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Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a Breakdown
Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a Breakdown
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Central Bank Crisis Risks Famine in Yemen
Central Bank Crisis Risks Famine in Yemen
Report 145 / Middle East & North Africa

Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a Breakdown

Yemen must agree on its state structure, including the South’s status, to forge a stable future. A final agreement cannot be forced by the National Dialogue Conference; for some key issues, only continued, more inclusive talks in the context of confidence-building measures can succeed.

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Executive Summary

Yemen is at a critical juncture. Its six-month National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was to have closed on 18 September, ushering in constitution drafting, a constitutional referendum and new elections. The timetable has slipped, and, though no end date has been set, there is an understandable urge among many international and some domestic actors to stick closely to agreed deadlines, wrap up the NDC negotiations and finish the transition to-do list. But despite progress, there is no broad-based, implementable agreement on the state’s future structure, and thus on the South’s status. Worse, such a result is unlikely to emerge from the current dialogue, even with a short extension. A rush to declare victory and complete the transition checklist could mean forcing through an outcome without necessary legitimacy or buy-in. It would be better to agree to a time-limited delay of the referendum, put in place modified transitional arrangements and ensure the next round of negotiations is in concert with confidence-building measures and includes a wider, more representative array of Southern voices.

How to structure the state arguably has become the most complicated and divisive political issue and must be a key component of any new constitution and durable political settlement. Parties have presented a wide array of options: from the current unitary system, through multi-region federalism, to two-state federalism (one entity in the North, the other in the South). Even this broad spectrum fails to include what, in the South, has turned into an increasingly attractive rallying cry: the demand for immediate independence.

Indeed, the question of the state’s structure inevitably is tied to the so-called Southern issue, shorthand for the political, economic and social demands emanating from the South, which had been an independent state prior to 1990. There, a loosely aligned mix of organisations and activists, known as the Southern Movement (Hiraak), is calling for separation or, at a minimum, temporary two-state federalism followed by a referendum on the South’s future. Separatist sentiment is running high and appears to have strengthened over the course of the transition.

To an extent, the NDC has made advances. It helped launch a healthy and overdue public debate over the roots of the Southern problem and began the consideration of potential outcomes. But the conference faced severe limitations. Debate in Sanaa is far removed from the increasingly separatist Southern street. Within the NDC, discussion of solutions, bereft of detail, was squeezed into the last two months of negotiations. Although consensus appears to be forming around a federal structure, critical elements remain unresolved: how to define administrative boundaries; redistribute political authority; and share resources. Even a general agreement will be hard to achieve. It will require bridging the yawning gap between Hiraak delegates, who demand a three-year transition under two-part federalism in order to rebuild the Southern state in advance of an ill-defined referendum on the South’s future status, and staunch pro-unity advocates, who passionately reject this option.

Garnering popular support for any eventual agreement will be more challenging still. The Hiraak delegation suspended its participation for nearly three weeks, complaining that negotiations were biased against it; even that delegation hardly is representative of broader and more militant Hiraak sentiment. Only a small slice of the Hiraak – many enjoying close ties to President Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi – agreed to join the NDC. The bulk of the movement chose to stay on the sidelines of talks they deemed illegitimate.

The South’s lack of faith in the NDC process perhaps was inevitable, but it has been exacerbated by the absence of genuine measures to improve security and economic conditions in the region. Government promises notwithstanding, little has changed, further undercutting those Southerners willing to negotiate and providing fodder to those for whom the only way out is separation.

As the time for reaching an agreement nears, all parties appear to be digging in their heels. The Hiraak NDC delegation demands significant concessions, arguing that anything short of two-state federalism and/or a promise to organise a referendum on the South’s future status is unacceptable; leaders from the former ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and from the predominant Islamist party, Islah, flatly refuse either prospect, clinging to the notion of a federal model with multiple administrative units. Each has made bets on the effect of competing political pressures: the former believe that their more militant rank and file will force the North to move toward them; the latter wager that Hadi’s interest in overseeing a successful transition will lead him to impose a compromise on his Hiraak allies. Both cannot be right, and middle ground remains elusive.

Then there are those on the outside. Most Hiraak members bank on the negotiations’ failure, due to inability to reach a substantive compromise or, if it comes to it, lack of implementation on the ground. They vow to escalate protests and a civil dis­obedience campaign, regardless of NDC decisions, until they achieve independence. A constitutional referendum would provide a focal point for their opposition, triggering a boycott and likely violence. The result would be to further undermine the transition’s legitimacy.

If Yemen hopes to forge a more stable future, it desperately needs to agree on the basic question of its state structure. That much is clear. But it does not mean forcing through a final settlement in circumstances where basic trust, legitimacy and consensus are lacking. That would be more than a fragile state, fragmented country and fractured political class could handle. It likely would further discredit the process, strengthen more militant Southern views and provoke dangerous brinkmanship and bloodshed. The goal instead should be a broad-based agreement that only continued, more inclusive negotiations in the context of improved security and economic conditions potentially can achieve.

Sanaa/Brussels, 25 September 2013

A boy pulls containers of water amid an acute shortage of clean drinking water in Sanaa, on 20 April 2015. REUTERS/Mohamed al-Sayaghi

Central Bank Crisis Risks Famine in Yemen

Efforts to move Yemen’s Central Bank will likely add to risks of insolvency and starvation, while complicating and deepening civil war divisions. Regional and international powers should rally round this critical institution and help revive UN-brokered peace talks.

The collapse of UN-mediated peace talks in August is sending Yemen’s war into a new phase, potentially with even more devastating consequences. During eighteen months of fighting between a Saudi-led coalition backing the internationally- recognised government of President Abed-Rabbo Mansour Hadi and Huthi (Zaydi/Shiite) rebels aligned with forces under the previous president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the population has been the primary victim, sustaining air bombardments, rocket attacks, and economic blockades. Over 10,000 people, approximately 4,000 of them civilians, have been killed, the majority in Saudi-led coalition airstrikes. Both sides stand accused of repeated violations of international humanitarian law, actions that make the conflict increasingly difficult to resolve. Over 3.2 million Yemenis are internally displaced. Fourteen of 26 million are food insecure, and 370,000 children under age five risk severe, acute malnutrition. Now the situation is about to get worse.

On 19 September, President Hadi fired the Central Bank governor and announced he would move the bank from the Huthi/Saleh-controlled capital, Sanaa, to the government’s temporary base in the port city of Aden. The decree could mark a turn toward economic warfare aimed at strangling the Huthi/Saleh alliance financially in its northern strongholds. Yet, ordinary Yemenis would suffer the most.

War in Yemen

April Longley Alley, Crisis Group Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula, explains in this video how Yemen reached this destructive impasse. CRISIS GROUP

The move appears to have no well-thought-out implementation plan and opens a host of uncertainties, including a breakdown of the banking system and continued inability to pay salaries that would accelerate economic collapse and could tip large parts of the country into famine. It will also vastly complicate prospects for a negotiated settlement and almost certainly encourage the Huthi/Saleh forces to escalate, including attacks inside Saudi territory. Not least, it will deepen the north-south political divide, making more difficult future efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the troubled relationship between these areas.

The economy has long been a weapon in the war. Huthi/Saleh forces enforce, with occasional loosening, a crippling blockade on the second largest city, Taiz, which has been fought over for more than a year, with disastrous humanitarian consequences. The Saudi-led coalition imposed a tight air/sea blockade on Huthi/Saleh-controlled areas early in the war, ostensibly to prevent Iranian weapons from entering. While that situation has gradually improved since May under a UN verification mechanism, the cumulative humanitarian impact has been calamitous.

There had been a tacit agreement between the sides to allow the Central Bank, run by veteran technocrat Mohammed Awad bin Humam, to perform its functions relatively free of interference. Diplomats and international economists agree that, under increasingly adverse circumstances, the bank has remained largely impartial, guaranteeing import of basic commodities, protecting the riyal’s value and paying public-sector salaries nationally. Without revenue from interrupted hydrocarbon exports, formerly approximately 70 per cent of the government’s budget, or donor support, however, the bank is rapidly approaching insolvency. Acute riyal shortages are interfering with its ability to pay salaries, and the Hadi government has blocked bin Humam from printing additional currency through a Russian company.

The bank’s looming insolvency coincides with a military stalemate and the breakdown of peace talks. In three months of negotiations in Kuwait, the parties came closer to a negotiated settlement than ever before. Both realised they were mired in a costly war of attrition, in which the Saudi-led coalition failed repeatedly to dislodge Huthi/Saleh forces from their northern positions, and the latter defended their area at great human cost without making headway in Taiz and further south. They sensibly entered into discussions on force withdrawals, general disarmament and formation of a national unity government, though the Huthis were unwilling to go into details on withdrawals. The talks faltered on sequencing security and political steps, however, and both sides have redoubled efforts to make decisive battlefield gains.

The bank’s looming insolvency coincides with a military stalemate and the breakdown of peace talks.

Even before peace talks ended, the Huthi/Saleh alliance had begun to entrench its political control of the north, highlighting the Hadi’s government’s lack of influence there, by forming a high political council as a first step toward a rival government. It also escalated attacks inside Saudi Arabia and is attempting to hold territory there. The Saudi-led coalition has pummelled Huthi/Saleh-controlled areas with airstrikes, and its Yemeni allies have tried, and again failed, to enter Sanaa from the north east. Possibly seeing it has limited military options in the northern highlands, Saudi Arabia and its main partner, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), now appear to be shifting the fight to the economic front, where they have significant leverage.

During the Kuwait talks, the Hadi government and its Gulf Cooperation Council backers turned increasingly critical of the Central Bank, accusing its governor of allowing the Huthi/Saleh forces to pilfer state coffers to fund their war effort. The heart of the issue is the monthly disbursal of 25 billion riyals (approximately $100 million) to the Huthi-controlled defence ministry. This notoriously opaque line item in the 2014 budget, which bin Humam has continued to implement absent a new budget, benefits the Huthis disproportionately, as they, like every group in Yemen before them, have likely stacked the ministry payroll with their loyalists.

Though Saudi Arabia intervened in the past to prop up the economy (and still has a $1 billion Central Bank deposit), it is no longer prepared to put cash into a bank it reasonably views as being used to finance a war against it and seems less concerned the bank’s demise in Sanaa could precipitate a total economic collapse that arguably would not be in its long-term interest. The Huthi/Saleh alliance has been unwilling to negotiate guarantees to address Saudi concerns, while Hadi and his supporters expect Saudi Arabia and the UAE to replenish the bank’s cash once it is in Aden. Faced with the prospect of a collapsing bank in Sanaa and a move to Aden that could inject much-needed liquidity even as it raises the possibility of economic warfare, the U.S., UK, UN and other international players have not opposed the move.

Yemen has become a failed and divided state and soon could also be a starving one.

Paradoxically, Hadi issued his decree on the heels of a push by his international backers to revive the peace talks. On 25 August, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the “quad” (U.S., UK, Saudi Arabia, UAE) had agreed with the UN special envoy, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, to renew negotiations for a comprehensive settlement that would move simultaneously on political and security tracks to achieve a Huthi/Saleh withdrawal from Sanaa, their handing over of heavy weapons to a third party and formation of a unity government. The plan brings together many elements the UN envoy proposed in Kuwait, while meeting the Huthi/Saleh demand that political and security compromises be signed as part of a package. It also closely sequences those compromises in a way that would give wins – and the perception of these – to both parties.

The proposal might force the Huthis, in particular, to show their cards, requiring them to either accept a plan that accommodates their demands or reject it, thus indicating unwillingness to make concessions to which they had previously committed in principle. But the promising initiative could be stillborn. None of its supposed backers, save Kerry, has strongly championed it. The UN has yet to officially submit a revised roadmap to the sides incorporating its ideas. And now the bank announcement undermines and complicates diplomatic prospects.

Yemen cannot bear the demise of yet another opportunity to end the war. It has become a failed and divided state and soon could also be a starving one. One of its last functioning, technocratically-run institutions, the Central Bank, is in peril. Pulling back from what threatens to be even more severe fragmentation and suffering requires urgent steps:

  1. A UN-brokered plan for effective Central Bank functioning and a ceasefire to allow immediate resumption of talks.
    • As part of this, the Hadi government would commit to resume paying civil servants throughout the country, suspending plans to move the bank to Aden and continuing to rely on the bank’s infrastructure and staff in Sanaa. Both sides would agree to a plan for collaboration between the bank’s Aden branch and Sanaa headquarters until a peace agreement.
    • To ensure civil-servant salaries will be paid nationally and the liquidity problem is addressed, the sides would agree to support immediate printing of additional riyals, which are essential for resumption of salary payments and should be delivered to Central Bank offices in Sanaa, Aden and elsewhere, according to a plan based on the 2014 budget’s salary stipulations. Ideally, defence ministry salaries would be paid nationally according to the 2014 budget and personnel lists, which include combatants on all sides but exclude Huthi fighters added since 2015. 
  2. Resumption, immediately following a ceasefire, of UN-mediated talks based on a new roadmap in line with the quad initiative.
    • The UN envoy should present the revised roadmap to the belligerents, preferably in writing, including a framework for political and security compromises moving simultaneously to result in phased withdrawals, disarmament and quick formation of a unity government.
    • The Huthi/Saleh delegation should, in response, propose a withdrawal plan to become part of the comprehensive agreement. Concluding an agreement would be contingent on negotiation of the plan’s details.
    • To complete the comprehensive settlement, the envoy should add a mechanism to the settlement package for addressing regional autonomy demands, including the possibility of southern independence.

A devastating economic war of attrition may still be avoided, but only if the sides agree to an immediate ceasefire and return to peace talks. If a settlement cannot be reached based on the quad initiative, at least the ceasefire would give humanitarian agencies and governments time to put in place mechanisms to mitigate the impact on average citizens during the next phase of conflict.