A visitor walks toward the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem's Old City October 19, 2014. REUTERS/Ammar Awad Report 159 / Middle East & North Africa 30 June 2015 The Status of the Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade remains at the epicentre of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With the holy month of Ramadan underway and the Jewish high holidays soon to follow, tensions are likely to increase. Calming the conflict’s symbolic core requires more support for the site’s status quo, including Palestinian participation and encouraging religious dialogue. Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Full Report Also available in עברית עברית English العربية Executive Summary With the Muslim holy month of Ramadan underway and Jewish high holidays soon to follow, tensions have started to rise, if only slightly, at the Holy Esplanade – the Temple Mount (har habayit) to Jews, the Noble Sanctuary (al-haram al-sharif) to Muslims. In mid-2014, it seemed the site might be the epicentre of the next Palestinian uprising, even a broader Jewish-Muslim clash. Israel believes 2015’s relative calm is sustainable, if ministers and Knesset members refrain from pushing, as they did last year, to change the setup. Even if this proves correct during the holiday season, quiet is unlikely to endure. While Jewish Temple activism was crucial in sparking the last round of unrest, the religious salience of and political contestation around the Esplanade, especially among Jews but also Muslims, has been increasing for two decades. This has eroded the status quo arrangement that has mostly kept the peace since Israel captured East Jerusalem in 1967. Any further slippage must be prevented and the status quo braced. Judaism’s holiest site and Islam’s third-most after Mecca and Medina, containing the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque, is a microcosm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It sees repeated violent upsurges that never decisively end, only fade; as a final-status issue in a stalemated peace process, its disposition remains unclear, a situation which Israel has exploited to expand control. Managed by an Israeli-Jordanian condominium, the site exemplifies political exclusion of Palestinians from what they consider their capital and the inability of their fractured national movement to defend it meaningfully. As a location that is both a paramount pillar of Judaism and centrally important in Islam, it invites Arab denial of Jewish history and connection to the Holy Land and Jewish rejection, especially within the religious camps, of Palestinian and Muslim ties. As the iconic national and religious symbol for both sides, it showcases the increasing weight of the Religious Zionist camp in Israel and Islamist voices among Palestinians. Yet, the Esplanade also has its specificities. It is the sole place in the West Bank where Jordan has a formal role and where in Jerusalem Palestinians can organise with relative autonomy. Its sensitivity also amplifies events elsewhere. With memories still fresh of the second intifada, which Ariel Sharon set off by visiting with several hundred security personnel, many believe there is no quicker path to a major conflagration than violence there. It has been a focus of the Israeli right, especially Religious Zionist elements, which came to emphasise it after the 1993 Oslo Accords and Israel’s 2005 Gaza withdrawal. Because it highlights violence potential, the fault lines of both societies and the failures of the diplomatic process, the Esplanade urgently requires attention. This exigency, at the same time, could perhaps offer a hint of how to rejuvenate an exhausted peace process. This may sound counter-intuitive, as the site is one of the toughest final-status issues. In Israel, attachment to it is stronger than ever. On right and left, it beggars belief that in a Jewish state Jews face limitations on religious practice at their holiest site. For decades after 1967, Israel was content to leave in place a status quo under which entry of Jews was on Jordanian sufferance, and non-Muslim prayer was banned. Today, mainstream Religious Zionist authorities even encourage Jewish ascension; despite profound ultra-orthodox disagreement, they have secular allies who believe Israel’s sovereignty and freedom of worship ought not be abridged. For Palestinians, increasing Jewish interest in and presence on the Esplanade portends the too familiar. From desecration of a number of mosques and other holy sites after the 1948 War to division of the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron to allow Jewish worship at the Cave of Machpela, Palestinians progressively have lost control over religious sites and national symbols. Jewish historical and religious sites in East Jerusalem have become foci of Israeli control, attracting a Jewish presence that securitises Arab surroundings and embitters residents. Many Palestinians believe their last stand is at Al-Aqsa, in a city already lost. With deteriorating coordination and competing interpretations of the status quo that leave stakeholders to protect interests by precipitating crises – by stones, security forces or diplomacy – the status quo conceived in June 1967 may seem obsolete but remains the only consensus about the Esplanade. To shore up the site’s stability, it must be shored up. This involves: Access. The presence of religious Jews on the Esplanade became contentious only once Muslim access was greatly reduced. Access for all communities is the best way to ensure access for each. Prayer. There should be no unilateral change in the prayer regime, the most explosive element of the status quo, so until Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians can agree on change, there should be no non-Muslim, including Jewish, prayer. Archaeology, Public Works. Leaders on both sides should denounce the obsolete, dangerous claims made by their own publics: in Israel, that Jordanian maintenance work performed by an Islamic endowment that administers holy places is destroying Jewish artefacts; and among Palestinians and Jordanians and Arabs in general, that Israel is plotting to destroy Al-Aqsa Mosque. Palestinian Participation. The status quo is an Israeli-Jordanian understanding that excludes Palestinians. The Jordanian body thus lacks credibility in East Jerusalem. Though formal Palestinian Authority (PA) participation would not be acceptable to Israel, a consultative entity of prominent Palestinian figures in Jerusalem could give it a degree of authority that could help stabilise the city. A bolder vision would see the site as a jumping off point to reimagine what is needed to reach peace. This requires including marginalised groups and excluded issues, such as Israel’s religious Zionists, Palestinian refugees, East Jerusalemites and Arab citizens of Israel. The Holy Esplanade is a venue for including the conflict’s religious and narrative dimensions, whose importance has grown. Religious dialogue, within each society and faith and if and when possible between them, is vital for resolving the conflict, but also for managing the site in the interim. Any deal, especially regarding the Esplanade, will be hard to forge or sustain without religious leaders’ support. But with the high potential for violence, there is reason to start with basics, ensuring a stable environment so building blocks of a new process can be laid. With the peace process defunct, Israel’s government willing to live without one, a major Gaza escalation always possible, the Palestinian national movement in shambles and a world distracted by a region aflame, calming the conflict’s symbolic core is important. Jerusalem/Brussels, 30 June 2015 Related Tags Israel/Palestine More for you Q&A / Middle East & North Africa Two Years, Four Elections: The Twists and Turns of Israel’s Political Deadlock Podcast / Middle East & North Africa Trump’s Morocco-Israel Transaction Up Next Statement / Middle East & North Africa Three Pillars for a New U.S. Approach to Peace in Israel-Palestine
Palestinians gather in front of an Israeli bulldozer as they protest against Israel's plan to demolish the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the occupied West Bank on 14 September 2018. REUTERS/Mussa Qawasma. Statement / Middle East & North Africa 15 December 2020 Three Pillars for a New U.S. Approach to Peace in Israel-Palestine Come January 2021, the Biden administration will face the responsibility of mitigating harm caused by President Trump’s destructive policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its challenge will be to undo Trump’s legacy without merely rewinding the tape to the situation that existed prior to his presidency. Share Facebook Twitter Email Save Print Download PDF Full Report (en) This publication is part of a joint initiative between the International Crisis Group and the United States/Middle East Project (USMEP) to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unlikely to be a priority for the new U.S. administration, but the conflict’s trajectory and its implications for U.S. interests should nonetheless concern U.S. policymakers. The new administration should learn the lessons of the past: it should be both ambitious in terms of seeking to change the terms of debate and modest with regard to the possibility of ending the conflict anytime soon. Over the years, U.S. policies have had the unfortunate – at times unintended – effect of facilitating entrenchment of Israeli control over Palestinians. The unintentional became clearly purposeful under the Trump administration, which has encouraged settlement construction and released a “Peace for Prosperity Plan” that tilted decisively in favour of Israel’s continued occupation. U.S. engagement should at a minimum aim to mitigate the fundamental asymmetry of power between Israel and the Palestinians; instead, it too often has done the opposite, and the Trump White House did that to an extreme. What is needed today is not a Nobel Prize-grabbing reach for a final peace deal but rather patiently putting in place those building blocks that are required to steer future generations of Israelis and Palestinians to a more peaceful and just future. Those building blocks include: an Israeli public that understands the consequences of permanent occupation and that the only way to avoid those consequences is to engage Palestinians both individually as equals and as a collective with aspirations to national self-determination; a coherent Palestinian polity with a leadership that can effectively chart a path forward and challenge the status quo by non-violent means and in ways consistent with international law; and a reversal of on-the-ground, legal and political trends that have savaged the diplomatic landscape and failed to ensure Palestinians their most basic human rights. Focus on these building blocks would help change the lens through which the conflict has tended to be viewed in Washington, away from an emphasis on pursuit of a process for the sake of a process, and toward establishing conditions for meaningful talks while protecting those whose rights are being violated in the area stretching between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The incoming administration almost certainly will make clear that a two-state solution is its preferred political framework, along the lines of the international consensus reflected in Secretary of State John Kerry’s 28 December 2016 speech. In this context, the U.S. should also make clear that in the event Israel continues to obstruct the establishment of a fully sovereign and viable Palestinian state, any alternative will have to respect the right to full equality and enfranchisement of all those in any space controlled by Israel. Accordingly, the point of departure for a new Israel-Palestine policy should rest on the following three pillars: Mitigate the damage of the Trump legacy and replace an emphasis on perpetuating the peace process with one centred around protecting the rights and well-being of people on the ground. The Trump administration’s multiple decisions – including recognising Jerusalem as Israel’s capital; cutting assistance to the Palestinians; shutting down both the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem and the Palestine Liberation Organization mission in Washington; and effectively endorsing the legality of Israeli settlement activity – have seriously damaged prospects for a fair resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and depleted the reserves of U.S. credibility. Undoing key Trump policies should be a priority, but it ought not to be tantamount to reverting to the status quo ante, when saving the peace process – as opposed to achieving peace or setting conditions for it – too often became a goal in itself. The result was to implicitly give cover to Israeli actions, particularly the construction and consolidation of settlements. Instead, the U.S. should prioritise halting creeping annexation and protecting Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza, where the blockade has precipitated a humanitarian emergency and threatens an escalation at any moment. Specifically, the new administration should: Unequivocally disavow the Trump plan of January 2020, issuing a clear statement that the plan does not represent U.S. policy; Focus on policies aimed at protecting the rights of Palestinians and Israelis. While the U.S. has historically affirmed and sought to safeguard the rights of Israelis to live in safety and security, it has been far less attentive to those of Palestinians to be free from violence, restrictions on freedom of movement, home demolitions, prolonged administrative detention and forced dispossession; Reaffirm that Israeli settlements are illegal, and that the U.S. will not recognise Israel’s annexation of any part of the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem; Reassert and strengthen differentiation between Israel and the Occupied Territories in all U.S. dealings, including reimposing geographical restrictions on the Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation, U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation and U.S.-Israel Agricultural Research and Development Fund, thereby not granting funding to Israeli research and development projects in the Occupied Territories; Clarify that, in opposing Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaigns toward Israel, the U.S. does not consider BDS to be, prima facie, anti-Semitic and will guarantee free speech rights; Re-engage with the PLO leadership and allow the PLO to reopen its mission in Washington; Reestablish the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem separate from the U.S. Embassy to Israel, actively support reopening Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem and affirm the U.S. intention to open an embassy to Palestine in East Jerusalem; Focus efforts on ending the blockade on Gaza and bringing security to those living in southern Israel and Gaza by advancing durable ceasefire arrangements between armed factions operating in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli government; Press Israel not to threaten Palestinian communities in Area C with further displacement, land expropriation and restrictions on movement, infrastructure development, construction and access to agricultural lands; Work to remove Israeli obstacles to Palestinian private sector development; and Restart funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency, which looks after Palestinian refugees until such time as their rights are fulfilled. Desist from actions that enable and empower Israeli policies seeking to prevent any peace deal or Palestinian state, including emboldening political actors who are looking to achieve the unacceptable outcome of a single, Jewish undemocratic state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. The U.S. should have an interest in encouraging conditions most conducive to a shift in Israeli policy toward the pursuit of a viable peace and an end to occupation.Even prior to the Trump administration, U.S. policy too often made it too easy for Israelis to assume that occupation can be permanently cost-free and hard choices can be avoided. In that spirit, the new administration should: Refrain from using its veto in the UN Security Council when doing so would undermine international law or be at odds with U.S. policy; Work with the EU, its member states and other third parties, including in international forums, to advance the above objectives. The U.S. should cease to obstruct efforts by multilateral bodies and third parties to differentiate between Israel and the Occupied Territories, including with regard to the updating of the UN Human Rights Council database of business enterprises involved in settlements; Avoid entering into negotiations with Israel over so-called acceptable settlement expansion; Ensure greater transparency, end-use monitoring and accountability regarding security assistance to Israel, so that Israel can be held to standard U.S. human rights and other benchmarks for aid recipients. Help facilitate and encourage the Palestinians to undertake their own political renewal, embrace democratic and accountable politics, advance internal reconciliation and give breathing space to non-violent strategies for achieving their goals. The Palestinian leadership is far from blameless – its security services mistreat their people, its national bodies are neither representative of, nor accountable to their public, and it has failed to pursue a coherent, effective approach. It has contributed to a situation in which Palestinians are divided and lack a credible strategy. Accordingly, the new U.S. administration should: Work with international partners to encourage and facilitate Palestinian political renewal, including Palestinian Legislative Council, presidential and Palestinian National Council elections, and in removing Israeli obstacles to the participation of Palestinian East Jerusalem residents in such elections; Support and promote internal Palestinian political reconciliation, conditioning U.S. engagement with a unity Palestinian government on its commitment to non-violence; Work with third parties to advance reforms to Palestinian governance, ensuring greater transparency and accountability in its finances. It should also work with the Palestinians to seek reforms in the financial assistance the Palestinian Authority provides to families of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, so that such assistance is linked to their, or their families’, level of financial distress. There are other elements, of course. President-elect Biden welcomed normalisation deals between Israel and several Arab countries and his administration can be expected to pursue more. But in doing so, it should ensure such deals contribute to, rather than detract from, the well-being of Palestinians and resolution of the conflict, and more broadly advance regional de-escalation and peace. Too, a Biden administration should embrace a multilateral approach to the conflict, coordinating with Europe and actively reintegrating Jordan into its efforts. The broader point is this: the Biden administration could be tempted to limit its engagement on Israel-Palestine to mitigating the Trump administration’s damage and restarting negotiations. That would be understandable but ineffective. The likely outcome of such an approach would be consolidated Israeli control over Palestinian territories, further Palestinian fragmentation, and rising frustration and despair. To steer the parties back to a place where a forceful diplomatic push might be productive, the Biden administration would be better advised to pursue a policy that is faithful to its stated commitment to international norms, respect for human rights, multilateralism and diplomacy. Related Tags From Early Warning to Early Action Israel/Palestine United States