Заявление по ситуации вокруг Сирии
Заявление по ситуации вокруг Сирии
A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West
A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West

Заявление по ситуации вокруг Сирии

При условии, что Конгресс США одобрит предложение администрации, Вашингтон (вместе с рядом союзников) вскоре нанесет военные удары по объектам сирийского режима. Если это произойдет, действия правительства США во многом пойдут вразрез с интересами сирийского народа. Администрация ссылается на необходимость покарать режим за применение химического оружия, а также предотвратить подобные инциденты в будущем. Это оправданная цель, хотя с начала конфликта сирийцы уже столкнулись с массовыми злодеяниями, приведшими к значительно большему количеству жертв, которые, тем не менее, не повлекли за собой каких-либо масштабных коллективных действий в их защиту.

Администрация также говорит о том, что Вашингтон должен поддерживать свой авторитет и быть последовательным, поскольку президент Обама предупреждал о категорической неприемлемости использования химического оружия — и это тоже понятная цель, которая, тем не менее, вряд ли найдет большой отклик в сердцах сирийцев. И все же главным приоритетом должны быть не разговоры о произволе, сдерживании и возрождении авторитета США, а благополучие сирийского народа. Между тем, независимо от того, вмешается ли армия США, такое благополучие невозможно без долговременного прекращения огня и политических изменений, которые поддержала бы большая часть общества.

Попытки заранее оценить эффект от военного удара США, независимо от его масштабов и предполагаемой точности, по определению обречены на провал. Применительно к конфликту, перешедшему в кровопролитную, хотя и ставшую привычной фазу, и к региону, состояние которого приближается к критической черте, военное вмешательство неизбежно внесет еще один значительный элемент неопределенности. Почти не вызывает сомнений тот факт, что его последствия будут непредсказуемыми. Тем не менее, есть ряд соображений относительно того, к чему оно может привести и чего не достигнет:

  • Военный удар не будет и не может быть встречен и минимальным международным консенсусом. В этом смысле все попытки предъявить даже самые надежные доказательства того, что режим применил химическое оружие, — при всей их необходимости — будут тщетны. Какие бы подтверждения ни приводили США, их в любом случае окажется недостаточно, чтобы убедить скептиков и рассеять все сомнения с учетом истории вторжения в Ирак в 2003 году под ложным предлогом и возникшей с тех пор региональной и международной поляризации вкупе с динамикой самого сирийского конфликта.
     
  • Удар может стать фактором, сдерживающим дальнейшее применение химического оружия, подать сигнал о том, что в случае рецидива нарушителя ждет еще более жестокое наказание, и это само по себе было бы большим достижением. Однако если режим окажется в ситуации борьбы за выживание, эти аргументы перестанут быть вескими. Кроме того, часть оппозиции может не устоять перед искушением применить подобное оружие, а затем возложить ответственность на режим — именно для того чтобы спровоцировать дальнейшее вмешательство США.
     
  • Он может спровоцировать эскалацию насилия в Сирии: режим начнет мстить повстанцам и жителям контролируемых ими районов, а оппозиция — пользоваться случаем для достижения собственных целей.
     
  • Крупномасштабная региональная или международная эскалация (акции возмездия со стороны режима, Ирана или «Хезболлы», преимущественно в адрес Израиля) возможна, но маловероятна с учетом имеющихся рисков, хотя это будет зависеть от масштаба военного вмешательства.
     
  • Военные действия, которые, как утверждают США, не будут иметь целью свержение режима, возможно, не окажут длительного влияния на расстановку сил на местах. Режим же одержит пропагандистскую победу, заявляя, что устоял против США, и продолжая настраивать общественное мнение внутри страны и в регионе против запада и империализма.

В конечном итоге принципиальный вопрос о возможном военном ударе заключается в том, получится ли после него вернуться к дипломатическим усилиям по разрешению конфликта. По мнению хорошо информированных источников, не получится: вряд ли режим и его союзники захотят садиться за стол переговоров с США после вторжения, которое они считают незаконным и нелегитимным. В теории хорошо было бы тщательно рассчитать удар таким образом, чтобы заставить режим переоценить ситуацию, при этом, не подтолкнув его к акциям возмездия и не создав препятствий для дипломатов. На практике такое почти невозможно.

Независимо от того, станут ли США наносить военный удар, им, прежде всего, нужно стремиться к тому, чтобы повысить шансы на дипломатический успех. Для этого вместо усугубления затянувшегося конфликта, возможность эскалации которого, похоже, безгранична, требуются усилия по двум направлениям, которые не прикладывались до сих пор: разработка реалистичного компромиссного политического предложения, а также содержательные переговоры с Россией и Ираном, чтобы понять, в чем заключаются их интересы.

С этой точки зрения, США должны представить — а союзники Сирии должны серьезно и конструктивно рассмотреть — предложение, состоящее из следующих элементов:

  • Необходимо прекратить войну. Никто не заинтересован в эскалации конфликта, нестабильности региона и втягивании других стран, которые неизбежны в случае ее продолжения
     
  • Есть только один выход из ситуации — политический. Для этого потребуются серьезные уступки и снижение требований всех сторон. Единственно возможное долгосрочное решение — компромисс, который обеспечит учет интересов всех граждан Сирии и, скорее, отразит, а не поменяет стратегический баланс сил в регионе.
     
  • Сирийский кризис предоставляет важную возможность проверить, насколько США и Исламская Республика Иран способны совместно разрешать региональные проблемы с целью восстановления стабильности.
     
  • Устойчивое политическое разрешение ситуации в Сирии не может заключаться в том, что нынешнее руководство страны бессрочно останется у власти. Однако в остальном США могут проявлять гибкость касательно сроков и конкретных условий.
     
  • США больше всего хотели бы избежать коллапса сирийского государства и политического вакуума, к которому он приведет. Поэтому необходимо выстраивать переход власти на основе имеющихся институтов, а не заменять их. Прежде всего, это касается армии.
     
  • Главная задача — сделать так, чтобы ни одна часть сирийского общества не стала объектом возмездия, дискриминации или маргинализации в контексте достигнутого соглашения.

За таким предложением должны последовать новые усилия со стороны спецпредставителя ООН и Лиги арабских государств Лахдара Брахими и скорейший созыв конференции «Женева-2».

Обсуждение возможного удара, его целесообразности, желательного масштаба, правомерности в отсутствие санкции Совета Безопасности ООН заслонило то, что действительно должно быть в центре внимания международной общественности: как вернуться к активному поиску путей политического урегулирования. Оставив в стороне вопросы правомерности, всякое военное вмешательство необходимо рассматривать с позиции того, насколько оно приблизит или, наоборот, отдалит достижение этой цели.

Брюссель

Workers carry boxes of humanitarian aid near Bab al-Hawa crossing at the Syrian-Turkish border, in Idlib governorate, Syria, June 30, 2021. Picture taken June 30, 2021. REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano

A Vital Humanitarian Mandate for Syria’s North West

The UN Security Council is considering renewing an understanding whereby UN agencies transport aid to Idlib, an area held by Syrian rebels. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Richard Gowan, Dareen Khalifa and Ashish Pradhan explain why the arrangement remains essential.

What is at stake in the Security Council?

The UN Security Council is set to vote soon on the renewal of a mandate that allows UN agencies to deliver aid to rebel-held Idlib in north-western Syria via a border crossing with Türkiye without asking for approval from the government in Damascus. The UN calculates that nearly two and a half million people rely on this lifeline for food and other essential supplies. Yet the arrangement is contentious. Since 2019, Russia, the Syrian regime’s ally, has aimed to curtail the mandate, arguing that the UN should work with Damascus on aid deliveries out of respect for Syria’s sovereignty.

In 2021, the U.S. made a concerted effort to convince Moscow to help keep the mandate alive, but it has made no similar push in 2022, as the two powers’ relations have collapsed over Russia’s war in Ukraine. Senior UN officials worry that Russia may veto the mandate – which should be renewed by 10 July – causing a dramatic drop in humanitarian assistance to Idlib and potentially leading to an influx of refugees into Türkiye. What happens with the mandate is a concern for the UN and, more importantly, for the people in Idlib.

The Security Council first authorised the UN to deliver cross-border aid to opposition-controlled areas of Syria without Damascus’s approval in 2014. At first, this mandate covered four crossing points, giving UN agencies access to southern and north-eastern Syria as well as the north west. The Council members’ cooperation on humanitarian issues despite their broader rifts over the war in Syria was a rare bright spot in UN diplomacy. But in rancorous debates in late 2019 and mid-2020, during which Russia and China used their vetoes three times to block resolutions renewing the mandate, Moscow succeeded in limiting the UN’s cross-border operations to a single crossing, at Bab al-Hawa between Türkiye and Idlib. Russia also made clear that the mandate could not be renewed indefinitely.

In 2021, the Biden administration identified maintaining aid to Idlib as an area for better relations with Russia. U.S. officials negotiated over the mandate’s future bilaterally with their Russian counterparts in Vienna and Geneva. While the official U.S. position was that the Council should reauthorise opening all four original crossings – an outcome few UN officials and diplomats thought likely – Russia assented that July only to keeping Bab al-Hawa open. Moscow also demanded that the UN work harder on channelling aid into Idlib from government-held Syrian territory (which is referred to as “cross-line” aid, as opposed to cross-border from Türkiye) and called for greater international funding for “early recovery” projects in government-controlled parts of Syria. Finally, Russia insisted that the UN Secretary-General report on cross-line aid halfway through the mandate period in January 2022, indicating that it might try to block the mandate’s continuation at that point (though it did not act on this threat). Despite these caveats, the Biden administration presented the fact that Russia was willing to keep the mandate alive at all – and the absence of public rows and vetoes at the UN like those in 2019 and 2020 – as proof that the U.S. could do business with the Kremlin.

Security Council members [fret] that Russian and Western diplomats would fail to reach an agreement on the future of aid to Syria.

A year on, that optimism looks like a thing of the past. Since Russia’s assault on Ukraine in February and the sharp deterioration in Moscow’s relations with Western powers, Security Council members have fretted that Russian and Western diplomats would fail to reach an agreement on the future of aid to Syria. As things stand, the mandate’s fate remains unclear with less than a week to go before the deadline for its renewal.

Ireland and Norway, the Security Council’s two elected members acting as “penholders” (diplomatic leads) on the issue, introduced a draft resolution renewing the authorisation for aid deliveries through Bab al-Hawa for twelve months on 27 June. Russia has yet to make a definitive response, and Council members expect that there may be intense wrangling over the text before the vote. The outcome will have a major effect on the lives of civilians in Idlib. It is also a crucial test of how far Russia and the West can continue to work together at the Security Council – however grudgingly – as the war in Ukraine rages and their policies become ever more hostile to one another.

How important is the mandate for Idlib and are there alternatives?

Despite the high level of tension in the Security Council over cross-border aid, this mandate has given the UN essential political backing to guide humanitarian operations in Idlib. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in particular has played a pivotal role in cross-border aid delivery. The Council mandate allowed OCHA to coordinate donor response, lead negotiations with local authorities, and guarantee a significant degree of transparency for aid delivered into these rebel-held areas. OCHA has also helped NGOs involved in relief work navigate the legal and political hurdles of operating in an area under the control of Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militia running most of Idlib. HTS is UN-sanctioned and is listed by Russia, the U.S. and Türkiye as a terrorist organisation.

The UN has additionally led negotiations involving Damascus and the HTS-backed Salvation Government that administers Idlib over the balance between cross-border and cross-line aid operations. The Syrian government and Russia insist that the UN ramp up cross-line assistance as an alternative to channelling aid through Bab al-Hawa, as part of their effort to reinstate Damascus’s influence over aid delivery to all of Syria. UN officials and Western diplomats are sceptical that this proposal is realistic, especially given the Syrian regime’s track record of blocking aid to punish civilians in opposition-held areas and the hostility of its rhetoric toward Idlib and its residents. From a technical point of view, cross-border aid remains the cheapest, quickest and most reliable way to meet Idlib’s needs. A report from the UN Secretary-General in June stated that UN humanitarian monitors counted some 1,686 trucks carrying supplies (four fifths of them bearing food) from Türkiye into Idlib in April and May alone. By contrast, the report noted that the UN had overseen just five cross-line convoys between July 2021 and June 2022, and highlighted one in May that involved just fourteen trucks.

The U.S. and its allies have agreed that the UN should also experiment with cross-line aid ... into Idlib.

Nonetheless, the U.S. and its allies have agreed that the UN should also experiment with cross-line aid, mainly as a political concession to Russia and in hope of retaining Moscow’s acquiescence to cross-border operations. In 2021, the Security Council agreed to “encourage efforts to improve cross-line deliveries of humanitarian assistance” from government-controlled areas into Idlib. Moscow complains that the resolution has not been fully respected, as cross-line deliveries to Idlib have remained irregular, while HTS (and civil society groups in Idlib) as well as many humanitarian agency employees describe these efforts as a sop to the Kremlin rather than serious aid.

This debate has also become highly contentious for local forces in Idlib. HTS and the Salvation Government have reluctantly agreed to some of the cross-line aid deliveries, providing them with security and allowing for safe distribution. Yet HTS has come under fierce criticism from parts of the population and rivals in Syria’s opposition for thus “collaborating” with a regime that has killed thousands and displaced millions of Syrians. In private, HTS members express concern that the cross-line mechanism is a quandary for them: if they cooperate, they are criticised locally; if they don’t, they will be condemned internationally; and in neither situation can cross-line aid address even a fraction of humanitarian needs in Idlib. For the time being, HTS has found it prudent to facilitate the safe passage of several cross-line aid convoys to avoid giving Moscow a pretext to put a halt to the UN’s cross-border mandate and to strengthen Türkiye’s hand in negotiating with Russia. According to HTS, it would be much harder for them to cooperate on cross-line aid if Moscow were to veto the cross-border mandate’s renewal.

What would a Russian veto mean?

If Russia does veto renewal of the cross-border aid mandate, the immediate fallout could be chaotic. It is not clear whether OCHA would have to abruptly end its Syria operations in Türkiye or whether it could continue to play a minimal coordination function during a transitional phase. Regardless, the absence of OCHA’s irreplaceable aid infrastructure and cross-border mandate would significantly reduce the volume of aid and the efficiency of the donor response. It would also leave NGOs and donors struggling to manage aid coordination and oversight, while reducing their leverage in dealing with authorities in Türkiye and Idlib. UN officials estimate that NGOs could supply at best 30 to 40 per cent of the aid that the UN has been providing. In practice that means hunger will increase, medical cases will go untreated, and millions will be at risk of losing shelter and assistance.

Crisis Group’s interlocutors in Idlib agree that the aid flow’s disruption could lead many of the region’s inhabitants – many of whom fled other parts of Syria earlier in the war – to attempt to escape the area, mostly by trying to enter Türkiye. How Ankara would respond to chaos at the border remains unclear; already in Türkiye the presence of an estimated 3.7 million Syrian refugees is a source of socio-political tension, which is on the rise due to economic troubles and elections due in June 2023. Although living conditions in Idlib have improved considerably since Moscow and Ankara forged a de facto ceasefire in 2020, the population remains anxious about the precarious situation. “Our lives depend on the mood in the Kremlin every few months. This is inhuman and unsustainable”, an Idlib resident said.

What are the chances the mandate will survive?

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s assault on Ukraine, Security Council members generally seemed pessimistic about the chances of renewing the mandate for cross-border aid in conversations with Crisis Group. Now, however, some are guardedly optimistic that Moscow will let it survive. It is mostly a matter of speculation. The Russian mission in New York typically has to wait until late in negotiations on this file to get clear instructions from Moscow on how to act. In negotiations on the draft resolution tabled by Ireland and Norway on 27 June extending the mandate, neither Russian nor Chinese diplomats appeared to have definite guidance from their capitals. Western diplomats hope that Moscow will decide that it will retain greater leverage over events in Idlib by agreeing to renew the mandate – which gives it a platform for pushing the UN to work harder at cross-line aid – rather than forcing a crisis.

Western officials hope that Moscow will [refrain from using its veto] on this occasion.

Although Western and Russian diplomats have had toxic relations at the Security Council over Ukraine, Moscow has refrained from using its veto on other resolutions, such as a new mandate for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, that other countries feared it might block. Western officials hope that Moscow will show similar restraint on this occasion, especially as vetoing the resolution would intensify its tensions with Türkiye (Turkish sources, by contrast, insist that they cannot prevent Russia from using its veto, and argue that Ankara should not be expected to fix this problem on behalf of the U.S. and European nations). China may also help moderate Russia’s calculations. During the 2021 negotiations over the Syrian humanitarian mandate, Chinese diplomats told Western counterparts that they did not want a repeat of the public disputes of 2019 and 2020. In 2022, they have emphasised the need to avoid too many blow-ups in the Security Council while the Russian-Ukrainian war continues.

There are different views regarding what Council negotiations will bring. Some Council members speculate that Russia could make last-minute demands – most likely over cross-line aid and funding for recovery – in the coming days. While the Council is slated to vote on mandate renewal on 7 July, it could push the date back, with negotiations perhaps running past the current mandate’s expiry on 10 July. Equally some UN officials guess that Russia will not create this sort of disruption, meaning that the process may end with a quick vote.

What is the longer-term future of cross-border aid to Syria?

It is clear that the best outcome of current UN diplomacy over Syria would be for the Security Council to renew the mandate for cross-border aid for a year. No credible alternative set of arrangements exists for cross-border aid. If Russia does veto the mandate, the fallout would provoke enormous humanitarian suffering, additional displacement and, potentially, political turmoil in and around Idlib. While Moscow has shown scant regard for the disapproval of other Security Council members over its war on Ukraine, it might be wary of straining its relationship with Ankara – and of creating a new crisis for itself in Syria while it is focused on Ukraine.

Nonetheless, Western members of the Council and UN officials need to ready themselves for an end to the cross-border-mandate, either in July or at a later date. The original Council mandate for cross-border aid to Syria in 2014 was based on the assumption that rebel-controlled enclaves around the country were temporary phenomena, and the mandate as well. For now, it appears more likely that the Syrian conflict is moving into an extended stalemate with no clear military or political resolution on the horizon. Areas of northern Syria where millions of displaced Syrians live might remain outside government control – and in need of significant external aid – for some time to come. There is no guarantee that the Security Council will continue to renew the authorisation for cross-border aid indefinitely.

Donors, the UN and NGOs already have plans for the eventuality that the cross-border arrangements end. One option – even if the mandate is renewed – may be for OCHA to gradually wind down its delivery operations while continuing to play a smaller coordination role and helping build up the capacity of NGOs to supply aid to Idlib in place of UN agencies. In this case, a future Russian veto would do less damage to aid supplies than it would do today. For the time being, however, it is essential that the Security Council renew the mandate for cross-border aid to avoid a fresh humanitarian disaster in north-western Syria.

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