plan remains a solid basis for progress, but since it was published, the parties have forgotten the lessons that enabled them to arrive at the JPOA and made maximalist demands that have changed the negotiating landscape.

As a result, the 40-point plan now needs slight adjustment. Likewise, uranium enrichment, which has emerged as the most contentious and complex issue of these talks, requires more detailed treatment. This briefing updates the previous plan in light of these new realities.

As in 2005, when now President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif were last in charge of the nuclear portfolio, negotiators are bogged down in a worn-out debate over exactly why Iran insists on uranium enrichment; its economic logic or lack thereof; whether Iran should be subject to restrictions beyond those imposed on other members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and how to calculate the time Iran would need to enrich enough uranium for one weapon – which, assuming other abilities are present, measures its “breakout capacity”.

Neither side’s technical arguments bear scrutiny in this debate because its roots are fundamentally political. Negotiators are both driven and constrained by their respective domestic politics, especially the U.S. and Iran, where powerful constituencies remain sceptical of the negotiations. The struggle over the number of centrifuges is a surrogate for a more basic one: the Iranian revolution was predicated on rejecting outside powers’ dictates after a century of Western intervention in Iranian affairs; for the West, its concerns are founded on Iran’s behaviour as an anti-status quo, revolutionary power.

While this power struggle cannot and will not be resolved within the framework of the nuclear talks, a workable and wise compromise is still possible. It can be achieved, however, neither by a contest of wills over maximalist positions nor by mechanically splitting differences. Instead, the parties should reverse engineer their underlying political concerns and legitimate interests to find common technical ground: for Iran this means a meaningful enrichment program, continued scientific advancement and tangible sanctions relief; and for the P5+1, a firewall between Iran’s civilian and potential military nuclear capabilities, ironclad monitoring mechanisms and sufficient time and Iranian cooperation to establish trust in the exclusively peaceful nature of the country’s nuclear program. If they resolve the key issue of enrichment, other pieces of the puzzle stand a better chance of falling into place. To achieve this goal:

  • Iran should accept more quantitative constraints on the number of its centrifuges; in return, the P5+1 should accept the continuation of nuclear research and development in Iran that would enable Tehran to make greater qualitative progress;
  • Instead of insisting on taking responsibility over fuelling the Bushehr power plant by 2021, Iran should commit to using Russian-supplied nuclear fuel for that plant’s lifetime in return for further Russian guarantees of that supply and P5+1 civil nuclear cooperation, especially on nuclear fuel fabrication, that gradually prepares it to assume such responsibility for a possible additional plant or plants by the end of the agreement, in eleven to sixteen years;
  • Instead of subjective timelines dictated by the political calendar, both sides should agree to use objective measures, such as the time the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs to investigate Iran’s past nuclear activities, to determine the duration of the final agreement’s several phases.

Despite the extra negotiating time, there is no guarantee the parties will be able to reach a compromise that permanently protects everyone’s core interests. Iran’s indigenous know-how could enable it to modify its program after international attention shifts away; the U.S. Congress could prevent the president from delivering on promised sanctions relief. But the alternatives – return to the sanctions versus centrifuges race or recourse to military force – are even less attractive.

A focus on irreducible core interests rather than maximalist stances would represent not a fatal compromise but, perhaps, the key to unlocking these talks. With the costs of failure and the benefits of success so high, there is no room for error and no time to waste.

Istanbul/Tehran/Washington/Brussels, 27 August 2014

How Biden Can Score a Diplomatic Win in the Gulf, With an Assist From Europe

Originally published in World Politics Review

Many world leaders, dismayed by four years of Donald Trump, are hoping that President-elect Joe Biden will return to an American foreign policy that is more pragmatic and balanced, less fickle and pettily punitive. One region crying out for an urgent recalibration in the U.S. approach is the Persian Gulf. Thanks to an emerging European initiative to help bring a modicum of calm to the tense region, Biden will have the opportunity to do a lot of good early in his term without having to invest too much political capital.

Ever since the 1979 Iranian revolution, tensions between Iran and the United States, and between Iran and its Arab neighbors, have given rise to violent conflict—whether fought directly, as during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, or by proxy, as in Iraq, Syria and Yemen today. The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and its “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran have made an already volatile region even more dangerous. 

Events of the past 18 months, in particular, have shown the escalatory potential of small-scale confrontations. Last year’s attacks on Gulf shipping routes and oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, allegedly at the hands of Iran or its proxies; Iran’s shooting down of an American surveillance drone over the Strait of Hormuz; the U.S. killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s top military commander, in January; Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes against Iraqi army bases housing U.S. troops; and the assassination in late November of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a senior Iranian nuclear scientist, allegedly at the hands of Israeli agents—any one of these incidents could have spun out of control, triggering a war that no one wants. The weeks leading up to Biden’s inauguration on Jan. 20 may be particularly perilous, as they present an opportunity for the Trump administration and Israel to escalate tensions in a way that would vastly complicate Biden’s efforts to return the relationship with Iran to a more stable footing. [https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/29253/trump-s-mad-dash-in-the-middle-east-could-leave-a-mess-for-biden]

As a first step to pulling back from the brink with Iran, the Biden administration is likely to prioritize finding a way for the United States to return to the nuclear deal—officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA—and for Iran to return to full compliance. After Trump withdrew from the agreement and reimposed devastating economic sanctions, Iran progressively began to violate aspects of the deal. It started increasing its stockpile of enriched uranium beyond the agreed amount; began enriching uranium above the deal’s limit of 3.67 percent, including at its underground enrichment facility in Fordow; and ceased observing the JCPOA’s cap on centrifuge quantities. In response to the Fakhrizadeh killing, the Iranian parliament passed a bill—which was subsequently approved by the Guardian Council, a constitutional watchdog body—calling for the immediate resumption of enrichment to 20 percent, a critical threshold that would allow Iran to more quickly produce weapons-grade fuel.

If the nuclear deal has survived nonetheless, it is because Tehran made clear that these steps are reversible, and that it would be prepared to reverse them if the U.S. were to lift its sanctions. The JCPOA’s other signatories—Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the European Union—have also stuck by it despite their evident distress at the U.S. withdrawal and Iran’s incremental breaches.

The Biden administration’s top priority in the Middle East next year will be to repair the damage done to the nuclear deal and reset the uneasy U.S. relationship with Iran.

The Biden administration’s top priority in the Middle East next year will be to repair the damage done to the nuclear deal and reset the uneasy U.S. relationship with Iran. It won’t be easy, but if Biden is successful, it will be a major step toward halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and lowering the temperature in the region.

At the same time, lifting sanctions and resuming negotiations with Tehran will not automatically erase four decades of enmity, nor would canceling “maximum pressure” ensure a major reduction in tensions between Iran and America’s regional allies. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, in particular, will hardly be reassured by a U.S. approach to Iran that they fear will increase their rival’s power and influence. Part of the reason the UAE and Israel recently agreed to normalize relations is their desire to forge a common front against Iran.

What is needed most urgently to reduce the heat is for Iran and Saudi Arabia, along with the other Gulf states, to open new channels of communication and to start talking to each other directly, at various levels of political, military and intelligence leadership. From Washington’s perspective, the timing for such dialogue could be opportune. There is no love lost for Iran in the incoming Biden administration or in Congress, given Tehran’s violent meddling in the Syrian and Yemeni wars. But U.S. officials are also increasingly wary of Saudi Arabia, which started a destructive and unwinnable war in Yemen, brutally murdered the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and escalated a dispute with fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member Qatar, also an important American ally.

A United States seeking a more balanced approach to the Middle East would want to find a workable accommodation with Iran, while also reining in Saudi leaders who are prone to ill-considered and destructive adventurism. What better way to deal with both problems simultaneously than by nudging them toward a mutual dialogue that could serve to stabilize a strategically and economically important part of the world? The talks would also be an opportunity to address head-on a common complaint about the JCPOA: that it ignored Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. 

Given the many challenges on his plate, however, Biden may not have the bandwidth to devote substantial energy and resources to this effort, at least during his first year in office. He could instead entrust the role of go-between in the Middle East to U.S. allies in Europe, which have been strategizing for months about how they could work together most effectively toward this diplomatic objective. A number of informal discussions have already taken place in European capitals, in some cases also involving NGOs and think tanks that have long pursued “Track II” dialogues, which don’t involve current government officials, in the Middle East. My organization, the International Crisis Group, has also taken part in these discussions.

European governments realize they cannot move forward in any substantive way without at least an implicit green light from Washington.

European governments realize they cannot move forward in any substantive way without at least an implicit green light from Washington. They knew they would never receive such a signal from the Trump administration, given its single-minded focus on bringing Iran to its knees. But now, they rightly believe the Biden administration would be more likely to give their diplomatic efforts a chance.

The process would begin with a core group of European governments, and possibly others with a stake in the stability of the Middle East, laying the groundwork for a Gulf-based dialogue by exploring the receptiveness toward such a move in Washington, Tehran, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Eventually, Gulf states and Iran would need to take ownership of the process, but they may require nudges, reassurances and possibly guarantees from external actors with a stake in the region—the United States foremost among them—even if the Biden administration does not take the lead. 

This could take the form of U.S. officials observing the dialogue, while working the corridors to show their allies that Washington is actively backing the effort. It could also include concrete and material incentives for constructive participation. Separately, the Biden administration would have to find ways to neutralize opposition from Israel’s right-wing government to reducing the threat from Iran through diplomacy, rather than coercion.

The idea for a Europe-mediated Gulf dialogue has been around for a long time, but the right opportunity to jumpstart it had not presented itself until now. Tensions in the region are at an all-time high, and the incoming U.S. president is likely to be both more even-handed and more favorably inclined to a diplomacy-focused approach than his predecessor. When European governments come knocking early next year to seek the new administration’s help, all Biden would need to do is say, “Go ahead, give it a try. The United States has your back.” It could be a quick and easy foreign policy win for an administration keen to have one after a difficult presidential transition.