Nine years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has reached another crossroads. The transition period defined by the Arusha Accords will be concluded in less than a year by a constitutional referendum and by multi-party elections which should symbolize the successful democratisation of the country. Today, however, there are multiple restrictions on political and civil liberty and no sign of any guarantee, or even indication, in the outline of the constitutional plan that the political opposition will be able to participate in these elections on an equal footing with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), in power since 1994.

Control over the activities of political parties was until now partly justified by the fragile security situation that Rwanda has experienced since 1994, during which it has been in a state of almost permanent war with the Hutu heirs of the Habyarimana regime on the DRC territory. The constant political and military support provided to the Rwandan Hutu militia by the successive Kabila regimes since 1998, has maintained a continuing security threat to the country. The restrictions on political participation can also be explained by the RPF’s distrust of multi-party politics and unrestricted electoral competition, inspired directly by the experience of the country’s political disintegration in the early 1990s leading into the genocide.

Faced with the risk of electoral competition based exclusively on ethnic lines, the RPF wants first and foremost to restructure Rwandan political culture through popular education and the increased accountability of political leaders. The Rwandan leadership argues, in effect, that the transformation of existing states of mind is the prerequisite for the restoration of full civil and political rights. Thus, for the past three years, the political parties have either been dismantled or forced to accept the consensus imposed by the RPF, the independent press has been silenced, and civil society forced to exist between repression and coercion. The RPF wields almost exclusive military, political and economic control and tolerates no criticism or challenge to its authority. The opposition has been forced into exile, and anti-establishment speeches relegated to secrecy. In the name of unity and national reconciliation, the various segments of Rwandan society are subjected to a paternalistic and authoritarian doctrine and cannot express themselves freely.

But the RPF should recognise that its authoritarian actions, whatever their motivation, has worked against its own stated objectives and is creating its own opposition. The government’s repression of critical voices creates a vicious circle by radicalizing the opposition both inside and outside Rwanda. A blood pact, or “Igihango”, has even been sealed between certain heirs of the “Hutu power” and survivors of the genocide. This kind of alliance lends a dangerous legitimacy to an armed Hutu opposition whose position regarding the genocide remains ambiguous. Given the unstable regional dynamics, the rise to power by the opposition forces and the propagation of genocide denial pose a serious threat to the stability of the country, particularly at a time when the Rwandan government is preparing to liberate tens of thousands of prisoners through gacaca courts and to repatriate and demobilise a large part of its army and rebel combatants.

The Rwandan government has honoured its commitments to the Congolese peace process and has withdrawn its troops from the Kivus. It should now display the same goodwill for the end of the transition. The RPF must allow public criticism and stop being judge and jury, as well as participant, in the process of political competition. A neutral institution, such as an ombudsman’s office – equipped with political, administrative, and financial independence – must be allowed to establish equitable standards for political competition and to define the limits of freedom of expression and association, in order to avoid abuse bound to lead to ethnic tensions.

ICG does not argue that all surveillance and all restraint should be removed from party, media and civil society activities. The external security situation, and the fragility of the internal reconciliation process, make continuing caution appropriate. But the regulation of political parties should be seen to be above partisan manipulation, with standards imposed not by the RPF but a wholly independent authority. The government must give Rwandan society the chance to regulate itself, to assume its own responsibilities towards the genocide and to create the foundations for general reconciliation, and not seek to impose every element of that process. It must not destroy the institutions of common ground where Hutus and Tutsis can meet, talk, argue and ultimately agree on the future of the country. It must reach out to the opposition in exile and offer it participation in a national debate on the country's future.

The year to come will be a crucial one for the credibility of Rwandan constitutional reform, electoral deadlines and post-transition institutions. The international community cannot remain silent accomplices to the authoritarian actions of the Rwandan government. It cannot finance elections that offer no political guarantees for a minimum of equity among the forces present. Today, eight months before the end of the transition period, the Rwandan government must bring itself to accept political liberalisation and reform.

Nairobi/Brussels, 13 November 2002