

**COLOMBIA: PRESIDENT URIBE'S
DEMOCRATIC SECURITY POLICY**

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COLOMBIA: PRESIDENT URIBE'S DEMOCRATIC SECURITY POLICY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

More than any of his predecessors, President Alvaro Uribe has made combating the insurgents the overriding priority and defining objective of the Colombian government. Through modest achievements on the ground a sense of public security has begun to be re-established. However, Uribe's "Democratic Security Policy" (DSP), the long-term strategy promised to lend coherence to the security effort, has been stalled for nearly a year by political infighting and fundamental arguments over how best to bring the 40-year conflict to a close. Without some serious modifications, it is doubtful that it will achieve its goal.

Under the DSP, Uribe has sought to regain control of the country by increasing the numbers and capacity of troops and police units and by deploying them across the country to challenge the guerrillas. This has been accompanied by a major increase in the eradication of illicit crops, aimed as much at denying revenues to the guerrillas and paramilitary groups as at reducing coca and opium poppy production. At the same time, the government has bolstered protection of oil and natural gas pipelines to safeguard that source of income and deny funds to the illegal armed groups, who had become accustomed to extorting payoffs by threatening attacks against those facilities.

While strengthening Colombia's formal security structure, Uribe unveiled three other, less formal mechanisms to boost security which have generated widespread controversy. First, he initiated a network of more than one million civilian collaborators and informants who are paid to provide information about the insurgents. This has raised concerns that the collaborators may use their power to pursue personal vendettas and that such a system

undermines community trust. Secondly, he organised a semi-trained peasant militia force whose members operate in their own home communities. Their isolation and generally poor training, however, have left them vulnerable to targeted attacks by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Thirdly, initially through executive decree and subsequently through anti-terrorist and other proposed legislation, Uribe has begun to grant the military a range of police powers, with neither judicial approval nor oversight, limiting individual civil liberties in the process.

These policies create the potential for arbitrary action by the security forces that would diminish the credibility of the government's appeal for international support and regional cooperation and threaten to cloud somewhat the legitimacy of its actions against the illegal armed groups. Sending a message that the security forces would be more successful if less constrained by the state's human rights obligations is dangerous and, as history has often shown, counterproductive.

The bulk of the conflict, including the increased number of clashes resulting from Uribe's more aggressive security policy, has taken place in rural Colombia. The absence of any coherent rural development policy constitutes perhaps the most serious threat to the potential effectiveness of the DSP. Making lasting gains against the insurgents will be difficult, if not impossible, unless rural communities see clear and immediate benefits in the government campaign. A comprehensive policy aimed at reducing poverty in the countryside, investing in social programs, and establishing the rule of law is a necessary complement to the military

components of the DSP; its absence makes the military task more difficult.

The surprising failure of Uribe's referendum on political and economical issues on 25 October 2003 may force a change in the way his government formulates its policies, particularly the DSP. It would certainly be wise, in this context, to launch a rural development initiative that would assist coca farmers, slow the flow of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and provide a reason for the rural population to be more enthusiastic about the DSP.

The government should also keep up the pressure on the paramilitaries, especially those not participating in the present talks, and ensure that any settlement with paramilitaries does not allow serious offenders against human rights to escape prison. Finally, it needs to make clear that, while its goal is to defeat the insurgents, the DSP does not close the door on the possibility of negotiated settlements. In fact, the realistic objective of a modified DSP should be to push the insurgent groups, as well as all paramilitaries, into serious negotiations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Colombia:

1. Amend the Democratic Security Policy (DSP) to incorporate both a strategy to reinforce the judiciary and the rule of law and a high priority development initiative that includes a sustainable land reform program to reduce rural poverty.
2. Revise pending legislation to:
 - (a) End impunity in the paramilitary demobilisation process by incorporating prison sentence provisions in the "near pardon" or "veiled amnesty" bill, particularly for those who have ordered or committed crimes against humanity;
 - (b) Withdraw the legislative proposals to restrict the competence of the constitutional court and the right of citizens to legal protection if their fundamental rights are threatened; and
 - (c) conform the proposed anti-terrorist legislation with Colombia's obligations under international law.

3. Introduce civilian control and Congressional oversight of the informants program and establish the National Defence Council to guarantee effective civilian-military cooperation in security policy.
4. Direct law enforcement units and armed forces commanders to bring to justice as a matter of highest priority those paramilitaries who do not adhere to the ceasefire and who continue to be involved in kidnappings and drug trafficking.
5. Continue to improve the capabilities and professionalism of the armed forces and conduct military operations aimed at denying territorial control and sanctuary to illegal forces.
6. Strengthen fundamental rights by putting an end to arbitrary detentions and house arrests based on evidence "provided by informants".
7. Broaden security cooperation with Colombia's neighbours.
8. Underscore the President's continuing willingness to negotiate settlements if the insurgents and paramilitaries meet the ceasefire conditions and end kidnapping and humanitarian law violations.

To Colombia's Neighbours:

9. Provide the necessary humanitarian and legal assistance and protection to the increasing number of Colombian refugees.
10. Share intelligence and military information with the Colombian military to stem the movement of illegal forces, weapons and drugs across common borders.

To the U.S. and Other Donors:

11. Insist that any security assistance be conditioned on respect for human rights, measures to end impunity, and the severing of remaining linkages between security forces and the paramilitaries.
12. Insist that demobilisation of the paramilitaries and the insurgents adhere to international human rights standards, ensuring that those who were responsible for crimes against humanity neither escape jail nor are permitted to retain land or other assets obtained through murder, intimidation or other illegal action.

13. Provide technical, financial and communication aid to the Colombian government and civil society to design, fund and implement a comprehensive national rural development strategy to reduce rural poverty, which should be the centrepiece of the next international

donors meeting, be implemented incrementally as security conditions permit, and become a model for similar action in other Andean countries.

Bogotá/Brussels, 13 November 2003



COLOMBIA: PRESIDENT URIBE'S DEMOCRATIC SECURITY POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the country's drawn out armed conflict, internal security has not been the highest policy priority of Colombian governments over the last two decades. From 7 August 2002, the day he took office, President Álvaro Uribe changed that.¹ While the Uribe administration has a mixed record on the other pillars of its stated policy agenda - modernising the state apparatus, battling corruption, balancing the budget while reviving economic growth and reducing unemployment - it has made clear that security must come first.² To achieve its objectives, the government devised what it called its "Democratic Defence and Security Policy" (DSP).³

Backed by persistently high domestic approval ratings and strong U.S. support, President Uribe has redefined the nature of the conflict and the strategy to overcome it. The thrust of his security policy has been to provide the state with the capacity to confront illegal armed groups by controlling progressively more territory with more troops and with newly-created special military and police units.

This strategy has been complemented by a sharp jump in the eradication of illicit crops, mostly through aerial spraying, and proposed anti-terrorist and "veiled amnesty" legislation which would grant the military controversial policing powers. The government also agreed to open talks with the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), the country's largest rightwing paramilitary group, despite its only partial adherence to a ceasefire declared in December 2002 and its continued involvement in killings, kidnappings and drug trafficking.⁴ No tangible progress has been made regarding peace talks with the leftwing insurgents.

In spite of the government's focus, there has not yet been an appreciable improvement in the security situation across the country. So far there are no indications that a solution to the armed conflict is at hand - or even close. The president's high domestic approval rating and a sense in parts of the country that things are changing for the better should not obscure the many pitfalls and challenges that lie ahead. Even if Colombia's military is strengthened significantly and other aspects of national security managed well, conditions still point to a long, slow struggle against determined insurgents on the left and paramilitaries on the right.⁵ Uribe's failure to garner

¹ Still under the shock of the failed peace negotiations between the Pastrana administration and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which had lingered on for three years without tangible results while thousands of civilians were killed by the armed groups, an unprecedented majority cast first-round ballots in favour of the "war president". See ICG Latin America Briefing, *The Stakes in the Presidential Election*, Bogotá/Brussels, 22 May 2002 and Uribe's political campaign program "Manifiesto Democrático: 100 puntos".

² ICG interview, Bogotá, 28 August 2003; see also Presidencia de la República, *Informe al Congreso 2003*, Bogotá, 20 July 2003 and Uribe's speech at the UN General Assembly in New York, 30 September 2003.

³ Presidencia de la República & Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática* (Bogotá, 16 June 2003).

⁴ Since his presidential campaign, Uribe has conditioned negotiations with irregular armed groups on the declaration of a ceasefire, the cessation of all hostilities, which includes an end to killing and abducting civilians, and disengagement from drug trafficking. See ICG Latin America Report N°5, *Colombia: Negotiating with the Paramilitaries*, 16 September 2003.

⁵ A survey published on 7 August 2003 revealed that 78 per cent of Colombians have a favourable impression of President Uribe, 69 per cent trust him, 63 per cent back his policies, and 60 per cent think he is fulfilling his campaign promises. While Uribe gets good marks for his security policy, a large majority of Colombians are not happy with

enough support in his “referendum against corruption and political chicanery” on 25 October 2003 and the strong showing by his political opponents show the depth of the challenges that lie ahead for the President, who has been unable to transform his high approval rating into concrete voting support from the electorate.⁶ The recent government shake-up in the aftermath of the elections, which has seen the resignations of the defence minister, the justice and interior minister, and the environment minister, along with the commander of the armed forces and the commander of the police, has further undermined the perceived strength of the president.⁷

Acceptance of the government's security policies appears greater domestically than abroad, but in both Colombia and the international community there are deep concerns about aspects related to human rights and civil liberties. Questions have been raised by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, state institutions such as the public inspector's office, the ombudsman's office, and the constitutional court, diplomatic missions in Bogotá, and domestic and international human rights groups. Uribe's strong verbal attack against human rights defenders in early September, some of whom he accused of collaboration with the insurgents, caused severe consternation in Colombia as well as

his economic and social policies, especially the lack of employment and high taxes.

⁶ Although the official results of the referendum have not yet been released, more than six and a half million affirmative votes were needed for approval and fewer than that number of voters seem to have gone to the polls on referendum day. By contrast, more than twelve million ballots appear to have been cast the following day for the election of governors and mayors. President Uribe clearly failed to mobilise support for his referendum. By failing to cast their votes, Colombians refused to support the president on two important issues: a) the strong fiscal measures Uribe sought to finance the war, which are now unlikely to pass as they must get through Congress, where support for Uribe is shaky; and b) measures against “political chicanery” and corruption, which also have little prospect of legislative approval.

⁷ The five resignations came within a week of each other: Fernando Londono, Justice and Interior Minister, 6 November; Minister of Defence Marta Lucia Ramirez, 8 November; National Police Commander Teodoro Campo, 11 November; Minister of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development Cecilia Rodriguez, 11 November; and Commander of the Armed Forces General Jorge Enrique Mora, 12 November (to take effect on 20 November).

abroad.⁸ Social investment, especially in rural areas, and humanitarian assistance to war victims – essential parts of the concept of human security – have been secondary to military security measures.⁹

Analysts are divided over how hard the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the paramilitaries have been hit by the government's security measures. Although the administration can show advances against the armed groups and drugs, the statistics remain subject to dispute. Government forces have been acting more aggressively, in particular against the insurgents but also against the paramilitaries. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the FARC has increased the frequency of its attacks, has been setting up more road blocks, and has formalised alliances with the ELN. While the FARC has not been as visible in urban areas as it threatened to be, and has clearly been forced out of its previous sanctuary in marginal areas of Medellín, many see its withdrawal as a tactic to recuperate, avoid damaging confrontations, and wait out the Uribe administration. The government also has suffered a number of serious setbacks, such as the FARC's killing, during a flawed military rescue operation, of the governor of Antioquia and his peace commissioner, who were abducted in mid-2002. Breakdowns in security continue to occur, especially in rural areas and smaller urban centres,¹⁰ where the

⁸ Palabras del Presidente Uribe en posesión del nuevo comandante de la Fuerza Aérea Colombiana, Bogotá, 8 September 2003.

⁹ In 1994, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defined the new challenge of security as follows: “For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world”. While there is no doubt that the events of 11 September 2001 have produced a new focus on terrorist threats, the “soft” components of security contained in UNDP's definition continue to be of importance. UNDP Human Development Report 1994.

¹⁰ This was evidenced by the chain of deadly car bombings in several provinces following the one-year-in-power celebrations on 7 August 2003, the setting alight of five oil wells by the FARC in the department of Putumayo, the insurgents' recent gunfire attack on the helicopter in which the president was travelling to the village of Granada

newly deployed and insufficiently trained and equipped peasant soldiers are deployed.

Critics, including some members of the Catholic Church with considerable experience in peace negotiations, also warn that the negotiations with the AUC and - once passed by parliament - the "law for the reinsertion of members of armed groups" will result in impunity for war criminals.¹¹ They further contend that there is a high risk that paramilitary demobilisation will ride roughshod over national reconciliation and the right of victims to reparation, and that substantial, illegally-acquired assets, especially land, will remain in the hands of former paramilitary leaders. In certain areas, such as the northwestern Urabá region in 1996 and more recently in the department of Quindío in the coffee belt, these paramilitary leaders deliberately terrorised small land owners, forced them to flee and seized their lands.¹²

To end the conflict, law enforcement and the military will have to grow even stronger than planned in the DSP, but the political, social and humanitarian costs of current government policy will have to be reduced. The Uribe government needs to put more emphasis on safeguarding fundamental rights, extending its social and economic presence into the rural areas and promoting the rule of law. The outcome of negotiations with the paramilitaries, or with any other armed group, cannot be to enshrine further impunity. If it is, the government risks generating international alienation and sowing the seeds for future violence.¹³ Getting the balance right between effectively improving security for all citizens while safeguarding fundamental rights is not an easy task for any government but it is essential that such an effort be made.

(Antioquia) and the car bombings in Florencia (Caquetá) and Bogotá in early October that killed 18 civilians and policemen.

¹¹ *Proyecto de Ley por el cual se dictan disposiciones en procura de la reincorporación de miembros de grupos armados que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la consecución de la paz nacional*, Bogotá, 21 August 2003. The "reinsertion bill" is in effect a "near pardon" or "veiled amnesty" bill, the terms that will be used throughout this report. See footnote 25 below.

¹² See ICG Report, *Negotiating with the Paramilitaries*, op. cit.

¹³ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga and Neiva, 8-11 September 2003.

II. THE SECURITY POLICY

On 29 June 2003, President Uribe symbolically launched the DSP in Putumayo province, a hotspot in the conflict. Two weeks earlier, after months of consultations with Colombian and international experts, the ministry of defence and the presidency jointly published the document that underpins the policy.¹⁴ Although the DSP represents an unprecedented effort by a Colombian government to provide a systematic assessment of the existing security challenges and the measures it intends to implement to confront them, it is not fully balanced, is somewhat repetitive and took too long to be published (partly reflecting the differences between the armed forces and the ministry of defence over key aspects of strategy). Implementation of most of the measures contemplated in the DSP began immediately following Uribe's inauguration; the document's release in mid-2003, therefore, appears as somewhat of a publicity stunt to legitimise government action after the fact.¹⁵ Perhaps of more concern, it still lacks at a strategic policy level fully elaborated programmatic and operational plans for implementation.

The DSP's stated goal is "to protect the rights of citizens and democratic values and institutions and foment solidarity and civilian cooperation in the defence of democracy".¹⁶ The government defines "terrorism" as the main threat to peace and democracy in Colombia, in conjunction with drug and arms trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and

¹⁴ Presidencia de la República & Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática*, Bogotá, 16 June 2003; ICG interviews, Bogotá, August 2003.

¹⁵ The government had to abandon some of the security measures that were implemented during the last quarter of 2002. For example, the constitutional court first restricted the measures related to the two Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones (RCZs) that were created in the departments of Arauca and Sucre and Bolívar under the state of public unrest imposed on 11 August 2002. In a subsequent decision, the court declared them incompatible with constitutional norms. Among the main features of the RCZs were enhanced military presence and the empowerment of military officers, who also acted as governors and mayors, to control the carrying of weapons and the movement of residents and vehicles. Hence, the insistence on the benefits derived from the RCZs in the DSP document reads a bit strangely. See footnote 26 below.

¹⁶ Presidencia de la República & Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, *Política de defensa y seguridad*, op. cit., p. 13.

homicide.¹⁷ Security, in turn, is defined as “the permanent and effective presence of the democratic authorities across the national territory as a result of a collective effort of the whole society”.¹⁸ This includes strengthening the judicial system, modernising the state security forces and improving security-related coordination between civilian and military state institutions.¹⁹ The issue of peace negotiations with the irregular armed groups does not figure prominently in the DSP. The government's concisely formulated stance is that the cessation of hostilities by the armed groups must precede any demobilisation negotiations. Social investment and rural development programs, considered by many to constitute important aspects of security policy in Colombia,²⁰ are left out of the DSP.

The main thrust of the government's security efforts has been to adjust and improve the military's position by increasing the capacity of the armed forces to hold territory and by creating incentives for members of the armed groups to demobilise. Troop numbers have been boosted, soldiers and policemen have been deployed across parts of Colombia from which they had been absent for decades, and new military and police units, such as the special mountain combat forces and mobile rural police squadrons (*carabineros*), have been created.²¹

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 24-31.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁹ On 20 July 2003, the administration submitted a security and defence bill to parliament which contains a number of measures aimed at improving security cooperation between civilian and military state institutions as well as between the different intelligence services. One of the most important new institutions charged with this task would be the National Security and Defence Council, comprised of the president, the ministers of defence, interior and justice, foreign affairs and finance, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the directors of the police and secret police (Department of Administrative Security, DAS). The bill still has to be debated in eight sessions in both houses of parliament before it can become law. *Proyecto de Ley por la cual se dictan disposiciones sobre la seguridad y defensa nacionales* (Bogotá, s.d.).

²⁰ See the recommendations in ICG Latin America Report N°4, *Colombia's Humanitarian Crisis*, 9 July 2003 and the UN's concept of human security in UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*.

²¹ According to the ministry of defence, by June 2003 10,000 additional regular soldiers were in training, and two mobile brigades and special mountain combat battalions each had entered into service in the departments of Cundinamarca, Meta, Valle and Boyacá. The creation of one battalion of special marine and infantry forces was completed, one special border guards battalion entered into service and eleven

Furthermore, the government began a massive program to incorporate civilians into the war effort through a network of “collaborators” and “informants”. It also proposed a reform of the existing military service law, making service effectively universal for all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 28 (though the option of obligatory social service was also introduced).²²

In all, 15,228 peasant soldiers have been incorporated into the army. Enrolled in a special form of military service, they are part of a battalion or brigade but after three months of basic training, are sent back to their home towns or villages. Originally, the peasant soldiers were meant to serve as municipal guards during the day and go home at night. But after they were declared military targets by the FARC and ELN and following a number of attacks on them, most are now stationed in small, newly-built military bases in the villages and are commanded by non-commissioned officers.²³ However, since they are members of the

groups of special anti-terrorist forces were established in the army and the navy; meanwhile, 6,800 additional police recruits were incorporated into the ranks, and new mobile police forces, the *carabineros*, were created. The latter's task is to patrol rural areas, especially in conflict-ridden regions, and disrupt the use by the insurgents of gun and drug-running corridors. According to police sources, they are trained in counter-insurgency tactics and warfare, are well-equipped and operate in coordination with the army. It is expected that by the end of the year 37 squads with 150 professional police officers each (5,500 total) will be in service. By 2006, the government plans to have 62 squads (9,300 officers). The defence ministry claims that, owing to the increase in troop numbers from 120,000 in early 2002 to 150,000, the armed forces and police have been able to extend their presence from 941 municipalities in December 2002 to 1,020 in June 2003. The government aims to have a police and army presence in all 1,098 municipalities by December 2004. ICG interviews, Bogotá, 12 August and 9 September 2003; information provided by the ministry of defence; Presidencia de la República, *Informe al Congreso 2003*, Bogotá, 20 July 2003.

²² Making military service in Colombia truly universal has been a long-standing demand abroad, especially of U.S. policy-makers. The existing military service law contemplates a number of exemptions, which, together with influence and money, have made it possible for the sons of the Colombian elites and upper-middle class to avoid serving. The bill proposed by the government attempts to remedy this inequality but still allow well-off Colombians the option to opt for social service. *Proyecto de Ley por la cual se dictan normas sobre el servicio militar obligatorio*, Bogotá, 24 April 2003).

²³ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga, 8-9 September 2003.

communities in which they are stationed, they and their families are widely known and can easily be identified by the insurgents.

More than 1.5 million citizens have allegedly been enrolled in the government's network of collaborators and informants. Most are "collaborators", who inform the military and police about any "suspicious activity" in their municipalities or home towns and villages without receiving money. The informants, on the other hand, are paid for information which helps capture members of armed groups or prevents hostile action. The informants are often former combatants or members of the irregular armed groups.²⁴ Lists of the members of the network are kept by the military and police. Civilian state institutions, such as the public inspector's office or the ministry of the interior, are not involved in control and supervision of the program.

These security measures were complemented by a one-time "security tax",²⁵ along with more decisive efforts at eradicating illicit crops, mostly through aerial spraying. At the same time, the Uribe administration negotiated with the paramilitaries. After the AUC's declaration of a "unilateral ceasefire" and parliament's passage of Law 782/02 (former Law 418/97), which expressly excludes granting political status to any group as a precondition for initiating talks, a commission appointed by the president held "exploratory talks" with paramilitary leaders. On 15 July 2003, representatives of both sides signed the Santa Fe de Ralito accord, which stipulates the opening of formal negotiations geared toward achieving the complete demobilisation of Colombia's main paramilitary group by the end of 2005.²⁶

The president's declaration of a state of "public unrest" on 11 August 2002, which came a few days after the FARC's mortar attack on his inauguration ceremony, was ended by a constitutional court decision which found it violated the 1991 constitution. The government subsequently submitted

anti-terrorist, justice reform and "veiled amnesty"²⁷ bills to parliament.²⁸ Through the proposed laws, it is seeking, on the one hand, to give broad judicial powers of detention to the military, reduce judicial oversight on the executive in security matters, and increase the pressure on the irregular armed groups; and on the other hand, to stimulate desertions from those groups.²⁹

The first anti-terrorist bill, submitted to parliament in April 2003, would give the state security forces, including the military, permanent legal powers to intercept communications, conduct house searches and arrest individuals without a judicial warrant. The bill, which is still to be debated in both houses of parliament, would amend Articles 15, 28 and 250 of the political constitution. The Attorney General's Office, in turn, would be empowered to create special judicial police units including members of the armed forces, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS) and the police.³⁰ In July, the executive submitted a second anti-terrorist bill to reform the

²⁷ The terms "veiled amnesty" and "near pardon" are used in this report. The bill does not contemplate acquitting or formally pardoning former combatants who have committed crimes. Rather, after standing trial they would be punished to a degree, but through mechanisms of "alternative justice" rather than on the basis of the penal code and international law, and with prospects of avoiding jail. *Proyecto de reforma a la Constitución Política: administración de justicia*, op. cit.; *Proyecto de Ley por el cual se dictan disposiciones en procura de la reincorporación de miembros de grupos armados que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la consecución de la paz nacional*, op. cit..

²⁸ On 11 August 2002, Uribe declared a state of public unrest citing article 213 of the constitution. Among the measures implemented were the creation of two Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones (RCZs) in the departments of Arauca and Sucre and Bolívar, and the levying of a one-time "security tax". Until April 2003, when they were ended by a constitutional court decision, the RCZs formed a core part of the DSP. For details, see ICG Briefing, *Will Uribe's Honeymoon Last?*, op. cit.

²⁹ The bills are: *Proyecto de Acto Legislativo N°223-2003 Cámara por medio del cual se modifican los artículos 15, 28, y 250 de la Constitución Política de Colombia, para enfrentar el terrorismo* (Bogotá, 19 May 2003); *Proyecto de Ley Estatuaria mediante el cual se adopta el Estatuto Nacional para Enfrentar el Terrorismo* (Bogotá, 21 July 2003); *Proyecto de reforma a la Constitución Política: administración de justicia* (Bogotá, July 2003); *Proyecto de Ley por el cual se dictan disposiciones en procura de la reincorporación de miembros de grupos armados que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la consecución de la paz nacional* (Bogotá, 21 August 2003).

³⁰ *Proyecto de Acto Legislativo N°223-2003*, op. cit.

²⁴ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga and Neiva, 8-11 September 2003.

²⁵ The "security tax" was a one-time payment of 1.2 per cent of liquid assets worth more than U.S.\$50,000. Through this tax the government raised approximately U.S.\$800 million for the war effort. See ICG Latin America Briefing, *Colombia: Will Uribe's Honeymoon Last?*, 19 December 2002.

²⁶ Santa Fe de Ralito accord, 15 July 2003; see ICG Report, *Negotiating with the Paramilitaries*, op. cit..

penal code, including expediting judicial processes and increasing punishment for a number of crimes, especially those related to acts of terrorism.³¹

Complementary to these “tough” bills, the government proposed a far-reaching constitutional reform of the judicial system and a veiled amnesty law for members of armed groups. The most controversial items of the judicial reform bill are its proposed restrictions of the constitutional court's areas of competence and of the right of citizens to legal protection of all fundamental rights (*tutela*). For example, the constitutional court would lose the power to evaluate and declare invalid a government decision to impose a state of public unrest or emergency. The court would also lose the power to take immediate action to suspend application of new laws deemed to violate the constitution, and instead would have to wait two years before it could act. Citizens would lose the right to legal action regarding social, economic and cultural rights.³²

The “near pardon” bill (sometimes also referred to as the “conditional liberty” or alternative sentencing bill), which is currently being debated, would offer demobilised members of the armed groups, even those who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, the possibility of avoiding any jail time once they have confessed or have been tried, convicted and sentenced. This provision, which has provoked strong criticism in Colombia and abroad, would allow the president to void a prison sentence issued by the court and replace it with an alternative sentence, such as a bar on holding public office for ten years or carrying weapons, or payment of reparations. The reparations might be financial or social (i.e. mine clearing work) and directed to the victims of fighting or, more generally, toward helping bring the conflict to an end. After five years, if all provisions were met, the demobilised fighter could have a conditional suspension of the sentence made permanent and be freed of any further obligations.³³

Critics further charge that, since there is no deadline for eligibility for the benefits, the bill, once passed,

would provide members of irregular armed groups who are engaged in the demobilisation process – so far only some members of the AUC – with a blank cheque to continue committing crimes until their eventual reintegration. There also is opposition to the bill because the verification commission that it would establish is aimed at monitoring compliance with the penalties but not the state's obligation to vouch for the reparation of victims.³⁴

³¹ *Proyecto de Ley Estatutaria mediante el cual se adopta el Estatuto Nacional para Enfrentar el Terrorismo*, op. cit.

³² ICG interview, Bogotá, 30 July 2003.

³³ *Proyecto de Ley por el cual se dictan disposiciones en procura de la reincorporación de miembros de grupos armados que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la consecución de la paz nacional*, op. cit.

³⁴ See, for example, UNHCHR Colombia Office, *Observaciones sobre el proyecto de ley “por la cual se dictan disposiciones en procura de la reincorporación de miembros de grupos armados que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la paz nacional”*, Bogotá, 23 September 2003. There is a tendency within the government to argue that it is not necessary to incorporate the state's obligation to vouch for the reparation of victims of the armed groups because a law exists on the expropriation of illegally acquired assets (*Ley de extinción de dominio para bienes ilícitos*, 27 December 2002). The argument is that victims will receive reparation through the application of the expropriation law. However, relatively few ill-acquired assets have been expropriated on the basis of the law, so the new bill, at least if it is passed in its present form, should provide that the expropriation law will be applied and the assets will be used to make reparations to victims of the irregular armed groups. ICG interviews, Bogotá.

III. BATTLES WON, VICTORY NOT IN SIGHT

The Uribe administration claims solid gains in the fight against the armed groups. According to army sources, between 7 August 2002 and 29 July 2003 the armed forces and the police killed 1,211 FARC, 379 ELN and 236 paramilitary fighters and captured 2,363 FARC, 556 ELN and 1,202 paramilitaries.³⁵ In addition, the army states that 1,099 FARC, 337 ELN and 258 paramilitary fighters gave themselves up.³⁶ The total losses of the irregular armed groups would thus add up to 8,641, more than 25 per cent of their total estimated fighting strength (30,000).

According to the ministry of defence, kidnappings fell from 2,519 cases (August 2001-May 2002) to 2,009 (August 2002-May 2003), a decrease of 20 per cent, although Colombia still has the dubious distinction of being the world leader.³⁷ This downward trend has been confirmed by the Free Country Foundation (*Fundación País Libre*), an NGO, which states that 1,861 persons were abducted between August 2002 and May 2003, as compared to 2,196 during the previous year.³⁸ The number of homicides and massacres³⁹ also fell, from 24,728 to 21,192, and from 119 to 87 respectively.⁴⁰ Moreover, 1,375 combatants of the irregular armed groups have been incorporated into the Uribe administration's demobilisation and reintegration program, a 39 per cent increase over the same period a year earlier. By 2006, the administration expects to demobilise 7,756 irregular fighters.⁴¹

³⁵ Among the captured paramilitaries are some leading figures, such as "Claudia", who acted as "accountant" for the AUC and oversaw drug trafficking operations in the department of Nariño.

³⁶ Ejército Nacional, *¡A la ofensiva por Colombia!*, Bogotá, August 2003.

³⁷ There has also been a slight increase in successful rescue operations: 531 hostages were freed by the security forces from August 2002 to May 2003, up from 523 in the same period the year before. Information provided by the ministry of defence.

³⁸ Fundación País Libre, *Estadísticas de secuestro*, at www.paislibre.org.

³⁹ The Human Rights office of the Colombian vice-presidency defines a massacre as the killing of four or more persons at a time in a single place.

⁴⁰ Information provided by the ministry of defence.

⁴¹ Presidencia de la República, *Informe*, op. cit.

ICG interviews support government statistics that guerrilla attacks on villages in the departments of Huila and Santander have decreased substantially.⁴² However, official data on battlefield trends should generally be taken with a grain of salt.⁴³ Presenting success stories to the public has been part of the propaganda efforts of the armed forces and the government, which at times has led commanders and ministers to express unwarranted optimism about the conflict.⁴⁴ While information provided to ICG in interviews – and information from other independent sources – indicates the military is indeed fighting the insurgents and paramilitaries with improved efficiency, it also suggests a more cautious balance. Moreover, it seems strange that, despite the numbers of captures, killings and desertions listed above, the government's overall estimate of insurgent and paramilitary troop strength remains unchanged at 30,000 fighters.⁴⁵

The Colombian NGO Foundation for Security and Democracy (*Fundación Seguridad y Democracia*) published a comparative study of the evolution of the armed conflict during the first halves of 2002 and 2003.⁴⁶ The report, which is based on cross-referenced data obtained from a variety of official and non-official sources, finds that the armed forces stepped up their offensive operations by 55 per cent in the first half of 2003.⁴⁷ Over the same period,

⁴² ICG interviews, Bucaramanga and Neiva, 8-11 September 2003.

⁴³ For example, there are differences between ministry of defence and army figures on battlefield successes. While those of the ministry also document more efficient military action against the irregular armed groups, they do not fully match those of the army. The ministry states that 1,986 and 4,602 paramilitary and insurgent (ELN and FARC) fighters, respectively, were captured in the period of August 2002-June 2003. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, *Resultados Fuerza Pública-Violencia y Criminalidad – Terrorismo*, Bogotá, 11 July 2003.

⁴⁴ For example, in May 2003 General Mora stated in a local press interview that the armed forces "had the guerrillas on the run" and "the insurgents were losing all battles". In a similar vein, Interior Minister Fernando Londoño asserted on 28 August that the state was "winning the conflict and very soon the insurgents will be asking to participate in negotiations" with the government. *El Espectador*, 4 May 2003, p. 4A; *El Tiempo*, 28 August 2003, p. 1/4.

⁴⁵ Statement of President Alvaro Uribe Velez, UN General Assembly, 30 September 2003, English language copy released in New York City, p. 4.

⁴⁶ Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, *Evaluación de la dinámica del conflicto armado*, Bogotá, August 2003.

⁴⁷ The sources are the armed forces, the police, the vice-presidency, the domestic media and NGOs.

casualties among irregular fighters increased by 24 per cent over 2002. The ELN was hit hardest, losing an average 1.5 fighters per battle, followed by the paramilitary groups (1.3 casualties per battle) and the FARC (1.1 casualties per battle).⁴⁸ Hence while the armed forces appear to have acted more aggressively, the effectiveness of military operations against the armed groups has not increased by the same measure. Furthermore, in 2003 the FARC have lost fewer men per battle than during the previous year, while the insurgents have increased their armed operations against government forces by 26 per cent. The number of illegal checkpoints set up by the guerrillas on roads has increased from 116 to 153.⁴⁹

In many parts of the country the police have effectively expanded their territorial presence. ICG interviews revealed that all 87 municipalities of the department of Santander and all 37 of the department of Huila now have a police station.⁵⁰ Between 40 and 50 peasant soldiers are stationed in small bases in many municipalities. At times the police and the peasant soldiers operate jointly.⁵¹ However, ICG found that in some places police expansion came as a result of overstressing forces. In Cauca province, for example, the police covered 50 per cent of municipalities prior to the launching of the DSP. Now, there is a police presence in about 80 per cent, but with reduced numbers per station.⁵²

While this data shows that the government has made advances, it also reflects what Colombian analysts have called the insurgents' "strategy of tactical withdrawal". This kind of tactical behaviour also followed the rupture of the peace talks with the Pastrana administration in February 2002 when the military retook the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). The FARC did not put up a fight but "evacuated" all commanders, fighters and weapons.⁵³ According to ICG sources, in Santander province, where little coca is grown, the FARC has withdrawn to remote mountain areas to safeguard the strategic corridor

that runs from the Middle Magdalena valley to the department of Norte de Santander (in particular, the coca rich Catatumbo region) and finally Venezuela.⁵⁴ It is also telling that the state security forces have been unable to capture any high-ranking rebel leaders so far.

It appears that the combination of more police and the newly-deployed peasant soldiers has permitted most mayors to return to their municipalities after having been under threat from the FARC since mid-2002. However, government policy was not entirely able to prevent the armed groups from interfering with the campaigning for the elections for mayor and governor, held on 26 October.⁵⁵ For example, candidates in Santander province had to seek the approval of the "strong" irregular armed group in their municipality before running. There is evidence that the paramilitaries were "protecting" their candidates and intimidating others in an attempt to increase their local and regional political power and thereby improve their bargaining position in the negotiations with the government.⁵⁶ While the ELN had issued a statement that it would not launch any "military operations aimed at stopping the electoral process",⁵⁷ the FARC attempted to destabilise the Uribe administration by sabotaging the vote.⁵⁸ Although the ministry of defence stated that killings of candidates had decreased by 34 per cent in comparison to the last elections, at least an estimated 100 municipalities were affected by the pressure, and 30 candidates were killed;⁵⁹ some municipalities did not have candidates at all.

⁴⁸ In Santander province, for example, the army managed to push the ELN out of some of its historic strongholds. Small remaining groups of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) were also destroyed. ICG interview, Bucaramanga, 8 September 2003.

⁴⁹ Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, *Evaluación*, op. cit..

⁵⁰ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga and Neiva, 8-11 September 2003.

⁵¹ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga, 8-9 September 2003.

⁵² ICG interviews, Popayán, 26-29 July 2003.

⁵³ See ICG Latin America Report N°1, *Colombia's Elusive Quest for Peace*, 26 March 2002.

⁵⁴ ICG interview, Bucaramanga, 8 September 2003.

⁵⁵ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga, 8-9 September 2003.

⁵⁶ ICG interview, Bucaramanga, 8 September 2003; *Semana*, 18-25 August 2003, pp. 30-33.

⁵⁷ Defensoría del Pueblo, "ELN se compromete a respetar procesos electorales en octubre" (Bogotá, 19 September 2003).

⁵⁸ The ELN's statement, which contrasts with the FARC's position, could indicate that the recently announced joining of forces by the two insurgent organisations is not yet fully consummated. FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central, *Comunicado conjunto de las FARC-EP y el ELN*, in the mountains of Colombia, July 2003.

⁵⁹ For example, during the first two days of September 2003 three candidates were killed, presumably by the insurgents, in the departments of Nariño and Santander. In the last week of August, the FARC declared that candidates for mayor and governor in Nariño were "military targets", *El Tiempo*, 27 August, 3 September and 7 October 2003, pp. 1/2, 1/4 and 1/16.

Finally, the security situation is perceived differently from region to region and by inhabitants of rural and urban areas. Interviewees in Neiva, the capital of the department of Huila in southern Colombia, a historic FARC stronghold, stated that insecurity and crime on roads have increased in recent months.⁶⁰ This perception is in sharp contrast to the statements heard in Santander, a more developed and industrialised department with stronger paramilitary presence, where tourist convoys on Colombia's main highways – the so-called “caravans” organised during holiday periods by authorities – have been successful.⁶¹ A further concern, widespread among Colombians, is that government forces, having “pacified” an area (i.e. pushed out the armed groups), will leave and expose the population to retaliation by the insurgents or occupation by the paramilitaries.⁶² Although important economic sectors, such as oil and mining, have received special attention from the government, there have been recent calls for the president to improve security on the ground in order to avoid scaring investors away.⁶³

A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

President Uribe has been extremely careful to build good relations with the armed forces. To encourage the military to accept responsibility for implementing the DSP, he has given the high command ample say in formulating the policy. Referring to himself as the “first soldier of the nation”, he constantly attempts to raise troop morale and, despite sporadic criticism of officers for not delivering results, has shown his determination to stand by the military, even when things go wrong. For example, immediately after the FARC killed abducted governor of Antioquia, Guillermo Gaviria, his peace commissioner, Gilberto Echeverri, and eight soldiers during a failed rescue operation, the president first requested a detailed account of the operation, then went on television with Defence Minister Martha Lucia Ramírez, Commander-in-Chief General Jorge Mora, Chief of the Army General Alberto Ospina and Attorney General Luis Osorio to explain the operation and the difficulties

the army had encountered.⁶⁴ The military appreciated the support, and the public appreciated his candour.

Defence Minister Ramírez, by contrast, has had a difficult relationship with the military leadership. She has pressed for more results and shown little respect for hierarchy and codes of conduct while bypassing established channels of communication and dealing directly with lower-level officers. Ramírez further introduced a new accounting and acquisitions system that aims to make military expenditure less corrupt, more transparent and more efficient.⁶⁵ She has had a number of public clashes with the high command, such as one in March 2003 with former Commander of the Air Force General Fabio Velasco over Spain's donation of ten used military aircraft.⁶⁶

This “division of labour” in handling the armed forces has allowed the president to maintain good relations with the high command. In addition, the allocation of more funds for military expenditure has naturally been popular with senior commanders, who are keen to produce results in the fight against the armed groups in order to continue the cash flow for more modern equipment.⁶⁷ However, the security forces appear to be divided between “hawks” or “hardliners”, who are fully behind the president and seek quick and spectacular military results, and “soft-liners” or “traditionalists”, who are less aggressive and more conscious of the legal and

⁶⁴ *El Tiempo*, 6 May 2003, p. 1/2.

⁶⁵ For example, the three branches of the armed forces – the army, the navy and the air force – are no longer allowed to buy military equipment individually. Acquisition is centralised in the ministry of defence, which aims to exploit advantages of scale on large orders on domestic and international markets. This new acquisition policy further aims to reduce corruption within the armed forces. Information provided by the ministry of defence.

⁶⁶ During an official visit to Madrid, Ramírez and her Spanish counterpart, Federico Trillo, announced that Spain would donate eight Mirage F-1 fighter jets and two transport aircraft – all used – to Colombia as part of a broad military aid package (including the sharing of real time, satellite-generated information and training programs for Colombian military officers). However, the then chief of the Colombian air force, General Velasco, publicly questioned the suitability and usefulness of the aircraft, which he deemed to be too old and hence too costly to maintain. Ramírez responded strongly to this criticism, and Uribe had to intervene to calm the waters. In December 2003, Commander-in-Chief General Mora will retire from active service. It remains to be seen whether Minister Ramírez will be able to impose her leadership style on the new high command of the armed forces. *El Tiempo*, 1 March 2003, p. 1/2.

⁶⁷ ICG interview, Bucaramanga, 9 September 2003.

⁶⁰ ICG interviews, Neiva, 10-11 September 2003.

⁶¹ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga, 8-9 September 2003.

⁶² ICG interviews, Bucaramanga and Neiva, 8-11 September 2003.

⁶³ ICG interview, Bucaramanga, 8 September 2003; and *Portafolio*, 16 September 2003, p. 9.

strategic limits on the military. Officers belonging to the latter group feel that the government is asking too much from them without respecting the established codes of conduct and procedure.⁶⁸

Uribe's willingness to provide the army and police with additional powers and fewer constitutional and judicial checks risks an increase in arbitrary actions by the security forces against the civilian population, as has occurred in the Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones (RCZs) and other parts of the country.⁶⁹ The armed forces, in turn, are worried that demobilisation of the paramilitaries could place them at a strategic disadvantage in some regions of the country.⁷⁰ This might explain why Uribe has so far avoided implementing a rigorous policy of investigating and cutting widely suspected military-paramilitary ties, and why he has avoided combating the paramilitaries, including those who are negotiating with the government but not complying with the ceasefire, with the same vigour as the insurgents.⁷¹ For the time being, it appears the government does not want to put more pressure on what is, despite the denial of the armed forces, a crucial "ally", however de facto, in the battle against "terrorism".⁷² Uribe's verbal attack on NGOs at the inauguration ceremony of the new chief of the air force, General Edgar Lesmes, may also constitute part of his strategy to unify the armed forces behind him.⁷³

⁶⁸ ICG interviews, Bogotá and Bucaramanga, August and September 2003.

⁶⁹ See section IV below.

⁷⁰ ICG interviews, Bogotá, August 2003.

⁷¹ ICG interviews, Bogotá and Popayán, 26-29 July and 28 August 2003; see also ICG Report, *Negotiating with the Paramilitaries*, op. cit.

⁷² ICG interview, Bogotá, August 2003.

⁷³ General Lesmes is the successor of General Fabio Velasco, who resigned in August 2003 because of allegations that he was responsible for the deaths of eighteen civilians in an air force bombardment in Santo Domingo (Arauca) in December 1998, and strong pressure from the U.S. government and human rights groups. Velasco has been assigned as ambassador to Israel. The president's outburst, which caused consternation at the OAS, the UN, the European Union, the U.S. State Department and Congress and international and domestic human rights groups, was probably sparked by publication of the book *The Authoritarian Spell*, a critical assessment of his first year in power, by Colombian NGOs. See Uribe's speech "Palabras del Presidente Uribe en posesión del Nuevo comandante de la FAC", at www.presidencia.gov.co.

B. ERADICATION OF ILLICIT CROPS

In cooperation with the U.S., the Uribe administration has stepped up the eradication of illicit crops. It states that 147,837 hectares were sprayed between August 2002 and June 2003 and close to 900 illegal drug-processing laboratories were destroyed.⁷⁴ A downward trend in illicit crop cultivation is confirmed by UN data, which reveals that coca bush cultivation in Colombia has fallen by 30 per cent, from 145,000 hectares (November 2001) to slightly over 100,000 hectares (end of December 2002). UN estimates for the first half of 2003 are that by 31 July, coca acreage was down to 69,000 hectares.⁷⁵ However, the UN highlights that new plantations have been established in a number of departments, such as Guaviare, and regions along Colombia's highly permeable and isolated borders that formerly were free of illicit crops.⁷⁶ Slight rises in illicit crop cultivation are expected in Peru and Bolivia.⁷⁷ According to the UNODC representative in Colombia, the downward trend in coca production in Colombia can only be sustained if small farmers are provided with an alternative way of earning a living, including alternative development programs and urgently needed land reform.⁷⁸

On 19 August 2003, in an announcement timed to coincide with the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, President George W. Bush authorised the State Department to resume aid to

⁷⁴ ICG interviews, Tumaco, 16 March 2003; Presidencia de la República, *Informe al Congreso 2003*, op. cit.

⁷⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Introducción de Klaus Nyholm, Representante para Colombia y Ecuador de la Oficina de Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito*, Bogotá, 17 September.

⁷⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Colombia: Coca Survey for 2002", preliminary report, March 2003.

⁷⁷ The migration of illegal activity to neighbouring countries because of more pressure inside Colombia can already be observed with regards to kidnapping. As was admitted by President Uribe in Cúcuta (Norte de Santander), the population of Venezuelan regions bordering Colombia, in particular the departments of Tachira and Zulia, is targeted by the FARC for abduction owing to the increased military pressure inside Colombia. For two days (2-3 September 2003), the president and some of his ministers worked from Cúcuta, the capital of the department of Norte de Santander. Earlier in the year, Uribe had also governed from Arauca for a few days. "Gobierno ajusta clavija para mejorar orden público", at www.presidencia.gov.co; UNODC, *Introducción*, op. cit.; see ICG Latin America Report N°3, *Colombia and Its Neighbours: The Tentacles of Instability*, 8 April 2003.

⁷⁸ UNODC, *Introducción*, op. cit.

Colombia for efforts to force down aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs.⁷⁹ Three days later, the Colombian air force announced that the interdiction of flights had resumed.⁸⁰ The new program contemplates safeguards that reduce the risk of “innocent loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with ... interdiction”.⁸¹

C. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IRREGULAR ARMED GROUPS

It is not evident why Uribe initiated talks with the AUC, as neither the paramilitaries nor the insurgents have complied with the government's three preconditions for talks: a ceasefire, the cessation of kidnapping and other actions against civilians, and disengagement from drug trafficking. This has recently been acknowledged by the AUC commanders themselves.⁸² During visits to Cúcuta (Norte de Santander), Neiva (Huila) and the Coffee Belt, ICG established that members of the AUC, like the insurgents, have continued to kill civilians despite their organisation's declaration of a “unilateral ceasefire” in November 2002.⁸³ In August 2003, in an AUC incursion in the northern part of the department of Huila, several farmers were killed by paramilitary fighters, and hundreds fled their homes.⁸⁴

The government's decision to continue negotiating with the AUC, therefore, appears to reflect acceptance of at least partial non-compliance with the three conditions. Unless there is visible and progressive adherence to the ceasefire and a marked decline in AUC human rights violations and drug trafficking, however, this breach of the DSP's spirit could seriously damage Uribe's reputation and jeopardise the entire negotiation process.

In addition to the secrecy about the negotiations, a series of ambivalent pronouncements by high-ranking administration officials in relation to the talks and the controversial “near pardon” bill have given rise to serious doubts and concerns. There are many questions regarding both sides' motives and the feasibility of demobilisation under conditions of ongoing warfare. There is also uncertainty about what the administration is prepared to offer the paramilitaries to lay down their arms and whether the negotiating process represents anything more than a means to cleanse the paramilitaries politically and legitimise their wealth and power.⁸⁵

Following strong internal and external criticism, the executive has come around to accepting that modifications are needed in the draft law and has invited the parliament and civil society, as well as the international community, to make proposals.⁸⁶ President Uribe further stated that the proposed law will not cleanse the records of drug traffickers, and that paramilitary leaders wanted on drug trafficking charges in the U.S., such as Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso, will not escape extradition.⁸⁷

If the government fails to conduct paramilitary demobilisation and reintegration in an accountable and transparent way, with due consideration given to justice, truth and reparations, the possibility of new, UN-facilitated peace talks with the FARC would probably be undercut.⁸⁸ Likewise, resumption of talks with the ELN, pointed to by Uribe after the group pledged not to interfere with the elections,

⁷⁹ The so-called “Air Bridge Denial program” was suspended in 2001 after the Peruvian air force accidentally shot down a plane carrying an American missionary and her child.

⁸⁰ Former Air Force Commander General Héctor Velasco said, however, that the air force did not have suitable and sufficient aircraft to meet the goal of 30 interception flights per day. *El Tiempo*, 22 August 2003, p.1/2.

⁸¹ The White House, “Presidential Determination N°2003-32”, Washington, 19 August 2003.

⁸² AUC, *Nota Editorial: La política - el arte de hacer posible aquello que resulta necesario*, at <http://colombia-libre.org>.

⁸³ ICG interviews, Cúcuta, Pereira and Neiva, May and September 2003.

⁸⁴ ICG visit to Huila, 10-11 September 2003.

⁸⁵ See ICG Report, *Negotiating with the Paramilitaries*, op. cit.; ICG testimony before the first commission of the Colombian Senate, 26 September 2003.

⁸⁶ President Uribe's speech at the UN General Assembly, New York, 30 September 2003.

⁸⁷ The president's announcement provoked a prompt reply from the AUC leadership. In a communiqué on 8 October 2003, thirteen paramilitary leaders, headed by Castaño and Mancuso, defended the amnesty law and requested security guarantees for their reinsertion into society. According to the paramilitaries, the peace process with the government would be put at risk if “new extradition requests” and arrest warrants were issued. *El Tiempo*, 8 October 2003; AUC, *Nota editorial*, op. cit.

⁸⁸ According to UN sources, a meeting between UN and FARC representatives was thought to have been possible in Brazil during the second half of October 2003 but it has been delayed. ICG interview, Bogotá, 16 September 2003.

would probably not be possible.⁸⁹ Instead, alliances between the insurgents could be strengthened.⁹⁰

D. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

President Uribe has made strong efforts to obtain international, above all U.S., support for his security policy, especially since the bombing of the Nugal social club in February 2003. The argument he commonly employs is that the conflict is financed by the international drug business, and the threats to Colombia's security – terrorism and drugs – are also threats to the rest of the world.⁹¹ Since 2000, Washington has provided approximately U.S.\$3 billion in support of Plan Colombia, largely aimed at stemming the production and flow of drugs to the U.S. For FY 2004, the aid flow – mostly military – to its closest South American ally in the “global war on terrorism” is expected to continue.⁹² The U.S. plans to appropriate approximately U.S.\$424 million in military and police assistance and U.S.\$150 million in social and economic aid through the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative (ACI). An additional

U.S.\$108 million would be provided by the defence department in foreign military assistance.⁹³

The Americans are training Colombian soldiers for the protection of the Coveñas-Caño Limón oil pipeline, providing assistance against kidnapping and for justice sector reform, and have, as mentioned above, resumed assistance to the Colombian air force for intercepting civilian aircraft suspected of carrying drugs or weapons. They also began training in February 2003 a 200-strong elite commando force, which became operational in September and is tasked with disrupting command and control and capturing or killing leaders of the illegal armed groups.⁹⁴ In recent months, there has been a string of high-level visitors: Secretary of State Colin Powell, in December 2002, followed by Director of the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy John Walters in July 2003 and General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defence Minister Donald Rumsfeld and U.S. State Department Counter-terrorism Coordinator J. Cofer Black in August.

In addition, the Uribe administration has signed military and police cooperation agreements with Spain and the UK. The former has donated used military aircraft and has agreed to provide satellite-generated military intelligence and officer training. The latter's special forces are training members of the Colombian navy and supporting mine-clearance efforts, while Colombian officers have been invited to attend the Royal College of Defence Studies.⁹⁵

However, relations with the European Union (EU) and other member states, such as Germany and France, have not recovered fully since the breakdown of the peace process with the FARC under Pastrana, a process in which several European states participated as “friends”. Colombia's strong alignment with the U.S. and the Uribe

⁸⁹ *El Tiempo*, 22 September 2003.

⁹⁰ See the declarations by the ELN military commander, Antonio García, in *El Tiempo*, 30 July 2003, p. 1/3. It is also telling that Felipe Torres, one of the two ELN commanders who were captured and imprisoned in the mid-1990s and since have acted as ELN spokespersons and middlemen in various peace initiatives with the government and civil society, has rejected Uribe's offer to become a “peace-maker” after being released from prison. Uribe conditioned his offer to Torres, who was released from Itaguí prison in early October 2003 on good conduct and after serving a nine-year sentence, on the renouncement of the armed struggle.

⁹¹ See “Necesitamos un gran apoyo de la comunidad internacional”, at www.presidencia.gov.co; President Uribe's speech at the UN General Assembly, op. cit.

⁹² On 17 September 2003, Foreign Minister Carolina Barco and U.S. Under Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker signed the “agreement regarding the surrender of persons of the United States of America to the International Criminal Court”. This agreement put an end to a year-long dispute over the U.S. insistence that the Uribe administration grant Americans arrested in Colombia for human rights violations immunity from prosecution before the ICC or military aid would be withheld. The deal stipulates that Colombia must seek the approval of the U.S. before forwarding a case involving an American citizen to the ICC – approval unlikely to be received in light of the Bush administration's opposition to the international court. A couple of weeks after the agreement was signed, the administration released U.S.\$5 million in military aid to Colombia. See Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, 17 September 2003.

⁹³ Democrats McGovern and Skelton introduced an amendment in the House of Representatives that sought to cut military assistance to Colombia by U.S.\$75 million. It was narrowly defeated. The ACI funds can be used for counter-narcotics and counter-terrorist operations. Colombia continues to be the third-largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world, after Israel and Egypt. See www.ciponline.org.

⁹⁴ ICG interviews with U.S. and Colombian military officers, Washington, D.C. 20 October, 22 October 2003. They agreed it would be a military and political failure if after several months, operations only were attempted against FARC and ELN leaderships and not also recalcitrant paramilitary leaders.

⁹⁵ EFE news agency, 1 September 2003.

administration's focus on security and the fight against terrorism contrast with the European approach, which assigns priority to social development, defence of human rights and political negotiations.⁹⁶ Following a donors meeting in London on 10 July 2003, the EU, the U.S., Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Norway and a number of Latin American states and international financial institutions backed the Colombian government in its "efforts to address threats to democracy, terrorism, illegal drugs, human rights and international humanitarian law violations and the serious humanitarian crisis".⁹⁷ By the same token, however, they highlighted that Colombia ought to make stronger efforts to address the humanitarian crisis and urged that prompt action be taken against impunity and collusion with paramilitary groups.

There has also been some diplomatic engagement by Peru and Panama, both of whom signed police cooperation agreements with Colombia. After the bombing of the Nogal social club, President Uribe challenged his neighbours to declare the FARC a terrorist organisation formally and give substantive intelligence, counter-drug and counter-insurgency support. Although he received encouraging resolutions from a Central American presidential summit, the OAS Permanent Council and the UN Security Council, only Panama fully met the request.⁹⁸ In view of the planned meeting between FARC and UN representatives in Brazil, however, the Lula administration's reluctance to declare FARC a terrorist organisation earlier in the year could prove advantageous if both the insurgents and the government are serious about pursuing negotiations this time.⁹⁹

Colombia is preparing a proposition for the OAS-organised hemispheric security summit. It wants to establish a concrete framework for hemispheric action against terrorism and drug trafficking, including the creation of a regional database, the

adoption of anti-terrorist legislation in all member states and increased joint border operations with its neighbours.¹⁰⁰ To some extent, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador all have made advances in military cooperation with Colombia, including information sharing. They have yet to conduct joint operations, although officer exchanges have taken place between Peruvian and Colombian border units, and Brazil has boosted its military presence along the Amazon border with Colombia.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, both military and political relations with Venezuela remain tense. According to the Colombian foreign ministry, there are no plans to propose amendments to the Rio Treaty to create a multinational intervention force that could be used in a member state, as suggested by President Uribe in September 2002.

⁹⁶ This position was reiterated by Claudia Roth, German Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid, during her visit to Colombia in early October 2003. Her visit also reflected awareness on the part of the German government that more concrete European involvement is needed to help Colombia resolve its conflict.

⁹⁷ London Declaration, 10 July 2003.

⁹⁸ See ICG Latin America Report N°3, *Colombia and Its Neighbours: The Tentacles of Instability*, 8 April 2003.

⁹⁹ Declarations by peace Commissioner Luis Restrepo in front of the first commission of the Colombian senate, Bogotá, 23 September 2003.

¹⁰⁰ *El Tiempo*, 14 August 2003; see ICG Report, *Colombia and Its Neighbours*, op. cit.

¹⁰¹ ICG interview, Washington, D.C., 22 October 2003.

IV. SECURITY VS. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Although the Uribe administration has emphasised time and again its commitment to defending human rights,¹⁰² serious problems persist. A broad spectrum of state institutions, international organisations and domestic and international human rights groups have voiced concern about the DSP's negative impact on human rights and the rule of law.

In November 2002, the constitutional court ruled some of the sweeping powers conceded to the military in the RCZs unconstitutional.¹⁰³ In May and August 2003, the public prosecutor's office issued two highly critical reports on the RCZs in Arauca and Bolívar and Sucre.¹⁰⁴ Among the main concerns were that the measures implemented there did not produce the expected results, such as guaranteeing that elected mayors threatened by insurgents could function freely. The reports highlighted that in many instances residents of the RCZs were arrested without sufficient evidence of involvement with irregular armed groups, and some detainees were subjected to unauthorised medical exams.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² For example, the government pledged to implement the recommendations made by UNHCHR earlier in the year. In July 2003, Defence Minister Ramírez gave explicit orders to the commanders of the armed forces and the police to comply rigorously with the ministry's policy of promoting the protection of human rights, in particular regarding workers, trade unionists and human rights defenders. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, *Directiva 09*, Bogotá, 8 July 2003; see also Presidencia de la República & Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional, *Política de defensa*, op. cit.

¹⁰³ Corte Constitucional, *Sentencia C-1024/02*, Bogotá, 26 November 2002. In April 2003, the court declared an early end to the state of public unrest because in the second and last prolongation in January (for 90 days), parliament had failed to meet a number of constitutional requirements.

¹⁰⁴ Procuraduría General de la Nación, *La zona de rehabilitación y consolidación de Arauca: informe especial*, Bogotá, 19 May 2003 and *La zona de rehabilitación y consolidación Sucre-Bolívar*, Bogotá, August 2003.

¹⁰⁵ According to the public prosecutor's office, many arrests were not based on police investigation but rather were made on the basis of information provided by demobilised members of the armed groups. The public prosecutor of the department of Sucre stated: "The armed forces took a deserter with them on their operations. He was dressed like a soldier and his face was covered in order to avoid being identified. The deserter pointed out alleged insurgents, who were subsequently arrested by the armed forces". Procuraduría

Employees of the attorney general's office were working from military bases in the RCZs, which gave at least the appearance of less than full independence. Moreover, promised social policies and income-generating measures were never implemented. Once the armed forces had driven out the insurgents, paramilitaries began to expand in the RCZs, subjecting residents to extortion and other criminal activity.¹⁰⁶

Comparable situations – though not in RCZs – were confirmed by ICG in the departments of Cauca, Huila, Nariño and Santander. In Popayán, Governor Floro Tunubalá and Archbishop Iván Marín, among others, charged that the government's policy was producing a more intense armed conflict, an increase in forced internal displacement and human rights violations, and an expansion of the paramilitary groups. Although the number of new IDPs is decreasing in Santander and Huila, this appears to be related not to an improvement in the security situation for the rural population but to the escalating violence between the military and the armed groups, which makes escape harder for the affected population. In all four departments, interviewees, including public officials, emphasised that one of the most serious defects of the DSP is the lack of social investment programs to complement the military strategy.

During the last two years, paramilitaries of the Central Bolívar Bloc have continued to expand their influence in Santander's capital, Bucaramanga, and selective killings, in part related to "social cleansing operations", are reportedly on the rise.¹⁰⁷ According to ICG sources, the same is happening in Neiva (Huila). During a visit in March 2003 to Tumaco (Nariño), ICG witnessed a visible, though not uniformed, paramilitary presence in the urban centre.¹⁰⁸ There are persistent allegations that paramilitaries took control of Comuna 13, a poor Medellín neighbourhood, after government security forces drove insurgent militias out in October 2002.¹⁰⁹

General de la Nación, *La zona de rehabilitación Sucre-Bolívar*, op. cit..

¹⁰⁶ Ibid; ICG visit to Arauca.

¹⁰⁷ ICG interview, Bucaramanga, 9 September 2003.

¹⁰⁸ ICG interviews, Tumaco, 17-19 March 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Citing declarations of a recently demobilized FARC commander, who said that it was not true that paramilitaries had taken control of Comuna 13, Vice-Minister of Defence Andrés Peñate told ICG that these allegations were unfounded. Yet, serious doubt remains, especially if one considers the testimony of residents of Comuna 13. ICG

A similar situation appears to exist in the Tequendama region in the department of Cundinamarca, 82 kilometres from Bogotá.¹¹⁰ In Bucaramanga, ICG was told by an official of the governor's office that the state security forces continue to be unable to control all territory and hence cannot stop the paramilitaries from expanding in areas where the army has launched operations against the insurgents.¹¹¹

While the network of informants is creating a climate of distrust among the population, residents and public officials in Bucaramanga and Neiva told ICG that people were afraid to denounce abuses by the state security forces, in particular massive and arbitrary detentions but also cases of torture and failure to prevent paramilitary incursions and massacres.¹¹² The lack of civilian control over the informant program has given rise to serious concerns about its effectiveness and about the possibility of infiltration by active or former paramilitary fighters. There are also concerns that the informants may make false accusations aimed at damaging the reputation of, or settling scores with, personal enemies.

Moreover, through the informant and peasant soldier programs, the government is blurring the distinction between combatants and non-combatants and exposing civilians to unacceptable levels of risk, especially since the peasant soldiers have been declared military targets by the insurgents. In Cauca and Cundinamarca provinces, a number of peasant soldiers, who lacked sufficient training and experience to defend themselves against the irregular armed groups, have been killed and wounded.¹¹³ In the southern part of the department of Bolívar, the FARC has threatened and kidnapped relatives of peasant soldiers and alleged collaborators and informants.¹¹⁴ Regional peace and humanitarian initiatives by the Catholic Church, mayors, peace commissioners and civil society organisations aimed

at freeing hostages or establishing ceasefire zones have almost come to a complete halt because of the priority assigned to military operations and the intensification of the conflict over the course of the last year.¹¹⁵

The government's anti-terrorist bills have to be evaluated in light of the ambiguous results of the RCZs and the difficulties and serious shortcomings experienced in the implementation of the DSP in many parts of Colombia over the last year. Critics of this proposed legislation, including the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) in Colombia, diplomatic missions and human rights groups,¹¹⁶ argue that it does not take appropriate account of human rights and international humanitarian law.¹¹⁷ They point out that granting sweeping powers to the military could easily lead to the victimisation of innocent citizens and seriously undermine the rule of law, especially under the prevailing conditions of a chronically weak justice system, high levels of impunity and the difficulties faced by the civilian authorities in expanding their presence across the country independently from the military.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the draft justice reform bill would probably exacerbate this situation because the right of citizens to seek legal action for the protection of their fundamental rights (*tutela*) would be restricted.

The government's "near pardon" bill has also set off alarm bells. The Uribe administration has been zealous in its application of the "stick" against irregular armed groups but may now be going overboard in its offer of a "carrot" to the paramilitaries.¹¹⁹ The UNHCHR office has highlighted the serious risks in the bill and

interview, Bogotá, 28 August 2003; see the account "En el vecindario de la Comuna 13", in *Lecturas Dominicales*, 31 August 2003, pp. 2-3. A representative of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights told ICG in an interview on 3 October 2003 that the commission had confirmed the account of paramilitary control.

¹¹⁰ *Semana*, 12 July 2003.

¹¹¹ ICG interview, Bucaramanga, 8 September 2003.

¹¹² ICG interviews, Bucaramanga, Neiva and Bogotá, 8-12 September 2003.

¹¹³ ICG interviews, Popayán, 26-29 July 2003.

¹¹⁴ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga and Bogotá, 9 August and 12 September 2003.

¹¹⁵ ICG interviews, Bucaramanga and Neiva, 8-11 September 2003.

¹¹⁶ *Observaciones de la Oficina en Colombia del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre el proyecto de acto legislativo N°223 de 2003-Cámara, "por medio del cual se modifican los artículos 15,24,28 y 250 de la Constitución Política de Colombia para enfrentar el terrorismo"*, Bogotá, 12 May 2003.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

¹¹⁸ A comparable bill, the National Security and Defence Law submitted by the Pastrana administration in 1999, was rejected by parliament in early 2002. It would have granted extraordinary powers to the military, creating special theatres of operation in which rights and liberties would be suspended. *Proyecto de Ley N°81 de 1999 Senado* (Bogotá, s.d.).

¹¹⁹ The executive does not speak of sticks and carrots but employs the metaphor of the "strong hand and big heart".

underscored its incompatibility with internationally protected human rights of victims.¹²⁰ Even stout Uribe supporters, such as Senator Rafael Pardo, have voiced concern about the draft's contents and timing.¹²¹ While it is clear that the government wants to incite desertions from the paramilitary groups and exploit their internal cleavages in order to remove them from the conflict, the bill stands in marked contrast to the other draft legislation, which seeks to punish all acts of terrorism more severely.

With this bill, the government is sending the wrong message at the wrong time to the paramilitaries. It includes no deadline by which a fighter would have to qualify for their benefits and could potentially allow even those who have ordered the commission of crimes against humanity to avoid jail. Furthermore, it puts the Colombian government's domestic and international reputation at risk. Peace Commissioner Restrepo insists that the bill has not been discussed with the AUC, but rather is an independent government initiative to provide the judicial framework for reintegrating large number of irregular fighters who do not qualify as "political actors". Nevertheless, many suspect that it has indeed been tailored to paramilitary requests at the negotiating table, not only for amnesty but also for continued control over large portions of ill-acquired assets, particularly land and drug money.¹²²

V. CONCLUSION

It is still too early to reach definitive conclusions regarding the Uribe administration's security policy. However, it is possible and important to call attention to the areas that require urgent modification. Despite some undeniable successes, there is a real danger that if the government continues on its current course, it could face widespread domestic and international disenchantment, diminished legitimacy and even violent backlash by the middle of its four-year term (that is, by August 2004). The outcomes of the October 2003 referendum and elections for governors and mayors are reminders to the Uribe administration that its political capital is not unlimited and that it will have to show more flexibility in shaping its policy.

Undoubtedly, building security constitutes the primary challenge for the Colombian authorities today. The insurgents and paramilitaries must be disbanded and disarmed and the illegal drug business dismantled. But security, if it is to be sustainable, needs to encompass more than additional troops, wider military and police presence, tough anti-terrorist legislation and intensified aerial spraying of illicit crops.

It is not sufficient to lure affluent sectors of Colombia's urban society into a false sense of security through publicity stunts and the trumpeting of a few preliminary successes while the rural population, particularly indigenous groups, continues to bear the brunt of the violence. It is also not helpful, and even dangerous, to have generals and ministers declare victory when victory is not even yet in sight. The peace negotiations with the paramilitaries are important but must not be founded on the premise of unacceptable government concessions, such as those contained in the "near pardon" bill, in order to eliminate one armed group from the conflict. If the government does continue down this route, it is virtually certain that the insurgents will demand the same treatment in any future peace negotiations.

The Uribe administration should, therefore, strongly consider modifying its security policy in the following four areas.

Formulating and implementing an integrated and comprehensive security policy. In addition to military security, understood as the control of national territory by the state's military and police

¹²⁰ UNHCHR, Colombia office, *Observaciones al Proyecto de Ley Estatutaria que trata sobre la reincorporación de miembros de grupos armados*, Bogotá, 28 August and 23 September 2003.

¹²¹ *Semana*, 1-8 August 2003, pp. 38-41; declaration by Senador Pardo at the hearing at the first senate commission, Bogotá, 30 September 2003.

¹²² Declarations of Peace Commissioner Restrepo before the first commission of the Senate, Bogotá, 23 September 2003, *El Tiempo*, 31 August 2003, p. 1/17. His argument may be weakened by the language in the Ralito accord that commits the government to search for the "necessary mechanisms" to reinsert the paramilitaries into civilian life, Accord of Santa Fe de Ralito, 15 July 2003.

forces, the government should assign far more importance to other aspects of security expressed in the UN's concept of human security.¹²³ These include strengthening the judicial system and the rule of law; providing efficient humanitarian assistance to the civilian victims of the conflict; designing and implementing a highly visible rural development strategy and distributing land; creating jobs and implementing income-generating measures; and guaranteeing the holding of free and fair elections and the democratic exercise of public office. These non-military government security programs should cover all provinces and sectors of society equally, but be applied incrementally as permitted by the specific security situations in departments and urban/rural areas.

The government should modify all security measures, such as the network of informants and the peasant soldier program, that put non-combatants or insufficiently trained and equipped recruits at greater risk. It is necessary to provide peasant soldiers with more thorough military training before sending them back to their home villages, where they should be stationed in military bases under the command of experienced officers. Cooperation schemes between the local police and peasant soldier contingents should be established across Colombia, if the program is to continue.

Those paramilitary groups that have refused to enter into a ceasefire as well as those that have declared a ceasefire but have not stopped killing and abducting civilians or disengaged from drug trafficking must be combated with at least the same determination as is evidenced in fighting the insurgents. The peace negotiations with the paramilitaries must not be based on the premise that a pardon is necessary to make them work. The parliament should not pass the bill submitted by the executive without substantial modification. Demobilisation of the paramilitaries, which could open a window of opportunity to achieve peace, needs to be based on the principles of justice, reparation and truth. Those members of the paramilitary groups found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity must be punished according to domestic and international norms, including at least some prison sentences. Less serious offences might be punished with alternative sanctions, if proportionality between crimes and sentence can be guaranteed.

The government must do everything in its power to stop paramilitary violence against civilians now. It is fundamental, therefore, that the bill include a deadline for members of irregular armed groups to participate fully in the ceasefire. Ill-acquired assets must be confiscated and should be assigned to a reparation fund for victims of irregular armed groups. Eventual negotiations with the insurgents should be based on the same premises. The underlying purpose of the security doctrine should be restated to make clear that there is willingness to restart talks with the insurgents if they prove they are serious by entering into a ceasefire, ending kidnappings and humanitarian law violations and stopping drug trafficking.

Improving military effectiveness and the professionalism of the armed forces. The government should make more effort to increase the effectiveness of military operations, the aim of which should not be solely to achieve quick and spectacular results but to advance territorial control. This includes providing soldiers and police officers with better training, including in human rights and international humanitarian law, better planning and execution of military operations and better military intelligence and security-related coordination between civilian and military state institutions. It also means expanding border cooperation with neighbouring countries. Civilian control and oversight of the informant program need to be implemented, while the training of professional soldiers should be given priority. All suspected military-paramilitary ties and human rights abuses by members of the security forces must be investigated and prosecuted by the military and/or civilian courts. Independent monitoring of those steps – perhaps with international participation – would lend them considerable credibility. Corruption in the security forces also needs to be attacked more resolutely.

Safeguarding fundamental rights and advancing democratic governance. Security must not come at the expense of respect for the fundamental rights of all citizens and the rule of law. Arbitrary detentions, house searches and interception of communications – based not on thorough police investigation and court supervision but on “evidence” provided by informants – have to be stopped. The inhabitants of entire regions, such as the former RCZs, should not be subjected to pressure by the security forces because of suspicions that they could be guerrilla collaborators. Instead, the government should increase its efforts to guarantee the democratic

¹²³ See fn. 8 above.

political process and the rule of law across the country by, inter alia, protecting mayors, governors, candidates, judges and human rights defenders more effectively. The constitutional court's jurisdiction and the right of citizens to legal action if their fundamental rights are not respected (*tutela*) should not be restricted. International human rights and humanitarian law norms should be fully respected and applied.

Broadening international security cooperation.

Increased military pressure on illegal armed groups has resulted in a growing threat that illicit crops will migrate from Colombia to its neighbours. Recognising this regional dimension to the conflict, the government should seek to broaden security cooperation with other Latin American states but not to the detriment of the increasing numbers of Colombian refugees in neighbouring countries. These

should be provided with the necessary humanitarian and legal assistance. In this regard, the government should cooperate closely with UNHCR. It should approach member states of the European Union with a clear plan for assistance in the areas of police and judicial reform and citizen security, including the defence of human rights and social investment. Such help, however, may reasonably be expected only if the Uribe administration demonstrates that it is prepared and able to balance security and the protection of fundamental rights far more effectively than it has done so far; and to match extension of "hard" security measures to the previously abandoned rural areas with "soft" security measures that offer social services and economic benefits.

Bogotá/Brussels 13 November 2003

APPENDIX A MAP OF COLOMBIA



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