Georgia’s political crisis, which climaxed in the forced resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze on 23 November 2003, is not over yet and could still lead to violence and the country’s disintegration. Georgia, in other words, is still pre-conflict, not post- conflict, and exceptional international action is required to contain the potential for chaos. Washington, which quietly supported what U.S. media called the “Rose Revolution”, has promised aid for organisation of the presidential election on 4 January 2004, as has the European Union; other donors should follow suit, and the international community should maintain this support through the equally important and potentially more contentious legislative elections in the spring.

The immediate cause of the crisis was the massive rigging of the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections, which caused a deep reservoir of broad popular discontent to bubble over. The electoral abuse took place despite concerted international pressure on the Shevardnadze government to observe democratic standards. While significant progress was made in electoral laws, they were simply not implemented on the ground. Some parties accepted the government-declared results, but others, led by outgoing speaker of parliament Nino Burjanadze and opposition party chieftains Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania, refused and launched street protests that demanded official recognition of their victory.

In less than a week, these protests were transformed into a revolt. President Shevardnadze, who had displayed supreme self-assurance until the opening of parliament on 22 November, was overnight forced to resign: the crowd occupied his office, the security forces did not intervene, and Washington, and especially Moscow (with a flying visit by Foreign Minister Ivanov), played an important part in concentrating his mind. The Supreme Court invalidated the fraudulent election, thus keeping the old parliament alive. Now that the regime has collapsed, Georgia has to find a way through a risky transition period, in which the interim president, Burjanadze, and the full term president to be elected in January must work with that body until new legislative elections can take place.

In the next days, finding temporary compromises with the former ruling elite will be a top priority for the new authorities, in order to ensure state continuity. Any deep purge in the administration at this stage should be avoided. The viability of the state is at stake. Georgia, which already lost the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, apparently permanently, in the early independence years, is now in danger of losing the autonomous region of Ajara. Negotiations and compromise with these regions are essential, as is a Western effort to persuade Russia to cooperate constructively in supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity – not Moscow’s highest priority in the past.

The next challenge for the interim leadership is to ensure that the coming presidential and parliamentary elections are free and fair. For that to happen, it will need strong support from the international community. Donors should cooperate with the Georgians to set up an Emergency Elections Task Force (EETF), under the aegis of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to supervise those elections, especially the parliamentary vote, which is likely to be the occasion when all political forces will be most tempted to pull out every stop to ensure their position in the new constellation. All external powers should be involved, including the Russian Federation.

Georgia needs a strong and genuinely popular government to deal with the country’s difficult economic and social situation and to re-establish its territorial integrity. A stable Georgia is in the interests of all, including Russia and other neighbours, and the EU and the U.S. The opportunity now on offer must not be missed.

Tbilisi/Brussels, 3 December 2003