

**FROM KABILA TO KABILA
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE CONGO**

16 March 2001

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FROM KABILA TO KABILA

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE CONGO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Joseph Kabila, son of the late Laurent Désiré Kabila, speaks a far more peaceful language than that of his bellicose father. But he will not be able to deliver peace alone, and there are already signs that the many parties to the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo are heading for renewed confrontation. In a Congo that continues to fragment, Kabila's patrons and his enemies are beginning to quarrel among themselves. What looms are a series of battles as the factions struggle for influence and spoils.

The assassination of Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 and the appointment of his son Joseph as President of the DRC brought fresh hope to the stalled Lusaka Peace process. The new president swiftly agreed to the deployment of a United Nations military observer force (MONUC) to oversee troop withdrawals, and he approved the appointment of Sir Ketumile Masire to open a vital Inter-Congolese Dialogue. There has also been contact between Kabila and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, his father's old enemy, on disarmament of the forces associated with the Rwandan genocide of 1994, who found refuge in Congo. The UN Security Council hailed these gestures of goodwill by approving the deployment of MONUC in February to verify disengagement of forces, and almost immediately Rwandan and Ugandan forces began some troop withdrawals.

But these positive steps on disarmament and disengagement are being undermined by the ongoing political struggle for influence and access to resources, which will make the Inter-Congolese Dialogue a very difficult exercise. It is still not clear how strong Joseph Kabila's true commitment to the peace process is, nor the extent of his real influence over the DRC's ruling elite. Kabila's nominal allies, Angola and Zimbabwe, deeply mistrustful of each other, are trying to push their own interests through Congolese proxies. Zimbabwe, suspicious of the security breach that enabled Laurent Kabila to be killed, has detained numerous Congolese associated with Angola, including Eddy Kapend, the military officer who appeared on television shortly after the assassination calling for calm.

The rifts between former allies are not confined to the pro-Kabila side. Rwanda and Uganda, once united against Laurent Kabila, are showing further signs that their relationship has frayed. President Yoweri Museveni recently called Rwanda a "hostile state," accusing it of giving financial support to his domestic political opponents during the recent elections. In turn, Rwanda has accused Uganda of harbouring some of President Kagame's opponents.

In Kinshasa, hardliners are back in control of the government, opposing any dialogue with anti-government rebels until there is a total military withdrawal of all foreign forces. The rebels, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, refuse any dialogue without a power-sharing agreement. Frustrated by the lack of progress, the powerful Ugandan-backed rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba has already threatened to reopen fighting. There appears, therefore, to be long odds against the Inter-Congolese Dialogue ever starting. If it does begin, it is likely to become a new theatre for strife between all the competing interests.

The success of the Lusaka process is critical for lasting peace in Congo and all of Central Africa. This giant land is a state in name only. Its structures are destroyed and regions fragmented between enemies and friends. It urgently needs a power-sharing agreement that includes unarmed opposition groups and rebel representatives as well as pro-Kabila factions. It needs a government of transition and a new constitution. None can be achieved without vigilance and support from all parties involved and the international community.

Strict conditions over assistance to Joseph Kabila must be enforced to overcome the political resistance to an Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Failure to act will mean a resumption of hostilities, a war of succession and further fragmentation of the country into semi-permanent spheres of military influence and the certainty of worse crises to come.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

A. On Disengagement

1. Maintain pressure on the belligerents to disengage their forces under the terms of the Kampala and Harare Disengagement Plans.
2. Maintain pressure on Rwanda and Uganda on the one hand, and Angola and Zimbabwe on the other, to negotiate in good faith on complete withdrawal of their forces from the DRC. Such pressure can be maintained through reassessments of their qualifications to receive military and financial aid, debt relief and trade privileges.

B. On Dialogue

3. Give provisional support, including the progressive resumption of development aid, to Joseph Kabila's regime on condition that: 1) he liberalises political activities and frees political prisoners; 2) he guarantees freedom of movement to all participants to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue as well as a peaceful working environment for Ketumile Masire's team in Kinshasa; 3) he agrees to participate in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue as outlined in the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement by supporting its preliminary and preparatory steps and consistently supporting Masire's activities.
4. Pressure the new government to immediately cease the repression of Kivutians and Equatorians on the territory it controls.
5. Pressure Rwanda and Uganda to have the RCD and FLC respect freedom of association in the territory they control and guarantee political party and civil society representatives' freedom of movement to meet Ketumile Masire's team.

6. Pressure Rwanda and Uganda to respect International Humanitarian Law in the Eastern DRC and to have the RCD and FLC arrest human rights abusers within their ranks and discipline them severely.

C. On Disarmament

7. Pressure the new government and its allies to immediately cease support of the ex-FAR and FDD factions and to encourage the FDD to join the Burundi peace process.
8. Direct the UN Observer Mission, MONUC, to commence planning for a comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement, and reintegration (DDRR) process of armed groups in the eastern DRC.
9. Implement UN Security Council Resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995), 1011 (1995), and 1341 (2001), as well as the recommendations of the report of the UN Commission of Enquiry on Rwanda (1997), which together provide a legal basis for the resumption of an arms embargo against the ex-FAR.

TO THE SIGNATORIES OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT

10. Immediately stop supporting the "negative forces" and co-operate as quickly as possible with MONUC in order to assess the needs for a major DDRR exercise.
11. Comply with the Kampala and Harare disengagement plan and start withdrawing from DRC.
12. Help the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by identifying the key interests to be negotiated in order to have a stable government emerge.

Nairobi/Brussels, 16 March 2001



FROM KABILA TO KABILA

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE CONGO

I. INTRODUCTION

Eighteen months of deadlock in efforts to end the war in the Congo came to a sudden end with the assassination of President Laurent Désiré Kabila on 16 January 2001. The late leader had been compelled to sign what he came to see as an unfavourable cease-fire agreement in the Zambian capital of Lusaka in July 1999, and had since obstructed implementation of its every term.¹ His replacement by his 29-year old son Joseph consequently gave new hope to the peace process.

The international community seized the opportunity afforded by the late president's murder and re-engaged in the DRC. Leaders in the U.S., Europe, and the United Nations immediately recognised the new president in order to give him the confidence to break from the policies of his father and implement the terms of the Lusaka cease-fire. In return, Joseph Kabila agreed to join an Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitated by the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, and welcomed a quick deployment of MONUC, the UN military observer mission for the Congo. The UN Security Council responded to these gestures with the passage of Resolution 1341 on 22 February 2001.

Yet no matter how hopeful the signs, peace in the Congo still remains to be achieved. The interests of the foreign belligerents and their Congolese allies do not favour the creation of a strong, independent and democratic state. In Kinshasa a dangerous contest to become Joseph Kabila's foremost foreign patron has sprung up between Angola and Zimbabwe. Similarly, in the east, tensions persist between different rebel groups and their competing Rwandan and Ugandan sponsors. None of these "strongman" governments are enthusiastic about an Inter-Congolese Dialogue or creation of a transition government built around the principles of power sharing. The late president's obstructionist policies had largely obscured these contradictions. Now that he is gone, they are certain to come to the fore.

The task of reconstruction, moreover, is daunting. After two regional wars, and 34 years of mismanagement, little remains of the Congolese state. Outside major towns and away from strategic locations, there is little or no government presence. Foreign armies and their mining operations control much of the country's legendary wealth, while rapacious militias and insurgent armies prey upon vast swathes of its

¹ For a comprehensive analysis of the war since the signature of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement see ICG Africa Report no. 26, *Scramble for the Congo. Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Nairobi/Brussels, 20 December 2000.

territory. In sum, the *de facto* disappearance of the DRC as a nation state is well underway.

A Joseph Kabila who is under the thumb of his foreign allies and the barons of his father's regime cannot reverse the country's decline. The same holds true for any other leader who might emerge from the rebellion or from within the present regime. What the country requires instead is an institutional rebirth, delivered through a Congolese Dialogue and a transition government with a mandate to organise rapid elections. This can only come about with regional co-operation and world engagement. Similarly the international community must overcome its frustration and lack of interest in Africa and live up to its calls for peace.

II. NEW PLANS FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT: A DIFFICULT ROAD AHEAD

The achievements of the 15 February 2001 regional summit on DRC in Lusaka and the 21/22 February Security Council meeting have revived hopes for a rebirth of the long-stalled peace process. The summit parties committed themselves to implement the Kampala and Harare plans for disengagement of forces, signed in April and December 2000.² In addition, Joseph Kabila accepted the former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire as the facilitator for the Inter-Congolese dialogue. The recent appointment of Brigadier General Njuki Mwanyiki of Kenya as the new Joint Military Commission (JMC) Chairman, as well as promises of UN cash, have revived the previously moribund organisation, which will soon be moved to Kinshasa.³

Then on 22 February 2001 the United Nation's Security Council returned its attention to the Congo by passing Resolution 1341, which again demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces and urged the parties to the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement to adopt a 'precise plan and schedule' by 15 May 2001. The Council demanded that the parties abide in the interim by their promises and start carrying out the Kampala and Harare disengagement plans on 15 March 2001. It also adopted a new Concept of Operations for MONUC, and confirmed its commitment to disarming the 'negative forces'.⁴

² The Kampala Plan, and Harare Sub-plan provide the operational details for the disengagement of belligerent forces. In phase one the parties will withdraw their forces 15 km from the Confrontation Line. In phase two they will concentrate their forces in Defensive Positions beyond the borders of the Demilitarised Zone for MONUC and JMC verification.

³ The JMC, made up of representatives of each signatory to the Lusaka Agreement was intended to plan, monitor and provide liaison for the cease-fire, disengagement and disarmament processes. It will now be co-located within MONUC HQ but is yet to function properly.

⁴ 'Concept of Operations' is a doctrinal military term used to refer to the broad outline of how a commander intends to accomplish his mission. A change in the Concept of Operations does not imply a change in the mission. 'Negative forces' is a term used in the Lusaka Agreement to describe armed groups other than government forces operating from the territory of the DRC. They include FAR, ADF, LRA, UNRF II, NALU, Interahamwe militias, FUNA, FDD, WNBF, UNITA and others.

A. Resolution 1341: The Return of the French

The Security Council resolution was a victory for the French diplomats who wrote it. Since the beginning of the war in August 1998, Paris has always been concerned to prevent the *de facto* partition of the DRC, the second largest francophone country in the world. It has condemned the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of the Congo as akin to the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in spite of his foibles, it recognised Laurent Kabila as the legitimate national leader of his country.⁵ After the Congolese president was compelled to sign the Lusaka cease-fire that was meant to bring about his fall from power, France continued to buttress his regime. Its worst enemy in this effort, it often seemed, was the erratic character of the late Congolese president himself, who consistently lived up to his poor reputation. The accession of his apparently more reasonable son, combined with U.S. acquiescence, permitted France to lead the new international effort.

French diplomacy began to capitalise on the mistakes of the Rwandan and Ugandan invaders last summer. After six days of fighting between their armies in the north-eastern city of Kisangani in June 2000 during which some 700 civilians perished, France orchestrated a Security Council condemnation (Resolution 1304). It called for immediate withdrawal of Rwandan and Uganda forces and noted with concern the continuing illegal exploitation of the DRC's natural resources. The same post-Kisangani displeasure with Rwanda and Uganda is echoed in Resolution 1341. Alone among the belligerents in the DRC, the two are singled out by name in the Council's demand for a withdrawal of foreign forces. In addition, the Council expressed support for the expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources, set up by resolution 1304, and affirmed that it was willing to put an end to these practices. The resolution also kept alive the prospect of deploying UN peace-keepers to the eastern borders of the DRC. Paris and Kinshasa have long argued that this would hinder the *de facto* partition of the country. Finally, the Council reaffirmed interest in the long-time project of French President Jacques Chirac for an international conference on peace, security, democracy, and development in the Great Lakes region. This proposal displeases Kigali and Kampala, who fear being outnumbered by Francophone Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and the Central African Republic, as well as Kabila's SADC allies. They argue this venue would not produce solutions for the Congo's reconstruction and the disarmament of armed groups.⁶

In spite of its criticism, Rwanda is not unhappy with Resolution 1341, which could have been much tougher. Paris' recognition of the need to disarm the ex Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex FAR) and Interahamwe militias⁷, and its call for an end to state support for these forces, reveals that it no longer systematically rejects the security arguments Rwanda uses to justify its presence in the Congo. The document makes no mention of sanctions against Kigali.

In order to bring about this rapprochement with France, Kigali seems to have accepted Paris' unwillingness to repent for its role in the 1994 genocide.⁸ This change of heart is due in part to France's readiness to forego efforts to undermine

⁵ ICG Interview, French Foreign Ministry official, Paris, 5 January 2001.

⁶ ICG interview, Rwanda security official, Kigali, 17 January 2001.

⁷ Ex-FAR and Interahamwe are the forces that carried out the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

⁸ Kigali's intention to re-open its Paris embassy is additional evidence of this warming of relations between the two countries.

Rwanda in multilateral organisations, as well as Kigali's fear of an electoral defeat for the Labour government in the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Blair, like U.S. President Clinton, always strongly supported the Kagame regime. Were he to be upset in the election anticipated later this year and relations with France to remain poor, Kigali would be dangerously exposed in the Security Council, and European Union councils.⁹

France's primary interest is to protect its oil-producing friends (Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Angola), and to reassure its Francophone African clients that Paris will stand behind them if their regimes are threatened. Since its reduced military presence on the ground calls into question its Cold War defence agreements with African countries, Paris must demonstrate that it can still win diplomatic battles. Resolution 1341 therefore marks the return of Paris to the forefront of Great Lakes diplomacy.

The French diplomatic activity comes as a relief to other permanent members of the Security Council, who hope to limit their own involvement in the Congolese imbroglio. The new U.S. President George W. Bush is showing no signs of engaging significantly in the continent's issues. Belgium, long one of the most active Western countries in the Congo, has limited resources and needs to build alliances for its turn as EU President in the second half of 2001.¹⁰

So far, the French diplomatic comeback has served the interests of the DRC government. However the free hand given to Paris does not bode well for the Congolese people if it permits France to continue its past unquestioning support for the Mobutu and then Kabila regimes.

B. Less is Better: MONUC's New Concept of Operations

The long stalled MONUC has started deploying following passage of Resolution 1341. This hopeful development results in part from the political thaw that accompanied Joseph Kabila's rise to power. At the same time, it is the consequence of serious rethinking within the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on how to accomplish its mission more effectively.

The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement originally called upon the UN to deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII mandate. The force's expected role was to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces, to collect and account for weapons held by civilians, and to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict. The mission also included peace enforcement. UN troops were to track down and disarm non-signatory forces, screen them for mass killers and other war criminals, and hand over suspected '*génocidaires*' to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

The enormity of the task of deploying a peacekeeping force to the DRC whatever its mandate was clear from the outset. Security Council officials in New York were loath to accept responsibility for what they expected to be a disaster. The U.S. Congress, which contributes one-third of any peacekeeping operation's budget, was equally wary of what appeared to be a dangerous Congolese quagmire.

⁹ Interview, French Diplomat, Kigali, 24 January 2001, and Rwandan diplomats, Kigali, Washington, February 2001.

¹⁰ ICG interviews, Belgian Foreign Ministry and EU officials, Brussels, February 2001.

Compelled to placate these conflicting concerns, the UN Secretary General decreed that the force deployed to the Congo must be both militarily credible and cheap. Armed with this guidance DPKO planners designed a Concept of Operations for MONUC, which was adopted on 24 February 2000 by the Security Council (Resolution 1291). In addition to 500 observers and support units, the UN would deploy four mechanised infantry battalions. This force was to establish four strong points in the DRC to which, in the event of trouble, the observers could retreat. The total mission would number 5,537 soldiers.

Over the next year the shortcomings of this plan became clear. The immediate task of the observers was to verify and monitor the disengagement of belligerents. The concept of operations implied, however, that this would have to wait for the deployment of the infantry battalions, which was expected to take at least six months. Moreover, planners could expect additional delays due to the uncertain availability and preparedness of units the member states had pledged. Finally, it was never clear what purpose these armed forces would serve once deployed.¹¹ From the outset, pundits ridiculed the notion that a four-battalion strong MONUC was militarily credible or even capable of defending itself. UN officials agreed that only a massive force could realistically bring a semblance of security to the country. Anything less, they worried, would encourage false expectations among the Congolese that would probably lead to another humiliating peacekeeping failure.

While the revised Concept of Operations is a substantial improvement¹², it leaves some questions unanswered. Planners have once again side stepped how to disarm groups such as the Interahamwe in the hope that the belligerents reach a political consensus. UN officials now think 'the only solution to disarmament is co-operation between the government of Rwanda and the government of DRC'.¹³

Prior to Laurent Kabila's death, DPKO began to revise its concept of operations for the Congo. Its motivation was above all the logistical difficulties involved in equipping and deploying the four infantry battalions.¹⁴ Planners were also afraid that the UN would be unprepared to seize the moment if the belligerents suddenly agreed to begin disengagement.¹⁵ In fact, this had occurred after the signing of the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan, when a lack of funds for leasing aircraft prevented the immediate deployment of observers.¹⁶

Under the new operations plan, the re-tooled force is tailored to accomplish the limited mission of verifying and monitoring the disengagement of conventional forces. This is an achievable objective if the belligerents co-operate. The document identifies other likely missions such as the disarmament of armed groups and the reconstruction of the Congolese Army, but delays these tasks until a later stage.

¹¹ ICG Telephone interview with a senior MONUC commander, Kinshasa, 19 February 2001.

¹² The new plan is consistent with ICG's recommendations in ICG Africa Report N° 26, *The Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, 20 December 2000, cited in footnote 1.

¹³ Interview, DPKO officials, New York, 24 February 2001. For a full assessment of MONUC's mandate and first Concept of Operation see ICG Africa Report N° 26, *The Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, op cit.

¹⁴ The dilapidated state of DRC airfields, roads, and urban infrastructure presented MONUC logisticians with enormous obstacles to overcome. For example to deploy a single battalion to Kisangani was expected to take 75 days. ICG Interviews, MONUC logistical officers, Kisangani, August 2000; ICG Telephone interview with a senior MONUC commander, Kinshasa, 19 February 2001; See, *Scramble for the Congo*, op cit, p. 75.

¹⁵ ICG Interview with MONUC official, Goma, 13 February 2001.

¹⁶ ICG Interview, former senior MONUC commander, London, 10 January 2001.

The revised plan foresees deployment of approximately 2,500 personnel and decreases armed troops from 3,400 to 1,900. Based on the understanding that the primary threat facing the UN forces is theft or sabotage rather than armed attack, planners have decided to deploy 'guard and security companies' to protect MONUC equipment and installations, instead of the logistically burdensome mechanised battalions. These armed troops will not be capable of rescuing at risk observers however, as was foreseen in the original concept of operations. Commanders must therefore remain vigilant to threats faced by the observers and be ready to withdraw them from regions where they might be at risk. The force is also to be augmented by additional command and control, aviation, logistical, and medical capabilities.

The latest changes to MONUC are also calculated to serve political agendas. Early discussions of what should be done included the notion of establishing a permanent mechanism to monitor the cease-fire to be collocated with the JMC in Kisangani. French influence, and the new-found respectability of the Kinshasa regime has led the Security Council to consent to relocate the JMC in the Congolese capital as originally planned, instead of the rebel controlled but largely demilitarised Kisangani.¹⁷

When presented with the new plan, regional countries complained that the force was too small and revealed international double standards when dealing with African crises. For example, Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge noted with concern that the plan was a 'step-by-step gradualist and minimalist concept of operations' and 'conveyed an impression of hesitancy and doubt'.¹⁸ In response, officials at the UN rightly argue that the new force will be able to concentrate on its mission of verifying and monitoring the disengagement better since it will not be burdened by the infantry battalions. The smaller footprint, moreover, will counter unrealistic expectations of the Congolese and other belligerents concerning the real capabilities of the UN force to bring peace.¹⁹

C. The MONUC Disengagement Operation

Security Council resolution 1341 demands that the belligerents implement the Harare Disengagement Plan over four periods of two weeks each starting 15 March 2001. The process of verification by MONUC will begin on 29 March in the Southern Katanga region. Observers will gradually work their way northwards, spending two weeks in each of the four areas defined by the Kampala Plan. Once they have finished verifying compliance in one area, they will leave in place a smaller monitoring force and shift their efforts to the next. At the conclusion of the 56-day process, MONUC will field a force capable of observing the entire conventional front line.

The elimination of the security battalions will permit MONUC to focus on the essential – but still substantial – tasks required for the force to conduct its verification and monitoring mission.²⁰ Additional observers, vehicles of all types, and aviation assets must be deployed to the theatre. In addition, the security

¹⁷ United Nations. 'Permanent Mechanism'. Mimeo, DPKO, 4 January 2001.

¹⁸ Press release, SC 7015, 21 February 2001.

¹⁹ ICG Telephone interview with a senior MONUC commander, Kinshasa, 19 February 2001.

²⁰ ICG Interview with MONUC official, Goma, 13 February 2001.

companies must be deployed to protect high value equipment and supplies. To accommodate this influx of personnel and equipment, MONUC must prepare buildings, create logistical depots, establish field hospitals, and set up redundant communication networks for its newly established Mbandaka, Kisangani, Kananga, and Kalemie Sector Headquarters. The requirements of the aviation intensive operation will also necessitate the creation of a robust air operations command structure and adequate ground support capabilities in all these locations.

After the completion of the initial verification phase, 376 officers divided into 94 military observation (MILOBS) teams will conduct continuous monitoring operations. To ease co-ordination between the MILOBS and the belligerent forces, DPKO expects to create additional small co-ordination centres, located possibly at Basankusu, Boende, Lusambo, and Pweto. There may also be a need to reinforce the MONUC Headquarters staff in Kinshasa and the Military Liaison Offices (MLO) in the belligerents' capitals.²¹

Where possible, observers will conduct their duties from vehicles. In cases where there are no usable roads or airstrips, observers will be deployed by helicopter, then move on foot. MONUC also intends to use the more than 14,000 KM of navigable waterways in the DRC to move supplies, observers, and demonstrate a UN presence. Where possible, local craft will be used but the force also intends to deploy military patrol vessels.

Finally, MONUC intends to put in place an information operation to deliver the MONUC perspective to the Congolese and respond in a timely manner to erroneous statements made by the belligerents. In addition, the force means to become the official source for public and international information concerning the disengagement process.

The parties have demanded some modifications to the Harare Plan that will make MONUC's task more difficult.²² The most important of these concerns involves the increase of cantonment points from 38 to 70 sites, which will increase the number of locations for observers to monitor. Over time, however, MONUC expects that the logistical difficulties inherent in supporting dispersed locations will convince the belligerent forces to consolidate their positions. Other problems concern the status of Pweto and Ikela, key logistical nodes to which opposing forces are demanding access.²³ MONUC is willing to monitor activities in these towns but not to assume complete control. Negotiations to resolve these questions are underway in the JMC.²³

Once the initial disengagement process is over, the UN hopes to move towards a full withdrawal of the belligerent forces from the DRC. Resolution 1341 urged the parties to the Lusaka Agreement 'to prepare and adopt not later than 15 May 2001, in close liaison with MONUC, a precise plan and schedule which would lead to the completion of the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops' from the country. In addition, the resolution calls upon the Secretary General to provide the Security Council with a report on the progress of these efforts by 15 April.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² ICG Interview, Senior MONUC Commander, Kinshasa, 7 March 2001.

²³ On Pweto, see further below.

²³ ICG Interview, Senior MONUC Commander, Kinshasa, 7 March 2001.

The symbolic gestures from the parties that this diplomatic pressure for withdrawal seems to have provoked does not yet indicate real progress. For example when Rwanda pulled out of Pweto, the town remained under the control of *Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD) - Goma forces, which are widely suspected of including RPA soldiers.²⁴ Likewise, its offer to pull back 200 KM, to the easily defendable line of the upper Congo River has always been a device to gain the diplomatic upper hand while not surrendering any military advantage. The same holds true for Uganda's current withdrawal of 1,500 troops from Buta and Beni, which observers in Kampala interpret as either a security measure or a political gesture from President Yoweri Museveni on the eve of the 12 March presidential elections.

The Kinshasa government's allies are also reluctant to leave the DRC. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe told Belgian officials on his official visit to Brussels on March 7 that Zimbabwean National Defence Forces (ZNDP) would not pull back as long as the Kinshasa government was militarily threatened.²⁵ The Angolans are also nervous that a premature departure of their forces from the Congo would result in a vacuum that could be filled by a pro-UNITA government.

Fears of post-withdrawal chaos are not entirely unreasonable as the recent upsurge of fighting in South Kivu makes clear. The pullout of foreign forces would leave in place a variety of armed non-signatory groups who, in the case of the Rwandan and Burundian insurgent movements, are intent on violently subverting the regimes presently in power in Kigali and Bujumbura. The behaviour of the foreign forces however, is often the cause of much of the turmoil in the country. The Mai Mai uprising in South Kivu is partly a reaction to the Rwandan occupation. Similarly, the inept Ugandan pacification measures in the north-eastern province of Ituri and the willingness of Ugandan officers to take sides for money have provoked repeated outbursts of ethnic fighting, and risks becoming a full blown insurgency aimed at the Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF).

Ultimately, without a political consensus among the belligerents, there is little that MONUC can do to bring about a withdrawal of the foreign forces. The international community will not, and should not, send large numbers of peace-keepers to the Congo. Nevertheless, the relative stability of much of Equateur Province, controlled by Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the government-controlled territories demonstrates that there is in fact little need for foreign troops whether they are peace-keepers or armed belligerents. Instead what is required is a serious international commitment to disarm the so-called 'negative forces' in the eastern Kivus region whose presence justifies the foreign occupation.

²⁴ On 4 December 2000 RPA and RCD-Goma forces seized the town of Pweto, which under the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan was to have remained in the hands of the FAC and allied forces. Subsequently, on 2 March the RPA troops carried out a well-publicised 200 km withdrawal from the town that was meant to signal Kigali's desire for peace. RCD-Goma troops however, remained in place in the town. To secure their pull-back as well, in accordance with the Disengagement Plan, the Kinshasa government was compelled to agree to an effective amendment of the original plan's Confrontation Line, from which the belligerent forces are to pull back 15 km. Negotiations to resolve these matters were underway in the JMC, when on 7 March the government accused the RPA of having withdrawn only 10 km from the town. See 'DR Congo says Rwandan Pullback from Pweto Incomplete – Criticises UN "Lethargy"', RTNC TV, Kinshasa, in French 1230 GMT 6 March 2001. As monitored by the BBC.

²⁵ 'Mugabe Faces European Critics, Avoids Arrest', Reuters, Brussels, 5 March 2001.

D. Disarmament: At Last, a Plan of Action?

The new Concept of Operations also envisages a future requirement to disarm groups like the Interahamwe. DPKO planners have delayed this unpleasant assignment in the hope that the evolution of the political situation will make it somehow easier to think about. Resolution 1341 in fact 'urges all the parties to the conflict, in close liaison with MONUC, to prepare by 15 May 2001 for immediate implementation, prioritised plans for the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of all armed groups' identified in the Lusaka agreement. Whether this will ease DPKO's operational task, however, is uncertain.

Nevertheless, a dialogue of sorts has sprung up between the belligerents in the aftermath of Laurent Kabila's murder. Ugandan President Museveni confessed that the threat from the Ugandan rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), no longer justified the presence of the army in the Congo.²⁶ Similarly there has been an important evolution of Rwanda's position on the Interahamwe.

1. Rwanda and the Interahamwe/ex-FAR

Kigali did not cry over Laurent Kabila's assassination. The Congolese president's support for the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, in Rwanda's view made him a threat to its national security and therefore an obstacle to peace. The early fallout from Kabila's murder however, was not necessarily pleasing to Rwanda. The late president's stubborn and erratic behaviour had always made it easy for Kigali to justify its presence in the DRC. His unexpected death, in fact, prevented the RPA from exploiting its late 2000 battlefield victories at Pweto and in North Kivu. Along with the strategic North Katangan town, the Rwandans seized an enormous stock of war material and provoked the flight of thousands of *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC), Interahamwe, and other allied forces into Zambia. Simultaneous Interahamwe efforts to infiltrate north-western Rwanda collapsed in the face of RPA counterattacks. At present the Rwandan government reports that it has neutralised the Interahamwe 'division' in Masisi, and heavy fighting is taking place in Shabunda.²⁷

In retrospect the battle of Pweto was a turning point in Rwandan strategy. The rout of the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, Interahamwe, and other FAC allies in the town prompted a debate within the top ranks of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) regime. Some insisted that the victory should be exploited to destroy the Interahamwe in Katanga. Some even advocated pursuing those forces into Zambia, where they had taken refuge. Their case was reinforced by the reluctance of Zambia to turn over those forces to the RPA. Others in Kigali, however, insisted that the diplomatic costs of such an operation would be too high.²⁸ In the end their view was confirmed by the

²⁶ 'Museveni Hints at "Unilateral Withdrawal"', IRIN, 7 February 2001.

²⁷ ICG Interview, Rwanda Government security officials, Kigali and Goma, 12-13 February 2001; 'Fighting Raging in Eastern DRC', PANA, 21 February 2001.

²⁸ ICG Phone Interviews with US officials, Brussels, 18 January 2001, UN officials and Rwanda officials, New York, 21-22 February 2001.

cold reception President Kagame received during his trip to Washington in late January and early February 2001.

Free of the once popular view that Kagame represented a 'new generation' of African leaders or any responsibility for policy during the 1994 genocide, the new American administration has veered sharply from President Clinton's support for Kigali. The Republicans appear to have little patience for Rwanda's penchant for military solutions to its security problems. When Kagame refused to attend the 15 February summit in Lusaka that was intended to revive the peace process, the Americans responded with an expression of official disappointment. Rwanda subsequently announced its satisfaction with the outcome of the Lusaka summit but internationally, the damage had been done.

In sharp contrast to the reception it gave the Rwandan president, Washington embraced Joseph Kabila as someone capable of breaking the Congolese impasse. Kagame realized that his claims to be fighting a bad government no longer worked and moved quickly to demonstrate his good faith by meeting with the young Kabila in the U.S. on 1 February and withdrawing from Pweto later in the month.

These moves were accompanied by a subtle shift in Kigali's rhetoric concerning the Interahamwe. In his 7 February presentation to the Security Council, Kagame estimated their numbers to be 15,000, a dramatic decrease from previous informal RPF estimates that hovered near 40,000.²⁹ Moreover, Kagame no longer insists that all of these gunmen need to be brought to justice. The leaders should be arrested and transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, he says, but many can be reintegrated into Rwandan society through the *gacaca* institutions of traditional justice or resettled in West Africa. In other words, there seems to be a greater acceptance by the Rwandan regime of the principle of voluntary repatriation. If so, and if the international community provides financial support, the problem of the Interahamwe can be quickly resolved once Kinshasa stops backing them.³⁰

Following their presidents' meeting in Washington, discreet negotiations between the Rwandan and Congolese governments continued.³¹ Positive signals from Kinshasa helped in part to persuade Kagame to pull the RPA out of Pweto by 28 February. In a letter to the Security Council, the government of the DRC recognised the security concerns of Rwanda and the need to solve the Interahamwe/ex-FAR issue³². Since then, however, there has been no progress. Rwandan, Burundian, and RCD-Goma officials all claim that Joseph Kabila has continued his father's clandestine support for the Interahamwe and other Hutu insurgent movements in the Eastern DRC.³³ They speculate

²⁹ ICG Interviews, RPA Officers, Kigali, Goma, July-August 2000; See also ICG Report N° 26, *Scramble for the Congo*, op. cit.

³⁰ ICG Interviews with Rwandan officials, New York, February 2001.

³¹ ICG Interviews with UN officials, New York, 21 February 2001.

³² Letter from the DRC government to the Security Council, 26 February 2001.

³³ ICG Interviews with Rwandan and Burundian Government officials, and western diplomats, Kigali 10 March 2001; 'Des combats intenses font rage à l'est de la RDC', PANA, 19 February 2001.

that the recent increase in fighting in South Kivu and Burundi means that the new Congolese president intentionally permitted these forces to escape Katanga. As evidence, they point to reports that many Interahamwe fighters, along with senior commander Tharcisse Renzaho, are currently in Burundi. Rwanda is obviously very worried about this and has re-deployed the units it withdrew from Pweto between Uvira and Fizi-Baraka in order to block further infiltration. The RPA has also reinforced its southern border to stop any attempts to infiltrate into Rwanda.

2. International Support for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRR)?

There appears to be a temporary increase in international energy to confront the issue of disarmament of the 'negative forces.' A plan first circulated by the U.S. in mid-2000 has survived the presidential transition.³⁴ It envisions putting pressure on the Lusaka signatories to cease support for these groups, increasing efforts to apprehend their leaders, while simultaneously providing the necessary international financial means to fund a UN led voluntary Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRR) effort in the Eastern Kivus region. Recent improvements in transatlantic co-ordination on the subject, due in large measure to the increased French and Belgium involvement in the Congo peace process, also give hope that a solution is in sight. Finally, the World Bank has become more involved and has already launched a series of pilot projects in government-controlled territory.³⁵

This new commitment of the international community to disarmament is long overdue. The presence of forces like the Interahamwe in the Congo lies at the heart of the conflict, and no peace will endure while they remain a threat to Rwanda. Consultations within the region as envisioned in Resolution 1341 are a necessary first step. The international community must nevertheless prevent the issue from becoming irresponsibly politicised by the belligerents. In fact contradictions are already becoming evident. For example, the Burundian rebel *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (FDD), who are currently being solicited by the Burundian Peace Negotiations Facilitator Nelson Mandela to enter into direct peace negotiations with the government, are characterised by the Lusaka Agreement as negative forces. Other groups so identified in the original cease-fire, such as the Angolan UNITA rebels, have largely departed the DRC and are not a source of conflict there. Finally, since the Lusaka Agreement, a dramatic proliferation of Mai-Mai militias has occurred in the eastern DRC. These groups also need to be disarmed, in spite of the fact that they are not specifically identified as negative forces in the cease-fire agreement. These issues are likely to become obstacles to disarmament if efforts are left to the regional powers.

The competition for leadership of these efforts between regional countries also threatens progress. The Rwandans stayed away from the 15 February Lusaka summit because of their displeasure with Zambia's unwillingness to co-operate with Rwandan demands that they turn over the several thousand

³⁴ ICG Interview with US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, Nairobi, November 2000, and State Department officials, Brussels, Washington, January-March 2001.

³⁵ ICG Interview with World Bank official, Africa Department, Washington, 28 February 2000.

Interahamwe who fled into Zambia after their defeat at Pweto in early December 2000. They did so with the encouragement of South Africa, which has been seeking to replace Zambian President Frederick Chiluba as the regional peacemaker. The ANC said it held talks with the RCD and is planning to have talks with other Congolese delegations³⁶

To overcome these dangers, the UN will have to take the operational lead on disarmament. A useful first step would be to create a formal staff assigned to begin work on courses of action for the eventual UN managed DDRR effort. Recent fighting in South Kivu makes clear that it will not be easy to disarm these forces. Ultimately what is needed is a new political and economic vision for the Congo. This, in turn, will require a high profile mobilisation of expertise and resources for the country and its region. As testimony to its commitment to peace in the Great Lakes, the international community must hasten to launch this effort.

III. THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE: THE GREAT UNKNOWN

Additional problems are certain to surface over the actors' different interpretations of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement. Alongside the military questions, peace depends upon the progress of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. However, the acceptance of the belligerents to disengage does not mean that they are willing to move forward with political negotiations for power sharing. The rebels argue that Lusaka was negotiated and signed as a package and that all its elements are linked. Therefore, no dialogue can take place without both disengagement and disarmament of the 'negative forces'. Kinshasa, however, rejects linkage between the different dimensions of Lusaka, and demands urgent implementation of the disengagement plan.³⁷ In its letter to the Security Council of 26 February, the DRC government reaffirms that dialogue is an strictly internal matter. All parties are in fact positioning themselves for the looming battle over the modalities of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

A. Joseph Kabila's Uneasy Situation

Laurent Kabila's murder radically upset the tenuously stalemated war in the Congo. At the heart of the dramatic changes that followed is the enigmatic character of Joseph Kabila, the unelected and politically inexperienced new president of the DRC. Whether an Inter-Congolese Dialogue can move forward depends upon his willingness, and his freedom, to enter into the discussions.

1. Seducing the West: Kabila's Search for Legitimacy.

In the face of open doubts about his ability to succeed his father, Joseph Kabila quickly managed to tip the diplomatic balance in his favour. After an early meeting with South African President Thabo Mbeki in Kinshasa, Kabila launched a personal diplomatic offensive in Western capitals. With an invitation to a U.S. Congressional prayer breakfast extended to his father in hand, the new president hastened to Washington. There he met Kagame,

³⁶ "DRC Factional Delegation , ANC Hold Talks", PANA, March 8 2001.

³⁷ "She Okitundu : Aucun lien n'existe entre le retrait des troupes d'agression et la tenue du dialogue inter-congolais", *Le Potentiel*, 17 February 2001.

who had also been invited. Along the way, Kabila stopped in Paris to meet Jacques Chirac, who praised him profusely. In the U.S. he also met Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and presented himself to the Security Council. During these meetings, he reiterated his commitment to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and promised to work with MONUC to enable the UN observer force's full deployment. The grateful international community responded with praise and pledges of humanitarian support for the Congolese people.

To reinforce his image as a peacemaker, the new president also threw himself into the Burundi Peace Negotiations (BPN) by meeting with its facilitator, Nelson Mandela, and attending the 26 February Summit in Arusha.³⁸ Kabila probably hopes to make a separate peace with Bujumbura, which he views as the weak link of the invading coalition. The BPN model of drawn out discussions in which the government holds a position of advantage also appeals to Kabila as a potential model for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

Kabila's diplomatic efforts are also intended to secure financial assistance for his regime. He needs U.S.\$ 8 million monthly to finance the purchase of fuel and other essential products for maintaining stability in the capital, Kinshasa.³⁹ Because of the war, its financial mismanagement, and endemic corruption the Congolese government lacks these funds from its own resources. The liberalisation of currency controls and the opening of the diamond market Kabila's government announced among its first measures in January 2001 were in part designed to appeal to the multilateral donor institutions ahead of the new president's meeting with the President of the World Bank, IMF officials, and American businessmen.⁴⁰ The presence of Leonard She Okitundu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Jean-Claude Masangu, the Head of the Central Bank, in the government also helped Kabila make his case. Both men are seen as 'pro-western,' honest and competent, in stark contrast to many of their colleagues.⁴¹ As a result of Kabila's lobbying, his economic policies, and his decisions to facilitate humanitarian access throughout the DRC, some foreign aid will now find its way to Kinshasa.⁴² The U.S., for example, announced that it would provide U.S.\$ 10 million for

³⁸ His father had brokered the first direct meeting between President Pierre Buyoya and CNDD-FDD rebel leader Jean Bosco-Ndayikengurukiye in Libreville shortly before his death on 6 January 2001.

³⁹ 'Carburant: la situation pourrait se normaliser le week-end avec 250 m3 livrés par jour', *Le Potentiel*, Kinshasa, 23 February 2001.

⁴⁰ The announcement of the lifting of currency controls alone provoked a temporary 30 per cent fall of the U.S. dollar rate on the black market. See 'Les perspectives de libéralisation font chuter le dollar US', PANA, 29 January 2001.

⁴¹ Masangu, has been tipped to take over as Finance Minister. She Okitundu is the former Minister for Humanitarian Affairs who replaced Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi as Foreign Affairs Minister in November 2000. His nomination was thought to have been prompted by the inability of Ndombasi to carry out his duties as a result of his international indictment by a Belgian court for his role in the August 1998 massacres of Tutsis in Kinshasa.

⁴² On 8 February the Minister of Health in Kinshasa gathered all humanitarian agencies present in the city to announce President Kabila's to participate in a countrywide humanitarian assessment, in co-operation with NGOs and the UN, in order to prepare an international for aid. Most of the government controlled half of the country had been off-limits to aid workers from 199-2001. See 'Winds of Change, Kinshasa', email from OCHA Kinshasa, 9 February 2001.

humanitarian assistance. Similar talk was heard in EU circles, and a World Bank mission closely followed Joseph Kabila's return to Kinshasa.⁴³

2. But There is Trouble in Kinshasa

These positive diplomatic developments are overshadowed by the dangerous power struggle that has erupted in Kinshasa between the DRC's Angolan and Zimbabwean allies.

During the tense interlude that followed Laurent Kabila's assassination, the two erstwhile allies' forces at first worked to maintain stability in the Congolese capital. Their troops disarmed the *Police d'Intervention Rapide* (PIR) and the *Forces d'Intervention de la Capitale* (FIC) in preparation for the funeral. Afterwards Angolan and Zimbabwean soldiers guarded important officials and strategic installations throughout the country.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, tension sparked by differences over the future course of the war soon arose between the two allies. Luanda approved of Joseph Kabila's conciliatory attitude towards Rwanda and Uganda because it saw little interest in continuing the war. The primary objective of its intervention has always been to deny use of the Congo to the insurgent UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi. Notwithstanding reports of a rise of guerrilla activity in Angola, this mission has been largely accomplished. Luanda would no doubt like to see a weak but stable regime in Kinshasa capable of policing its own frontiers but does not feel this is worth the expense of a continued large-scale military presence in the DRC. Therefore, it pushed Kabila to accept implementation of the Lusaka cease-fire, including the deployment of MONUC and the start of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

Unlike Angola, Zimbabwe did not appreciably moderate its position on the conflict. National prestige and the personal pride of President Mugabe have always been at the heart of Zimbabwe's intervention. The recent disaster at Pweto in which the ZNDF lost large stocks of military equipment makes it more difficult for the Harare strongman to accept a pull-out which his domestic opponents in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) would paint as a defeat in advance of Zimbabwe's presidential election. There are other obstacles to a pull out, such as the fact that many of the troops who would return home are from the region of Zimbabwe where opposition to Mugabe has traditionally been strongest.⁴⁵ The units are said to be plagued by a morale sapping mixture of alcoholism, disease, and political discontent. Finally, fears that the new DRC government would not honour financial promises to ZANU-PF leaders also blocked any thoughts of a withdrawal.

⁴³ 'Michel Annoyed by EU Dithering on Congo', *De Standaard*, Brussels, 27 February 2001.

⁴⁴ ICG Interview, Telephone call to Kinshasa, 28 January 2001.

⁴⁵ Matebeleland is a stronghold of the internal political opposition to President Mugabe. Telling indicators of this discontent include court martial proceedings against ZNDF soldiers who deserted their posts in Pweto to flee to Zambia. Others have reportedly renounced their military status, and remain in Zambian refugee camps. See United Nations. Security Council. 'Sixth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo' 12 February 2001.

New footnote: *Kadogo* is a general term used in Congo to describe soldiers who have been recruited as children.

These differences between Angola and Zimbabwe quickly sparked tension in the Congolese capital. Harare suspected that behind Angola's new moderation was an effort to undermine its financial interests in the Congo. To fight back, Zimbabwean officials began casting doubt on the official explanation that *kadogo* (add footnote below) soldiers alone murdered Laurent Kabila. They suggested that there were serious lapses in Kinshasa's Angolan dominated internal security hierarchy.

At first Angola appeared to have retained its dominant position in Kinshasa, largely due to its powerful army and its geographical proximity to the Congolese capital. This influence seemed assured by the continued presence of its Mulunda ally, Presidential Aide de Camp Eddy Kapend in the regime's inner circle. Meanwhile, reputed hardliners like the Mulubakat Minister for Home Affairs, Gaëtan Kakudji, appeared to have been sidelined and were expected to be eased out in a ministerial reshuffle. Kakudji, moreover, who like Kapend was a cousin to the late president, was perceived as a rival to Joseph Kabila.

Then, to Luanda's dismay, the balance of power in Kinshasa lurched towards Zimbabwe and its Balubakat allies, led by the minister of justice, Mwenge Kongolo (another cousin of the late president). On 24 February Kapend⁴⁶ and fellow Mulunda, General Yav Nawesh, the commander of the Kinshasa garrison and brother-in-law to the late president, were secretly arrested for complicity in the assassination.⁴⁷ Pierre Victor Mpoyo, the Angolan backed former Minister of Petroleum and close friend to President Dos Santos, was rumoured to be in hiding as a result of the investigation. Diplomats meanwhile reported that Harare was arming the Balubakat elements in the Kinshasa PIR and the *Force d'Autodéfense Populaire* (FAP).⁴⁸ But then in early March, while the new president was attending the pan-African summit in Libya, the direction of events in Kinshasa again changed when Kongolo was reportedly put briefly under house arrest.⁴⁹

Joseph Kabila's role in these affairs remains murky. The return of 400-600 veterans of the *Forces Armées Zairoises* (FAZ) from Brazzaville, reportedly orchestrated by General Denis Kalume, is suspected to mark the beginning of a military force loyal to the new president.⁵⁰ The 9 March reshuffle of the top military commanders also suggests that Kabila is seeking to assert his own control over the army. The appointment of new advisers on 14 March confirm that the Lundas from South Katanga, who have strong links with Angola, are the losers of the recent reshuffles. The noticeable hardening in his recent statements, such as the accusation that Rwanda has committed

⁴⁶ At the time of writing there were unconfirmed reports that Kapend had been executed.

⁴⁷ 'A Kinshasa, l'homme-clé de la succession Kabila a été arrêté', *Le Monde*, Paris, 27 February 2001. Kapend personally executed a bodyguard suspected of the assassination. General Yav Nawesh was responsible for disarming the troops of Camp Kokolo and Camp Tchatchi, the day before the assassination. Kongolo's allies reportedly include the Minister for Home Affairs Gaëtan Kakudji, the Inspector General of the Police General Celestin Kifwa, the Minister of Finance Mwana Nanga Mawapanga, and the Governor of Katanga.

⁴⁸ ICG interview, Western diplomat, Kigali, 5 February 2001.

⁴⁹ 'L'heure des règlements de comptes à Kinshasa', *Le Soir*, Brussels, 5 March 2001.

⁵⁰ 'Sassou largue 600 ex-FAZ à Kinshasa', *Palmarès*, Kinshasa, 26 February 2001; ICG Interview, Western Diplomat, Kigali, 5 March 2001.

genocide in the Congo, may suggest that he has reached an accommodation with Harare.⁵¹

The New FAC Leadership⁵²	
Chef d'état-major des armées (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)	Lieutenant Général Sylvestre Lwetcha The elderly Lwetcha remains at the top of the FAC. His presence in the office is a symbol of Kinshasa's continued support for the Mai Mai militias
Chef d'état-major au quartier général (Assistant Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)	Brigadier Général Dieudonné Kayembe Ex-FAZ. Has no known constituency.
Commandant des forces terrestres (Commander of Land Forces)	Brigadier Général François Olenga Olenga is a confidant of Joseph Kabila, who he succeeds in this post. He has no military training. His nomination likely represents an attempt to maintain political control of the army.
Commandant des forces navales (Commander of Naval Forces)	Major Général Liwanga Hata Ex-FAZ.
Commandant des forces aériennes (Commander of Air Forces)	Brigadier Général John Numbi Numbi replaces Faustin Munene, who had been a key ally to the Angolans.
Chef d'état-major des forces terrestres (Chief of Staff – Land Forces)	Brigadier Général Lukama Ex-FAZ with a professional military education, Lukama may be an improvement for the FAC.
Chef d'état-major des forces navales (Chief of Staff – Naval Forces)	Colonel Damas Kabulo Kabulo was the head of the <i>Détection militaire des activités anti-patrie</i> (DEMIAP) internal wing. His new appointment is a clear demotion, which may be due to the late president's assassination. It is likely, moreover, that Joseph Kabila could not remove Kabulo, who is a Mulabakat relative.
Inspecteur général des forces armées congolaises Inspector General	Général Delphin Mulangu Ex-FAZ. Professional military education.
Commandant du service national National Service Commander	Général Faustin Munene. Powerless position.
Administrateur général de l'agence nationale de renseignement (ANR) General Administrator for the National Intelligence Agency	Kazadi Nyembwe A confidant to the late president, with whom he lived in Dar es-Salaam and Uganda. Former head of Co-Hydro. - Likely to be Joseph Kabila's key internal security man.

⁵¹ Interview with Joseph Kabila, by Colette Braeckman, *Le Soir*, Brussels, 8 March 2001.

⁵² République Démocratique du Congo. Décrets présidentiels, n° 010/2001, 011/2001, 012/2001, 013/2001, 014/2001 et 15/2001', 9 March 2001; ICG interview with western diplomats, Kigali, 10 March 2001.

<p>Conseiller spécial en matière de sécurité Special Advisor on Security Matters</p>	<p>Maître Jean Mbuyu Muyongola. A former advisor to Laurent Kabila, his role remains unclear, but he has been present since Joseph Kabila's rise to power. Muyongola comes from Bas-Congo, and he is probably tasked to maintain control of this important capital region constituency.</p>
<p>Armed forces: The changes at the top of the FAC represent an obvious return of the FAZ under the leadership of General Denis Kalume, who was said to have been given that job by the Angolans. The new president is looking for men loyal to him, and the ex-FAZ are one obvious source. The return of 400-600 ex-FAZ from Congo-Brazzaville is another indicator of this trend. These changes are not likely to provide much improvement to the quality of the FAC though. Ex-FAZ are not known for discipline, courage and efficiency. The new chief of the land forces has no formal military training, for example. More likely is a continued state of confusion within the armed forces, caused by ex-FAZ attempts to supplant the unpopular Angolan and Zimbabwean 'forces of occupation'. The ex-FAZ also have outstanding quarrels dating from 1997 with the Balubakat militias and the Angolan-Lunda gendarmes and "Katangese Tigers". If these disputes are not contained, Kinshasa is likely to witness violent armed clashes.</p> <p>Security services: Joseph Kabila is replacing the arrested Georges Leta Mangasa (former general administrator of the ANR) and Constantin Nono Lutula (former presidential adviser on security matters) with his own men. Their leader is Kazadi Nyembwe, the former head of Co-Hydro and a long time associate and friend of the Kabila Family. The rivalry between the already existing Balubakat and Balunda factions within the different security services is nevertheless likely to continue.</p>	

Wracked by an internecine power struggle, Kinshasa is in a state of dangerous confusion. The investigation into Laurent Kabila's murder, which was to have been wrapped up by early March, has been extended another month. An atmosphere of insecurity has crept over the city, prompted by continuing arrests and revelations that security services mysteriously executed approximately eleven Lebanese nationals in the aftermath of the President's assassination.⁵³

In part this dangerous situation is due to the divide and rule strategies of the late president. His efforts to prevent rivals from emerging have left the Congo threatened by the feuds of his lieutenants. It is also due to the destabilising presence of the self-serving allied forces. The Angolans appear to be trying to repeat the failed 1996 efforts of the Rwandans to build a Congolese army and a controllable government. Harare meanwhile is struggling to maintain its grip on the legendary wealth of the DRC, with which it believes economic recovery can be fueled in Zimbabwe. A clash between the two armies, as occurred between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani, cannot be ruled out.

These ominous developments cast doubt on Joseph Kabila's freedom to decide the future of his country. Equally questionable however, is the new

⁵³ 'Government Demands Role in Congo Murders probe', *Daily Star*, Beirut, 9 march 2001.

president's willingness to permit the political liberalisation required for a successful Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

3. The Internal Front: Continued Repression

On the internal political front Joseph Kabila has so far followed the path of his father while concealing this reality behind vague and seductive promises. There has been no sign of a loosening of the government's grip over politics in the spirit of the Lusaka Agreement. In his first address to the nation, the new president deftly avoided any recognition of the still illegal political opposition. To the disappointment of many moreover, he did not announce the abrogation of Presidential Decree 194 of 1997 that restricted the activities of political parties. Nor did he free any political prisoners. In fact he even praised the unpopular institutions crafted by his father for controlling opposition political activities: the *Comités de Pouvoir Populaire* (Committees for People's Power, CPP), the FAP, and the *Assemblée Constituante et Législative –Parlement de Transition* (Legislative and Constituent Assembly – Parliament of Transition, ACL-PT).

Yet, he promised that the dreaded *Cour d'Ordre Militaire* (Court of Military Order, COM) was to have its jurisdiction immediately limited to military matters and invited all political actors and representatives of civil society to join him in Libreville for the preparatory phases of an eventual Inter-Congolese Dialogue. 'Political problems of prime importance must find their solutions within the framework of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue', he said. 'I call on all the political actors as well as members of the civil society to join without hesitation the preparative efforts for the success of this dialogue, namely pursuing efforts to ensure the conclusion of the Libreville process.'⁵³

Efforts to broaden the government seem to have been stillborn. In the current atmosphere of uncertainty, a government reshuffle that would create an opening for opposition and civil society leaders seems unlikely to occur or will be at best limited. Several meetings between Kabila and opposition political parties have been cancelled because of mutual suspicion and suspected manipulation. In the end, the opposition leaders refused to accept the president's conditions. 'We did not know what the agenda would be or who would be there', said one. 'We would have been there with the people's power committees and other groups like that. We are no longer willing to go to political fairs.'⁵⁴ The honeymoon optimism surrounding Kabila's promises to liberalise politics in the DRC has died.

4. Joseph Kabila on the Dialogue

It would be a surprise if the DRC government had appreciably changed its views on the discussions. The format for the talks outlined in the Lusaka ceasefire was expressly designed to unseat the regime of then President Laurent Kabila by forcing him to negotiate on an equal status with his many opponents. The same fate awaits his son Joseph and his 'uncles' if he enters into the dialogue. Even if Joseph accepted such a dialogue, it is unlikely that his father's allies, on whom he is still dependent, would allow him to proceed.

⁵³ RTNC TV Kinshasa, in French 1955 GMT, 26 Jan 2001. As monitored by the BBC.

⁵⁴ 'Congo's Kabila Delays Meeting Shunned by Opponents', Reuters, 1 March 2001.

Kabila's acceptance of Masire's role in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue nonetheless inspired euphoria among Congo's well-wishers. Resolution 1341 in fact 'welcomed the expressed willingness' of the DRC authorities 'to proceed with the dialogue under the aegis of the neutral Facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire.' The new president however, neglected to inform Masire of this change in position for another week.⁵⁵ Kabila, moreover, had previously told the UN Special Envoy to the DRC that no dialogue could take place prior to the complete withdrawal of foreign forces.⁵⁶

Kabila is not without international support for these positions. Paris in particular agrees that the reunification of the country must precede any binding talks. President Chirac spoke of the need for the country's integrity to be restored and for the Congolese people to enter into a dialogue when they wished. Likewise Portugal has indicated support for Kinshasa's views. Belgian officials emphasise that the laws on political parties must be rewritten, political prisoners be freed, and the dialogue started if Kabila wants to be seen as delivering on his promise of a political opening. However, they also quietly sympathise with his desire to avoid the regional and ethnic side effects of political liberalisation.⁵⁷

Ultimately there appears to be a fundamental contradiction in the international strategy to support the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Joseph Kabila enjoys no legitimacy as the president of his country. All sides, including his enemies, are ostensibly seeking to build up the young leader in order to give him the necessary confidence and authority to launch the dialogue. But if he shows himself to be a reasonable - and malleable - leader by accepting power sharing talks, will the region and world community ultimately still insist that he leave office?

B. The Rebels' View of the Dialogue

The rebel movements in control of over half the territory of the Congo uniformly rejected the selection of Joseph Kabila as president and demanded the immediate convening of the Inter-Congolese dialogue as provided in the 1999 Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement. The subsequent pictures of the young president's reception in Paris, Washington, New York, and Brussels left them enraged. Instead of being ostracised by the international community, Joseph Kabila had secured a *de facto* recognition as the country's legitimate president.

The format of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue remains uncertain. Rebel leaders ostensibly have a common view of the negotiations as well as the shape of a transitional government, which they formalised in the January 2000 Kyankwanzi

⁵⁵ ICG Interview, official from the Office of the Neutral Facilitator, 2 March 2001; 'Joseph Kabila bientôt face à la classe politique!' Kinshasa, 3 March 2001. The document is a Kinshasa newspaper article from an unknown source posted at www.digitalcongo.net/actualite/01-03-05-joseph.shtml. Masire is now scheduled to visit Kinshasa between 16 and 19 March 2001. "DR Congo Mediator Masire to Hold talks With Kabila in Kinshasa", SAPA, 10 March 2001.

⁵⁶ IRIN, Great Lakes briefing, 26 January 2001.

⁵⁷ See Interview with Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel, IRIN, 30 January 2001.

Accord.⁵⁸ Nothing, they argue, can be accomplished without working institutions of government. In particular they want unification of the army under a single commander. Bemba's claim to have built the most organised – and best disciplined – force is viewed by his supporters as a strong argument for him to get the post of Minister of Defence.⁵⁹

Rebel unity however, is unlikely to endure once the dialogue has begun. The dynamics of the talks are certain to feature competition between the armed groups for support of the unarmed opposition. RCD-Goma is likely to be at an extreme disadvantage because of its image as a puppet of Rwanda and the numerous human rights abuses its forces are known to have committed. Less certain will be the balance of support between Bemba and Kabila, both of whom must overcome significantly flawed reputations.

1. Bemba and the FLC: A Popular Movement?

Laurent Kabila's assassination left most Congolese feeling either humiliated or fearful. Yet in the normally sleepy towns of Equateur Province controlled by Jean-Pierre Bemba's rebel *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (MLC) the news sparked enthusiastic celebrations.

Public enthusiasm notwithstanding, the murder caught the MLC off guard. Bemba was unable to influence events in Kinshasa during the tense days of transition. He was similarly unable to temper the readiness of the international community to support Joseph Kabila. He could take solace in the conditions placed upon the new president, including acceptance of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, but Kabila's reception by the leading powers left him furious.

Nevertheless the rebel movement pledged to refrain from attacking government forces while diplomatic efforts were underway. This decision was in part forced upon Bemba since President Museveni of Uganda, who was embroiled in a tight re-election campaign, had no interest in a new military initiative.

In addition the rebel leader was distracted by the 16 January merger between his movement and the RCD-ML⁶⁰ factions loyal to Mbusa Nyamwisi and Atenyi Tibasiima to form the *Front de Libération du Congo* (FLC). As president of this new movement, Bemba is henceforth responsible for pacifying turbulent Ituri Province. Attacks by the Balendu population upon UPDF positions in January give this task greater urgency if the rebel leader hopes to maintain Uganda's confidence.⁶¹

⁵⁸ ICG interviews, MLC officials, Gbadolite DRC, 1-12 February 2001; MLC/RCD/RCD-ML 'Accord de Kyankwanzi: Rapport de travail de la commission politique de front commun MLC/RCD/RCD-ML', Kabale, Uganda, 21 December 1999.

⁵⁹ ICG interviews, MLC officials, Gbadolite DRC, 1-12 February 2001.

⁶⁰ *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie – Mouvement pour la libération*.

⁶¹ See also Human Rights Watch, "Congo : Massacres dans les regions controlées par l'Ouganda. Museveni est appelé à discipliner les troupes ougandaises à Bunia".

Most importantly however, Bemba held back because his strategy has always focused on achieving victory in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.⁶² Since he launched the MLC in November 1998, Bemba has sought to establish himself as the sole legitimate actor on the Congolese political stage. He subsequently devoted himself to the organisation of an army, a territorial administration, and the beginnings of a mass political party. The merger with RCD-ML has expanded his territory to encompass a third of the country, with a population of between fifteen and twenty million.

However, Bemba's preparations for the dialogue are incomplete. He has not yet overcome the lingering reputation of being a 'Mobutist', who would be likely to rule in the same manner as the long-time dictator. In addition he must make real progress in the pacification of Ituri to give credibility to his claim of being able to bring peace to the Congo. Doubts have already emerged. His initial efforts included coercive measures to force the predominantly Lendu militias in the forest to disarm by 15 February or be hunted down.⁶³ Since the Lendu's enemies, the Hema, mainly reside in towns and do not carry weapons openly, Bemba's strategy risks appearing one sided.

Other dangers loom for Bemba in the sudden acceleration of diplomatic activity that accompanied Joseph Kabila's accession to power in Kinshasa. MLC leaders suspect that the pre-war ties between Joseph Kabila and his former Rwandan patrons still exist. They fear that Kigali and possibly even Kampala will seek to use these ties to negotiate an end to the conflict or a suspension of hostilities.⁶⁴ This in turn could lead to an effort to undermine elements of the Lusaka Cease-fire, like the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, that do not serve the interests of Kabila or Rwanda. No matter how the situation evolves, Bemba swears that he will never recognise Kabila as president of the Congo. Should the nascent dialogue break down, he is intent on returning to war. As if to reinforce this point, MLC forces clashed with the FAC at Bolomba in southern Equateur in mid-March 2001.

2. RCD-Goma: Backs Against the Wall

RCD leaders claim to be eager for the start of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue. On 9 March the movement's secretary, General Azarias Ruberwa, told journalists in Belgium that 'only (a dialogue) would permit the establishment of who will lead the state during the period of transition'.⁶⁵ In the RCD's view he explained, these talks should last between 45 and 90 days and focus on building a national army, government, and parliament of transition. This should be followed by a two or three-year transition period focused on integrating RCD, FLC, and FAC forces as well as preparing national elections. Finally, he said, since it was the movement's revolt that brought about the dialogue and transitional regime, the RCD should receive the all-important transitional government presidency.

⁶² Interviews with MLC officials, Gbadolite, DRC, 1-2 February 2001.

⁶³ Policy announced in Nyankunde reconciliation meeting, Ituri province DRC, 8 February 2001.

⁶⁴ ICG interviews, MLC officials, Gbadolite DRC, 1-2 February 2001.

⁶⁵ 'Le RCD confirme sa participation au dialogue', BELGA, 9 March 2001.

In reality, however, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue holds little promise for RCD-Goma. Endemic corruption and rampant human rights abuses have left the movement with no support outside the Eastern Kasai region, home of its president, Adolphe Onusumba Yemba. Well aware of their looming political isolation, RCD-Goma leaders are reaching out for allies. The reluctance of others to associate too closely with the much-maligned movement, as well as its own internal divisions, will probably doom these efforts.

Ever since its creation at the war's outset, RCD-Goma has been an albatross around Kigali's neck. Out of patience, Kigali deposed President Emile Illunga in November 2000 and purged the movement's top ranks. Since then, Rwandans claim to be pleased with its performance. They assert that it is now led by honest and competent professionals, who have met the January and February payrolls of their 30,000 government workers.⁶⁶

The movement's leaders, however, are less sanguine about their prospects and have begun to fear being sacrificed by Kigali. For example, Kagame acknowledged before the UN Security Council that the rebel movement was guilty of human rights abuses in order to argue that Rwanda's own forces were free of such practices.⁶⁷

The movement is similarly concerned by the evolution of the BPN and in particular the increased ties between Kinshasa and Bujumbura. The Buyoya regime has been an important ally to the RCD, and its defection would expose the movement's southern flank to the FAC and its Burundian and Rwandan Hutu allies. The Bifulero, Bavira, Babembe, and Babwari inhabitants of this region, moreover, provide the most militant of the anti-RCD Mai Mai militias.

Movement leaders realize that they must separate themselves from Rwanda in order to prepare the ground for a potential alliance with the unarmed opposition in the upcoming Inter-Congolese Dialogue. They are also intent on stopping Joseph Kabila from monopolising the diplomatic stage by making the case for the justice of their cause. Finally, the movement is concerned to limit the political effects of the upcoming report by the UN expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, set up by Resolution 1304 from June 2000.

In an effort to forestall these dangers, the movement has attempted to reach out in new directions in the early months of 2001. Senior leaders have paraded through Europe and North America, and President Adolphe Onusumba Yemba intends to do the same in the near future. Internally the movement has been pushing its support of a federal government structure to the autonomy-minded leaders of the South Kivu Mai Mai. It is also talking with a variety of opposition leaders and figures from the former Mobutu regime.

⁶⁶ ICG interviews, Goma and Kigali, 1-13 February 2001.

⁶⁷ For a different view see: Human Rights Watch, 'Congo : Rwanda responsible for severe abuses: US should urge Kabila, Kagame to protect civilians', Washington, 1 February 2001.

3. Rebel Suspicions of One Another

The desire for a stronger position in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue has also prompted RCD-Goma to seek a common front with Jean-Pierre Bemba, and the new Ugandan backed FLC umbrella movement. To date, however, these efforts have enjoyed no success. A meeting scheduled for 3 March in Goma to map out a common strategy appears to have been blocked by Uganda.⁶⁸

The RCD believes that Bemba is at a political disadvantage because he controls no major Congolese cities. They explain the January clashes near Banalia as an effort by the MLC to take Kisangani. Bemba in turn sees the RCD as a political failure and believes it is divided between the Banyamulenge and the other ethnicities. Distrustful of Rwanda, he would like to fashion an agreement with the non-Tutsi RCD leaders but would probably insist on being in charge.

The continued mutual suspicions between the Ugandan and Rwandan rebel camps prevent deeper co-operation. Uganda supported creation of the FLC in part to counter Rwanda's military success at Pweto, which it feared would convince Kagame to advance on the southern Katangan city of Lubumbashi. Another source of tensions is Museveni's suspicion that Rwanda provided moral and financial support to the campaign of his opponent, Colonel Kiiza Besigye, in Uganda's 12 March presidential election.

C. Masire's Plan

Out of touch with the Kinshasa authorities for nine months, the facilitator's office has made little progress in organising the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Once contact is re-established in full, Masire intends to convene rapidly a preliminary meeting in which he would present his plans and signatories of the Lusaka cease-fire would agree on how to move the talks forward. A 'preparatory meeting' would follow in which the signatories would meet with a 'representative sampling' of the political opposition and civil society to agree upon the venue, date, agenda, and procedural rules for the dialogue itself.⁶⁹

There appears to be little agreement on the context in which the dialogue would unfold. In contrast to many of the rebels, who believe a transitional government should be put in place before the dialogue, Masire sees the talks as ending in the establishment of a transitional government to run the country until elections can be held. Consequently, he intends to organise electoral, constitution, humanitarian-development, and military commissions so that discussions encompass the entire breadth of Congolese political institutions.

The problem of a Francophone co-facilitator also continues to bedevil the English-speaking Masire's office. This demand, originally made by Laurent Kabila after he had already agreed to the former Botswana president's appointment, was always a means either to delay or undermine the equal status format envisaged in the Lusaka Agreement. The rebels consequently reject the idea of a co-facilitator on

⁶⁸ ICG Interview, FLC Official, Kampala, 3 March 2001.

⁶⁹ ICG Interview, Officials from the office of the Neutral Facilitator, Nairobi, 20/02/01.

the grounds that it is unnecessary and not part of the Lusaka Agreement.⁷⁰ The suggestion of Gabon's president, Omar Bongo, as a co-facilitator, supported by the DRC, the French and the Belgian governments, is also worrisome. Even with a limited role, President Bongo hardly qualifies as a credible Francophone leader eager to bring the Congo to a new "democratic political dispensation" considering his failed mediation efforts in Congo Brazzaville. At present it appears that some in the Kabila government continue to argue for a francophone co-facilitator and for a preparatory session in Libreville, Gabon.

In Masire's view, the appointment of a co-facilitator would require an amendment to the Lusaka Agreement signed by all the original signatories. No one, in his opinion, has adequately defined what purpose this individual would serve. To try to put an end to the problem, Masire has consented to appointing a francophone assistant to run his Kinshasa office. Whether this will overcome future efforts to stonewall the talks, however, is doubtful.

A successful dialogue is ultimately critical for bringing peace and a 'new political dispensation' to the Congo. It must at all costs avoid the mistakes of similar efforts such as the Burundi Peace Negotiations. Masire is correct to limit participation of the unarmed opposition and civil society to a 'representative sample'. To do otherwise would unacceptably delay and then prolong the talks. The key players are the government, the two armed rebel movements, and the major political parties (UDPS, MPR, PDSC, FONUS, PALU). The facilitator must press for rapid talks between these forces on power sharing in a transitional government charged with leading the nation towards a new democratic future.

With the humanitarian catastrophe worsening every day, and the limited resources available, there is no time for 'all inclusive' deliberations. The Congolese dialogue must be short, efficient and managed with an iron fist (though in a velvet glove). It is not the first Congolese national consultation. It can capitalise on the results of the National Sovereign Conference and even the February 2000 National Consultation organised by Laurent Kabila. The dialogue has to fulfil two aims. First, it must liberalise political activity and work out a power-sharing agreement between the main opposition political parties and the belligerents, supported by their foreign backers, to establish a government of transition. Second, the same parties must draft a new constitution together with civil society representatives.

The powers of this government of transition should be limited to the strict minimum in order to provide urgent relief to the suffering of the population, restart the economy, and expedite daily administrative affairs. It should organise within one year national elections under UN supervision and a national referendum on the new Constitution establishing "a new political dispensation for the Congo". By the time of the elections, all foreign troops should have pulled out of the Congo and all militias should have been disarmed. The Congo has no time left for bickering and politicking. Its politicians, neighbours and other international friends have to demonstrate their commitment to peace by supporting unreservedly such an agenda to foster a rebirth of the central African nation.

⁷⁰ ICG Interview, Rwanda's security officials and RCD officials, Kigali-Goma, 1-13 February 2001. See also *Le Potentiel*, 20 February 2001.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Joseph Kabila appears determined to follow a different road from his father. Many in his father's former inner circle, however, resent the new president's apparent willingness to reform the security services and enter an Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Whether he has the political acumen to overcome the conflicts that surround him is doubtful. Until greater stability is achieved, no real dialogue or political relaxation is likely. It will be important for the international community to emphasise that it agrees with Belgium's recommendations that immediate support for Joseph Kabila depends on liberalisation of political activities, the freeing of political prisoners, and the free movement of persons for the genuine preparation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Ketumile Masire's team must be able to meet civil society and political party representatives freely in Kinshasa.

As a result, the window of opportunity for peace created by the murder of Laurent Kabila is closing. Most worrying is the potential for clashes between Zimbabwe and Angola in Kinshasa itself, where the armies of the two allies are no longer seen as a benevolent presence. In the east, Rwanda and Uganda are for the moment intent on achieving a cease-fire. Their complete withdrawal from the Congo, however, is a different matter. All the belligerents have invested prestige and resources in what has proved to be a disastrous war. None will leave until their individual interests are catered to. This can only occur within the much-anticipated Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

The format of those talks is equally important for peace efforts in the Congo. The task is to help bring about a return of responsible politics to the country and to give credibility to a transitional regime. This can be best accomplished with a 90-day dialogue, as envisaged in the Lusaka Cease-fire, between a limited number of participants. The dialogue should then lead quickly to the establishment of a genuine government of transition built upon a power-sharing agreement with the armed and unarmed opposition. Similarly, the transitional government should be limited to one year and should only be mandated to organise elections, restart the economy, and relieve humanitarian suffering.

The Congolese people's interest in an Inter-Congolese Dialogue is clear. The same cannot be said for many of the country's leaders or for the other belligerents. To protect the sanctity of the dialogue and safeguard it from the predictable efforts to obstruct its progress must be the mission of all those who desire peace in the region. The presence of foreign armies, whether 'invited' or 'uninvited', must end prior to national elections.

There is likely to be little progress toward withdrawal of foreign forces until serious work is begun on disengagement and disarmament. Resolution 1341 and the new MONUC concept of operations are critical for the former. Peace in the Congo however, will not come about until the rapacious forces present in the east of the country are disarmed. Divided and distrustful of one another, the regional powers cannot accomplish this alone. The international community must accept its responsibilities to take the lead on this critical issue.

APPENDIX A: Abbreviations, Names and Places

Abubakar, Abdulsalami (General)	Former ruler of Nigeria who served as a UN Special Envoy to meet with Kabila in August 2000.
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire: Kabila's rebel group in 1996-1997.
ALiR	Armée de Libération du Rwanda. A Hutu rebel group composed of ex-FAR, Interahamwe and new recruits.
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	Ugandan insurgent movement whose operations out of the Eastern DRC served as a justification for Uganda's intervention in the war.
Amouri (Colonel)	MLC Chief of Staff.
Atenyi, Tibasiima	Renegade Second Vice President of the RCD-ML
Augustin Bizimungu, General	Ex-FAR Commander. See Appendix E.
Bangboka Airport	The larger of two Kisangani airfields fought over by the RPA and UPDF. One of the three longest runways in the country.
Banyamulenge	Ethnic Tutsis who have lived in South Kivu since the 1900's. Their rights to Congolese citizenship are questioned by many, and their communities are under assault from rival ethnic groups.
Banyarwanda	A collective name for the inhabitants of DRC who are of Rwandan ancestry.
Bemba, Jean-Pierre	Leader of the Equateur-based MLC.
Besigye, Kiiza (Colonel)	An early member of the Ugandan NRM who has challenged President Museveni in the upcoming Ugandan elections.
Bo-Boliko, André	A leader of the PDSC.
Bugera, Déogratias	North Kivu Tutsi, and founding member of the RCD.
Bululu, Lunda	Former Prime Minister of Zaire, and founding member of the RCD.

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Buyoya, Pierre (Major)	President of Burundi since his July 1996 <i>coup d'Etat</i> .
Chiluba, Frederick	The President of Zambia, and broker of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement.
Chissano, Joachim Comiex	The President of Mozambique. DRC company, chaired by Pierre Victor Mpoyo, involved in mineral exploitation with Zimbabwe's OSLEG.
CPP	Committees of Popular Power. Local bodies elected under the direction of the Kinshasa Government.
Dos Santos, Jose Eduardo Dunia, Lwengamia	President of Angola. Mai Mai leader in the Fizi region of South Kivu. Appointed a FAC Commander in September 1999.
Ex-FAR	Former Rwandan Armed Forces which took part in the 1994 genocide.
FAC	Forces Armées Congolaises or Congolese Armed Forces. The military force of the Kinshasa Government.
FAZ	<i>Forces Armées Zairoises</i> . The Mobutu regime's military.
FDD	A Burundian Hutu rebel group led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye. Many fight alongside the FAC.
<i>Forces d'Autodéfense Populaire (FAP)</i>	The official name of Dunia's Mai Mai militia.
<i>Forces Innovatrices de l'Union et de Solidarité (FONUS)</i>	DRC opposition party led by Joseph Olenghankoy.
Former Uganda National Army (FUNA)	A largely defunct Uganda rebel group.
Gécamines	The DRC's state mining corporation.
Habyarimana, Juvénal	Late Hutu President of Rwanda, whose assassination marked the start of the 1994 genocide.
Hedi Annabi	Assistant UN Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.
Hema	Eastern DRC-based ethnic group with powerful land and business interests.
Holbrooke, Richard	US Ambassador to the United Nations.
Ilunga, Emile (Doctor)	Former President of RCD-

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Interahamwe	Goma. Extremist Hutu militia group that committed the bulk of Rwanda's 1994 genocide. Now known as AliR.
Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye	Leader of the Burundian rebel Hutu FDD movement. At present is an ally to Kabila Government.
Jogo Baptista De Matos, General	Chief of Staff of the Angolan armed forces.
Joint Military Commission (JMC)	A body composed of two officers picked from each of Lusaka's signatory armies, appointed to plan and implement the Cease-fire and forces' disengagement with the help of UN and OAU.
Kabarebe, James (Colonel)	RPA Deputy Chief of Staff. Commander of August 1998 attack on Kitona and Kinshasa
Kabila, Joseph	DRC President Laurent-Désiré Kabila's son and a top commander in the FAC. (See Appendix D).
Kabila, Laurent-Désiré	President of the DRC.
Kakudji, Gaetan	Kabila's cousin and DRC Minister of the Interior.
Kamitatu Massamba, Cleophas	A leader of the PDSC who is currently imprisoned in Kinshasa. Also the father of leading MLC member - Olivier Kamitatu.
Kamitatu, Olivier	Jean-Pierre Bemba's lieutenant in the MLC.
Kapend, Eddy	<i>Aide-de-Camp</i> to DRC President Kabila.
Karaha, Bizima	Chief of RCD-Goma Security. An ethnic munyamulenge.
Kataliko, Emmanuel	The late Catholic Archbishop of Bukavu. Accused of encouraging resistance to the Rwandan presence, he was barred from the city in early 2000.
Kazembe, Timothy (Brigadier)	Zambian officer named as second Chairman of the JMC.
Kazini, James (Brigadier)	UPDF Chief of Staff.
Kibassa Maliba, Frederic	Former DRC Minister of Mines. Leader of the state authorised wing of the UDPS.
Kibonge, Mulomba (Colonel)	MLC Defence Secretary.
Kifwa, Celestin	DRC National Police Chief (See Appendix D).
Kony, Joseph	Leader of the rebel Ugandan

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Lendu	Lords Resistance Army (LRA). Eastern Congo ethnic group that has been embroiled in bloodletting against the Hema.
Lumumba, Francois	Leader of MNC/L party. Currently resides in Belgium.
Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement	Signed by the DRC war combatants – five foreign states, Congo's government and rebels - in July and August 1999.
Mahachi, Moven	Zimbabwe Defence Minister.
Mai Mai	Traditional militias found in the Eastern DRC.
Makoni, Simba	Finance Minister of Zimbabwe.
Mamba, Mashako (Doctor)	DRC Health Minister.
Mandela, Nelson	Former President of South Africa and current Burundi Peace Negotiations' Facilitator.
Masire, Sir Ketumile	Former President of Botswana and OAU appointed Inter-Congolese Dialogue Neutral Facilitator.
Mazimpaka, Patrick	Rwandan Presidential Envoy to the Great Lakes.
Mbemba, Theophile	Governor of Kinshasa. Once a key intellectual and strategist in the UDPS.
Mbia, Albert	MLC Secretary of the Economy.
Mbombo, Catherine Nzuzi Wa	Current leader of Mobutu's MPR party.
<i>Mchaka Mchaka</i>	The name of the ideological program employed by the Ugandan National Resistance Movement (NRM) in its revolution, and then subsequently recommended to the Congolese.
Miranda, Joao Bernardo	Angolan Foreign Minister.
Mocumbi, Pascoal	Prime Minister of Mozambique.
Mongole Combatants	A Hutu militia formed in the early 1990s to defend the interests of the North Kivu Banyarwanda.
Monsengwo Pasinya, Laurent (Cardinal)	He presided over the Sovereign National Conference, would probably be called upon to contribute to a Dialogue.
MONUC	United Nations Organisation. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo created in August 1999 and authorised to deploy 5,537 observers and

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<i>Mouvement Nationaliste du Congo/Lumumbiste</i> (MNC/L)	armed troops by the Security Council. DRC opposition party that originated with Patrice Lumumba's MNC party.
<i>Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution</i> (MPR)	Mobutu's governing party. Its current leader is Catherine Nzuji Wa Mbombo.
<i>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</i> (MLC)	Jean-Pierre Bemba's Equateur-based guerrilla group.
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)	Zimbabwe's main opposition party.
MPLA	Angolan ruling party.
Mpoyo, Pierre Victor	DRC Petroleum Minister.
Muamba, Francois	MLC Finance Secretary.
Mugabe, Robert	President of Zimbabwe.
Mulumba, Kin Kiey	RCD-Goma Official Spokesman. Was Mobutu's last Minister of Information, and is President of the Brussels based <i>Le Soft</i> Newspaper.
Museveni, Yoweri	President of Uganda.
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda. A clandestine and largely defeated guerrilla force.
National Resistance Movement (NRM)	Yoweri Museveni's political-military group created in the bush war in the early 1980s that became the government army after he took power.
Nawej, Yav (Brigadier General)	Commander of the FAC Kinshasa Brigade.
Ndombasi, Yerodia Abdoulaye	Former DRC Foreign Affairs Minister. Current Minister for Education.
Ngoma, Arthur Zahidi	Long-time opposition politician, and leader of the <i>Force du Futur</i> party. Was a founding member of the RCD, but subsequently quit the movement.
Ntaganda, Bosco	A Hema militia leader who is alleged to have received support from UPDF officers.
Nyamwisi, Mbusa	Former First Vice President of the RCD-ML and, from November 2000, self-declared President.
Nyarugabo, Moise	Former RCD-Goma Second Vice President, and still on of the Movement's senior leaders.
Odongo, Jeje (Major General)	UPDF Chief of Staff.
Olenghankoy, Joseph	Leader of FONUS party.

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Onusumba, Adolphe	President of RCD-Goma since October 2000. Previous to he served as the movement's Foreign Minister.
Oryx Diamonds	Zimbabwean-Omani-DRC mining consortium that failed to gain a London Stock Exchange listing in mid-2000.
Osleg (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy)	Zimbabwean Army company engaged in buying diamonds in the DRC.
Padiri Karendo Bulenda	Bunyakiri-based Mai Mai leader. Appointed a FAC Commander in September 1999.
<i>Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien</i> (PDSC)	DRC opposition party that enjoys considerable support among intellectuals but has less nationwide appeal than the UDPS. Like Tshisekedi, its leaders and had served in governments under Mobutu.
<i>Parti Lumumbiste Unifié</i> (PALU)	Party formed in 1964 by Antoine Gizenga, minister in Lumumba's government.
Ramm, Colette	Official spokeswoman for Wamba's faction of RCD-ML.
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie or the Congolese Rally for Democracy.
RCD Kisangani or ML faction	Faction of RCD that followed Wamba dia Wamba when he split from the Goma based RCD in March 1999.
Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)	The army of Rwanda. Originally created as a guerrilla movement to fight the former Hutu government between 1990-94.
Saleh, Salim (Major General)	President Yoweri Museveni's brother and former Minister of State for Defence.
Saolona, Bemba	The father of Jean-Pierre Bemba, and former Minister under both Mobutu and Kabila.
Savimbi, Jonas	Leader of the Angolan rebel movement UNITA.
She Okitundu, Léonard	DRC Human Rights Minister.
Sikatende, Shabani	A Mai Mai leader. Appointed a FAC Commander in September 1999.
Silwamba, Eric	Zambian Presidential Affairs Minister.
SONANGOL	Angolan state oil company. Involved in DRC oil exploration

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Sovereign National Conference of 1991	and distribution. DRC's 18-month constitutional talks conducted under the aegis of then President Mobutu Sese Seko, who later sabotaged the process.
Tambwe, Alexis	A founding member of the RCD.
Mbeki, Thabo	President of the Republic of South Africa.
<i>Tous pour la Paix et le Développement</i> (TPD).	North Kivu NGO involved in the repatriation of Hutu and Tutsi refugees.
Tshisekedi, Etienne	Leader of the UDPS. DRC's best-known opposition politician.
Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF)	The army of Uganda.
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Angolan rebel movement led by Jonas Savimbi.
Wamala, Katumba (Brigadier)	Overall Commander of the UPDF operations in Congo after July 2000.
Wamba dia Wamba, Ernest	Embattled leader of Bunia based RCD-ML that broke away from the main RCD faction in March 1999.
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)	A largely defunct Ugandan rebel group.
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwean ruling party.
Zimbabwean Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA)	Zimbabwean state power company supplied by the DRC's Inga Hydro-electrical Dam.

- **Appendix B: Chronology of the War in the DRC**

2 August 1998	Second rebellion in the DRC breaks out.
6 August-1 September 1998	Rebels and Rwandans seize Kitona, and move on Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Angola intervene to save Kabila from being overthrown, and beat back the rebels and their allies from the capital city. In Kinshasa anti-Tutsi massacres break out.
23 August 1998	Rebels and Rwandans seize Kisangani.
October 1998	Growing international pressure on Rwanda to "admit its role" in DRC.
27 October 1998	Zambian President Frederick Chiluba mandated to press on with peace initiative to end the war after consultations between regional foreign and defense ministers.
November 1998	New rebel group, the <i>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</i> (MLC), reported in Equateur province. Its leader is Jean-Pierre Bemba, son of leading businessman Bemba Saolona who was close to ex-president Mobutu.
6 November 1998	Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame admits Rwandan troops helping DRC rebels, citing security concerns. Reports say he acceded to a request by South African President Nelson Mandela to admit involvement in a bid to advance peace talks.
1 January 1999	RCD claims they killed 400 Hutu rebel militiamen in three days of fighting at Makobola near Uvira. Missionary news service report that hundreds of civilians shot and hacked to death.
18 January 1999	Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola agree on cease-fire at Windhoek meeting. RCD not invited, but promises to examine text.
22 January 1999	RCD restructures movement. General assembly enlarged from 28 to 147 members, including 22 military personnel. Executive committee comprises 23 departments, up from eight. Ten-man political council created to head the movement. General assembly urges better cohesion between political and military wings.
30 January 1999	Cracks appear in RCD. Non-Tutsi Congolese members query why Banyamulenge "hold so many posts" in new set-up. Belgian daily <i>Le Soir</i> describes the new "political mixture" in the RCD as "explosive". RCD leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba reportedly at odds with his deputy chairman of the RCD, describing its Members as "petty puppets".
25 February 1999	UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in DRC, Roberto Garreton, urges international community to take action against Tutsis detained in Kinshasa, expressing concern for their safety.
5 March 1999	Missionaries claim 100 people killed in RCD reprisal attack at Kamituga in South Kivu. RCD denies the allegations.
9 March 1999	Rebels confirm strategic town of Kindu is under their control.
22 March 1999	Southern African Development Community (SADC) reaffirms support for Kabila, at meeting in Botswana, but expresses concern over continuing destabilization of the region.
3 April 1999	Kagame vows to keep his troops in DRC as long as Rwanda's national security is threatened.
5 April 1999	Tension increases within RCD, as Wamba moves his base from Goma to Kisangani. Disagreement between RCD and MLC in Kisangani also intensifies.

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- 18 April 1999 Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, and Kabila sign cease-fire accord in Sirte, Libya, through the mediation of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Both the RCD and Rwanda refuse to be bound by the agreement.
- 20 April 1999 Kabila announces dissolution of ADFL, which swept him to power in 1997, accusing some members of "opportunism" and "self-enrichment".
- 4 May 1999 Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, spearheading peace efforts for the DRC, "agrees to work" with Gaddafi to implement Sirte accord. Rwanda says it only recognizes the Chiluba peace initiative. Presidents of Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania meet in Dodoma to discuss growing rift between Ugandan and Rwandan military campaigns in DRC.
- 7 May 1999 Outbreak of a hemorrhagic fever in rebel-held Watsa, possibly due to Marburg virus. WHO confirms Ebola virus not present. First ever flight between Kinshasa and rebel-held territory since the conflict began, lands in Goma bringing medical experts.
- 11 May 1999 Over 40 killed and 50 wounded in bombing of Goma by Government and its allies. The aircraft then went on to bomb Uvira, killing two.
- 15 May 1999 Details of Sirte accord released, in which Kabila reportedly agrees to "direct talks" with the rebels. He previously resisted all attempts to meet the RCD.
- 16 May 1999 Disaffection within the RCD reaches its peak as Wamba ousted, and Emile Ilunga announced as the new leader. Wamba refuses to step down, saying he is the victim of a "coup" within the rebel movement.
- 17 May 1999 Kabila celebrates two years in power with a lackluster ceremony and "forced parade".
- 23 May 1999 Rival RCD factions clash in Kisangani. Rwanda and Uganda deny reports of a split.
- 26 May 1999 Chad, which supported Kabila, withdraws troops from Equateur province "in line with the Sirte agreement".
- 29 May 1999 Rwanda declares unilateral cease-fire in DRC.
- 2 June 1999 Uvira and Bukavu airport bombed by Government forces.
- 3 June 1999 RCD issues statement explaining that Wamba's leadership style had resulted in a "series of crises" within the movement. It announces new structures, including a Congress, Council and an Executive with the latter two headed by the same person, DR. Emile Ilunga. The now-defunct General Assembly decamps to Kisangani in a show of support for Wamba.
- 7 June 1999 Journalists confirm that Kabila's hometown of Manono, in Katanga province, is under rebel control.
- 8 June 1999 Rebel factions meet in Uganda, along with Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, to try and iron out differences and form a united front against Kabila.
- 10 July 1999 Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and the Minister of Defence of Angola sign an Agreement for a cessation of hostilities between all belligerent forces in the DRC. Representatives of the RCD and MLC refuse to sign.
- 15 July 1999 RPA forces cross the Sankuru River, capture the East Kasai town of Lusambo, and advance to within 50 km of Mbuji Mayi. The UN Secretary General issues report on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment to the DRC.
- 1 August 1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba signs the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement.

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7 August 1999	Fighting between the RPA and UPDF first breaks out in the Northeastern city of Kisangani over an attempt by then Ugandan-supported RCD dissident, Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, to hold a political rally.
14 August 1999	Renewed violence breaks out in Kisangani, followed by three days of clashes in which the two armies battled for the airport, the central bank and the major road junctions.
17 August 1999	Rwanda and Uganda agreed on a temporary cease-fire. The fighting had caused approximately 600 casualties.
31 August 1999	50 Representatives of the RCD sign the Lusaka Cease-fire agreement.
September 1999	Intensification of militia activities in South Kivu.
1 October 1999	RCD Kisangani moves its headquarters to Bunia.
October 1999	DRC Government launches offensive against the MLC in the vicinity of Mbandaka that lasts till mid December.
11-12 October 1999	First meeting of the JMC occurs in Kampala.
15 October 1999	First meeting of the Political Committee in Lusaka. Expresses concern about the "slow pace at which the United Nations was handling the request for the deployment of peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo" and calls on it to address the situation "with the urgency and seriousness it deserves."
23 - 24 October 1999	The third and final round of polio immunizations carried out in the DRC.
1 November 1999	Secretary General issues a second report on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in the DRC.
November 1999	At mid month 15 Congolese women accused of aiding the Mai-Mai are allegedly buried alive at Mwenga in South Kivu.
November 1999	FAC and ZNDF forces attempt to advance from Basankusu to relieve the siege of Ikela. The attempt fails.
3-10 November 1999	Special Envoy of the Secretary General for the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Moustapha Niasse, visits Kinshasa to discuss the difficulties experienced by MONUC in positioning liaison officers at rear military headquarters, as well as the freedom of movement for the operations of the technical survey team.
30 November 1999	Security Council decides that the personnel authorized under Resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999) should constitute MONUC until 1 March 2000.
9 December 1999	ADF guerrillas attack Fort Portal Prison in Southwest Uganda.
10 December 1999	Government of the DRC declares a moratorium on Capital Punishment on the occasion of the 51 st Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the Military Court of Justice continues to sentence prisoners to death and conduct executions.
11 December 1999	Kamel Morjane of Tunisia assumes his duties as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Kinshasa. On the same day he meets with US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, who was on a tour of the sub-region.
14 December 1999	A rebel massacre of 23 women and children alleged to have occurred near the town of Kalima, North East of Kindu. Victims were accused of complicity with the Mai Mai.
15 December 1999	OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim, announces the appointment of former Botswana President, Sir Ketumile Masire, as 'Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations'.

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16 December 1999	UN Security Council briefed by Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Bernard Miyet. Informed that the detailed Concept of Operations plan for MONUC is impossible to carry out until the mission's observers are guaranteed full security and freedom of movement. US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, says the US supports the operation, but wants to "get it right."
17 December 1999	Government of the DRC frees 156 political prisoners. The majority are activists of PALU or the UDPS.
22 December 1999	UN Secretary General writes to Chairman and Secretary general of the OAU to urge the establishment of the JMC as a standing body.
29 December 1999	Government of the DRC accuses rebels of burying 15 women alive in Kivu province under the suspicion that had ties with the Mai Mai.
January 2000	With his authority as Temporary Chairman to the Security Council, US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke declares that the month will be dedicated to Africa. A coordinated attack by Interahamwe, Mai-Mai and some FAC commanders succeeded in temporarily seizing Shabunda.
24 January 2000	Security Council Meeting on the Congo Peace Process. Kofi Annan declares, "The entire sub region has been engulfed in a crisis of such complexity that it continues to defy our best efforts to resolve it... The Lusaka Agreement remains the most viable blueprint for resolving grievances and achieving a comprehensive negotiated solution."
25 January 2000	UN Mini-summit in New York on the Congo Peace process.
27 January 2000	Masire presents his preliminary requirements for achieving his mission as Neutral Facilitator to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue at a donors meeting in New York. President Kabila declares his willingness to participate in the dialogue, and meet with Masire.
28 January 2000	An investigation into the Mwenga massacre conducted by the DRC branch of UNHCR. Investigation lasts till 15 February, and ascertains that the event did in fact take place.
31 January 2000	Unrest breaks out in Goma and Bukavu, in which the local population conducts strikes aimed at the RCD authorities until 6 February. These events prompt the RCD-Goma to refuse Archbishop Kataliko permission to return to his parish in Bukavu.
February 2000	Fighting between the MLC and FAC continues around Mbandaka. At Ikela, Zimbabwean, Namibian, and Congolese troops relieved the siege of the city. Also clashes reported in the East between the Rwandans and rebel forces.
15 February 2000	Holbrooke testifies to the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa: "The time has come for the parties to realize the full potential of the Lusaka Agreement. And the time has come for the US to lend its support."
16 February 2000	US Secretary of Defence meets with current South African President Thabo Mbeki in Pretoria, and promises to provide logistics support to a Congo peacekeeping operation once there is a "genuine agreement."
11-17 February 2000	Masire visits Kinshasa, where he meets with Kabila, representatives of civil society, the opposition, and the Secretary General's Special Representative.
17 February 2000	US President Bill Clinton addresses the opening of US National Summit on Africa. About the Lusaka agreement, he says "it is more than a cease-fire; it is a blueprint for building peace. Best of all, it is a genuinely African solution to an African problem.... I have told our congress that America intends to do its part by supporting the next phase of the UN's peacekeeping operation in the Congo, which will

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	send observers to oversee the implementation of the agreement.”
19 February 2000	Presidential Decree by Kabila on amnesty for political prisoners.
23 February 2000	Signatories of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement meet in Lusaka. The group reaffirms its support for the agreement, welcomes the imminent adoption of resolution 1291 (2000) by the Security Council, and establishes a new implementation calendar for the Lusaka process starting 1 March 2000.
24 February 2000	Security Council passes Resolution 1291 authorizing the expansion of MONUC to 5537 military personnel and appropriate civilian staff. Resolution also authorized a phased deployment of MONUC by the Secretary General in accordance with specified prerequisite conditions of security assurances.
March 2000	Banyamulenge inhabitants of the Haut-Plateau area, in the vicinity of Fizi-Uvira, come under effective siege by the interahamwe and Mai Mai forces.
12 March 2000	A 13 member ad-hoc commission (<i>Commission ad hoc chargé de veiller à la stricte application du décret</i>) headed by the Minister of Justice established to ensure the strict application of the DRC Presidential decree on amnesty.
12 March 2000	Rwandans and RCD-Goma seize Idumbe as part of an offensive launched Southwards and Westwards in Kasai province. Offensive included attacks towards Longa, Lodi, and Bena Leka astride the Ilebo-Kananga railroad. The Rwandans and RCD Goma also continue efforts to cut off Kabinda and Mbuji-Mayi.
17 March 2000	Kamel Morjane met with J-P Bemba in Gbadolite, and with President Ange-Félix Patassé of the Central African Republic.
20-22 march 2000	Masire visits Kinshasa, where he is prevented from traveling in the interior of the country. He subsequently cuts short his visit.
29 March 2000	Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation in the DRC, Roberto Garreton, submits his sixth report to the Commission on Human Rights.
4 April 2000	JMC meets in Kampala to discuss a draft plan for the disengagement of forces from the confrontation line.
7 April 2000	Security Council passes Resolution 54/260 grants commitment authority for USD 200 million for MONUC in order to permit its logistical preparations for phase II. Secretary General's third report on MONUC predicts that some US\$58.7 million will be spent by 30 June 2000.
8 April 2000	Kampala disengagement plan signed by the Political Committee.
10 April 2000	Kabila held a special cabinet meeting and issued statement reaffirming the government's support for the inter-Congolese dialogue.
14 April 2000	A series of explosions devastate Ndjili Airport in Kinshasa.
18 April 2000	Issue of second report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
21 April 2000	As per the Kampala agreement the parties required to provide MONUC and the JMC with detailed military information, area by area, for the planning on disengagement.
21 April 2000	Masire briefs the Security Council on the approach he intends to follow in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
30 April 2000	OAU summit on the DRC convened in Algiers.
5 May 2000	Heavy fighting breaks out between the RPA and UPDF in Kisangani.
4 - 8 May 2000	Security Council mission, led by Holbrooke, visits Kinshasa, Lusaka, Harare, Kigali, and Kampala.

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9 May 2000	The second outbreak of fighting between the RPA and UPDF in Kisangani resumes.
12 May 2000	MONUC reinforcements arrive in Kisangani from Kinshasa.
14 May 2000	Presidents Museveni and Kagame meet in Mwanza, Tanzania. The two reaffirm their willingness to demilitarise Kisangani.
11-21 May	Masire travels to Kinshasa where he meets with Kabila. Then he continues to meet RCD leaders in Goma, RCD-ML leaders in Bunia, and MLC leaders at Gbadolite.
22 May 2000	RPA and UPDF Chiefs of Staff sign an agreement and calendar for the demilitarisation of Kisangani.
23 May 2000	Jean-Pierre Bemba assures the Secretary General's Special Representative that his forces will halt their forward movement. Nevertheless, their advance continues.
23- 24 May 2000	Masire returns to Kinshasa, where he meets with the Foreign Minister instead of Kabila.
25 May 2000	DRC Government announces that they had launched a counter-attack to stem the MLC's advance.
28 May 2000	Museveni addresses Parliament on Uganda's role in the DRC.
29 May 2000	Start of Kisangani demilitarisation.
31 May 2000	Bangboka airport in Kisangani re-opened to civilian flights.
3 June 2000	Kabila and Kagame meet at Eldoret, Kenya. End of demilitarisation around Bangboka Airport and La Forestière (Zone 1) camp.
5 June 2000	Heavy fighting between RPA and UPDF breaks out in Kisangani. UPDF crosses Tshopo River, and occupies Northern portion of the city. Incident is the third outbreak of fighting between the two countries. MONUC observer team in Mbandaka requested to convey message from government of the DRC to Bemba threatening to push back the MLC forces if they did not withdraw to the positions they occupied at the time of the Lusaka Agreement. DRC government officials prevent representatives from civil society and the unarmed opposition from leaving Kinshasa for Inter-Congolese Dialogue meeting Cotonou.
7 June 2000	RPA asks MONUC to leave Kisangani because they are not able to assure their security. MONUC Commander declines.
8 June 2000	A cease-fire is signed by the Ambassadors of Rwanda and Uganda to the UN, scheduled to go into force at 1600 Kisangani time. Cease-fire is not observed. Holbrooke and Annan contact President's Kagame and Museveni to urge them to order an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of their respective forces from Kisangani. The Political Committee meets in Lusaka to discuss preparations for the meeting with the Security Council in New York on 15 and 16 June.
11 June 2000	Kisangani fighting comes to an end in early morning. MONUC deploys to Tshopo Bridge between the two armies.
12 June 2000	Third Report of the Secretary General on MONUC.
12 June 2000	Ugandan forces reported to have withdrawn northwards from Kisangani.
9-14 June 2000	A series of violent demonstrations, involving several hundred people, takes place outside of MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa. Protests are intended to criticize the UN's supposed inaction during the

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	fighting in Kisangani. Demonstrations occurred on the 9 th , 10 th , and 14 th .
15 June 2000	Open meeting on the situation in the Congo. Holbrooke states "the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement is one of the few things standing between order in the DRC and its degeneration to war-lord dominated, resource driven satrapies."
16 June 2000	UN Security Council passes Resolution 1304 Condemning Rwanda and Uganda for their actions in Kisangani.
16 June 2000	The UN Security Council approves Resolution 1304 calling upon Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw from the DRC.
30 June 2000	DRC celebrates its fortieth anniversary since independence. Promises to inaugurate Constituent Assembly on 1 July.
4 July 2000	OAU mini-summit in Algiers.
19 July 2000	Uganda appoints Brigadier Edward Katumba Walumba as overall Commander of Operation Safe Haven – the UPDF operation in the DRC. He replaces UPDF Chief of Staff, Brigadier James Kazini.
24 July 2000	RCD Government of Kisangani replaced because of popular dissatisfaction in the city.
27 July 2000	Fighting reportedly intensifies at Ikela.
1 August 2000	Interahamwe attack on Ruhengeri Commune in Rwanda.
7 August 2000	SADC summit meeting in Windhoek Namibia. DRC president Kabila does not attend because he is 'busy'.
9 August 2000	MLC forces decisively repulse FAC advance northwards along the Ubangui River near Libenge. The 'high-tide mark' of Kabila's Equateur Offensive.
9 August 2000	The Rwandan Government announces that it is willing to withdraw 200 km from the current DRC frontlines, rather than the 15 km called for in the Kampala Disengagement Plan of 8 April 2000.
10 August 2000	RCD-Goma rebel movement announces that it is willing to withdraw 200 km alongside its Rwandan supporters.
14-15 August 2000	All night summit in Lusaka between the warring parties, minus the rebels, breaks down in acrimony as Kabila maintains his rejection of Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire.
16 August 2000	UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, recommends a one-month extension of the MONUC mandate.
21 August 2000	Kabila swears in constituent and legislative assembly in Lumumbashi. He says the body is not a 'sham'.
22 August 2000	Former Nigerian President, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, arrives in Kinshasa as the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for the DRC, and meets with Kabila.
23 August 2000	DRC Government officially 'suspends' the Lusaka Agreement, and then authorizes the deployment of MONUC observers to monitor the cease-fire. The Security Council extends the MONUC mandate until October 15.
28 August 2000	A grenade attack at a social gathering in Bukavu leaves seven dead and 43 injured. The authorities blame forces loyal to the Kabila government of using terrorist tactics. Bukavu civil society blames Rwanda and the RCD of the same thing.
11 October 2000	Museveni hosts reconciliation conference between rival RCD-ML leaders Wamba and Nyamwisi in State House.
28 October 2000	RCD-Goma President Dr. Emile Ilunga resigns from the Movement's top post. Is reported to have recognized the 'mistakes of his leadership'. His two Vice Presidents, Jean-Pierre Ondekane and

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- Moise Nyarugabo, also resign. The new President, Adolph Onusumba, reshuffles the rebel cabinet.
- 5 November 2000 Forces loyal to renegade RCD-ML First Vice President Nyamwisi launch a coup attempt against movement president Wamba dia Wamba. The attempt fails.
- 8 November 2000 Talks in Tripoli, Libya, conclude with decision to send an African peacekeeping force to the DRC. The summit was attended by the Heads of State of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Mali, as well as representatives from Angola, the DRC, Namibia and South Africa.
- 14 November 2000 South African President Thabo Mbeki cancels his trip to Maputo Mozambique, where he had been scheduled to lead a second round of discussions on the DRC conflict.
- 15 November 2000 DRC Government defers the introduction of new rules requiring import taxes and a number of other government fees to be paid in foreign currency. The measure had threatened to paralyse the Congolese economy, cause a shortage of basic goods, and contribute to inflation.
- 16 November 2000 Tension in Bunia is reported to be 'very high'. Nyamwisi orders Wamba to leave the town within the week. Wamba says that it is out of the question for him to leave the people of Bunia to this fate.
- 16 November 2000 Fighting reported in the vicinity of Pepa. RPA and RCD reported to be advancing on the town.
- 27 November 2000 South African President Thabo Mbeki convenes a second summit in Maputo Mozambique, to review progress on the implementation of the Kampala Disengagement Plan. Summit breaks down in arguments between the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC.
- 29 November 2000 DRC President Kabila says UN demands for freedom of movement in the DRC for MONUC amount to a denial of national sovereignty.
- 29 November 2000 Political Committee overseeing the Lusaka Peace Process meets in Lusaka and calls on the UN to increase its military presence in the DRC, to take advantage of the renewed commitment by the parties to pull back their forces.
- 30 November 2000 Acting UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Carolyn McAskie, briefs the Security Council on the situation in the DRC, which she describes as "one of the world's worst humanitarian crises."
- 4 December 2000 An Antonov Transport Aircraft owned by the Great Lakes Company is hijacked while enroute from Goma to Kindu. Hijackers demand that the plane be flown to Government controlled territory. The attempt fails when an RCD Commander on the plane fatally shoots one of the hijackers in the neck.
- 4 December 2000 RPA and RCD forces seize Pweto. Tens of thousands civilians resident in the region flee towards Zambia. Several thousand Government and allied troops accompany them. DRC Government calls the retreat a 'tactical withdrawal'. Zimbabwe Government explains that their forces had pulled back in order not to violate the Lusaka Cease-fire.
- 8 December 2000 The International Court of Justice refuses to order the suspension of an international arrest warrant issued by Belgium against the former Foreign Minister of the DRC, Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi, for his role in the August 1998 massacres of Tutsis in Kinshasa. The DRC Government had complained that the warrant prevented Yerodia from traveling, and therefore, from doing his job as Foreign Minister. The World Court however, ruled that the recent Cabinet reshuffle that transferred him to the Ministry of Education invalidated the appeal.

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