Govt forces repelled several attacks by suspected jihadists in north.

Suspected jihadist violence persisted in northern departments. In Alibori department near border with Niger, unidentified gunmen overnight 10-11 Nov clashed with soldiers in Karimama commune, leaving no casualties. In Atakora department near border with Burkina Faso, security forces overnight 24-25 Nov reportedly foiled attack by dozen gunmen at military base in Kérou town, leaving four assailants dead. In Borgou department near border with Nigeria, unidentified gunmen same night attacked Kalalé town, leaving one soldier wounded as military intervened to repel them.

Govt received French equipment to combat insecurity. Interior ministry 10 and 25 Nov received French donation of military equipment including over 20 vehicles. Parliament 23 Nov passed law granting benefits to relatives of soldiers deceased or disappeared and to soldiers wounded in mission.

Transitional leadership sought to consolidate power, while UN human rights office accused military of shelling villages amid countrywide insecurity.

New junta leaders installed transitional legislature. New 71-member transitional legislative assembly 11 Nov took office, same day elected previous legislature member Ousmane Bougouma as speaker; 19 Nov voted in favour of PM Apollinaire Joachim Kyélem de Tambela’s general policy statement, which emphasised securing “the territory and the populations”. Following late Oct nationwide civilian recruitment to fight jihadists, transitional President Capt. Traoré 14 Nov announced formation of six new rapid intervention units.

Tensions ran high with France, transitional govt sought regional support. Hundreds 18 Nov protested in capital Ouagadougou against French military presence in country. In speech before transitional assembly, Tambela 19 Nov vowed to diversify security partnerships; French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu same day alluded to French forces’ potential withdrawal from Burkina Faso, as Barkhane Operation 9 Nov came to formal end. Meanwhile, Traoré 2 Nov travelled to Mali, met with counterpart Col. Assimi Goïta to discuss military cooperation. Ouagadougou around 3 Nov secured extradition from Togo of four Burkinabé officers close to deposed transition President Lt-Col. Damiba and suspected of “plotting” against Traoré.

Dozens reportedly killed in military operation as insecurity remained widespread. In Sahel region (north), army and volunteer fighters (VDPs) 6-9 Nov conducted counter-insurgency operation near Djibo town (Soum province); shelling and airstrikes on several villages reportedly left 42 dead, including civilians; after UN human rights office 10 Nov expressed concern, govt 12 Nov vowed to launch investigation. Also in Sahel, Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) 15 Nov killed ten Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) fighters in Deou village and Erafnaman locality, while suspected IS-Sahel militants 21 Nov killed six civilians near Markoye town (all Oudalan province). In North region, troops 9 Nov repelled alleged JNIM attack on military patrol in Solle town (Loroum province), leaving 33 assailants dead. In Centre-North region, suspected JNIM elements 21 Nov attacked Safi village (Namentenga province) near Kaya city, killing eight VDPs. In East region, govt forces 4 Nov engaged alleged JNIM combatants near Tanwalbougou locality (Gourma province), leaving around ten dead.

President Ndayishimiye moved to consolidate control over ruling party and engaged in intense diplomacy on security crisis in eastern DR Congo.

Ndayishimiye restructured ruling party’s governing bodies. Ruling CNDD-FDD party’s council of elders, chaired by Ndayishimiye, 2 Nov nominated new general commissioners and replaced several party administrators; restructuring of party’s governing bodies comes amid power struggle between Ndayishimiye and CNDD-FDD Sec Gen Révérien Ndikuriyo.

Bujumbura took active role in regional diplomacy. Ndayishimiye, who has been East African Community (EAC) rotating president since June, 4 Nov hosted former Kenyan president and EAC’s peace process facilitator for DR Congo (DRC), Uhuru Kenyatta; 7 Nov convened rare summit of EAC heads of state on sidelines of UN climate change conference in Egypt to push for concerted response to security crisis in eastern DRC. Ndayishimiye 23 Nov attended mini-summit on peace and security in eastern DRC in Angolan capital Luanda, and 28 Nov opened third session of EAC-led Nairobi talks between Congolese govt and several armed groups active in country’s east (see DR Congo).

In other important developments. In Cibitoke province, security forces 12-16 Nov clashed with Kinyarwanda-speaking rebels in Kibira forest, killing at least seven and arresting four. International Criminal Court 25 Nov reported progress on investigations into bloody aftermath of 2015 coup attempt, saying it intends to issue arrest warrants shortly.

President Biya celebrated 40 years in power as Anglophone conflict continued in west and jihadist violence persisted in Far North.

Biya marked 40 years as president, pursued plans to have his son succeed him. For Biya’s 40th anniversary in power, ruling party around 6 Nov held official celebrations and ceremonies across country. Traditional authorities, ruling party officials and residents in North region – a ruling party stronghold – same day received Biya’s son Franck in great pomp with all airs of president-in-waiting. Meanwhile, members of diaspora political opposition group Brigade Anti-Sardinards violently disrupted reception marking Biya’s 40-year rule in French capital Paris, with some guests reportedly wounded.

Armed Anglophone separatists and military continued to engage in fighting. Govt forces 3 Nov reportedly killed separatist commander in Ediki village, Meme division, South West region (SW), and 7 Nov clashed with separatists near North West region (NW)’s capital Bamenda (Mezam division), leaving three dead. Separatists 14 Nov ambushed military convoy in Tubah town near Bamenda (NW), reportedly killing three soldiers; attack on another convoy between Kumba and Mamfe cities (SW) next day killed at least one soldier. Conflict continued to take toll on civilians. Notably, unidentified gunmen 3 Nov kidnapped nine health workers from govt-run hospital in Batibo town, Momo division (NW); authorities blamed separatists, who denied responsibility. Govt forces 24 Nov allegedly killed two civilians in Awing town, Mezam division (NW). UN working group on arbitrary detention around 14 Nov called for “immediate and unconditional” release of separatist leader Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe and nine co-prisoners, said their arrest in Nigeria in 2018 was “arbitrary.”

Far North region saw sporadic jihadist violence. Suspected Boko Haram (JAS) or Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants continued to target civilians, killing one 14 Nov near Tourou town (Mayo-Tsanaga division) and another 20 Nov near Kolofata town (Mayo-Sava division). Unidentified armed group around 14 Nov clashed with military forces near Bonderi town (Mayo-Sava), killing at least one soldier. Suspected jihadist combatants 15 Nov ambushed military patrol near Amchide town (Mayo-Sava), and throughout month repeatedly looted town.

Dispute persisted between pro-govt groups and opposition over constitutional referendum as authorities postponed local elections, and insecurity continued across country.

Constitutional revision process remained divisive. After ruling party late Oct called for constitutional referendum that would allow President Touadéra to run for third term, pro-govt movement Front Républicain 10 Nov addressed letter to Touadéra proposing 18 constitutional amendments. G-16 civil society coalition 1 Nov called for creation of “resistance council” against constitutional changes, while hundreds 5 Nov gathered in French capital Paris calling for Touadéra’s dismissal. Meanwhile, 16 opposition parties 18 Nov demanded guarantees that upcoming local and regional elections will not be combined with constitutional referendum, requested restructuring of National Electoral Authority (ANE), citing lack of neutrality. ANE 21 Nov postponed local and regional elections from 22 Jan to 16 July 2023 to allow for electoral roll’s revision.

MINUSCA’s mandate renewed amid tensions with France. Ahead of UN Security Council vote on renewal of UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSCA), FM Sylvie Baïpo-Temon 7 Nov declared draft resolution failed to reflect Central Africans’ “aspirations”, criticised France’s role as penholder; around same day withdrew symbolic title of dean of diplomatic corps traditionally given to French ambassador to Bangui, citing latter’s “discourtesy” toward Touadéra. Security Council 14 Nov renewed MINUSCA’s mandate for one year following tense debates, with Russia, China and Gabon abstaining.

Insecurity continued countrywide, notably at border with Chad. Russian paramilitaries 4 Nov raided Union of Patriots for Change rebel post in Blakadja village (Nana-Gribizi prefecture), leaving one rebel dead and four injured. Coalition of Patriots for Change rebels 19 Nov clashed with govt forces and allies in Kouango city (Ouaka prefecture), death toll unknown. Kidnapping for ransom reported throughout month. Notably, 3R rebels 8 Nov kidnapped three miners at Kombo-Nana site (Nana-Mambéré prefecture), freeing them after payment; unidentified armed elements 11 Nov abducted one civil servant and two UN personnel near Ndiffa locality (Vakaga prefecture). Unidentified assailants 24 Nov killed MINUSCA peacekeeper in Obo town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture). Govt said plane coming from border country overnight 27-28 Nov bombed base where govt forces and Russian allies were stationed in Bossangoa town (Ouham prefecture) near Chadian border, threatened retaliation.

Opposition called out military leadership on brutal repression of dissent, and jihadists launched deadly attack on govt forces in west.

Tensions continued to run high between govt and opposition. Following deadly crackdown on 20 Oct opposition protests and subsequent wave of arrests, leader of Les Transformateurs party, Succès Masra, 1 Nov left country, while leader of Wakit Tama civil society coalition, Max Loalngar, and other opposition figures late Oct-early Nov went into hiding. Transitional authorities 8 Nov accepted calls for international independent inquiry into deadly protests; however insisted that Chadian official oversee inquiry. Les Transformateurs and Wakit Tama around same day referred case to International Criminal Court, saying events surrounding protests likely qualify as crimes against humanity.

Implementation of national dialogue’s recommendations started. Following conclusion of national dialogue in Oct, PM Saleh Kebzabo 3 Nov presented new transition roadmap to Transitional National Council (CNT) legislative body, with constitutional referendum and new legal framework for elections as main priorities, and President Mahamat Déby 7 Nov appointed 104 additional CNT members including former opposition leaders and representatives of rebel groups that signed Doha peace deal in August. AU Peace and Security Council 11 Nov voted against sanctioning transitional authorities despite report of AU Chair Moussa Faki castigating military leadership for failing to honour 18-month transition timeframe.

Jihadist violence and intercommunal conflicts persisted in west. President Déby 14 Nov announced deployment of 600 military personnel in Lake province to fight enduring Boko Haram presence; jihadist group 22 Nov killed ten soldiers near Ngouboua village close to Nigeria’s border. In Chari-Baguirmi province, farmer-herder conflict 13 Nov left four wounded in Tchiltchlie village. In Logone-Occidental province, gendarmes in Krim Krim locality 22 Nov opened fire at protesters demanding release of farmer incarcerated after dispute with herders; eight civilians dead and 30 injured.

Tensions with Mali persisted over ongoing detention of Ivorian soldiers, and former President Gbagbo-era figure Charles Blé Goudé returned from exile.

Govt rejected Mali’s conditions for release of detained soldiers. Paris-based media outlet Africa Intelligence 2 Nov revealed that Abidjan late Oct rejected Bamako’s latest conditions for liberation of 46 Ivorian soldiers detained since July, including that govt acknowledge attempt to destabilise Mali. Meanwhile, Abidjan mid-Nov announced “gradual” withdrawal of its roughly 900 personnel from UN peacekeeping force in Mali.

Political manoeuvring continued ahead of 2025 presidential election. Former President Gbagbo’s right-hand man turned rival, Charles Blé Goudé, 26 Nov returned to Côte d’Ivoire after decade-long exile. In search of political allies, Goudé’s Pan-African Congress for Justice and Peoples’ Equality 1 Nov sent delegation to Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) headed by Pascal Affi N’Guessan (former PM and another Gbagbo ally turned rival). After months of rumours, FPI early Nov confirmed political rapprochement with President Ouattara’s Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace.

Govt kept up efforts to contain jihadist threat in country’s north. Youth Minister Mamadou Touré 10-13 Nov visited northern regions to assess govt social stabilisation plan, launched in Jan 2022 to promote youth integration and local development in regions at risk of jihadist violence.

M23 rebel group advanced further toward North Kivu’s capital Goma, as regional efforts to cool tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali continued.

M23 made further gains near Goma amid regional efforts to de-escalate conflict. Fighting between govt forces and M23 rebels around 11 Nov picked up again in several areas, with M23 mid-month taking control of Kibumba town (Nyiragongo territory) and Tongo city (Rutshuru territory), cutting off only remaining supply route to Goma apart from Rwandan border. M23 rebels 20 Nov seized populated settlements of Kiseguro and Katwiguru (both Rutshuru), about 30km from Ishasha border point with Uganda, and 25 Nov captured Kisharo settlement in same area. As President Tshisekedi 3 Nov again denounced Kigali’s “expansionist impulses” in supporting M23, East African Community (EAC) redoubled efforts to de-escalate tensions (see Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda). Tshisekedi and Rwandan FM Vincent Biruta 23 Nov attended mini-summit on peace and security in eastern DRC held in Angolan capital Luanda, called for immediate withdrawal of M23 from “occupied zones” in North Kivu and cessation of hostilities starting 25 Nov; M23 refused to lay down arms or withdraw from captured territory.

Govt forces and allies continued to clash with other rebel groups in east. In North Kivu’s Beni territory, alleged Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 8 Nov attacked Kabasha village, killing three civilians, and around 9 Nov killed 13 civilians in Bashu settlement. Ugandan Air Force 4 Nov destroyed large ADF camp at undisclosed location in east, while govt forces 25 Nov killed seven ADF insurgents and freed 30 hostages in Mwalika area, Beni. Maï-Maï militiamen 25-26 Nov exchanged fire with govt forces in Butembo city, also Beni; five dead on both sides. CODECO militia carried out several attacks in Ituri province, notably 18-19 Nov in Walla area, Mahagi territory. Military said joint Burundi-DR Congo operation around 26 Nov killed 40 members of Hutu-led rebel group of Rwandan origin National Forces of Liberation near Nabombi town, South Kivu province.

Conflict between Yaka and Teke communities continued in western provinces. Clashes in Misia town, Kwilu province, 2 Nov left 16 people dead and 25 missing; armed assailants 7 Nov attacked Boku village, Kwamouth territory of Mai-Ndombe province, leaving at least 20 dead.

Asmara quietly consented to fragile peace accord between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigray leaders, but could act as spoiler over disarmament protocols in coming weeks and months.

Asmara hinted at satisfaction with deal to resolve Tigray conflict. Following peace accord signed 2 Nov between Addis Ababa and Tigray leaders in South Africa’s capital Pretoria (see Ethiopia), Asmara remained silent, indicating its tacit acceptance of deal to end conflict despite not being party to accord. Meanwhile, its military activities in Tigray subsided although reports of ongoing Eritrean violence against civilians in Shire city and surrounding areas persisted during month.

Asmara could spoil peace process absent speedy implementation of disarmament protocols. Longstanding enmity between Tigray People’s Liberation Front and Asmara could coax latter to challenge implementation of accord if it feels Tigray’s leaders are backtracking on some political concessions, most notably promised reduction of Tigray’s military capabilities. Meanwhile, Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel 28 Nov criticised U.S. for endorsing African Union Envoy Olusegun Obasanjo’s comment that “no country should accept the presence of a foreign country on its land”, defending troop presence in Ethiopia as “defense architecture”.

Somalia’s president met Somali cadets during second visit to Eritrea this year. Somali President Mohamud 10-12 Nov visited Eritrea, second such trip since his election in May this year, signalling continued desire for cooperation. Mohamud 12 Nov met members of Somali National Army who have been undergoing military training in Eritrea since 2019; program, estimated to include about 5,000 cadets, has been shrouded in controversy regarding participants’ alleged deployment in Tigray. Mohamud 12 Nov returned to Somalia without Somali troops, suggesting he had again failed to convince Asmara to allow cadets to return to Somalia, possibly due to ongoing discussions over payments.

Pro-democracy movement turned violent as militants launched series of attacks on public buildings and officials.

Pro-democracy militant group Swaziland International Solidarity Forces (SISF) conducted spate of violent attacks across country, targeting public figures and security infrastructure. Notably, suspected SISF members overnight 4-5 Nov killed traditional chief, Prince Mahloma of Zandondo in Manzini region, reportedly after forcing him to record video urging King Mswati III to initiate democratic reforms; 14 Nov opened fired at Ludzidzini Royal Palace, Mswati’s residence in Lobamba city, Hhohho region, reportedly injuring one guard and forcing Mswati’s evacuation to another palace; and 29 Nov attacked Zibonele army camp in Hhohho region, killing unknown numbers of soldiers. Meanwhile, pro-democracy activists, transport trade union and Swaziland Youth Congress 15 Nov demonstrated in capital Mbabane (Hhohho) to demand release of legislators arrested in June-July 2021; heavy police presence and roadblocks impeded mobilisation, reportedly resulting in several protesters being shot or detained by security forces.

Federal govt and Tigray leaders signed deal to end devastating conflict, but fragile calm could shatter absent consolidation of initial pledges; violence in Oromia intensified.

Federal and Tigray leaders struck welcome, yet fragile, peace accord. After over two years of brutal warfare, federal govt and Tigray leaders 2 Nov signed surprise “permanent cessation of hostilities” accord in South Africa’s capital Pretoria under African Union auspices. Agreement reflected military pressure Tigray’s forces had come under in Oct: federal govt consented to halt its offensive and end de facto siege; in return, Tigray’s embattled leaders agreed to disarm their forces, dissolve Tigray’s administration (thereby delegitimising regional election that led to war in 2020) and restore federal authority in region; sides also agreed to discussions over “contested areas”. Accord received mixed reactions: PM Abiy and international actors welcomed it; Eritrea’s silence appeared to signal consent; Amhara nationalists feared deal could be mechanism to hand over contested Western Tigray to Mekelle; Tigray’s leaders expressed dissatisfaction with some aspects, reflecting deal’s fragility. Nonetheless, both sides stopped fighting and humanitarian deliveries began trickling into region, although World Food Programme 25 Nov said deliveries are “not matching needs”. Military commanders 12 Nov also agreed during follow-up talks in Kenya’s capital Nairobi that Tigray would hand over heavy weapons in return for foreign (Eritrea) and non-federal (Amhara) troop withdrawal from Tigray.

Violence escalated in Oromia amid uptick in rebel operations and govt air strikes. Fighting between federal and Oromia security forces and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) rebels intensified. Notably, federal air force early Nov launched three drone strikes in West Wollega Zone, killing 55. OLA fighters 6 Nov entered Nekemte town (East Wollega Zone) where they clashed with security forces, looted two banks, released over 120 prisoners from “Abiy regime’s torture camps” and abducted officials. OLA now controls over a dozen districts in East and West Wollega zones.

Relations with Sudan thawed. Following talks 15 Oct between PM Abiy and Sudan’s de facto head of state Gen. al-Burhan in Ethiopia’s Bahir Dar city, govt representatives met several times during month to resolve border dispute.

Main opposition groups boycotted ECOWAS-mediated dialogue with junta after listing conditions for participation, while repression of dissent persisted.

Junta and opposition remained at loggerheads despite regional mediation efforts. PM Bernard Gomou 10 Nov met with so-called quartet, group of four major opposition groups including National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC) and deposed President Condé’s Rally of the Guinean People (RPG), to discuss conditions for participation in West African regional bloc (ECOWAS)-mediated dialogue; quartet listed release of political prisoners, end to protest ban and restructuring of ruling National Transitional Council as main prerequisites. FNDC, RPG and other quartet member 24 Nov boycotted opening session of ECOWAS-mediated dialogue, said govt was acting in bad faith. Col. Doumbouya-led junta is set to meet with ECOWAS before year’s end to validate 21 Oct agreement on 24-month transition back to civilian rule; junta insists latter starts from 1 Jan 2023, while main opposition groups wants 5 Sept 2021 coup as start date.

Prominent protest leaders prolonged detention without trial. Two senior FNDC leaders jailed after leading banned protest in July, Ibrahima Diallo and Oumar Sylla (aka Foniké Mengué), 7 Nov announced hunger strike to protest prolonged detention without trial; 15 Nov suspended strike at request of their lawyers.

Authorities targeted Condé as part of anti-corruption campaign. Justice Minister Charles Wright 3 Nov ordered legal proceedings on corruption charges against Condé, who has resided in Türkiye since May, and 187 former Condé officials, some of whom are dead or already in prison. Col. Doumbouya 16 Nov also dismissed Infrastructure Minister Yaya Sow, citing corruption charges.

Authorities stepped up mediation role in Ethiopia and DR Congo (DRC) conflicts, while insecurity persisted notably near Somalia border and in Rift Valley.

Opposition faced internal rifts, warned about threats to judicial independence. Former President Kenyatta’s Jubilee party 10 Nov threatened to withdraw from Azimio coalition after Azimio leadership in Senate removed Jubilee candidate from list of nominees to Parliamentary Service Commission. Orange Democratic Movement and Wiper Democratic Movement – both Azimio members – 17 Nov secured election of respective leaders’ children as members of Eastern African Legislative Assembly, prompting Jubilee to denounce “dynasty” politics. Meanwhile, court 10 Nov dropped $60m corruption case against Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua and nine others, citing lack of evidence; runner-up in Aug presidential election Raila Odinga immediately denounced lack of judicial independence.

Nairobi played key role in regional efforts to advance peace. Govt from 12 Nov deployed troops to eastern DRC as part of East African Community (EAC) force. After touring region 4-15 Nov in effort to de-escalate tensions between Rwanda and DRC, EAC peace process facilitator for DRC, former President Kenyatta, 18 Nov reported agreement with Rwandan President Kagame “to urge the M23 to cease fire and withdraw from captured territory” in North Kivu, paving way for broader regional call on 23 Nov (see DR Congo). Nairobi 28 Nov also hosted third round of EAC talks between Congolese govt and some armed groups active in country’s eastern provinces. After Kenyatta played key role in mediating 2 Nov peace deal between Addis Ababa and Tigray, Nairobi 7-12 Nov hosted follow-up talks between parties (see Ethiopia).

Al-Shabaab remained active, govt continued operations against cattle rustling. Police 1 Nov reported suspected Al-Shabaab elements kidnapped four, including paramedics, in ambush on ambulance in Mandera county near Somalia border. In Rift Valley, interior ministry 8 Nov said police recovered over 700 livestock and shot one suspect dead in operation targeting cattle rustling in Turkana county; Interior Cabinet Secretary Kithure Kindiki 9, 18 and 23 Nov met regional leaders in Baringo, West Pokot and Samburu counties to discuss insecurity.

Violent conflict continued in north and centre, and UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) saw several troop contributors withdraw.

Rampant insecurity in north fuelled popular discontent. Main trade unions 8 Nov declared 48-hour general strike in Gao region to protest govt’s lack of response to growing insecurity; Algiers peace accord signatory group leader around same day called on young Tuaregs to join fight against Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) in Gao. Meanwhile, deadly attacks continued across region. Notably, local officials 23 Nov reported jihadist attack on Kadji camp for internally displaced persons 21 Nov left 11 civilians dead. Encounters between IS-Sahel and rival al-Qaeda affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) reported around 12-13 Nov in Gao and Timbuktu regions; death toll unknown.

Violence involving jihadist militants and security forces continued in centre. Govt forces 1 Nov reportedly killed five JNIM militants near Pogo locality (Ségou region). JNIM militants 10 Nov killed three pro-govt militia fighters in Kargue village (Bandiagara region). MINUSMA convoy on its way to Timbuktu city 21 Nov hit mine near Douentza town in Mopti region, leaving three peacekeepers injured. Conflict took high civilian toll. Govt forces 12 Nov reportedly killed up to four civilians during operation in Birga-Peulh village, and 14 Nov allegedly killed four Fulani civilians near Derou village (both Mopti).

Key troop contributors announced withdrawal from MINUSMA. UK, Côte d’Ivoire and Germany 14-22 Nov announced withdrawal of their military contingents, leaving mission’s future uncertain. Meanwhile, MINUSMA 9 Nov reported govt forces 1 July-30 Sept committed 162 human rights abuses, 33% increase from 1 April - 30 June period; also noted limited ability to investigate abuses as MINUSMA personnel does not enjoy free movement. NGO International Federation for Human Rights 24 Nov warned that 2022 “will likely be the deadliest in Mali” since 2012, denounced impunity of those responsible for human right abuses.

In other important developments. After French govt 17 Nov suspended development assistance to Mali, citing presence of Russian paramilitary Wagner Group, Bamako 21 Nov banned French and French-funded NGOs from operating in country; number of NGOs subsequently suspended activity, including Doctors of the World-Belgium 22 Nov.

Islamist militants pushed deeper into southern districts of Cabo Delgado and continued attacks elsewhere in province, seizing large quantities of weapons and ammunition.

Insurgents expanded offensive in southern Cabo Delgado province. In Namuno district, Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) 1 Nov attacked police’s Rapid Intervention Unit garrison at Minhanha village, reportedly killing two soldiers and stealing weapons and ammunition; 5 Nov entered Pararene village, killing at least two civilians; local militiamen known as Naparama 10 Nov pursued and killed five insurgents, captured at least ten after Nanrapa village came under attack. International Organization for Migration (IOM) 8 Nov said over 16,000 displaced by violence in Namuno since 29 Oct. Suspected ISMP 12-14 Nov for first time crossed into Balama district further west, killing at least five people in Muripa, Mualia and Marica villages. In Montepuez district, Naparamas and ISMP 22 Nov clashed in Nairoto area, reportedly leaving several insurgents dead; five Naparamas also beheaded after being captured.

Violence persisted in northern and central districts of Cabo Delgado. In Muidumbe district, alleged ISMP militants throughout month attacked Mandava, Litapata and Muambula villages, killing and kidnapping several civilians; 20 Nov ambushed and killed senior police officer and three other people in Xitaxi village. IOM reported 45,000 displaced 28 Oct-25 Nov by violence in Muidumbe. In Macomia district, suspected ISMP insurgents 10, 17 Nov reportedly killed five soldiers and looted weapons and ammunition in Nguida village. In Nangade district, ISMP 8 Nov attacked security forces’ post at Ngalonga village, capturing large quantities of weapons and ammunitions; 15 Nov ambushed Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) convoy near Mungano village, reportedly injuring five Tanzanian troops; SAMIM forces 29 Nov allegedly attacked ISMP base in Ngonga area, killing scores of insurgent but losing two soldiers.

In other important developments. Govt around 22 Nov reopened key port of Mocímboa da Praia after two-year closure amid violence. After police late Oct detained journalist Arlindi Chissale in Cabo Delgado, public prosecutor’s office 3 Nov accused him of collecting information to foment terrorism; Chissale, who was granted provisional release next day, said he was being repressed because of his links to opposition.

Civilians suffered violence at the hands of jihadist and govt forces in southern regions, and French Operation Barkhane formally ended.

Jihadists targeted civilians in Diffa region in south east. Alleged members of Boko Haram JAS faction 2 Nov attacked camp for internally displaced persons in N’Gala Peulh locality (N’Guigmi department), killing five civilians. Unidentified Boko Haram faction 4 Nov kidnapped three people between Djilmari and Waragou localities (Diffa department); national guard later freed hostages, killing one jihadist. Suspected JAS combatants 7 Nov kidnapped eight people in Maldjori town, Diffa department; national guard operation in Bague locality, Bosso department next day reportedly freed hostages, leaving five militants dead.

Counter-insurgency operations continued in Tillabery region in south west. Alleged Islamic State Sahel Province 6 Nov attacked national guard position in Zibane locality (Tillabery department), leaving no casualties; in response, military in cooperation with French forces launched ground and air operation in area, killing 15 militants. As opposition continued to accuse govt forces of killing several civilians in airstrike on Tamou mining site in Oct, coordinator of M62 coalition of 15 civil society organisations, Abdoulaye Seydou, 17 Nov said police had summoned him three times for his comments on incident.

French Operation Barkhane came to a formal end. French President Macron 9 Nov announced formal end of Operation Barkhane amid reconfiguration of France’s military strategy in Sahel region; around 1,000 French troops will however remain in Niger as part of bilateral military cooperation. European Union official 11 Nov announced launch of military cooperation mission in early 2023 to support Nigerien forces in their fight against jihadists.

Electoral violence continued to disrupt campaign for 2023 polls, while jihadist, criminal and separatist groups demonstrated resilience amid military operations on multiple fronts.

Political violence persisted ahead of early 2023 general elections. Authorities 11 Nov reported 52 cases of electoral violence since campaign started on 28 Sept. Notably, unidentified assailants 8 Nov reportedly attacked convoy of opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) presidential candidate, Atiku Abubakar, in Borno state capital Maiduguri, leaving at least one dead and 70 injured; PDP blamed attack on ruling All Progressives Congress.

Criminal and other violence ran high in North West and North Central zones. Kidnapping for ransom remained widespread, notably in Zamfara state: gunmen 7 Nov kidnapped 50 people in Bukkuyum area; 20 Nov raided four villages in Zurmi and Maradun areas, reportedly abducting over 100; 23 Nov kidnapped at least 60 people in Kaura Namoda area. Govt forces throughout Nov continued land and air operations, notably carrying out aerial assaults on armed groups’ enclaves in Birnin Gwari, Chikun and Giwa areas of Kaduna state. Meanwhile, intercommunal violence 7-9 Nov killed at least 28 people in Addo area, Benue state; farmer-herder clashes 14 Nov killed dozen people in Bokkos area, Plateau state.

Jihadists launched deadly attacks in North East zone despite security operations. In Borno state, Boko Haram (BH) operatives 10-12 Nov reportedly killed at least 26 women accused of witchcraft near Gwoza town; suspected Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) combatants overnight 18-19 Nov launched complex attack on Malam Fatori town and army base, killing 11 security forces and unconfirmed number of civilians. Large-scale counter-insurgency operations continued in Borno: army airstrike 5 Nov reportedly killed 15 ISWAP combatants in Bolowa village, 16-17 Nov killed about 16 BH fighters near Banki town.

Biafra separatist agitation and criminal violence persisted in South East. Notably, gunmen 12 Nov attacked military checkpoint at Isuofia town in Aguata area of Anambra state, killing two soldiers; 19 Nov killed three policemen in Agbani town, Nkanu West area of Enugu state. In Imo state, troops allegedly searching for Biafra separatists 3 Nov raided Amangwu town in Ohafia area; locals alleged soldiers killed about ten people.

Authorities joined call for M23 rebels to halt fighting in eastern DR Congo (DRC) as regional efforts intensified to de-escalate tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa.

Regional leaders called for immediate ceasefire in eastern DRC. Congolese President Tshisekedi 3 Nov again denounced Kigali’s “expansionist impulses” in supporting M23 rebels. East African Community (EAC) 18 Nov said EAC peace process facilitator for DRC, former Kenyan President Kenyatta, and President Kagame had agreed on need for M23 to cease fire and withdraw from captured territories in DRC’s North Kivu province. During mini-summit on peace and security in eastern DRC held in Angola's capital Luanda, regional leaders including Congolese President Tshisekedi and Rwandan FM Vincent Biruta 23 Nov called for cessation of hostilities in eastern DRC starting 25 Nov; M23 in following days rejected call (see DR Congo).

Border incidents highlighted heightened tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa. As DRC forces continued to combat M23 rebels in eastern provinces, Congolese SU-25 fighter jet 7 Nov entered Rwandan airspace, landing briefly at Rubavu airport, Western province; Rwanda took no military action but accused Kinshasa of “provocation”. Rwandan troops 19 Nov killed Congolese soldier who had crossed border into Rwanda’s Rubavu district.

Federal govt’s clan-based offensive against Al-Shabaab faced setbacks amid resistance from militants; Mogadishu continued to prioritise cordial relations with member states.

Offensive against Al-Shabaab in central regions slowed down. In Galguduud region, govt forces 9 Nov captured Wabxo town, 11 Nov pulled out allowing Al-Shabaab to re-capture town; major Al-Shabaab assault 7 Nov temporarily displaced govt forces from Qayib town, while govt forces 25 Nov repelled Al-Shabaab assault on Qayib. In Middle Shabelle region, govt forces 3 Nov captured El Harereri town, 17 Nov took control of Cad Caddey village. Use of U.S. and Turkish drones reportedly supported govt forces’ advance in Middle Shabelle, while outbreak of clan conflict between two Abgaal sub-clans in Adale district from mid-Nov hampered efforts. In Hiraan region, govt forces focused on shoring up gains south of Beledweyne city and preventing Al-Shabaab infiltration from across western side of Shabelle river; military 11 Nov foiled large-scale Al-Shabaab assault on govt forces in Burdaar area. Al-Shabaab continued attacks in urban centres. Notably, militants 27-28 Nov laid siege to hotel near presidential palace in capital Mogadishu, killing at least eight people.

President Mohamud invested in good relations with members states and regional partners. Mohamud late Nov travelled to war’s front lines in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states in effort to reinvigorate offensive against Al-Shabaab. Earlier, federal govt and member state leaders 27-31 Oct met in Mogadishu for third time since Mohamud took office in May; leaders agreed to share funds that federal govt recently received from international actors, and all member states committed to participate in operations against Al-Shabaab. As part of Mogadishu’s efforts to find regional support to further develop security institutions and bolster current offensive, defence ministry 2 Nov and National Intelligence Service Agency 5 Nov signed agreements with Sudanese and Ethiopian counterparts, respectively.

Humanitarian situation remained dreadful. Mohamud 15 Nov told MPs that record drought had devastated country’s economy and acknowledged looming famine in parts of country as UN agencies continued to warn that 6.7mn people face severe food insecurity. In report released 14 Nov, UN human rights office said Al-Shabaab is exacerbating impact of drought and risk of famine, including by destroying wells and other essential infrastructure.

Deadlock over upcoming political cycle persisted with little prospect of immediate breakthrough as political opposition stated it no longer recognises Bihi as president.

Opposition denounced govt as illegitimate. Opposition Waddani and UCID parties 13 Nov – originally scheduled date for presidential election – announced they no longer recognise Bihi’s administration, while failing to clarify what this means in practice. Some youth same day clashed with security forces in country’s second-largest city Burco, resulting in at least seven people injured.

Govt remained unwilling to dialogue over sequencing of high-stake elections. Govt in Nov continued to rebuff all domestic and international appeals to dialogue with Waddani and UCID over sequencing of forthcoming elections, reiterating it will organise political parties’ vote – to licence three parties that will be allowed to participate in formal politics going forward – ahead of presidential ballot; also said it will follow National Electoral Commission’s nine-month timeline for presidential election (although parliament’s Upper House in Oct extended Bihi’s mandate by two years).

Process to select new political parties moved forward. Registration committee 6 Nov approved nine political associations, on top of three current ones, to compete in unscheduled political parties’ election; in joint press conference, all nine political associations 15 Nov said any process to overcome current deadlock over sequencing of elections must include them.

Conflict persisted in Upper Nile state, govt suspended Rome peace talks with opposition groups, and World Food Programme laid bare dire humanitarian situation. 

Rampant violence continued in Upper Nile state. Fighting pitting ethnic Shilluk “Agwalek” forces under Gen. Johnson Olony against Nuer forces, predominantly backed by Gen. Simon Gatwech, continued during month. Notably, ethnic Nuer community militias early Nov marched into Fashoda county, killing unknown number of people and prompting Agwalek forces 26 Nov to engage and force their retreat late Nov; meanwhile, Agwalek forces 10 Nov shelled Nuer positions from Atar town. UN mission in South Sudan 19 Nov expressed deep concern about violence and urged parties to halt fighting; President Salva Kiir and First VP Riek Machar have echoed calls, despite likely supporting fighting themselves, on opposing sides.

Intercommunal violence persisted in Central Equatoria and Warrap states. Unknown gunmen believed to be cattle herders from Jonglei state 11 Nov killed five civilians in Ngerjebe village, Juba county of Central Equatoria state; state governor next day issued 72-hour ultimatum to all cattle herders to leave state. Violence between Kuok and Luach-Abuong communities 18 Nov left five dead in Tonj East county, Warrap state.

Govt suspended peace talks with major rebel groups. Following progress in Oct on restarting talks between govt and holdout opposition groups in Italy’s capital Rome, govt 21 Nov abandoned initiative, accusing rebel groups of using dialogue to “buy time to prepare for war”. Opposition groups decried decision; notably, Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Group same day said it was dismayed by move and urged Juba to reverse decision, while National Salvation Front 25 Nov said govt’s “allegations are unfounded”. Decision came after leader of South Sudan People’s Movement/Army (SSPM/A) Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang 19 Oct proposed Unified Front among all non-signatory opposition groups to “challenge the regime physically”.

In other important developments. World Food Programme 3 Nov published report stating that 6.6mn people, over half country’s population, are affected by acute food insecurity, malnutrition, famine and rampant insecurity. NGO Global Rights Compliance 24 Nov published report accusing govt and opposition of committing war crimes through routine use of mass starvation and forcible displacement. 

Military-civilian negotiations made progress amid tensions between international mediators, authorities cracked down on Islamist groups, and violence flared in Central Darfur.

Military-civilian forces advanced toward transition deal. Main civilian opposition bloc Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FFC-CC) 16 Nov announced they had reached “framework agreement” with military on most critical issues to restore democratic transition; dialogue officially mediated by Trilateral Mechanism led by UN mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union (AU), and Intergovernmental Authority on Development also quietly facilitated by Quad countries (U.S., UK, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia). Parties consented to second phase of negotiations to resolve outstanding issues and produce final deal.

AU bristled at “external interference” in negotiations. AU Special Envoy for Sudan Mohamed Belaiche 2 Nov denounced “external interference” in Trilateral Mechanism by Quad countries, whom he accused of publicly supporting trilateral process while undermining it through parallel negotiation process. Remarks point to breakdown between Quad and Trilateral process in coordination on Sudan. Quad countries say their initiative supports Trilateral Mechanism since FFC-military disagreement was primary obstacle when trilateral negotiations stalled in June.

Concerns grew over resurgence of Bashir-era Islamist groups. Following late Oct alleged coup attempt that fractured alliance between military and Islamist groups, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan 6 Nov warned that Islamist groups should refrain from interfering in military affairs. Authorities subsequently conducted several high-profile arrests; notably, authorities 9 Nov re-arrested former President Omar al-Bashir; 14 Nov arrested leaders of newly formed Patriotic Entity Forces, allegedly affiliated with Islamist groups, 19 Nov released them. Al-Burhan 28 Nov suspended activities of trade unions, reportedly to curb Islamists’ influence.

Violence killed dozens in Central Darfur, clashes persisted in West Kordofan. In Central Darfur, clashes 11-13 Nov between Misseriya and Awlad Rashid clans of Rezeigat tribe near Juguma village reportedly killed 48 and displaced thousands; clashes 19 Nov between rival factions of Sudan Liberation Army–Abdel Wahid (SLA/AW) left 13 dead in Shamal Jabal Marrah locality. Renewed fighting in En Nehoud locality in West Kordofan 19-20 Nov left six dead.

Jihadist combatants launched deadly attacks on govt forces in northern Savanes region.

Security forces 17 Nov engaged in fighting with al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) combatants in Sankortchagou locality (Savanes region) at border with Burkina Faso; local sources reported at least six soldiers and two jihadists killed. JNIM combatants 24 Nov attacked army post in Tiwoli village (also Savanes); local media reported at least 17 soldiers killed. JNIM claimed both attacks.

Govt deployed troops to DR Congo as part of East African regional force amid mounting allegations that Kampala supports M23 rebels; series of attacks targeted security infrastructure.

Spate of attacks targeted security installations. After gunmen 31 Oct shot two police officers dead in raid on Busiika police station in central Luwero district, unidentified assailants 14 Nov raided Kyanja police post in suburb of capital Kampala, reportedly leaving no casualties. Attackers 17 Nov also raided Gaddafi barracks in eastern Jinja district, killing one soldier, while police 23 Nov reportedly foiled attack on Nakulabye police station in Kampala. Deputy inspector general of police accused rebel group Uganda Coalition Front for Change of responsibility for 31 Oct attack.

Army moved against President Museveni’s former allies. Military 8 Nov arrested ten people, including relatives of former minister Maj. Abdul Nadduli, in Nakaseke district, reportedly over gun that went missing at burial of Nadduli’s son in late Oct; Maj. Nadduli late Sept had voiced criticism of Museveni’s alleged plan to have his own son, Lt-Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, succeed him. Security forces 8-9 Nov also deployed at farm of senior presidential adviser, retired Maj. Roland Kakooza Mutale, in Luwero district, accusing him of giving illegal military training to group of over 100 youths.

Govt faced growing accusations of supporting M23 rebels in DR Congo’s east. Congolese parliamentarians 1 Nov and civil society activists next day accused Uganda of supporting M23 and urged Congolese President Tshisekedi to severe ties with Kampala. Adding to concerns, Museveni’s son Kainerugaba 6 Nov publicly endorsed M23 rebels “fighting for the rights of Tutsi” in eastern DR Congo and issued veiled threat against anyone combating “those brothers of ours”. UN Security Council delegation 18 Nov met with Museveni in Kampala and reportedly asked him to clarify Uganda’s ties with M23. Kampala 21 Nov announced imminent deployment of 1,000 troops to eastern DR Congo as part of East African Community force battling armed groups there.

Ahead of 2023 general elections, relations between govt and opposition remained tense.

Authorities continued to stifle dissent. About 30 alleged supporters of ruling ZANU-PF party 8 Nov disrupted press conference by main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) in capital Harare despite police presence, seizing party banners and other materials. National housing and social amenities minister and ZANU-PF’s Mashonaland East provincial chairperson, Daniel Garwe, 12 Nov told supporters that “courts, military and police belong to ZANU-PF” and that party was preparing whip to “fight back” against those who insult President Mnangagwa. Meanwhile, Magistrates Court in Harare 9 Nov granted bail to CCC parliament member Godfrey Sithole, who was arrested in June alongside his colleague Job Sikhala on charges of inciting violence following killing of CCC activist Moreblessing Ali; Sikhala remained in custody after ninth attempt to secure bail late Nov failed. In move widely interpreted as clampdown on govt critics, govt 22 Nov adopted new legislation that will criminalise behaviour deemed as undermining “national interests and sovereignty”.

Opposition pressured authorities to create conditions for competitive polls. Opposition parties, including CCC, mid-Nov urged govt to expedite establishment of Zimbabwe Independent Complaints Commission to investigate acts of misconduct by members of security forces. Two civil society organisations – Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Election Resource Centre – 6 Nov announced legal complaint against electoral commission over $187,000 fee that commission requires to provide voters list.

Taliban sought to suppress National Resistance Front and Islamic State’s local branch threats in north east, while Taliban signalled harsher restrictions, particularly aimed at women.

Anti-Taliban resistance forces continued insurgency in north east. Despite falling levels of violence with onset of cold weather, insecurity continued in Badakhshan province (north east) after Taliban in Oct launched large-scale operations in districts bordering Tajikistan; operations for time being appeared to stunt National Resistance Front (NRF) activities in province but strained relations with Tajikistan, neighbouring country that harbours NRF fighters. Similarly, in Takhar province (north east), numerous reports surfaced during month of Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) and NRF attacks; Taliban forces launched raids against hideouts, primarily targeting ISKP. Meanwhile, deadly clashes erupted between Taliban and Pakistani border forces around Chaman border crossing 13 Nov and in Paktia province (east) 15 Nov (see Pakistan). Bomb 30 Nov targeting religious school in Samangan province (north) killed at least 17 students, majority of them believed to be children.

Taliban regime continued repressive measures, including on women. Taliban 5 Nov stated efforts were under way to end caretaker govt model; how the Taliban will shift to permanent govt remains unclear as group signalled intent to introduce additional governance restrictions. UN children’s agency 7 Nov claimed that women were increasingly being denied access to health facilities unless accompanied by male relatives; ministry for promoting virtue and preventing vice next day announced closure of women’s public baths and declared that women will no longer be able to visit public parks. UN experts 25 Nov said treatment of women and girls may amount to “gender persecution”. Earlier, Taliban 3 Nov arrested human rights activist Zarifa Yaqhoubi and her colleagues in capital Kabul who announced formation of women-led political party. Taliban emir 13 Nov met with judges and urged application of stricter punishments against kidnappers, seditionists and thieves.

Humanitarian crisis persisted as winter approached. With harsh winter fast approaching, little progress was made in addressing economic and humanitarian crises; notably, China 9 Nov announced it will grant zero-tariffs on 98% of Afghan products from Dec onward.

Opposition held countrywide protest rallies, fuelling tensions with govt, while deadly attacks in Rohingya refugee camps continued.

Amid economic crisis, tensions persisted between govt and opposition. Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) held protest rallies at divisional headquarters countrywide against rising fuel, power and commodity prices, aimed at culminating in mass rally in capital Dhaka on 10 Dec. PM Sheikh Hasina 2 Nov told parliament BNP was attempting to destabilise politics amid economic crisis, warning govt would take action against those engaged in anti-govt activities. BNP sec gen same day said “our present goal is to intensify the movement” to force elections; Hasina next day warned against BNP “excesses”, threatening party’s chairperson could be sent back to jail. Notably, BNP 12 Nov held large-scale rally in Faridabad suburb, Dhaka division. Police same day arrested 32 BNP leaders and activists in Dhaka city on charges of “hatching an anti-government conspiracy”. Police 16 Nov fired rubber bullets at BNP party activists in Habiganj district, Sylhet division, who were planning rally, injuring 60, including ten police officers. Govt and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 9 Nov provisionally signed $4.5bn support program, which finance minister same day said would help prevent economic instability from escalating into crisis.

Security operations against militant groups continued. Security operations against suspected militants and separatists continued in Bandarband district. By 9 Nov, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) had arrested 29 suspected members of militant group Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya from Bandarband, Comilla and Narayanjanj districts. Two Ansar-al-Islam militants – sentenced to death for killing of secular publisher in 2015 – 19 Nov escaped from court; police 22 Nov arrested one accomplice.

Violence persisted in Rohingya refugee camps. After police late Oct launched operation in Cox’s Bazar camps to arrest at least 56 Rohingyas, including 24 suspected of murdering seven community leaders in recent months, police attributed 8 Nov killing of Rohingya man in Cox’s Bazar Teknaf sub-district to clash between rival Rohingya factions. Rohingya militants 14 Nov fired on RAB officials in Bandarband’s Konapara camp, killing woman and injuring security forces member.

China continued maritime activity around disputed islands, while Tokyo and Beijing struck five-point agreement aimed at strengthening cooperation.

China continued maritime activity as Japan hosted joint naval drills. As of 29 Nov, 108 Chinese Coast Guard vessels were detected in Japan’s contiguous zone over 27 days, including eight that entered Japan’s territorial waters. Japan hosted ten-day Malabar Exercise with “Quad” countries – U.S., Australia and India – that 10 Nov commenced off Yokosuka Island in East China Sea. Japanese media 9 Nov reported that Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force and Coast Guard will conduct joint drill simulating armed attack on disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea for first time before end of fiscal year.

Japan and China agreed five-point consensus following first face-to-face leaders’ meeting. Japan’s PM Fumio Kishida and China’s President Xi Jinping 17 Nov met for first time on sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Thailand’s capital Bangkok and agreed five-point consensus, which includes provisions to build mutual trust, work on high-level economic dialogue, strengthen dialogue and communication between defence and maritime departments (including early launch of direct telephone line) and commit to jointly shoulder responsibility for maintaining international and regional peace and prosperity; during meeting, Kishida expressed concern over China’s intrusions into Japanese waters around Senkaku Islands and recent ballistic missile launches around Taiwan.

Govt and China made no progress on resolving remaining friction points along disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC), while Maoists continued violent attacks in centre and east.

LAC remained point of contention with China. Indian Army Chief Gen. Manoj Pande 12 Nov said situation in eastern Ladakh along LAC was “stable but unpredictable” as two out of seven friction points are yet to be resolved, and noted that China had not significantly reduced its troops and continued “unabated” infrastructure development; local media mid-month cited Indian defence sources who said India had increased “constructions in forward areas along LAC”. In first public exchange since deadly Galwan Valley clash in June 2020, India’s PM Narendra Modi and China’s President Xi Jinping 15 Nov greeted each other on sidelines of G20 summit.

Maoist violence continued in centre and east. In Telangana state (centre), Maoists 9 Nov killed tribal man suspected of working with police in Mulugu district. In Odisha state (east), Maoists 10 Nov killed youth suspected of being police informer in Kandhama district; security forces 11 Nov killed two Maoists in Koraput district. In Jharkhand state (east), security forces 21 Nov killed three Maoists in Latehar district, where Maoists 22 Nov set ablaze dozens vehicles at railway construction site. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), security forces 26 Nov killed four Maoists during clashes in Bijapur district. In statement ahead of its 22nd anniversary on 2 Dec, People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army – military wing of outlawed Communist Party of India (Maoist) – mid-month said 132 members were killed in security operations countrywide since Dec 2021 and claimed it had staged 1,300 attacks that killed 429 security personnel.

Improvised bomb exploded in south west. Low-intensity pressure-cooker bomb blast 19 Nov critically injured two, including perpetrator, in Mangaluru city, Karnataka state (south west); police said attacker was inspired by Islamic State ideology.

India and Pakistan continued mutual reproaches, while security operations and militant attacks persisted in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

Tensions persisted between New Delhi and Islamabad. After Pakistan’s foreign ministry late Oct protested Indian defence minister’s remarks that “the mission will complete only when Gilgit Baltistan and areas of [Pakistan-administered Kashmir] reunite with India”, Indian PM Narenda Modi 18 Nov said “it is well known that [militant] organisations get money through several sources”, including “state support”. India’s home ministry 8 Nov reported 73 cross-border infiltration attempts in 2021, lowest in five years, and stated ongoing militancy in J&K “is linked with infiltration of [militants] from across the border”. Indian security forces 9 Nov claimed to have shot down drone entering from Pakistan into Punjab’s Ferozepur district.

Security operations and militant attacks continued in J&K despite onset of winter. Security forces continued operations: 1 Nov killed three Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militants in Pulwama district; 3 Nov killed three militants trying to infiltrate border in Poonch district; 11 Nov killed Pakistani Jaish-e-Mohammad militant in Shopian district; 15 Nov arrested four alleged members of armed group The Resistance Front in Srinagar city; 19 Nov killed alleged Pakistani militant infiltrating border in Rajouri district, Jammu region; alleged Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant was 19 Nov shot dead in police custody in Anantnag district in unclear circumstances, in second such incident since Oct. Militants 3 Nov shot two non-local labourers in Anantnag district; militant fired on two non-local labourers in Anantnag district. India’s northern command chief 22 Nov claimed “82 Pakistani and 53 local terrorists are active” in region, alongside 170 additional unidentified insurgents.

In other important developments. The Resistance Front 13 Nov threatened 21 journalists working for Kashmir’s prominent local English language newspapers and news agency, accusing them of siding with India; at least six journalists shortly afterward announced resignations.

North Korea test fired dozens of missiles, including its largest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and admonished U.S. and South Korea in harsh criticism.

Pyongyang continued intense missile testing and military provocations. Following multiple launches throughout Oct, Pyongyang 2-3 Nov fired approximately 26 missiles, including likely long-range cruise missile and ICBM, latter of which landed 200km west of northerly Japanese island of Hokkaido; another missile landed south of Northern Limit Line (de facto inter-Korean maritime border) just 40km from east coast of South Korean town of Sokcho. Amid barrage, North Korea 2 Nov fired approximately 100 artillery shells in vicinity of South Korea’s maritime buffer zone. Further launches of short-range missiles followed 9 and 17 Nov; North 18 Nov fired “Hwasong-17”, which appears to mark first successful launch of largest ICBM in its arsenal following launch failure in March. North characterised early Nov launches as response to recent U.S.-South Korean military drills, but seem to form part of sustained strategy that is raising peninsula tensions.

Concerns persisted over potential seventh nuclear test. Satellite imagery taken on or around 7 Nov published by U.S. think-tank CSIS showed no activity at third of four tunnels at North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site; analysts and observers believe Pyongyang is technically ready to conduct seventh nuclear test – and first since 2017 – at site with minimal further preparations. South Korean President Yoon 28 Nov warned response to seventh test would “will be something that has not been seen before”.

Pyongyang slammed U.S. and South Korea. Exploiting opportunity offered by inconclusive UN Security Council meeting regarding North Korea’s missile launches, Sister of Kim Jong-un, Kim Yo-jong, 22 Nov called U.S. “scared barking dog” and alleged that Washington is feeling frustrated by council’s inability to achieve unanimity due to geopolitical tensions with China and Russia; Kim warned North Korea sees “grave political provocations attempting to drive the Korean Peninsula situation into a new phase of crisis”. Kim 24 Nov asserted “[President] Yoon Suk-yeol and his idiots continue to create a dangerous situation”.

Military clashed heavily with Arakan Army in Rakhine State and resistance forces in centre amid mounting allegations of atrocities, while regime pardoned thousands of prisoners.

Arakan Army (AA) stepped up ambushes on military in Rakhine State. Clashes were reported in four townships 8 Nov, with AA claiming to have killed at least ten members of security forces. AA landmines 10 Nov struck military truck carrying rations in Ponnagyun township, killing ten soldiers; regime forces same day retaliated by massacring at least nine civilians in nearby village. AA 14 Nov ambushed military convoy in northern Maungdaw township, 15 Nov attacked military outposts in Buthidaung and Ponnagyun townships. Military 15 Nov allegedly shelled children’s birthday party in Maungdaw, killing at least 11 civilians.

Resistance forces and military battled in central and southern areas. In Sagaing region, regime soldiers 6 Nov allegedly killed as many as 14 people, including eight civilians and four People’s Defence Forces (PDF) members, in Monywa township; several victims showed signs of severe torture. Meanwhile, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and allied PDFs launched several major attacks in mid-Nov, capturing military outposts; notably, 12 Nov attacked police station in Kyaikmayaw township, Mon State, killing three police officers, and same day captured three military camps in Bago region.

Regime released prisoners amid 2023 election preparations. In mass pardon to mark National Day, regime 17 Nov released almost 6,000 prisoners, including former ministers, activists, senior National League for Democracy (NLD) officials and four foreigners; regime claimed 700 were political prisoners. Meanwhile, Vice Senior General Soe Win 10 Nov chaired meeting on verifying voter lists for 2023 election while leader Min Aung Hlaing next day underscored importance of ongoing peace talks with ethnic armed groups to support election, expressing hope of concluding agreements with armed groups by year’s end. New Mon State Party 9-10 Nov participated in third round of talks with regime.

ASEAN reiterated support for its diplomatic initiative. Regional body ASEAN leaders 11 Nov retained its Five Point Consensus to end crisis, tasked FMs with developing “concrete” implementation plan, and agreed to maintain ban on regime officials attending meetings.

Voters participated in second general election under 2015 constitution, which saw relatively low turnout and signs of frustration with mainstream parties.

In largely peaceful vote, Nepali Congress poised to become largest party. Country 20 Nov held second general election under current constitutional set-up; vote proceeded largely peacefully despite some disruptions. Notably, police intervened to address disruptions in six districts countrywide; one person died after being shot by police during clashes in Bajura district. Around 61% of nearly 18m registered voters cast their ballots in polls for federal and provincial assemblies — marking decrease from 68% in 2017 contest. With votes still being tallied late Nov, Nepali Congress appeared set to become largest party in federal parliament with calculations predicting around 90 of 275 seats in House of Representatives, 165 of which are elected via first-past-the-post (FPTP) and 110 through nationwide proportional representation (PR) system; Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) appeared poised to secure most PR seats with 2.18mn nationwide votes. Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) will likely remain third largest party but with its share of FPTP seats falling to 18, half of those secured in 2017. Non-mainstream and independent Rastriya Swatantra Party appeared set to secure eight FPTP seats after winning prominent races in Kathmandu and Lalitpur districts, underscoring anti-establishment sentiment, especially in urban areas.

Political instability intensified amid failed assassination attempt on former PM Imran Khan; Pakistani Taliban continued deadly attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while border forces clashed with Afghan Taliban.

Attack on Khan further fuelled political tensions. Assassination attempt on Khan in Punjab district’s Wazirabad city 3 Nov killed one and injured Khan as well as 14 others, including leaders of opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party; police arrested shooter at scene. As protests erupted in major cities, Khan next day accused PM Sharif, interior minister and senior intelligence official of “hatching a conspiracy” to kill him and urged supporters to continue protests. Military 4 Nov condemned Khan’s “baseless and irresponsible allegations”. Khan 9 Nov tweeted he would disclose name of “second officer” allegedly involved in plot. Khan’s “long march” 10 Nov resumed in Wazirabad. After govt 25 Nov announced General Asim Munir as new chief of army, Khan next day called off march and announced decision to quit all provincial legislatures; 28 Nov announced decision to dissolve PTI-led parliaments in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces to have elections; govt vowed to prevent dissolution.

Pakistani Taliban continued deadly attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Pakistani Taliban claimed series of lethal assaults: notably, militants 16 Nov killed six police in Lakki Marwat district and two soldiers in Bajaur district 15-16 Nov. Pakistani Taliban, blaming military for escalating security operations, 29 Nov ended tenuous ceasefire, calling on fighters to “carry out attacks wherever and whenever you can”. Series of unclaimed attacks continued: notably, militants 5 Nov gunned down police constable in Mardan district; militant attack 9 Nov killed two police constables in South Waziristan district. Police 19 Nov reported 151 militants in province in 2022 had killed 105 police personnel.

Deadly border firefight erupted with Afghan Taliban. Cross-border attack on Pakistani side of Chaman border crossing 13 Nov killed Frontier Corps soldier, leading to hour-long exchange of fire with Taliban fighters; local media next day reported firefight killed five Afghan Taliban militants. Clashed 15 Nov reportedly erupted in Afghanistan’s Paktia province. Afghan Taliban reportedly agreed to punish perpetrators following meeting with Pakistani counterparts 21 Nov.

Insecurity persisted in south amid govt security operations and feuding between militants, while confrontations between govt and communist rebels killed dozens.

Tensions with Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members flared in south. In breach of ceasefire, 64th Infantry Battalion 10 Nov clashed with elements of MILF’s 114 Base Command in Ungkaya Pukan town, Basilan province, killing ten fighters and displacing some 2,000 families. In sign of inter-group feuding, suspected Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) member 18 Nov killed MILF commander; clashes erupted between family members associated with both in Kuloy village, Maguindanao.

Operations against Islamist militants continued amid surrenders. Notably, 33rd Infantry Battalion 5 Nov clashed with BIFF militants in Shariff Aguak town, Maguindanao province. Police 17 Nov arrested Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) sub-leader Ibraham Asara in Parang town, Sulu province, following ten years in hiding in province. In Maguindanao, six BIFF members 4 Nov surrendered in Pikit town, with further three militants surrendering 19 Nov in Rajah Buayan town. In Zamboanga City, three ASG militants formerly aligned with deceased commander Isnilon Hapilon 4 Nov surrendered, with further seven surrendering 9 Nov in Luuk municipality, Sulu province.

Clashes between military and communist rebels claimed high death toll. Military operations and some militant ambushes by communist New People’s Army in Mindanao Island in south, Visayas Islands in centre and Luzon Island in north claimed at least 28 combatant and civilian fatalities.

U.S. VP Kamala Harris visited Philippines, deepening military ties between allies, while negotiations on South China Sea (SCS) Code of Conduct made no progress.

U.S. VP reiterated commitment to Philippines, visiting island on rim of SCS. U.S. VP Kamala Harris 20 Nov commenced visit to Philippines, meeting Philippine President Marcos Jr. to discuss expanding U.S.-Philippine security ties, including Coast Guard partnership and maritime law enforcement cooperation, as Harris reaffirmed U.S. commitment toward Philippines under 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty in case of “armed attack on the Philippines armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific”. Harris 22 Nov became highest-ranking U.S. official ever to visit Palawan – western Philippine island near disputed Spratly Islands in SCS. U.S. Navy ship USS Chancellorsville 29 Nov conducted freedom of navigation operation near Spratly Islands; China’s eastern theatre command same day rebuked operation as “trespassing” into Chinese waters. Earlier, Philippine military 21 Nov said Chinese Coast Guard forcibly seized suspected Chinese rocket debris being towed by Philippine Navy off Philippine-occupied Thitu Island.

SCS Code of Conduct negotiations remained stalled. President Marcos, Jr. 13 Nov reiterated urgency of concluding negotiations on Code of Conduct as conclusion of regional body ASEAN’s East Asia Summit brought no progress on finalising draft. ASEAN and China same day released joint statement pledging to make SCS “sea of peace, friendship, and cooperation” and conclude early adoption of Code of Conduct. Chinese President Xi 18 Nov reiterated pledge during meeting with Brunei’s leader Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah. U.S. President Biden same day affirmed freedom of navigation and overflight must be respected in East and South China Seas.

Govt maintained harsh response to dissent, expressed willingness to address Tamil demands and introduced new budget amid ongoing economic strains.

Govt continued hard line on protests and rejected early elections. Police 18 Nov used water cannons and tear gas to disperse large crowd of students attempting to deliver petition to UN, protesting detention of two student leaders under Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA); court previous day extended leaders’ detention, which Amnesty International 18 Nov denounced as “targeted persecution” that has “chilling effect on civil society”. President Wickremesinghe 23 Nov rejected widespread calls for early elections, telling parliament he would “impose emergency law and deploy the military” if protesters try to “topple the government”.

Govt made some overtures to civil society groups and Tamil politicians. Govt during month held ministerial meetings and consultations with civil society groups on revised draft of proposed “anti-corruption act” aimed at including provisions of UN Convention against Corruption and other international norms. Wickremesinghe 10 Nov invited Tamil leaders for discussion, pledging to address their decades-long demands ahead of 75th independence day on 4 Feb 2023; Tamil politicians expressed scepticism at initiative but did not reject it. Justice Minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe 20 Nov confirmed govt was drafting new counter-terrorism law to replace PTA.

Amid ongoing economic hardship, govt introduced budget. Wickremesinghe 14 Nov presented 2023 budget to parliament – approved by wide margins in initial votes – aimed at reducing fiscal deficit in line with preliminary deal struck with International Monetary Fund in Sept; budget primarily relies on tax hikes, while maintaining high spending on police and military. Govt statistics released 21 Nov showed inflation slowing slightly to 70.6% in Oct, following record 73.7% in Sept. Meanwhile, debt restructuring talks appear to have made little headway, imperilling govt’s ambition to finalise restructuring by year’s end; govt postponed another round of talks with creditors scheduled for 17 Nov reportedly to allow officials time to prepare. UK Parliament 9 Nov adopted resolution expressing concern over “reports of increased militarisation and human rights violations” and urged govt to reduce high defence spending.

Military activities around island continued as China maintained frequent aerial and maritime incursions, while U.S. and Chinese presidents discussed Taiwan in first face-to-face meeting.

China continued military presence around island as U.S vessel transited strait. As of Nov 20, Taiwan detected 436 Chinese aircraft entering its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), of which estimated 170 either crossed unofficial demarcation “median line” or entered south-western ADIZ; Chinese naval vessels in surrounding waters were sighted 98 times. U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold 5 Nov sailed through Taiwan Strait; Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet 20 Nov said that U.S. has been sending warships through strait approximately every month. Meanwhile, Taiwan 7 Nov began its annual “Sky Dragon” military drills involving aerial combat exercises and ground-based support operations over six days, while Taiwan’s army 19 Nov conducted live-fire drill on outlying Penghu Islands; routine drills are expected to be held monthly in response to growing intimidations from China.

U.S. and China leaders held first face-to-face meeting, agreeing to manage Taiwan differences. In bilateral meeting at G20 summit, U.S. President Biden and China’s President Xi Jinping 14 Nov agreed to manage their differences and competition, including on question of Taiwan; Xi said that Taiwan is “at the very core of China’s core interests, the bedrock of the political foundation of China-U.S. relations, and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations”, while Biden reportedly expressed objections to Beijing’s coercive and increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan. Taiwan same day thanked Biden for reiterating U.S. support. Taiwan and U.S. 16 Nov reportedly signed deal to maintain long-range early-warning radar systems. U.S. and China defence chiefs 22 Nov met and agreed to improve communication channels and crisis management mechanism, suspended since U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August.

Govt hosted regional summit in capital Bangkok amid modest-sized anti-govt and pro-democracy protests, while deadly violence intensified in deep south.

Protesters held small-scale rallies around Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. Ahead of APEC summit held 18-19 Nov in Bangkok, anti-govt and pro-democracy protesters, primarily led by “Ratsadon Stops APEC 2022” group, 16 Nov coalesced around Bangkok demanding Prayuth’s suspension as APEC chair, fresh election and cancellation of Bio Circular Green Economy policy. Protesters next day non-violently confronted riot police at Asoke intersection. Several hundred protesters 18 Nov gathered at City Hall Plaza to march to APEC venue; police blocked protesters near Democracy Monument, leading to scuffles that saw 25 arrests and ten injuries after police deployed force, including use of rubber bullets.

Insurgents staged multiple attacks and bombings in deep south. In Pattani province, insurgents 7 Nov opened fire on police and soldiers in Nong Chik district, killing village leader and one insurgent, and wounding two police officers. Insurgents 15 Nov bombed petrol stations in Muang district and Yaring district, firing shots to disperse bystanders and detonating IEDs near pumps. IED attack next day wounded police officer near school in Panare district. In Narathiwat province, insurgents 13 Nov detonated bomb and opened fire on Buddhist villagers in Chanae district, killing one and wounding two, then staged IED attack on armoured security forces vehicle responding to incident, killing army captain. Also in Chanae, Special Operations Task Force troops 19 Nov clashed with insurgents while on rural patrol, killing one insurgent. In Reuso district, insurgents, 16 Nov detonated two pipe bombs near security checkpoint. Militants 22 Nov detonated vehicle-borne IED at apartment block housing police officers and their families in Muang district, Narathiwat, killing one officer and wounding 31 others, including 15 civilians and three children.

Tensions with Azerbaijan persisted amid numerous reports of shooting along border and in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), efforts to reach peace deal continued, and CSTO summit took place in Yerevan.

Armenia and Azerbaijan traded accusations of shooting along border. Situation at Armenia-Azerbaijan border remained fragile following Sept clashes, with both sides reporting shooting along front line during month. Kremlin 7 Nov called on parties to refrain from actions that could spark “escalation”, while U.S. State Dept 12 Nov said it was “deeply concerned” by reports. Meanwhile, tensions simmered in NK conflict zone, with de facto authorities reporting one civilian and at least two servicemen killed 10, 28 Nov respectively (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Support for bilateral diplomacy continued, but Azerbaijan contested French efforts. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 7 Nov hosted Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs in U.S. capital Washington, praising “courageous steps” toward peace. French President Macron and PM Pashinyan 19 Nov highlighted importance of “strengthening stability and security in the South Caucasus” during Summit of International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) in Tunisia; according to Pashinyan’s press office, PM also “stressed the need to eliminate the consequences of Azerbaijani aggression”. Azerbaijan same day criticised OIF members’ “anti-Azerbaijani position” while country’s President Aliyev 25 Nov cancelled Dec meeting with Pashinyan over Armenian request to involve Macron. Meanwhile, Pashinyan 10 Nov made public Armenian proposal to establish demilitarised zone along state border after Azerbaijani troops withdraw from Armenian territory; Baku had not responded by end of month.

Armenia hosted CSTO summit. Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit 23 Nov took place in capital Yerevan for discussions on international and regional security issues. Pashinyan refused to sign declaration on “joint measures on providing assistance to Armenia”, saying it did not address Yerevan’s concerns regarding CSTO’s “lack of a clear political assessment” on conflict with Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan and de facto Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) authorities accused each other of targeting military positions and civilian areas in NK; disagreements over format of future NK negotiations continued.

Azerbaijan and de facto NK authorities traded accusations of ceasefire violations. Reports of sharp increase in attacks at military positions and nearby civilian areas along front line in NK conflict zone drew accusations and denials from Azerbaijan and de facto authorities in equal measure. Notably, Stepanakert 10 Nov said Azerbaijani shooting injured one farmer; Azerbaijan’s defence ministry 26 Nov reported downing of quadcopter allegedly used by de facto forces for surveillance purposes; Stepanakert 28 Nov said Azerbaijani forces injured two soldiers with mine launchers. Russian peacekeepers’ reports of stepped-up shootings aggravated tensions with Baku, which 24, 25 Nov accused mission of partial and biased reporting. Meanwhile, situation at Armenia-Azerbaijan border remained fragile following Sept clashes, with both sides reporting shooting along front line during Nov (see Armenia, Azerbaijan).

Azerbaijan accused Armenia of planting mines in NK conflict zone. Azerbaijan 23 Nov invited military attachés of several foreign states to observe hundreds of mines, reportedly produced in Armenia in 2021 and discovered around Sarybaba heights near Lachin corridor after being captured by Azerbaijani troops during Aug escalation. Baku also invited Russian peacekeeping mission and Russian-Turkish observation centres, mandated to prevent transportation of any weapons from Armenia to NK, to site. Yerevan and Stepanakert 24 Nov denied planting mines in area and accused Baku of staging it as pretext for provocation.

Stepanakert and Baku disagreed over format of future NK negotiations. Russian businessman Ruben Vardanyan 4 Nov became de facto state minister of NK; Azerbaijani President Aliyev 17 Nov ruled out possibility of negotiations with Vardanyan, who he said was sent from Moscow “with a very clear agenda”. In same statement, Aliyev confirmed willingness to speak with “Armenians who live in Karabakh” but excluded talks with de facto NK authorities; de facto FM Davit Babayan next day reiterated readiness to negotiate with Azerbaijan but only in “internationally recognised” format, namely “the OSCE Minsk Group”.

Tensions with Armenia persisted amid numerous reports of shooting along border and in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK); diplomatic efforts to reach peace deal continued.

Armenia and Azerbaijan traded accusations of shooting along border. Situation at Armenia-Azerbaijan border remained fragile following Sept clashes, with both sides reporting shooting along front line during month. Kremlin 7 Nov called on parties to refrain from actions that could spark “escalation”, while U.S. State Dept 12 Nov said it was “deeply concerned” by reports. Meanwhile, tensions simmered in NK conflict zone, with de facto authorities reporting one civilian and at least two servicemen killed 10, 28 Nov respectively (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Support for bilateral diplomacy continued, but Azerbaijan contested French efforts. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 7 Nov hosted Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs in U.S. capital Washington, praising “courageous steps” toward peace. French President Macron and Armenian PM Pashinyan 19 Nov highlighted importance of “strengthening stability and security in the South Caucasus” during Summit of International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) in Tunisia; according to Pashinyan’s press office, Armenian PM also “stressed the need to eliminate the consequences of Azerbaijani aggression”. Azerbaijan same day criticised OIF members’ “anti-Azerbaijani position” while President Aliyev 25 Nov cancelled Dec meeting with Pashinyan over Armenian request to involve Macron. Meanwhile, Pashinyan 10 Nov made public Armenian proposal to establish demilitarised zone along state border after Azerbaijani troops withdraw from Armenian territory; Baku had not responded by end of month.

In other important developments. President Aliyev 16 Nov signed decree endorsing program for reconstruction and resettlement in territories recaptured during 2020 war; under program, known as “The Great Return”, Azerbaijan plans to return 34,500 displaced families between 2022-2026. Parliament 18 Nov approved decision to open embassy in Israel, which has had an embassy in capital Baku since 1992.

Crackdown on political opposition continued apace; Western powers threatened Minsk over its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Authorities handed down prison sentences to opposition leaders. Court 3 Nov sentenced leader of opposition United Civic Party to 30 months in prison and two associates to 18 and 12 months in prison for actions that disrupted civil order. Similarly, trade union leader Alyaksandr Mishuk 15 Nov received 30-month prison term for “actions against national security”. Trial against ten members of Workers’ Movement, indicted for high treason, 9 Nov began in Homel city. Meanwhile, authorities 29 Nov transferred leading opposition figure Maryya Kalesnikava, sentenced Sept 2021 to 11 years in prison, to hospital where she was placed in intensive care.

G7 warned Belarus against deepening support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. G7 4 Nov urged Belarus to “stop enabling Russia’s war of aggression” and warned that “more direct” Belarusian involvement would see G7 impose “overwhelming additional costs on the regime”. President Lukashenko 23 Nov dismissed rumours of military involvement in Ukraine during Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization summit in Armenia, saying “it is not Belarus’ role”. Meanwhile, Canada’s govt 22 Nov imposed new sanctions on 22 Belarusian officials and 16 companies for “facilitating and enabling” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Organization of Turkic States admitted “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) as observer member.

“TRNC” acquired observer status at Organization of Turkic States. Türkiye 11 Nov announced “TRNC” was awarded observer status at Organization of Turkic States, which includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan. Republic of Cyprus same day called move “meaningless”, claiming Ankara had to downgrade observer status to “entity” rather than “state” to win support. European Union 12 Nov called move “regrettable”, while U.S. 15 Nov said decision was inconsistent with principles of territorial integrity and UN Charter.

In other important developments. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders 17-18 Nov met UN Assistant Sec-Gen Miroslav Jenča and peacekeeping head Colin Steward to discuss prospects for progress on Cyprus issue. European Council 8 Nov agreed to extend framework of sanctions (in place since Nov 2019) against Türkiye in response to its “unauthorised drilling activities” in waters around Cyprus until 12 Nov 2023. Meanwhile, following 7 Nov meeting with Republic of Cyprus FM Ioannis Kasoulides, Greece’s FM Nikos Dendias warned “any attempt to create fait accomplis either in Greece or in Cyprus will result in a European response” and noted being “on the verge of resuming talks between Cyprus and Lebanon on the delimitation of an Exclusive Economic Zone”.

Authorities took further steps to align with European Union’s (EU) candidacy status demands and expressed concerns over “illegal” arrests in breakaway Abkhazia.

Georgia and Western actors sought closer cooperation. European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi 15-16 Nov visited Tbilisi, underscoring EU’s interest in strengthening energy and security cooperation; leadership viewed visit as new chapter in Georgia-EU relations. Following trip, parliament 28 Nov paused adoption process for law on de-oligarchisation – one of EU’s demands as precondition for candidate status – to hear suggestions from Council of Europe’s Venice Commission amid pressure from EU officials; EU 28 Nov welcomed decision, saying it is “important to consult international standard setters and implement their recommendations”. Meanwhile, NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg 21 Nov called for “more support” from Western defence alliance to Georgia, which he said is “vulnerable” to “Russian coercion and aggression”; NATO Allies 30 Nov agreed to “step up tailored support” to Georgia.

De facto authorities in breakaway Abkhazia detained more Georgian citizens. De facto security service 4 Nov detained Asmat Tavadze in Gali district on charges of illegal drug purchase and storage; de facto authorities also reported seizing Georgian flag and other Georgian state symbols found in her apartment. Georgia 5 Nov condemned de facto Abkhaz security forces for illegal detention and said “work was underway to release” her. Tbilisi 8 Nov announced another arrest of Georgian citizen in same area with similar charges.

Amid limited space for political campaigning, President Tokayev won landslide victory in snap election before reaffirming ties with Russia.

Re-election of Tokayev paves way for seven-year term. Kazakhs 20 Nov headed to polls to vote in snap presidential election, which incumbent President Tokayev won in landslide victory, securing over 80% of vote. Victory allows Tokayev to extend his presidential term by seven years under country’s new term limits. Tokayev’s Sept announcement to hold election gave his opponents little preparation time, raising concerns around lack of competition. Notably, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe observer mission 21 Nov said “early presidential election took place in a political environment lacking competitiveness, and while efficiently prepared, the election underlined the need for further reforms (…) to ensure genuine pluralism”.

Tokayev reaffirmed ties with Russia in first foreign visit since election. Tokayev 28 Nov met Russian President Putin in Moscow amid public disagreements over Ukraine; notably, Tokayev had declined to recognise Russia’s declared annexation of four Ukrainian regions. Still, Tokayev reaffirmed bilateral relations, saying “Russia is and has always been a strategic partner” while Putin hailed “special” relations between Moscow and Astana.

Authorities reached deal with Belgrade over license plates, ending nearly two-year dispute that had fuelled worrying rise in tensions.

Pristina and Belgrade 23 Nov struck European Union (EU)-brokered deal to end license plate dispute amid growing concerns of possible violence. According to EU High Representative Josep Borrell, “Serbia will stop issuing licence plates with Kosovo cities’ denominations”, while Kosovo will cease demands to re-register vehicles with Serbian plates. Borrell added that priority is now Franco-German proposal “on the normalisation of their relations”, details of which were leaked by news agency Euractiv 9 Nov. Deal came as tensions peaked during first part of month. Interior Minister Xhelal Sveçla 3 Nov suspended northern Kosovo’s police chief for refusing to issue warnings of fines to drivers with Serbia-issued license plates, as per govt plan. In protest, hundreds of Serb lawmakers, judges and police officers 5 Nov resigned, while reportedly thousands next day rallied in northern Mitrovica city. EU mid-Nov deployed 130 police officers from Poland and Italy to take over patrols in northern Kosovo after resignation of some 600 police officers. NATO 7 Nov urged “both to refrain from unilateral action” while EU and U.S. 21 Nov urged Kosovo to “immediately suspend” next phase of license plate plan. Kurti same day agreed to “48-hour postponement” of fines before parties reached final deal two days later.

Authorities signed agreements with Uzbekistan on border delimitation amid ongoing local opposition.

FM Jeenbek Kulubaev and Uzbek counterpart Vladimir Norov 2 Nov signed agreements on border delimitation in capital Bishkek, including deal on joint management of Kempir-Abad water reservoir, vital water source that lies between Osh region and Uzbekistan’s Andijan region. Kyrgyz lawmakers 17 Nov ratified deal giving Uzbekistan ownership of reservoir in return for 19,000 hectares of land elsewhere along border; Uzbek Senate following day approved agreement. Both countries’ presidents must give final approval before deal is authorised. Govt’s decision to cede control of reservoir to Uzbekistan has however ignited anger among border communities, whose protests in Oct prompted authorities to detain 20 activists and politicians. Detainees 1 Nov made public their letter to Uzbek President Mirziyoev, urging him to suspend signing deal until issue of reservoir is resolved within Kyrgyzstan.

Authorities introduced new laws on military service as tensions within army surfaced, Ukrainian shelling continued, and ties with Iran deepened.

President Putin gave updates on mobilisation drive, authorised new laws on military service. Following Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announcement late Oct that 300,000 people had been mobilised for war in Ukraine, Putin 4 Nov said additional 18,000 soldiers had been mobilised and that 49,000 were engaged in combat activities. No official decree has been issued to end mobilisation despite reaching declared goal of 300,000 soldiers, enabling future mobilisation drives. Putin 4 Nov signed law allowing authorities to mobilise citizens convicted of serious crimes, including murder and robbery; decree exempts crimes such as espionage, terrorism and sexual crimes against minors. Putin 14 Nov signed additional decree allowing foreign citizens to be drafted.

Russian army faced backlash over poor leadership and logistical problems. Over 100 people 1 Nov held protest in western Ulyanovsk city against lack of payments to conscripts, following day announced “total strike” until payments are made. Videos 5 Nov emerged showing soldiers in south-western Kazan city decrying poor conditions and lack of proper training, uniforms and weapons. Soldiers from southern Tomsk city 18 Nov held rally, criticising commanders’ lack of leadership and poor training. Meanwhile, members of Council of Mothers and Wives, which demands return of mobilised relatives from front lines, 14 Nov held protest rally in St. Petersburg city, 22 Nov proposed meeting with Putin; Putin 25 Nov held meeting, but did not invite any member who opposes war and criticises military leadership.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory persisted. Shelling continued near border with Ukraine throughout Nov. Notably, authorities in Belgorod region 15 Nov reported two killed in Shebekino town, 18 Nov said shelling killed one in Valuiki city. Ukrainian naval drone 18 Nov attacked Sheskharis oil terminal and naval base in Novorossiysk.

In other important developments. Media outlet The Washington Post 19 Nov reported that Moscow had struck deal with Tehran to produce Iranian drones in Russia. U.S. 10 Nov revoked Russia’s market economy status, European Union 23 Nov designated Russia a state sponsor of terrorism, and UK 30 Nov sanctioned 22 Russian officials.

Authorities targeted activists in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO); govt deepened military cooperation with China.

Crackdown on GBAO activists persisted. In wake of May anti-govt protests in GBAO that turned violent amid heavy-handed response, Supreme Court 23 Nov handed down life sentences to five activists; eight other defendants were sentenced to between ten and 30 years in prison.

Govt strengthened military cooperation with China. Authorities 21 Nov published agreement committing Dushanbe to joint anti-terrorism drills with Chinese forces every two years.

Govt blamed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Syrian affiliate for deadly Istanbul bombing that killed six, launching strikes in Syria and Iraq and threatening new ground operations.

Govt attributed Istanbul attack to PKK and Syrian affiliate People’s Protection Units (YPG). In first street bombing targeting civilians since 2017, explosion 13 Nov in bustling Istanbul street killed six and injured at least 81 civilians; officials immediately blamed “the [PKK and YPG]”. Security forces 14 Nov announced arrest of alleged bomber and Syrian national Ahlam Albashir and 49 other suspects; PKK and YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces 14 Nov separately denied involvement. Govt 28 Nov claimed new evidence linking plot to YPG.

Military announced new operations in Syria and Iraq. Following bomb attack, military 20 Nov began “Operation Claw Sword”, conducting airstrikes in northern Syria and Iraq against scores of alleged PKK and YPG targets (see Syria and Iraq). President Erdoğan next day signalled possible ground incursions in both countries and 28 Nov stated govt was “determined to root out the PKK” in both; threat of ground incursion in northern Syria appeared more likely than in Iraq, and could trigger displacement and fuel escalatory cycle of violence with YPG (see Syria). Retaliatory cross-border attacks from northern Syria increased: notably, rocket attack 21 Nov killed three civilians in Gaziantep province. Earlier, operations against PKK within country concentrated on rural areas of Bitlis, Tunceli and Hakkari provinces.

Tensions with Greece remained elevated. Erdoğan 16 Nov reiterated threats that Türkiye “can come suddenly one night” and criticised Greece’s alleged militarisation of Aegean islands; Greece’s FM Nikos Dendias same day condemned threat. Meanwhile, Greek military 10 Nov reported Turkish armed drone flew over Greek islet of Kandelioussa. Turkish Oil Exploration Company 25 Nov said drillship was planning new mission in eastern Mediterranean, triggering uproar in Greek media.

In other important developments. Security forces arrested at least 90 individuals countrywide with alleged links to Islamic State. Ruling party officials 6 Nov met Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), signalling manoeuvring ahead of 2023 elections. Ankara continued efforts to normalise relations with Israel, Armenia and Egypt.

Ukrainian forces sustained counteroffensive in east and south, recapturing Kherson city; Russian airstrikes on energy infrastructure left millions without electricity.

Russian forces retreated from Kherson city amid Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukrainian forces’ counteroffensive advanced further in southern Kherson region as they closed in on Kherson city and surrounding area on right bank of Dnipro River. Russian authorities 9 Nov announced retreat from Kherson city to more defensible positions along river’s left bank; Ukrainian troops 11 Nov took back control, marking strategic and symbolic victory as Kherson constituted only regional capital Russian troops occupied since Feb invasion. In east, Ukraine’s counteroffensive ground on slowly amid reports of heavy losses on both sides; fierce fighting notably reported around Kreminna and Rubizhne cities in Luhansk region, and around Bakhmut city in Donetsk region. President Zelenskyy 20 Nov accused Russian forces of launching “almost 400 artillery strikes in the east” in one day. In Zaporizhzhia region, Moscow and Kyiv 21 Nov traded blame for shelling at nuclear power plant.

Russian strikes on energy infrastructure aggravated humanitarian crisis. Zelenskyy 1 Nov announce that Russian air strikes had damaged around 40% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, as strikes on energy systems continued unabated throughout month. Notably, Russia 15 Nov fired over 90 missiles and drones into country; during raid, missile struck village in NATO member Poland, killing two and fuelling fears of escalation; however, Polish officials and NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg next day said Ukrainian missile had likely fallen in Poland accidentally while intercepting Russian missiles. Attacks during month left millions without electricity, water or heating as temperatures fell below zero, bringing country to brink of winter crisis and prompting Kyiv 21 Nov to advise civilians from Kherson and Mykolaiv regions to evacuate.

In other important developments. Following Russia’s withdrawal late Oct from UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Deal, Russia and Ukraine 17 Nov agreed to extend deal for 120 days. UN General Assembly 14 Nov adopted resolution calling for Russian war reparations to Ukraine; 94 countries voted for resolution, 14 voted against and 73 abstained.

Authorities signed agreements with Kyrgyzstan on border delimitation; trial against Karakalpak activists began.

Uzbek and Kyrgyz authorities signed border delimitation deal. FM Vladimir Norov and Kyrgyz counterpart Jeenbek Kulubaev 2 Nov signed agreements on border delimitation in Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, including deal on joint management of Kempir-Abad water reservoir, vital water source that lies between Andijan region and Kyrgyzstan’s Osh region, and flashpoint for domestic Kyrgyz opposition (see Kyrgyzstan). Kyrgyz lawmakers 17 Nov ratified deal giving Uzbekistan ownership of reservoir in return for 19,000 hectares of land elsewhere along border; Uzbek Senate following day approved agreement. Both countries’ presidents must give final approval before deal is authorised.

Karakalpak activists arrested during July protests went on trial. Bukhara provincial court 28 Nov began hearings in trial of 22 people charged with inciting deadly July protests in autonomous Karakalpakstan region against proposed constitutional amendments. Meanwhile, ombudsman’s office 1 Nov announced release of 35 activists arrested during July protests; 516 people were arrested at time, of which 107 have been released.

President Bolsonaro’s attempt to challenge election result failed amid dwindling protests.

Protests challenging President Bolsonaro’s electoral defeat slowly lost momentum. Following Oct presidential election in which Bolsonaro narrowly lost to Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, unrest early Nov continued. Notably, footage showed Federal Highway Police agents 1 Nov helping pro-Bolsonaro protesters block highway in São Paulo state. Several blockades resulted in violence, including when car 2 Nov ran into barricade, also in São Paulo state, injuring at least 16 people. Bolsonaro same day called on protesters to lift blockades, while Supreme Court 11 Nov ordered law enforcement to clear all roads. While some highways remained blocked until 18 Nov, all roads eventually cleared by late Nov as protests dwindled.

Bolsonaro contested results, but court rejected request. Amid some lingering protests, Bolsonaro – who had not conceded defeat – and his Liberal Party 22 Nov filed petition formally contesting results, despite 1 Nov saying he would respect constitution; Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes next day rejected challenge.

Authorities made progress with “Total Peace” plan as talks with ELN got under way; President Petro pledged greater cooperation with Venezuela during first official visit to Caracas.

Govt made strides in initiating “Total Peace” plan. President Petro 4 Nov signed legislation giving govt legal authority to: negotiate with armed groups and “criminal structures of high impact” (outfits with sustained capacity to carry out violence threatening civilians); suspend arrest warrants for individuals participating in dialogue; and gradually eliminate mandatory military service in favour of social service. Meanwhile, peace talks with National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas 21 Nov began in Venezuelan capital Caracas, group’s first negotiations with govt since 2019. ELN same day issued statement saying negotiating team “has the backing of the entire organisation” amid concerns around its decentralised structure, which has impeded past negotiations.

Localised armed and criminal violence rose, notably in Arauca and Valle de Cauca. In initial outreach to armed and criminal actors, govt requested demonstrations of good-will through reduction in violence against civilians; however, attacks and other types of violent control increased during month. Notably, brief calm in Arauca department shattered after Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident faction known as 28th Front 8 Nov released audio promising to kill 300 civilians, likely including social leaders, allegedly linked to rival group ELN. In port city of Buenaventura, Valle de Cauca department, clashes resumed early Nov between Los Shotas and Los Espartanos criminal groups, breaking 2 Oct truce and causing forced displacements and confinements. Meanwhile, Petro 5 Nov signed Colombia’s ratification of Escazú Agreement, intended to protect environmental activists, who have been heavily targeted during country’s armed conflict. Govt 28 Nov announced offensive against armed groups operating in border areas and called for collaboration from neighbours.

Petro visited Venezuela amid ongoing efforts to normalise relations. Petro met Venezuelan President Maduro 1 Nov for first official presidential visit to Caracas, during which they signed joint communiqué pledging cooperation in areas such as trade, border security, consular services and transport links; Colombian Senate 2 Nov unanimously approved bill to better regulate international transport of cargo and passengers between two countries, thereby improving commercial ties and reducing border insecurity.

Gang violence surged in coastal cities following mass prison transfers, prompting President Lasso to declare state of emergency in three provinces.

Criminal violence spiked across several cities, triggering state of emergency. Following transfer of 1,002 inmates from Guayaquil’s Guayas prison to other detention facilities controlled by rival gangs, criminal gangs 1 Nov launched at least 18 attacks, half of them in coastal cities of Guayaquil and Esmeraldas, leaving five police officers and one civilian dead. President Guillermo Lasso same day called incidents “a declaration of open war” and imposed state of emergency in Guayas and Esmeraldas provinces, 4 Nov extended measure to Santa Domingo de los Tsáchilas province. Police 2 Nov arrested 28 people while Defence Minister Luis Lara same day announced deployment of 1,400 soldiers to Guayaquil. According to Interior Minister Juan Zapata, police 1-15 Nov captured 2,878 suspects.

Deadly prison clashes between rival gangs continued. Amid threat of mass prisoner transfer disrupting gang control within prisons, fighting 2 Nov broke out at Guayas prison, leaving two dead and six injured; inmates from Esmeraldas prison in Esmeraldas province 1 Nov also kidnapped and then released eight prison officers. In capital Quito’s El Inca prison, violent confrontation between rival criminal groups Los Lobos and Las Ñetas 7 Nov left five inmates dead; hours later, President Lasso announced security forces had regained control of prison. In other incident at El Inca prison, at least ten inmates 18 Nov died during violent riots that broke out after authorities moved two gang leaders – “Bermudez” from Los Lobos and “Anchundia” from R7 – to maximum security facility. Authorities 28 Nov nearly doubled number of prison guards, announcing 1,461 new personnel.

Govt’s heavy-handed approach to gangs continued amid eighth renewal of state of exception; further evidence of past ties between officials and gangs emerged.

Bukele administration continued its mano dura approach to tackle gangs. Vice Minister of Justice and director of prison system Osiris Luna Meza 1 Nov posted video of non-gang affiliated prisoners destroying tombs of gang members, part of new effort to erase all gang symbolism in country. Legislative Assembly same day approved series of reforms that ease proceedings to approve wiretapping through newly established Examining Courts; reforms exempt attorney general’s office from submitting reports on wiretaps to judges and strip human rights ombudsman’s office of oversight role. President Bukele 23 Nov announced phase 5 of “Territorial Control Plan”, called Extraction, intended to “extract every last terrorist from the communities of El Salvador”. Meanwhile, Legislative Assembly 15 Nov renewed state of exception for eighth time, while ministry of security 21 Nov reported arrest of over 58,000 suspected gang members since state of exception began in March. Police reported stark reduction of daily homicides between Jan and 14 Nov, putting 2022 on track to break record low murder rate of 2021. However, UN Committee against Torture 25 Nov published report expressing concern over arrests and irregularities committed under state of exception.

Media continued to expose past ties between authorities and gangs. Association of Journalists of El Salvador 3 Nov accused authorities of harassment and threats against journalist Juan Martínez d’Aubuisson after investigation published four days earlier found that current Attorney General Rodolfo Delgado had defended MS-13 collaborators in the past. Meanwhile, online news outlet El Faro 7 Nov revealed that National Civil Police had investigated Luna Meza in 2020 for possible links to gang leaders and drug traffickers.

In other important developments. Bukele 9 Nov announced that El Salvador and China will sign free trade agreement.

Police regained control of oil terminal amid rising levels of gang violence, humanitarian crisis deepened, and international partners imposed sanctions on gang sponsors.

Police unblocked main oil terminal, but gang violence continued to spread. Govt 3 Nov announced National Police had regained control of Varreux oil terminal, blocked since 12 Sept by G9 gang coalition. Clashes between police and gangs however continued nearby for several days, preventing employees from returning to terminal until 7 Nov. Fuel 12 Nov reached petrol stations, but gangs’ control of key roads leading out of capital Port-au-Prince hindered supply to much of country. Meanwhile, violence continued at high levels. Notably, in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite commune – controlled by three allied gangs – unknown assailants 9 Nov killed 15 residents with machetes for their alleged complicity with gangs; suspected 400 Mawozo gang members 14 Nov attacked convoy of commercial vehicles, U.S. embassy vehicles and police in Croix-des-Bouquets commune.

Humanitarian crisis persisted. Gang violence continued to restrict flow of essential goods, intensifying humanitarian crisis. Notably, amid impact of fuel shortages on access to clean water and other basic services, ministry of health 27 Nov reported 1,003 confirmed cases of cholera, 11,889 suspected cases, and 223 deaths as of 26 Nov.

Foreign partners imposed new sanctions, continued discussions on military intervention. In bid to help authorities tackle rising insecurity, U.S. and Canada 4 Nov imposed sanctions on Senate President Joseph Lambert and former Senate President and leader of Ayiti An Aksyon political party Youri Latortue. Justice Minister Berto Dorcé and Interior Minsiter Liszt Quitel 11 Nov resigned, allegedly after their American visas were revoked. Canada 20 Nov announced sanctions against former President Michel Martelly and two former prime ministers, Laurent Lamothe and Jean-Henry Céant. Meanwhile, U.S. State Dept 8 Nov insisted on need for foreign troops to combat “long-term challenges”; Canadian PM Justin Trudeau 20 Nov said Canada is considering possible role in mission, but stressed need for “consensus across political parties in Haiti” before taking “more significant steps”. Ambassador to U.S. Bocchit Edmond 28 Nov reiterated need for “an international presence to help confront the gangs”.

Rising extortion rates prompted govt to declare national emergency; discussions over election of Supreme Court members inflamed political frictions.

Govt declared national emergency amid mounting levels of extortion. Supreme Court president 4 Nov said establishment of UN-backed International Commission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras will not be enough to curb increasing rates of violent crime if national institutions are not strengthened. Head of Council for Private Enterprise 14 Nov said extortion was “getting out of hand” and called on authorities to intervene. Head of Police Gustavo Sánchez 24 Nov released plan to tackle extortion and President Castro same day declared national security emergency, announcing measures such as border militarisation and bank controls to “eradicate extortion”. Sánchez 25 Nov said operations will initially focus on 120 neighbourhoods in capital Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, two most populous and violent cities.

Efforts to elect new Supreme Court aggravated political tensions. Amid brewing political crisis, which emerged mid-Oct after ruling party Libre announced alliance with Honduras’ Saviour Party (PSH) had broken down, political debate largely centred on election of new Supreme Court members. Nominating committee tasked with selecting candidates 1 Nov published list of 185 candidates for 2023-2030 term, trimmed down to 105 on 18 Nov. Committee has until mid-Jan to forward list of 45 candidates to National Congress, which in turn elects 15 members. Former President and Libre coordinator Manuel Zelaya 11 Nov acknowledged that selection of Court justices is guided by political interests and announced negotiations with opposition National Party on distribution of Supreme Court seats between each party; VP and head of PSH Salvador Nasralla same day insisted on PHS participation in any negotiations. Leader of National Party, Tomás Zambrano, 14 Nov said Libre had not shown willingness to negotiate in good faith.

Criminal violence remained high, govt efforts to push through legislation extending military control over policing met resistance, and opposition against electoral reform mounted.

Lethal violence remained high. In central Guanajuato state, unknown assailants 6 Nov killed mother looking for her missing son in Abasolo city, becoming fifth volunteer search activist to be murdered this year. Also in Guanajuato, arrest of a Santa Rosa de Lima cartel leader sparked wave of violence, leaving nine dead in Apaseo el Alto municipality. In Tarimoro municipality, unknown gunmen 22 Nov shot dead four family members of local police officer. In central Zacatecas department, unknown gunmen 24 Nov shot dead National Guard coordinator José Silvestre Urzúa in Pinos municipality. In eastern Veracruz state, unknown assailants 22 Nov killed journalist Pedro Pablo Kumul in regional capital Xalapa. In central Tamaulipas state, shoot-out following arrest of criminal leader 28 Nov prompted schools and public transport to shut down. In central Jalisco state, unknown gunmen 29 Nov shot dead two civilians in their home in Tlajomulco de Zúñiga municipality.

Govt efforts to deepen militarisation of public security faced headwinds. Senate 9 Nov approved constitutional reform allowing armed forces to continue performing domestic law enforcement duties until 2028, after consent of over 20 state legislatures. Still, govt’s efforts to militarise public security stalled after federal judges in Guanajuato city and Mexico City 15 Nov granted provisional suspension against integration of National Guard into ministry of defence, arguing that initiative violates constitution; planned integration had prompted criticism from civil society observers who accused President López Obrador of breaking campaign promise to keep National Guard a civilian institution.

Proposed electoral reforms sparked backlash. López Obrador’s proposed electoral reforms, which envisage an overhaul of National Electoral Institute (INE) and reduction in number of legislators in Congress and Senate, prompted thousands 13 Nov to protest in over 16 states amid fears reforms could threaten independence and impartiality of electoral system. Despite these calls, López Obrador sought to advance proposals, with Chamber of Deputies 28 Nov approving reform in first debate. Meanwhile, López Obrador 27 Nov led march in Mexico City in response to opposition protests.

Authorities continued to consolidate one-party state, holding local elections amid ongoing repression; relations with Russia and China deepened.

President Ortega secured full control of all municipalities in flawed elections. In another step toward establishing one-party state, authorities 6 Nov held municipal elections without participation of opposition parties and with little citizen engagement. Supreme Electoral Council 14 Nov confirmed victory of ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front in all 153 municipalities and set voter turnout at 57.5%, although independent Urnas Abiertas observatory 7 Nov estimated that 82.7% of voters did not participate. Number of international actors criticised elections. Notably, Chile’s President Gabriel Boric 9 Nov criticised lack of freedom and unreliable electoral justice; European Union 15 Nov said polls “can neither be considered democratic or legitimate”; and UN human rights office 17 Nov released report stating elections could not be considered transparent, democratic or legitimate.

Crackdown on civil society and political opponents persisted. Interior ministry 4 Nov shut down 100 NGOs, 10 Nov 100 more and 16 Nov revoked 100 more, bringing total number banned since Dec 2018 to around 2,900. Authorities 22 Nov detained renowned sociologist and govt critic Óscar René Vargas, 24 Nov detained opposition figure Guisella Ortega.

Amid deteriorating relations with regional partners, ties with Russia and China deepened. President Ortega 8 Nov accused Costa Rica of being “a terrorist base”, alluding to persecuted politicians who have requested refuge in country; Costa Rica’s President Rodrigo Chaves next day rejected allegations. Meanwhile, Beijing's ambassador to Managua 8 Nov announced equipment donations for National Police while China's top legislator, Li Zhanshu, 16 Nov held talks with president of National Assembly on strengthening bilateral ties. VP Rosario Murillo 15 Nov disclosed transport agreements with Russia, while authorities 25 Nov signed cooperation agreement with Russia on cybersecurity.

Dialogue between authorities and opposition resumed in Mexico after one year on hold as sides signed long-awaited agreement to alleviate humanitarian crisis.

Govt and opposition signed humanitarian deal during resumed Mexico talks. Govt and opposition 26 Nov re-joined Norwegian-facilitated Mexico City dialogue, suspended since Oct 2021, and signed long-awaited deal to gradually unfreeze some $3bn in Venezuelan state assets held abroad; agreement is intended to provide finance, under UN supervision, for improvements in electricity infrastructure as well as health, education and food projects, to alleviate humanitarian crisis. UN Sec-Gen Guterres 27 Nov welcomed agreement and called on parties to “remain fully engaged” in negotiations. Going forward, discussions expected to centre around resolution of underlying political conflict. U.S. 26 Nov responded to advances in negotiations by exempting oil company Chevron from sanctions, allowing it to expand oil production and sell it on U.S. market. Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami 29 Nov announced govt had signed contracts with Chevron.

Preparation for opposition primaries continued. Opposition alliance Unitary Platform 15 Nov installed commission charged with organising primaries in 2023 to select single candidate for 2024 presidential election. Commission must decide on number of contentious issues, such as whether to seek assistance from govt-controlled National Electoral Council and/or international electoral bodies, and how to ensure participation of Venezuelan diaspora, which currently numbers around 7mn. Law Professor Jesús María Casal, who chairs commission, 15 Nov said it would immediately begin consultations with political parties, potential candidates and civil society.

Colombian and Venezuelan leaders pledged cooperation during Caracas meeting. As Colombian President Petro 1 Nov conducted first official visit to capital Caracas, he and President Maduro signed joint communiqué pledging cooperation in areas such as trade, border security, consular services and transport links. Meeting however failed to produce many concrete commitments. Notably, Venezuela did not agree to return to inter-American human rights system, despite Colombian govt’s indications it would, nor did communiqué mention Venezuela’s return to Andean Community trading bloc, despite Maduro’s comments to the contrary 1 Nov.

Algiers doubled its defence budget amid growing military ties with Russia; Moroccan King Mohammed VI did not attend Arab League summit held in Algeria.

Repression of dissent continued. Algiers court 14 Nov sentenced in absentia leader of outlawed Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia, Ferhat Mehenni, to life imprisonment on charges of “establishing and running a terrorist organisation” and “undermining territorial integrity and national unity”.

Govt launched joint military exercises with Russia near Moroccan border. Army chief of staff, Gen. Saïd Chengriha, 10 Nov met with Russian head of military cooperation, Dimitri Evguenievitch Chougaev, in capital Algiers. Russia and Algeria 16-28 Nov conducted first joint military exercises on Algerian territory in Bechar region near Moroccan border. President Tebboune, who is due to visit Russia in Dec, reportedly close to signing military equipment contract worth around $12bn with Moscow as part of effort to modernise Algerian army. Meanwhile, parliament’s lower house 22 Nov approved 2023 finance law increasing military budget to $23bn from $10bn in 2022.

Tensions with Morocco remained high. Hours before Arab League summit kicked off in Algiers, Rabat 1 Nov announced that Moroccan King Mohammed VI would not attend event, prompting Algiers and Rabat to blame each other for missed opportunity. Moroccan FM Nasser Bourita, who represented kingdom at summit, 2 Nov said Mohammed VI had invited Tebboune to visit Morocco; Algiers rejected invitation as “deceitful marketing”.

Widespread repression came under scrutiny during Egypt-hosted UN climate change conference (COP27); Islamist militants in Sinai Peninsula demonstrated resilience.

Security forces arrested scores ahead of planned protests during COP27. Authorities early Nov resorted to mass arrests and security forces deployment amid online calls to organise anti-govt protests on 11 Nov – to coincide with COP27 held 6-18 Nov in Sharm el-Sheikh city. Notably, NGO Human Rights Watch 16 Nov recorded 700 people detained 1 Oct-14 Nov across 18 governorates, denounced “nationwide crackdown”. As COP27 kicked off, imprisoned blogger and activist Alaa Abd el-Fattah 6 Nov stopped drinking water for about ten days in addition to his six-month-long hunger strike, drawing international attention to his plight; at least three other political detainees died in Egyptian prisons during COP27. European Parliament 23 Nov passed resolution calling for thorough review of European Union’s relations with Egypt in light of poor human rights record.

Media report alleged cracks in security apparatus. Paris-based media outlet Africa Intelligence early Nov reported that six intelligence officers 23 Oct resigned after failing to convince intelligence chief Abbas Kamel to address widespread popular frustration over economic hardship; incident, if confirmed, would highlight existence of major disagreements within security establishment.

Islamist militants proved resilient in Sinai Peninsula. Amid ongoing counter-insurgency operations by govt forces and allied tribal militiamen, Islamic State-affiliated Sinai Province (SP) militants 18-19 Nov exchanged fire with govt forces and took over several govt buildings in Al-Qantara city near Suez Canal; air force fighter jets fired missiles at school where militants had barricaded themselves, reportedly killing them; at least one army officer and five soldiers also killed.

In other important developments. On sidelines of football World Cup opening ceremony in Qatar, President al-Sisi 20 Nov for first time shook hands with Turkish President Erdoğan, who few days later reaffirmed intent to pursue full normalisation of diplomatic relations with Cairo.

Nationwide protests continued as Revolutionary Guards attacked Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq, while govt stepped up nuclear activity in response to international censure for its nuclear intransigence.

Nationwide protests continued into their third month. Protesters held commemoration ceremonies for those killed by security forces and events marking mid-Nov anniversary of 2019 protests, as security forces maintained heavy-handed crackdowns, with reports late month indicating greater coercive force in Kurdish-majority regions. Human rights groups mid-month estimated that fatalities to date may exceed 400, including 50 children; senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander 20 Nov indicated around 60 fatalities among security personnel. Authorities continued to blame unrest on foreign agitation: notably, IRGC 14, 20-21 and 22 Nov resumed cross-border missile and drone attacks into northern Iraq on Iranian Kurdish outfits, while bolstering military presence in border regions (see Iraq).

Tehran expanded nuclear activity in response to atomic watchdog’s censure vote. At International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s quarterly Board of Governors meeting, Director General Rafael Grossi 16 Nov shared “serious concern” over lack of progress in resolving safeguards concerns related to past activities at undeclared nuclear sites; board 17 Nov passed censure resolution deeming Iranian cooperation “essential and urgent”, as Russia and China voted against. In response, govt 22 Nov began enriching uranium to 60% as its fortified Fordow facility and promised to install more advanced centrifuges there and at Natanz site. Earlier, IAEA’s 10 Nov survey showed growing stockpile of 60% enriched uranium reached 62.3kg.

U.S. and its Western allies imposed sanctions. In sign of concerted diplomatic pressure, U.S. 16 Nov blacklisted half dozen employees of Iran’s state media and 23 Nov designated three officials over crackdown; European Union and UK 14 Nov sanctioned individuals and entities for govt crackdown and drone provision to Russia. U.S. 15 Nov sanctioned three Iranian entities implicated in drone transfer to Russia. UN Human Rights Council 24 Nov voted to establish investigation into human rights violations; foreign ministry 28 Nov rejected cooperation. U.S. 16 Nov said Iran “likely” behind attack on Liberian-flagged Israeli-owned tanker off Oman’s coast previous day. Saudi Arabia warned of Iranian attacks (see Saudi Arabia).

Türkiye intensified strikes against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in north after deadly Istanbul bombing, while Iranian forces resumed attacks on Iranian Kurdish groups.

Türkiye targeted PKK and threatened ground incursion. Following 13 Nov bombing in Turkish city Istanbul that killed six, which Türkiye blamed on PKK and Syrian affiliate People’s Protection Units (YPG), Turkish forces 20 Nov launched “Operation Claw-Sword” in northern Syria and Iraq (see Türkiye); Turkish defence ministry claimed strikes in both areas 20-21 Nov killed 184 militants. Turkish President Erdoğan starting 21 Nov repeatedly signalled possible ground invasion into northern Syria and Iraq; threat of ground incursion in northern Syria appeared more likely than Iraq (see Syria). Before new operation, Turkish drone attacks 1, 3 Nov killed at least four PKK-affiliated Sinjar Resistance Unit members in Sinjar district, Ninewa governorate. Militant attacks in north 5 Nov and 25 Nov killed four Turkish soldiers.

Iran resumed strikes on Iranian Kurdish groups in Kurdistan region. Amid ongoing domestic turmoil in Iran that authorities blame on foreign agitation (see Iran), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 14, 20-21 and 22 Nov launched missile and drone attacks against Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iran (KDPI) in Zargawez area of Sulaymaniyah governorate and Sidakan area of Erbil governorate, reportedly killing at least two; forces also bolstered military presence in Iranian border regions. IRGC Quds Force commander 14 Nov visited capital Baghdad and threatened ground offensive if border was not secured from Kurdish infiltration.

In other important developments. Islamic State (ISIS) continued its insurgency; notably, ISIS 19 Nov attacked army position in Kirkuk governorate, killing four soldiers. Unidentified assailant 7 Nov killed U.S. aid worker in capital Baghdad; PM Sudani same day formed committee to investigate killing. In Kurdistan region, Kurdish Democratic Party 3 Nov held first party congress in 12 years, which appointed Masrour Barzani, son of party leader Masoud Barzani, as second deputy president amid waning influence of his cousin Nechirvan Barzani.

Double bombing rocked Jerusalem amid heightened volatility in West Bank, and victory of far-right coalition could bring even more destabilising policies in near future.

Deadly bombings struck Jerusalem as Israeli and Palestinian violence continued in West Bank. In first such attack since 2016, unclaimed bombings at two bus stops in Jerusalem during rush hour 23 Nov killed one Israeli teenager and wounded at least 18, and raised prospect of further attacks. In West Bank, near-daily clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinians continued, as Israel conducted over 170 raids in West Bank and killed at least 18 Palestinians, bringing deaths in 2022 to at least 205. Palestinians killed several Israelis; notably, 15 Nov killed three in Ariel settlement. In incident that may portend greater state-sanctioned settler violence, 30,000 Israeli settlers 19 Nov entered Hebron where hundreds vandalised Palestinian properties and attacked Palestinians. Shin Bet head mid-month reportedly warned of imminent collapse of Palestinian Authority. Meanwhile, in first launches since Aug ceasefire, Gaza-based militants 3 Nov fired rockets into Israel; Israeli aircraft next day struck alleged Hamas rocket-making facility in Gaza.

Right-wing coalition led by former PM Netanyahu won Israeli elections. In 1 Nov Israeli elections, voters elected most right-wing parliament in Israel’s history, as former PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc won 64 of 120 Knesset seats with 14 going to ultra-conservative, anti-Arab Religious Zionist alliance. President Herzog 13 Nov tasked Netanyahu with forming govt, which may give far-right members control of police and army; possible policies such as encouraging formation of Jewish militias could ignite violence in mixed Arab-Jewish cities and occupied territories, while potential visit by far-right leader to Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade could dramatically inflame tensions.

In other important developments. In East Jerusalem, Israeli authorities confiscated or demolished around dozen Palestinian-owned buildings. UN decolonization committee 11 Nov adopted Palestinian-drafted resolution requesting International Court of Justice to provide legal opinion on Israel’s occupation. Defence minister 14 Nov revealed U.S. Justice Dept opened investigation into killing of U.S.-Palestinian journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. Syrian state media reported Israeli strikes 13, 19 Nov killed six Syrian soldiers (see Syria).

Country entered presidential vacuum, which may persist indefinitely so long as political blocs fail to find compromise, while absence of new govt further impaired efforts to address economic crisis.

Country entered presidential vacuum, which could extend for months or years. Parliamentary blocs made no tangible progress on appointing replacement for outgoing President Michel Aoun, whose six-year term ended on 31 Oct. House Speaker Nabih Berri convened parliamentary voting sessions on 10, 17 and 24 Nov, but none made progress; Michel Moawad favoured by anti-Hizbollah camp in his best showing 10 Nov received 44 votes in first round, short of 86 required for outright first-round win, as pro-Hizbollah alliance continued to return blank votes and refrained from offering alternative candidate amid lack of agreement within bloc.

Presidential vacuum boded ill for forming empowered govt. Prospects of forming new govt without president’s election remained exceedingly dim, as politicians generally accept that caretaker govt exercising presidential prerogatives cannot approve new cabinet. Further weakening current caretaker administration, PM Mikati had late Oct announced that he will convene cabinet only “for urgent matters” during vacuum. Constant debates over presidential choices and constitutionality of govt activity could absorb most of political leadership’ already minimal policymaking capacity, allowing economic crisis to deepen.

State budget entered into force amid concern over worsening economic crisis. Country’s 2022 state budget 15 Nov came into effect, one of several International Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements to unlock potential financial aid package. Notably, budget ended long-defunct official exchange rate of 1,507.5 Lebanese pounds to $1 and adopted significantly higher exchange rates for customs (15,000 pounds for $1); ten-fold increase in customs fees could fuel another bout of inflation, thereby reducing purchasing power and increasing poverty amid soaring energy prices at onset of winter; measure also raised concern that projected state revenue will be less than anticipated. World Food Programme 22 Nov announced it had earmarked $5.4bn in food assistance for next three years, noting food prices are 16 times higher than Oct 2019, when Lebanon’s economic crisis became widely apparent.

Tensions between Tripoli-based institutions reached new heights as country remained divided into two rival govts with no political solution in sight.

Rival institutions remained at odds on means to resolve political crisis. Tripoli-based advisory High Council of State (HCS) Chair Khalid al-Meshri 14 Nov accused militiamen affiliated with Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba of “besieging” HCS headquarters; said HCS had convened session to follow up on tentative agreement with eastern-based legislature House of Representatives (HoR) to work toward forming new unity govt. Dabaiba, who is opposed to HoR-HSC negotiations, immediately denounced “incitement and exaggeration”, saying only “a few” protesters had gathered outside HCS building, accused Meshri of making secret “power-sharing” deals to delay elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh same day condemned “threats and intimidation by armed groups using force” against HCS. Dabaiba 29 Nov reportedly accused Meshri and Saleh of “systematically obstructing elections”. East-based military commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar around 22 Nov weighed in on political crisis, saying “time has come for the Libyan people to put an end to failed experiments and dead ends”, accusing politicians of “worshipping their seats of power”.

Greek FM’s refusal to meet Tripoli-based govt minister sparked diplomatic spat. After Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity (GNU) in Oct signed deal with Türkyie on oil and gas exploration in areas of Mediterranean contested by Athens, Greek FM Nikos Dendias 17 Nov canceled Tripoli visit upon landing to avoid being welcomed by his Libyan counterpart, FM Najla al-Mangoush; Dendias claimed he had come to meet Tripoli-based Presidential Council head Mohamed al-Menfi. GNU subsequently recalled its ambassador from Athens and summoned Greek chargé d’affaires in Tripoli.

In other important developments. In his briefing to UN Security Council, UN sec-gen’s special representative for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, 15 Nov renewed call for legislative and presidential elections but did not articulate how he planned to address sources of friction over electoral roadmap. International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan early Nov met with Haftar during first ever visit to Libya, 9 Nov told UN Security Council he expects latter to cooperate with ICC investigations into alleged crimes committed by Haftar’s Libyan National Army.

Tensions surfaced with Iran as Riyadh anticipated potential attacks, while govt and Huthis held back-channel talks.

Riyadh warned of imminent Iranian attacks. Media reports 1 Nov reported that U.S. officials had said Saudi Arabia shared intelligence suggesting imminent Iranian attack on kingdom and Iraq’s Kurdistan region, prompting Saudi and U.S. militaries to go on high alert; Iran’s foreign ministry next day said claims were “baseless”. Iranian intelligence minister 9 Nov warned Tehran’s “strategic patience” could run out and threatened “glass palaces will crumble” if Iran decides to retaliate. U.S. 11 Nov announced two B-52H bombers flew over region to demonstrate “commitment to regional security”, as Israel said two of its fighter jets accompanied bombers on exercise.

Govt held back-channel talks with Huthis, amid sign of improved intra-Gulf ties. Govt and Huthis held back-channel talks following Yemen truce’s expiry in Oct and amid Huthi attacks and threats of escalation (see Yemen). FIFA World Cup in Qatar 20 Nov commenced; alongside other Gulf leaders, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman attended opening ceremony, in sign of slow but steady intra-Gulf reconciliation process after Al-Ula agreement officially ended intra-Gulf rift in Jan 2021. Meanwhile, U.S. govt 17 Nov spoke out in support of Crown Prince and PM Mohammed bin Salman’s claim to sovereign immunity in lawsuit over murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.

Türkiye intensified attacks against Kurdish-led forces after deadly Istanbul bombing, threatening ground offensive in north that could trigger displacement and fuel escalatory cycle of violence.

Türkiye stepped up strikes against Kurdish-led forces, threatening ground incursion. Following 13 Nov bombing in Turkish city Istanbul that killed six, which Türkiye blamed on Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Protection Units (YPG), Turkish forces 20 Nov launched “Operation Claw-Sword” in northern Syria and Iraq (see Türkiye); Turkish defence ministry claimed strikes targeting Kobani and Tal Rifat in Aleppo province, Cizire and Derik in Hasakah province and northern Iraq 20-21 Nov killed 184 militants. Turkish President Erdoğan from 21 Nov repeatedly signalled possible ground invasion into north as Ankara reportedly negotiated with Russia on possible offensive west of Euphrates River; potential ground operation in coming weeks – fourth since 2016 – would risk large-scale displacement, civilian casualties and escalatory cycle of violence with YPG. U.S. 23 Nov said Turkish strikes in Syria threatened safety of U.S. personnel and progress of anti-Islamic State (ISIS) operations. Meanwhile, retaliatory cross-border attacks into Türkiye increased: notably; rocket attack 21 Nov killed three civilians in Gaziantep province.

Russia continued strikes in Idlib, while Israel attacked regime bases. Russian aircraft 6 Nov bombed IDP camps near Idilb city, reportedly killing at least nine civilians and injuring over 70. Syrian military claimed Israeli missiles 13 Nov hit Shayrat air base in Homs province, killing two servicemen; Syrian state media reported Israeli airstrikes 19 Nov killed four soldiers and injured one in military bases in central and western Syria.

Deadly unclaimed attacks continued. Unidentified drone strike 8 Nov targeted militia convoy, reportedly killing at least 14, including suspected Iranian nationals, in Deir Ez-Zor province. Explosion near capital Damascus 21 Nov killed two, including Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps colonel. Rocket attack 22 Nov reportedly killed five civilians in Aleppo province’s Azaz city, controlled by Türkiye-backed groups.

In other important developments. Beheaded bodies of two teenage Egyptian girls were found in al-Hol camp in north east 15 Nov. Erdoğan 17 Nov raised prospect of normalising relations with Damascus following Turkish elections in 2023.

Despite opposition boycott and amid shrinking space for dissent, authorities proceeded apace with plans to hold legislative elections in December.

Electoral process went on despite opposition boycott. Electoral commission 3 Nov announced 1,058 candidates, including 936 men and 122 women, cleared to run in legislative elections set for 17 Dec, with seven constituencies lacking any candidates. Electoral campaign launched 25 Nov.

Authorities continued to use court and other means to stifle dissent. Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party leader Rached Ghannouchi 10 Nov appeared before court in Sousse city as part of investigation into money-laundering and incitement to violence; anti-terror judge in capital Tunis 28 Nov questioned him for second time over terrorism allegations. After Business News media outlet 10 Nov published article critical of PM Najla Bouden’s track record, Justice Minister Leila Jaffel next day sued Business News chief editor Nizar Bahloul under new decree criminalising spreading “false information and rumours” online. Afek Tounes opposition party leader Fadel Abdel Kefi said police 16 Nov prevented him from leaving country without any judicial warrant; interior ministry official same day said Tunis court had issued judicial decision to prevent Kefi from travelling abroad on unclear basis. In Zarzis town, security forces 18 Nov used tear gas to disperse demonstrators demanding renewed search for 18 Tunisian migrants who went missing in Mediterranean Sea in Sept.

Partners stepped up budget support to Tunisia amid ongoing economic crisis. Notably, European Union 13 Nov granted additional €100mn and France 19 Nov announced €200mn loan. Moves come as International Monetary Fund is expected to greenlight $1.9bn four-year program in Dec.

Lawyers and NGO coalition filed new torture complaints against Morocco and UN Sec-Gen Guterres met with Moroccan King Mohammed VI.

Human rights groups, including International Federation for Human Rights, 8 Nov filed new complaints against Morocco before UN Committee Against Torture demanding release of six Sahrawi prisoners, saying their confessions were obtained under torture. UN Sec-Gen Guterres 23 Nov met in Morocco’s capital Rabat with Moroccan King Mohammed VI on margins of UN Alliance of Civiliza-tions conference; Mohammed VI reaffirmed Morocco’s position that Western Sahara conflict should be settled “within the framework of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the kingdom”.

Back-channel talks between Huthis and Saudi Arabia signalled deal could be reached outside stalled UN process, while Huthis attacked energy infrastructure, raising risks of front-line and regional escalation.

Huthis and Riyadh intensified back-channel negotiations away from UN process. As UN efforts to resurrect truce remained deadlocked, Huthis and Saudi Arabia intensified Oman-facilitated secret talks that excludes Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and UN Special Envoy. Huthis demanded govt use oil and gas revenues to pay civilian and military state employees; while PLC rejected demand, Riyadh reportedly showed willingness to accommodate request provided Huthis enter political process first. Talks raise prospect of bilateral agreement that excludes PLC, which could incentivise anti-Huthi factions to act as spoilers.

Huthis attacked oil and gas infrastructure and redeployed troops on front lines. Huthis 9 Nov launched “warning shot” drone attack on Qana port in Shebwa governorate and ramped up media campaign threatening to target domestic and regional oil and gas facilities; attack disrupted crude oil exports, which is govt’s only source of revenue, and raised spectre of high-profile attack on Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates during World Cup. Huthis 21 Nov attacked al-Dhabba oil terminal for second time. While violence remained below pre-truce levels, tempo of skirmishes along front lines rose steadily, as Huthis sent reinforcements to Marib governorate. Unknown gunmen 8 Nov killed adviser to defence minister and his driver near Marib city. Meanwhile, UN human rights chief 4 Nov said Huthis had committed war crimes since truce’s expiry. U.S. Navy 8 Nov reported-ly intercepted shipment of missile fuel from Iran to Huthis in Gulf of Oman.

Diplomatic efforts continued to reinstate UN-brokered truce. U.S. Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking 2-8 Nov visited Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to meet Saudi, Emirati and govt officials. UN Special Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg 7 Nov concluded visit to Saudi capital Riyadh, where he met Saudi ambassador to Yemen who is reportedly prominently involved in back-channel talks. Meanwhile, PLC leader al-Alimi 2 Nov attended Arab summit in Algerian capital Algiers and urged member states to designate Huthis as terrorist organisation, as PLC had done in Oct.