A year after major police operations in the Central Sulawesi district of Poso, there are grounds for cautious optimism that Muslim-Christian and jihadist violence is a thing of the past. But much remains to be done to ensure that peace is sustained, including resolving underlying grievances relating to justice and accountability, and ensuring effective targeting and oversight of recovery funding.

Serious violence in Poso has had a ten-year history. Between 1998 and 2001, it had been the scene of Christian-Muslim fighting. After 2001 and a government-brokered peace pact, the violence became one-sided, with local extremists, many of them linked to and directed by the extremist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), mounting attacks on Christians, local officials and suspected informants. The 11 and 22 January 2007 operations were the culmination of almost a year’s unsuccessful effort by the police to persuade those responsible for criminal acts to turn themselves in. Fourteen militants and one policeman died in the process, but Poso is quieter and safer, by all accounts, than it has been in years. As a result of the January operations:

• almost all the JI religious teachers from Java have fled the area;
   
• the perpetrators of all the jihadi crimes committed since the 2001 Malino peace accord have been identified, and most have been arrested, tried and convicted, without any backlash;
   
• the JI administrative unit (wakalah) in Poso appears to have been destroyed, at least temporarily;
   
• a major vocational training program is underway aimed at ensuring that would-be extremists have career opportunities that will keep them out of trouble;
   
• the central government has made new funding available, including for improving education in the hope of diluting the influence of radical teaching; and
   
• no serious violence has taken place in Poso in twelve months.

Despite remaining questions about whether the death toll was needlessly high, the operations have to be seen as a net gain for peace. But many problems remain, and the question is how to ensure that peace will be sustainable. Underlying grievances, particularly relating to justice and accountability, have not been fully resolved. Oversight of the new funding is poor, there are many allegations of corruption, and there are problems in ensuring equity among different groups of recipients. The problems with cash handouts to conflict victims mirror the difficulties that Aceh has faced with reintegration funding. Public distrust of the police remains high, particularly among non-governmental organisations (NGOs), hampering the prospects of community-based security.

The government at all levels – national, provincial and district – needs urgently to institute strict auditing measures and increase transparency about how and to whom funds are being disbursed. Police and NGOs need to find ways to end their cold war. And donors need to ensure that a useful vocational training program for released prisoners and young men deemed potential troublemakers can be evaluated and continued.

Jakarta/Brussels, 22 January 2008